THE PUTINI TRIBE.
To assist in paying the expenses of the expedition, “Government”
had “eaten up” the small tribe commonly known as the “Putini,” but
properly called the “Amangwe” tribe, “Putini” being, in reality, the
name of their late chief, who died shortly before the disturbances,
leaving the sole custody of their infant son and heir to his young
widow, who accordingly held the position and dignity of chieftainess
in the tribe.
To say that the “eating up” of these people was an utter mistake is
to say no more than can honestly be said concerning Langalibalele’s
tribe, the Ama-Hlubi; but, in the case of the Putini people, the
mistake was a more flagrant one, and, when all was said and done,
there was no possibility of making out a charge against them at all.
Finally the fact stared the Government (both at home and in Natal) in
the face that a tribe had been attacked, members of it killed, the
people taken prisoners and stripped of all their possessions, without
even the shadow of a reason for such treatment being forthcoming.
Major (by this time Lieutenant-Colonel) Durnford specially took up
the cause of this injured and innocent people. It was plain enough
that the Government at home would never ratify the action taken
against the Amangwe tribe by the Government in Natal; and that sooner
or later the latter would be forced, in this instance, to undo their
work as far as possible—to restore the people to their location, and
to disgorge at least part of their plunder:—and it was evident to
Colonel Durnford that the sooner this was done the better for all
parties. The Natal Government would put itself in a more dignified
position by voluntarily and speedily making full amends for the wrong
done, and doing of its own accord what eventually it would be obliged
to do at the command of the home Government. It was also of special
importance to the people themselves that they should be allowed to
return to their homes in time to plant their crops for the following
year.
About May, 1874, it had been decided by the Government that
Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, in his capacity of Colonial Engineer,
should take a working-party to the Draakensberg Mountains, and blow
up, or otherwise destroy, all the passes by which ingress or egress
could be obtained. The chief object of this demolition was that of
giving confidence to the up-country districts, the inhabitants of
which were in perpetual fear of inroads from the scattered members
of the outlawed tribe. They had indeed certain grounds for such
apprehensions, as one or two attacks had been made upon farmhouses
since the expedition. Even these demonstrations were not evidence of
organised resistance, but mere individual acts of vengeance committed
by single men or small parties, in return for brutalities inflicted
upon the women and children belonging to them. They were, however,
sufficient to keep the country in perpetual alarm, which it was
highly advisable should be checked.
The demolition of the passes being decided upon, Colonel Durnford
applied for the services of the male Putini prisoners, some eighty in
number, and induced the Government to promise the men their liberty,
with that of the rest of the tribe, if, on their return, when the
work should be finished, the Colonel could give them a good character.
He left Pietermaritzburg with his party of pioneers and a company of
the 75th Regiment, under Captain Boyes and Lieutenant Trower, in May,
and spent some months in the complete destruction of the Draakensberg
passes, returning to the capital in September. The movement at first
raised violent though unavailing opposition amongst the colonists,
who persisted in looking upon the Putini men as bloodthirsty rebels,
who might at any moment break loose upon them and ravage the country.
But when the whole party returned from the mountains, without a
single case of misconduct or desertion amongst them—although they
had had hard work and undergone great hardships (shared to the full
by Colonel Durnford, who suffered to the end of his life from the
effects of intense cold upon his wounded arm)—the colonists ceased to
look upon them as desperate ruffians, and soon forgot their fears.
Meanwhile the Colonel found considerable difficulty in obtaining the
actual freedom of the tribe, for which he and his eighty pioneers had
worked so hard and suffered so much. Any less resolute spirit would
have been beaten in the contest, for “Government” was determined not
to give way an inch more than could possibly be helped.
However, the matter was carried through at last, and the whole tribe
returned to their devastated homes—including the eighty pioneers,
to whom the Colonel had paid the full wages of free labourers for
the time during which they had worked—in good time to plant their
crops for the coming year. Eventually they also received some small
compensation for the property of which they had been robbed, though
nothing even approaching to an equivalent for all that had been taken
from them or destroyed by the Government force in 1873.
The same party of mounted Basutos who were with Colonel Durnford at
the Bushman’s River Pass affair, accompanied him throughout this
second more peaceful expedition, and remained his devoted followers
for the rest of his life.
The colony was tranquil again, and gradually the immediate
consequences of the expedition vanished below the surface of everyday
life, except in the minds of those who had suffered by it. But one
important result was obtained. England was once more convinced that
the time for withdrawing her troops from the colony and leaving it
to protect itself had not yet arrived. Some such project had been
entertained during the previous year, and its speedy accomplishment
was frequently foretold; but such a proceeding would have been fatal
to the plans of the empire-making politicians. The impossibility
of withdrawing the troops was clearly established by turning a
mole-hill into a mountain—by proving how critical the condition of
the native mind within the colony was considered to be by those who
should be the best judges—so that it was thought necessary to turn
out the whole available European force, regular and irregular, upon
the slightest sign of disturbance; and most of all by creating such a
panic in the colonial mind as had not existed since the early days of
Natal.
It is doubtful how soon the Secretary of State for the Colonies
himself knew the extent to which the operations of 1873-4 could be
made subservient to his great confederation scheme; or rather, to
speak more correctly, how seriously the latter must be injured by
any attempt to set right the injustice done to the Hlubi tribe. When
the Bishop went to England[34] and pleaded in person the cause of
the injured people, there can be no doubt that Lord Carnarvon was
fully impressed by the facts then made known to him. None of the
despatches sent home could in the least justify the proceedings of
his subordinates in Natal. Lord Carnarvon’s own words, expressing
his disapproval of the action taken against the two tribes, and
requiring that all possible restitution should be made to them, show
plainly enough that at the period of the Bishop’s visit to him, with
all the facts of the case before him, his judgment in the matter
coincided with that of the Bishop himself. The latter returned to
Natal, satisfied that substantial justice would now be done, or at
all events that the suffering already inflicted upon the innocent
Hlubi and Amangwe tribes, by the rash and mistaken action of the
Government, would be alleviated to the utmost extent considered
possible without lowering that Government in the eyes of the people.
Certain steps, indeed, were immediately taken. Orders were sent out
for the release of the Putini people, which order Colonel Durnford
had already induced the Natal Government to anticipate; and a further
order was notified that the tribe should be compensated for the
losses sustained by them during the late expedition. In the case of
Langalibalele and his tribe, although it was not thought advisable
to reinstate them in their old position, every effort was to be
made to mitigate the severity with which they had been treated. A
few extracts from the Earl of Carnarvon’s despatch on the subject
will best show the tone in which he wrote, and that the Bishop might
reasonably feel satisfied that mercy and consideration would be shown
to the oppressed people.
The Earl of Carnarvon, after reviewing the whole proceeding, comments
somewhat severely upon the manner in which the trial had been
conducted. On this point he says: “I feel bound to express my opinion
that there are several points open to grave observation and regret.”
He speaks of the “peculiar and anomalous” constitution of the court,
the equally “peculiar” law by which the prisoner was tried, and of
“the confusion and unsatisfactory result to which such an anomalous
blending of civilised and savage terms and procedure must lead.” He
remarks that it was in his judgment “a grave mistake to treat the
plea of the prisoner as one of guilty;” and he says, “still more
serious, because it involved practical consequences of a very grave
nature to the prisoner, was the absence of counsel on his behalf.”
Entering into the various charges brought against the prisoner, and
the evidence produced to support them, he dismisses the magistrate’s
accusation of “general indications, of which, however, it is
difficult to give special instance, of impatience of control”; and
the Governor and Secretary for Native Affairs comments on the same
as unimportant, with the words, “I am bound to say that the evidence
does not appear to me fully to support these statements.”[35]
Reviewing the circumstances and evidence concerning the unregistered
guns, he says: “I am brought to the conclusion that, though there
was probably negligence—it may be more or less culpable—in complying
with the law, there was no sufficient justification for the charge
in the indictment that Langalibalele did encourage and conspire
with the people under him to procure firearms and retain them,
as he and they well knew contrary to law, for the purpose and
with the intention of, by means of such firearms, resisting the
authority of the Supreme Chief.” Of the extent to which the chief’s
disobedience, in not appearing when summoned by Government, was due
to a “deliberately-planned scheme of resistance in concert with
others, or the mere effect of an unfounded panic,” the Earl remarks:
“Unfortunately this was not made clear.” And, finally, referring to
the charge of insulting the Government messengers, he says: “I am
obliged, with great regret, to conclude that this very important
portion of the evidence given against the prisoner at the trial was
so far untrustworthy as to leave it an open question whether the
indignities of which the witness complained may not have amounted to
no more than being obliged to take off his coat, which might be a
precaution dictated by fear, and nothing else.”
Having thus censured the proceedings of his subordinates on every
point, he says:
“That the Amahlubi tribe should be removed from its location may
have been a political necessity which, after all that had occurred,
was forced upon you, and I fear[36] it is out of the question
to reinstate them in the position, whether of land or property,
which they occupied previously. The relations of the colony with
the natives, both within and without its boundaries, render this
impossible. But every care should be taken to obviate the hardships
and to mitigate the severities which, assuming the offence of the
chief and his tribe to be _even greater than I have estimated it,
have far exceeded the limits of justice_.[37] Not only should the
terms of the amnesty of the 2nd May last be scrupulously observed,
but as far as possible means should be provided by which the members
of the tribe may be enabled to re-establish themselves in settled
occupations.”[38] Lord Carnarvon further says: “With respect to
the Putili tribe, I have in their case also expressed my opinion
that no sufficient cause has been shown for removing them from
their location. I can discover no indication of their conspiracy
or combination with Langalibalele, beyond the vague and wholly
uncorroborated apprehension of some movement on their part in
connection with the supposed tendencies of his tribe; and therefore I
can see no good reason for any punishment on this ground.”
The proclamation to the native population enclosed in this despatch
contained the following sentences:
“Langalibalele we release from imprisonment on the island in the sea,
but he shall not return to Natal. The Amahlubi may, if they choose,
when that is prepared which is to be prepared, go to him, but he will
not be allowed to go to the Amahlubi.”
In all that Lord Carnarvon thought fit to say on this occasion he
does not express the slightest approval of any person concerned,
or action taken, except of the “conduct of Colonel Durnford, whose
forbearance and humanity towards the natives” (he says) “has
attracted my attention.” A despatch of the same date (3rd December,
1874) recalls Sir Benjamin Pine from the government of Natal.
Anything more thoroughly condemnatory could hardly be imagined,
although it may be reasonably questioned how far justice was done to
Sir Benjamin Pine[39] by the whole weight of mismanagement being
placed upon his shoulders, while his coadjutor and adviser, Mr.
Shepstone, on whose opinion he had acted throughout, and whose word,
by his supposed knowledge of native ways and character, was law
throughout the affair, was promoted and rewarded.
After perusing Lord Carnarvon’s remarks and directions, my readers
may imagine that some very good result would be produced on the
fortunes of both tribes, but in this supposition they would be
greatly mistaken. Nor, unless they had been in the habit of perusing
South African despatches with attention, would it occur to them how
easily the proclamation quoted from, drawn up by Mr. Shepstone, could
be evaded. The proclamation itself is almost childish in its foolish
way of informing the people that they had behaved very badly, and
deserved all they had got, but would be relieved of their punishment
by the mercy of the Queen, and must behave very well and gratefully
in future. Such exhortations to people who were perfectly aware that
they had been treated with the utmost injustice were rather likely
to raise secret contempt than respect in the minds of an intelligent
people, who would have far better understood an honest declaration
that “we have punished you, under the impression that you had done
what we find you did not do, and will therefore make it up to you as
much as possible.”
The two important sentences of the proclamation (already quoted at
p. 71), however, were capable of being adapted to an extent of which
Lord Carnarvon probably did not dream. His lordship can hardly have
intended the first sentence by which Langalibalele was released
“from imprisonment on the island in the sea,” simply to mean that
he was to be conveyed to the nearest (most dreary) mainland, and
imprisoned there, within the limits of a small and barren farm, where
every irritating restriction and annoying regulation were still
imposed five years after. The words “he shall not return to Natal,”
certainly do not imply rigid confinement to a small extent of land,
where friends, white or black, are not allowed to visit him, or
send the most innocent presents without tedious delay and official
permission. The second sentence is an admirable specimen of South
African art. The people might go to their chief if they chose, “_when
that is prepared which is to be prepared_”—but which never has been
yet.
We give Lord Carnarvon full credit for not having the slightest
notion that this clause would have no result whatever, as nothing
ever would be “prepared.” Year after year has dragged on—one or two
women[40] and a couple of boys being allowed, as a great favour, to
join the old chief during that time. But every difficulty has always
been raised about it, and not the slightest attempt has been made to
enable or permit the tribe or any part of it to follow.
When the chief and his son were first removed from Robben Island to
Uitvlugt, a desolate and unfruitful piece of ground on the adjoining
mainland, at a considerable distance from the nearest dwelling-place
of any description, it was understood that the family would live in
comparative liberty, being merely “under surveillance;” that is to
say, that some suitable person or persons would be appointed by the
Cape Government to live within reach of them, and to be answerable
for their general good behaviour, for their gratification in every
reasonable wish or request, and for their making no attempt to escape
from the Cape Colony and return to their homes in Natal.
Strict justice would have required that the chief and his
people—those that were left of them—should be restored to their
location, as was done in the case of the other tribe, and that
both should be repaid the full ascertainable value of the property
taken from them or destroyed; but politicians in these our days
place “expediency” so far above justice and truth, that men who are
fighting for the latter out-of-date objects may well be thankful for
the smallest concession to their side.
The Bishop accordingly was satisfied that the new arrangement
proposed for the captive chief’s comfort was as good a one as he
could expect from Lord Carnarvon, although not what he might have
done himself had the power lain with him. But when he signified his
satisfaction in the matter, it was certainly on the assumption that
Langalibalele was to be made to feel his captivity as little as
possible upon the mainland—in fact that it was to consist _merely_ in
his inability to leave the colony, or, without permission, the land
assigned to him in it. But that such reasonable permission should be
easily obtainable—that as many of his family and tribe as desired to
do so should be allowed to join him there—that no galling restraints
(such as still exist) should be imposed upon him, were certainly
conditions proposed by Lord Carnarvon and accepted by the Bishop.
When the Bishop returned to Natal, however, he left behind him in
England one who, closely following upon his steps, undid much of the
work which the other had done. Mr. Shepstone could have brought no
new light to bear upon the subject—he could have given Lord Carnarvon
no fresh facts which had not appeared already in the despatches,
through which the Natal Government had been in constant communication
with him. It was not likely that Mr. Shepstone should possess
information hitherto unknown to the rest of the world, including Lord
Carnarvon himself, which should have the power of entirely altering
the latter’s deliberately-formed judgment upon the subject under
consideration. But had this been so, Lord Carnarvon would assuredly
have communicated the fact to the Bishop, with whom he had parted in
complete unanimity of opinion, and to whom, and through whom to the
unhappy chief, promises had been made and hopes held out, destined,
apparently, never to be fulfilled.
It is needless to conjecture what may have passed between Lord
Carnarvon and the man who reached England somewhat under a cloud,
with certain errors to answer for to a chief who was well up in facts
beforehand, but who, in 1876, appears as Sir Theophilus Shepstone,
K.C.M.G., with a commission as administrator of the Transvaal hidden
in the depths of his pocket. The facts speak for themselves. The
desire of the Secretary of State to achieve confederation in South
Africa (the South African Empire!), the peculiar capabilities of Mr.
Shepstone for dealing with the native and Dutch races of the country,
and the considerable check which “strict justice” to the injured
tribes would be to the great confederation scheme, are sufficient
grounds for believing that absolution for the past, and immunity
from the consequences of his acts were purchased by the engagement,
on Mr. Shepstone’s part, to carry out in quiet and successful manner
the first decided step towards the great project of confederation and
empire, namely, the annexation of the Transvaal. In the light cast by
succeeding events, it is plain that nothing would have been much more
inconvenient in the scheme of South African politics than any measure
which would be a censure upon Mr. Shepstone, or prevent his promotion
to a higher office in the State.
That no such alteration in the opinion of the Secretary of State ever
took place may be gathered from his very decided though courteous
replies to the appeals made to him from the colony, to the addresses
from the Legislative Council and other colonists, containing
protests against Lord Carnarvon’s decisions, and professing to give
additional evidence against the tribes in question which would
completely justify the proceedings of the colonial Government, and
the severities of their punishment.
To all that could be thus alleged Lord Carnarvon replies: “I did
not form my opinion until I had received and considered the fullest
explanation which the Government whose acts are questioned desired
to place before me, and in considering the case I had the advantage
of personal communication with an officer who was specially deputed
to represent the Government of Natal before me, and who, from his
knowledge, ability, and experience, was perhaps better qualified than
any other to discharge the duty which was confided to him. I fail to
find in the present documents the explanations which are promised in
the address to Her Majesty, or indeed any evidence so specific or
conclusive as to affect the opinion which, after the most anxious
consideration, Her Majesty’s Government formed upon this case.”—(P.
P. [C. 1342-1] p. 45.)
In another despatch of the same date (July 27, 1875, [C. 1342-1] p.
46), addressed to the officer administering the Government, Natal,
he concludes: “As there is apparently no prospect of arriving at
an agreement of opinion on several points, there is, perhaps, no
advantage in continuing the discussion of them.” Nevertheless,
although holding so clear and decided a judgment, Lord Carnarvon
permitted his just and humane directions for the treatment of the
injured tribes to be practically set aside by those in authority
under him.[41]