TRIAL OF LANGALIBALELE.
Meanwhile the fugitive chief had at last been captured by the
treachery of a Basuto chief named Molappo, who enticed him into
his hands, and then delivered him up to Mr. Griffiths, resident
magistrate in that part of British Basutoland. When he and his party
were first captured they had with them a horse laden with all the
coin which the tribe had been able to get together during the last
few days before the expedition started from Pietermaritzburg, and
which they had collected to send down as a ransom for their chief.
Their purpose was arrested by the news that the soldiers had actually
started to attack them; when, feeling that all was lost, they fled,
carrying the chief and his ransom with them. What became of the
money, whether it became Molappo’s perquisite, or whether it formed
part of the English spoil, has never been publicly known. But it can
hardly be denied that the readiness of the people to pay away in
ransom for their chief the whole wealth of the tribe earned by years
of labour on the part of the working members, is in itself a proof
that their tendencies were by no means rebellious.
Langalibalele, with seven of his sons and many indunas (captains) and
headmen, was brought down to Pietermaritzburg for trial, reaching the
town on the 21st December.
So strong was the unreasoning hatred of the colonists against him
on account of the death of the three Carbineers which had resulted
from the expedition, that the unhappy man, a helpless captive, was
insulted and pelted by the populace as he was conveyed in irons to
the capital; and again, after sentence had been passed upon him, upon
his way to Durban.
It was at this stage of affairs that the Bishop of Natal first
came upon the scene, and interfered on behalf of the oppressed.
Until 1873, while earnestly endeavouring to do his best as teacher
and pastor amongst the natives as well as amongst their white
fellow-colonists, he had not found it to be his duty to go deeply
into political matters concerning them. He had great confidence at
that time in the justice and humanity of their government as carried
on by Mr. Shepstone, for whom he had a warm personal regard, based
on the apparent uprightness of his conduct; and he had therefore
contented himself with accepting Mr. Shepstone’s word in all that
concerned them.
That so many years should have passed without the Bishop’s having
discovered how greatly his views and those of his friend differed in
first principles as to the government of the people, is due partly to
the fact that the two met but seldom, and then at regular expected
intervals, and partly because no great crisis had previously taken
place to prove the principles of either in that respect. Their
regular interviews were upon Sundays, when the Bishop, going into
Pietermaritzburg for the cathedral service, invariably spent a
couple of hours with his friend. During these comparatively short
meetings doubtless Mr. Shepstone’s real personal regard for the
Bishop caused him temporarily to feel somewhat as he did, and,
where he could not do so, to refrain from entering upon political
discussion. The sympathy with Mr. Shepstone which existed in the
Bishop’s mind prevented the latter from looking more closely for
himself into matters which he believed to be in good hands, and which
did not naturally fall within the sphere of his duties; while the
comparatively trivial character of the cases with which the native
department had hitherto dealt, was not such as to force their details
before a mind otherwise and fully employed.
The Langalibalele expedition, however, opened the Bishop’s eyes.
While it lasted, although deeply deploring the loss of life on either
side, and feeling great indignation at the atrocities perpetrated
on ours, he did not doubt that Mr. Shepstone had done all he could
to avert the necessity of bloodshed, and expected to find him, upon
his return to Pietermaritzburg, much grieved and indignant at the
needless amount of suffering inflicted upon his people, the greater
portion of whom must be entirely innocent, even although the charges
against their chief should be proved.
The discovery that Mr. Shepstone entirely ratified what had been
done[20] was the first blow to his friend’s reliance on him. The
mockery of justice termed a trial, granted to Langalibalele, was the
next; and the discovery of how completely he had misconceived Mr.
Shepstone’s policy closed the intimacy of their friendship.
It soon became apparent that the trial of the chief was indeed to
be a farce—a pretence, meant to satisfy inquiring minds at home
that justice had been done, but which could have but one result,
the condemnation of the prisoner, already prejudged by a Government
which, having declared him to be a rebel and having treated him as
such, was hardly likely to stultify itself by allowing him to be
proved innocent of the charges brought against him.
That there might be no doubt at all upon the subject, the prisoner
was denied the help of counsel, white or black, in the hearing
of his case, even to watch the proceedings on his behalf, or to
cross-examine the witnesses; consequently the official record of the
trial can only be looked upon as an _ex parte_ statement of the case,
derived from witnesses selected by the Supreme Chief,[21] examined by
the Crown Prosecutor, and not cross-examined at all on the prisoner’s
behalf, although the assistance of counsel was recognised by the
Crown Prosecutor himself as being in accordance with Kafir law.[22]
But the formation of the court and its whole proceedings were
palpably absurd, except for the purpose of securing a conviction;
and that this was the case was generally understood in Natal, Even
those colonists who were most violent against the so-called “rebel,”
and would have had him hanged without mercy, asserting that he had
been “taken red-handed,” saw that the authorities had put themselves
in the wrong by granting the prisoner a trial against the justice of
which so much could be alleged.
In point of fact, the Lieut.-Governor had no power to form a court
such as that by which Langalibalele was tried, consisting of his
excellency himself as Supreme Chief, the Secretary for Native
Affairs, certain administrators of native law, and certain native
chiefs and indunas. Besides which the Lieut.-Governor was not only
debarred by an ordinance of the colony[23] from sitting as judge in
such a court, from which he would be the sole judge in a court of
appeal, but had already committed himself to a decision adverse to
the prisoner by having issued the proclamation of November 11th,
1873, declaring that the chief and his tribe had “set themselves
in open revolt and rebellion against Her Majesty’s Government in
this colony,” and “proclaiming and making known that they were in
rebellion, and were hereby declared to be outlaws,” and that “the
said tribe was broken up, and from that day forth had ceased to
exist,” and by further seizing and confiscating all the cattle and
property of the said tribe within reach, deposing Langalibalele from
his chieftainship, and otherwise treating him and his tribe as rebels.
His Excellency, therefore, could not possibly be looked upon as an
unprejudiced judge of the first instance in the prisoner’s case;
nor could the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone, by whose
advice and with whose approval the expedition had been undertaken.
As to the minor members of the court, they could hardly be expected
to have an independent opinion in the matter, especially the “native
chiefs and indunas,” who knew very well that they would be liable to
the accusation of disaffection themselves if they ventured to show
any bearing towards the prisoner, or to do otherwise than blindly
follow the lead of their white “brother-judges” (!) and masters.
The native names gave a satisfactory air of justice to the
proceedings of the court in English eyes, but in point of fact they
were but dummy judges after all.
Not only, however, was the court wrongly constituted, but its
proceedings were irregular and illegal. It was called, and considered
to be, a _native_ court, but in point of fact it was a nondescript
assembly, such usages of either native or supreme court as could
possibly tell on the prisoner’s side (notably the use of counsel)
being omitted, and only those which would insure his conviction
admitted.
It was not the practice of the colony for serious crimes to be tried
before a native court. But in this case they were obliged to run
counter to custom for the reason given in a previous note, that most
of the separate charges against the chief could not be recognised
as crimes at all in an English court of law. At the same time the
sentence finally given was one quite beyond the power of the court
to pronounce. Clause 4 of the ordinance limits the power of the
Supreme Chief to “appointing or removing the subordinate chiefs or
other authorities” among the natives, but gives him no power to
sentence to death, or to “banishment or transportation for life to
such place as the Supreme Chief or Lieut.-Governor may appoint.”
When Langalibalele had been “removed” from his chieftainship, and
himself and the bulk of his tribe “driven over the mountain out of
the colony” by the Government force, as announced in the bulletin of
November 13th, 1873, the cattle within the colony seized, and many of
the tribe killed in resisting the attempt to seize them, the Supreme
Chief, under native law, had expended his power; while banishment is
a punishment wholly unknown to Kafir law, as is plainly stated in
“Kafir Laws and Customs,” p. 39.
Again, throughout the trial, the prisoner was assumed to have pleaded
guilty, although in point of fact he had merely admitted that he had
done certain acts, but desired witnesses to be called whose “evidence
would justify or extenuate what he had done,” a plea which in any
ordinary court would be recorded as a plea of “Not guilty.”
The native members of the court, also, were made to sign a judgment,
the contents of which had been “interpreted” to them, and their
signatures “witnessed,” by which the prisoner is declared to have
been “convicted, on clear evidence, of several acts, for some of
which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every
civilised country in the world.” The absurdity of this is palpable,
since it was impossible that these men should know anything of the
law of any civilised land; it is plain, therefore, that in pretending
to agree with assertions, of the meaning of which they were totally
ignorant, they were under some strong influence, such as prejudice
against the prisoner, undue fear of the Supreme Chief, or desire to
please him—one of them being “Head Induna of the Natal Government,”
and another the “Induna to the Secretary for Native Affairs.”
To turn to these crimes, “for some of which he would be liable to
forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the
world”—to which statement His Excellency the Supreme Chief, the
Secretary for Native Affairs, and the Administrators of Native Law
have also signed their names—we find that the charges run as follows:
1. “Setting at naught the authority of the magistrate in a manner[24]
_not indeed sufficiently palpable to warrant the use of forcible
coercion to our_ (civilised) laws and customs.” Which charge we may
at once dismiss as absurd.
2. “Permitting, or _probably_ encouraging, his tribe to possess
fire-arms, and retain them contrary to law.”
3. “With reference to these fire-arms, defying the authority of the
magistrate, and once insulting the messenger.”
4. “Refusing to appear before” the Supreme Chief when summoned,
“excusing his refusal by evasion and falsehood,” and “insulting his
messenger.”
5. “Directing his cattle and other effects to be taken out of the
colony under an armed escort.”
6. Causing the death of Her Majesty’s subjects at the Bushman’s River
Pass.
It is plain to the most casual observation that none of the first
five accusations, even if fully proved, refer to crimes punishable by
death in any civilised land; and it is difficult to see how the Chief
could reasonably be considered responsible for the sixth and last,
seeing that the action took place in his absence, against his express
commands, and to his great regret.
Returning to the five first-named offences, we find that the
statements contained in the second and third charges are the only
proofs alleged of the truth of the first—to which therefore we need
give no further attention—the magistrate himself stating that “this
was the first time the prisoner ever refused to appear before him
when ordered to do so;” and this was the first time for more than
twenty years that he had been reported for any fault whatever.
Proceeding to charge No. 2, we find that the prisoner entirely denied
having encouraged his young men to possess themselves of guns; nor
could he justly be said to have even “permitted” them to do so merely
because he did not actively exert himself to prevent it. The men went
away from home, worked, were paid for their services in guns, or
purchased them with their earnings, without consulting him. He had
never considered it to be part of his duty to search the huts of his
people for unregistered guns, but had simply left them to suffer the
consequences of breaking the laws of the colony, if discovered. It
is also to be observed that amongst the seven sons captured with him
only one had a gun at a time when certainly, if ever, they would have
carried them; which does not look as though he had greatly encouraged
them to possess themselves of firearms.
But if the second charge, in a very modified form, might be
considered a true one, yet Langalibalele had done no worse in that
respect than most of the other chiefs in the colony. In proof of
this assertion may be brought “Perrin’s Register” for the years
1871-2-3—the years during which a large number of natives received
payment for their services at the diamond-fields in guns. From this
register it appears that the total number of guns registered in eight
of the principal northern tribes of the colony—the two first-named
chiefs being _indunas_ to the very magistrate who complained of
Langalibalele—was as follows:
+---------------------+--------------------+
| | GUNS REGISTERED IN |
| HUTS. +--------------------+
| | 1871.| 1872.| 1873.|
+---------------------+------+------+------+
| Ndomba 1190 | — | — | — |
| Faku 2071 | — | 2 | — |
| Mganu 1277 | — | — | — |
| Pakade 2222 | 1 | — | 1 |
| Zikali 1651 | — | 1 | — |
| Nodada 3000 | — | 1 | 2 |
| Putini 1239 | — | 1 | — |
| Langalibalele 2244 | — | 9 | 4 |
+---------------------+------+------+------+
Furthermore, any fault with respect to the guns was not an offence
under Kafir Law, and could only have been tried in the Colonial
Court under the ordinary law of the colony.
The third and fourth charges were those which, when first reported in
Natal, produced considerable alarm and indignation in the minds of
the colonists. A defiance of the authority, both of magistrate and
Supreme Chief, and insult offered to their messengers, looked indeed
like actual rebellion. The charges, however, dwindled down to very
little when properly examined. The “defiance” in question consisted
only in an answer made to the magistrate to the effect that he could
not send in as desired five young men—in possession of unregistered
guns—because they had run away, he knew not whither, being frightened
by the course pursued by the magistrate’s messenger; and that he
could not find eight others, said to have come into the colony with
guns, and to belong to his tribe, upon such insufficient data,
and unless their names were given to him. The sincerity of which
reasoning was shortly proved by the fact that, as soon as their names
were notified to him, he did send in three of those very lads, with
their guns, and two more belonging to other members of their party,
besides sending in with their guns those who had worked for Mr. W. E.
Shepstone, and who probably thought that the name of their master was
a sufficient guarantee for their right to possess firearms.
The charge of insulting the native messengers from Government, of
which a great deal was made at first, proved to be of very little
consequence when investigated, but it is one to which special
attention should be given because, indirectly, it is connected with
the Zulu War.
The facts are as follows: One of the chief witnesses for the
prosecution, Mawiza, a messenger of the Government, stated in his
evidence-in-chief on the second day of the trial, that on the
occasion of his carrying a message from Government, the prisoner’s
people had “taken all his things from him,” and had “stripped, and
taken him naked” into the Chiefs presence. But on the fourth day,
in answer to a question from His Excellency, he said “that they had
_intended_ to strip him but had allowed him to retain his trousers
and boots,” thereby contradicting himself flatly. Nevertheless the
court being asked by His Excellency whether it required further
evidence on this point, replied in the negative. They did not even
ask a question, on the subject, of Mawiza’s two companion messengers,
Mnyembe and Gayede, though both these were examined; Mnyembe’s
evidence-in-chief being cut short _before_ he came to that part of
the story, and Gayede’s taken up just _after_ it.
The chief was kept in solitary confinement from the day when he was
brought down to Pietermaritzburg, December 31st, till the day when
his sons were sentenced, February 27th; not being allowed to converse
with any of his sons, or with any members of his tribe, or with any
friend or adviser, white or black. It was therefore quite out of his
power to find witnesses who would have shown, as Mnyembe and Gayede
would have done, that Mawiza’s statements about the “stripping” were
false; that he still wore his waistcoat, shirt, trousers, boots, and
gaiters, when he was taken to the chief; and that the “stripping”
in question only amounted to this, that he himself put off his two
coats, by the chiefs orders, “as a matter of precaution caused by
fear” and not for the purpose of insulting the messenger, or defying
the Supreme Chief. They would have satisfied the court also that
other acts charged against the prisoner arose from fear, and dread of
the Supreme Chief, and not from a spirit of defiance.
This affair of the messenger, explained by fear and suspicion on the
part of Langalibalele, by which, also, he accounted for his refusal
to “appear before” the Supreme Chief (which is to say that, being
desired to give himself up into the hands of the Government, he was
afraid to do so, and ran away), was the turning-point of the whole
trial. What special reason he had for that fear and distrust will
be inquired into shortly. Meanwhile the court considered that such
expressed distrust of the good faith of the authorities was an added
offence on the part of the prisoner, who was formally condemned to
death, but his sentence commuted to banishment for life to Robben
Island, the abode of lunatics and lepers, in which other captive
native chiefs had languished and died before him.[25]