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HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR
AND ITS ORIGIN.
HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR
AND ITS ORIGIN.
BY
FRANCES E. COLENSO.
ASSISTED IN THOSE PORTIONS OF THE WORK WHICH TOUCH UPON
MILITARY MATTERS
BY
LIEUT.-COLONEL EDWARD DURNFORD.
London:
CHAPMAN AND HALL, LIMITED, 193, PICCADILLY.
1880.
_All Rights reserved._
CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS,
CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS.
PREFACE.
It is probable that the Bishop of Natal may be held responsible
for the contents of a volume written partly by his daughter, and
having for its subject the Zulu War; more especially if a general
coincidence can be traced between what are known to be his views
and those which are expressed in this history. My father’s opinions
have, naturally, considerable influence over those held or expressed
by his family, and I do not imagine that much will be found in these
pages from which he will dissent. Nevertheless, it is desirable that
my readers should understand from the first that he is in no sense
responsible for their contents.
When I left Natal, in September last, the idea of writing upon the
subject of the Zulu War had hardly occurred to me; it has developed
since to an extent quite beyond my original intentions, and I find
that its fulfilment has rather taken my father by surprise. I had no
opportunity of consulting him upon the subject, nor has he yet seen a
word of what I have written, for on reaching England I found that, to
be of any use at all, the book should appear almost at once.
I made, indeed, ample use of the pamphlets which the Bishop of Natal
has written on behalf of Langalibalele and Cetshwayo, which have
saved me many hours of weary search. Consequently, while the Bishop
is in no way responsible for such errors or omissions as may occur in
this volume, any merit or usefulness which my portion of the book
may contain is due chiefly to his labours.
The general plan of my history was laid out, and the first
few chapters were written, during the voyage from Natal, and
upon reaching England I obtained the assistance of my friend
Lieut.-Colonel Edward Durnford in that portion of the work which
deals with the military conduct of the war. While it was desirable
that a record of military events should be made by one whose
professional knowledge qualified him for the duty, there was an
additional reason which made his help appropriate. It may easily
be understood from his name that the interest taken by him in his
task would be of no ordinary kind. Colonel Durnford has written
the military portions of the book, but is not responsible for any
expressions of opinion upon matters strictly political.
I am far from feeling that I am the best person to undertake such a
work as this, which my father himself would look upon as a serious
one, and which he, or even my sister, who has worked with him
throughout, would do so much better than I; but they were not at
hand, and I have thought it my duty to do what I could, while I could
have had no better aid than that given me by Colonel Durnford.
However insufficient the result may prove, we shall at least hope
that our work may give some slight assistance to that cause of
justice, truth, and mercy, the maintenance of which alone can ensure
the true honour of the British name.
FRANCES ELLEN COLENSO.
_January 22nd, 1880._
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
FIRST CAUSES 1
CHAPTER II.
LANGALIBALELE 20
CHAPTER III.
TRIAL OF LANGALIBALELE 38
CHAPTER IV.
THE BISHOP’S DEFENCE 51
CHAPTER V.
THE PUTINI TRIBE 63
CHAPTER VI.
SIR GARNET WOLSELEY: WHAT HE CAME FOR, WHAT HE DID,
AND WHAT HE DID NOT DO 78
CHAPTER VII.
THE MATSHANA INQUIRY AND COLONEL COLLEY 89
CHAPTER VIII.
THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL 112
CHAPTER IX.
THE DISPUTED TERRITORY 138
CHAPTER X.
THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION 163
CHAPTER XI.
SIHAYO, UMBILINI, AND THE MISSIONARIES IN ZULULAND 192
CHAPTER XII.
THE ULTIMATUM, DECLARATION OF WAR, AND COMMENCEMENT OF
CAMPAIGN 235
CHAPTER XIII.
ISANDHLWANA 273
CHAPTER XIV.
RORKE’S DRIFT—HELPMAKAAR—COURT OF INQUIRY, ETC. 302
CHAPTER XV.
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SIKUKUNI 325
CHAPTER XVI.
NO. 4 COLUMN—INTOMBI—INDHLOBANE—KAMBULA—KING’S
MESSENGERS 344
CHAPTER XVII.
THE LOWER TUGELA—INYEZANE—ETSHOWE 368
CHAPTER XVIII.
NGINGINDHLOVU—RELIEF OF ETSHOWE—BORDER RAIDING 380
CHAPTER XIX.
REINFORCEMENTS—ISANDHLWANA REVISITED 394
CHAPTER XX.
THE PRINCE IMPERIAL 418
CHAPTER XXI.
ULUNDI 433
CHAPTER XXII.
SIR GARNET WOLSELEY—CAPTURE OF CETSHWAYO 453
CONCLUSION 475
THE ZULU WAR.
CHAPTER I.
FIRST CAUSES.
England’s collisions with the savage races bordering upon her
colonies have in all probability usually been brought about by the
exigencies of the moment, by border-troubles, and acts of violence
and insolence on the part of the savages, and from the absolute
necessity of protecting a small and trembling white population from
their assaults.
No such causes as these have led up to the war of 1879. For more
than twenty years the Zulus and the colonists of Natal have lived
side by side in perfect peace and quietness. The tranquillity of
our border had been a matter of pride as compared to the disturbed
and uncertain boundaries between Zululand and the Transvaal. The
mere fact of the utterly unprotected condition of the frontier
farmers on _our_ border, and the entire absence of anything like
precaution, evinced by the common practice of building houses of the
most combustible description, is a proof that the colonists felt
no real alarm concerning the Zulus until the idea was suggested to
them by those in authority over them.[1] The only interruption to
this tranquil condition of the public mind about the Zulus was in the
year 1861, when a scare took place in the colony, for which, as it
afterwards proved, there were no grounds whatsoever. A general but
unfounded belief was rife that Cetshwayo,[2] king, or rather at that
time prince, ruling Zululand, was about to invade Natal, in order to
obtain possession of his young brother Umkungo, a claimant of the
Zulu crown, and who had escaped over the border at the time of the
great civil war of which we shall presently treat. This young prince
had been placed—by the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone—at
Bishopstowe,[3] for his education in the Native Boys’ School there;
and it was not until he had been there for years that the fancy
arose, suggested and fostered by the border farmers and traders in
Zululand, that Cetshwayo intended to take him by force from amongst
us, or at all events to make the attempt.
Under the influence of this belief the troops then stationed in
Natal were ordered to the frontier, the colonial volunteers were
called out, the defence of the principal towns became a matter for
consideration; while outlying farmers, and residents in the country,
hastened to remove their families to places of comparative safety.
Bishopstowe was supposed to be the special object of the expected
attack; but the Bishop himself, having occasional opportunities of
learning the state of things in Zululand, through his missionary
there, could never be brought thoroughly to believe in the gravity
of the danger. It is true that, as a matter of precaution, and in
deference to the strongly-expressed opinion of the Lieut.-Governor
of the Colony and of Mr. Shepstone, he sent away the threatened boy
to some of his own people, in a more remote and safer part of the
colony. But he was extremely reluctant to take the further step,
strongly urged upon him, of removing his family and people to the
adjacent city of Pietermaritzburg, and only consented to do so
under protest. During the night following his consent, but before
the project had been carried out, he had reason for a few hours to
suppose that he had been mistaken in his own judgment. The family
at Bishopstowe was knocked up at one o’clock in the morning by a
messenger from a passing Dutch farmer, who, on his way into town with
his own family, had sent word to the Bishop that Cetshwayo’s army had
entered the colony, was already between him and Table Mountain—that
is to say within a distance of nine miles—and was burning, killing,
and destroying all upon the way to Bishopstowe. There seemed to be no
doubt of the fact; so, hastily collecting their native villagers,[4]
the Colensos left their homes and started for the town, which they
reached, most of them on foot, about daybreak. The consequence of
their being accompanied and followed by a considerable party of
natives (of both sexes and all ages!) was that the townspeople
immediately supposed that the “Zulus had come;” and some of them
actually left their houses, and took refuge in the various places of
safety—such as the fort, the principal churches, and so on—previously
decided upon by the authorities in case of necessity. In common South
African terms they “went into laager.”
As the day passed, and still no further tidings arrived of the
approach of the Zulus or the destruction of Bishopstowe, the Bishop
began to have strong suspicions that, after all, he had been right in
his original opinion, and that “the killing, burning, and destroying”
had been conjured up by some excited imagination. This opinion was
confirmed, if not completely established, in the course of the day,
by the reception of a letter from the missionary in Zululand before
mentioned, in which he inquired, on the Zulu king’s behalf, what
fault the latter had committed towards the English, that they should
be preparing to invade his country. The missionary added that all
was perfectly quiet in Zululand, until the border tribes, seeing
the British troops approaching, fled inland in alarm, killing their
cattle to prevent their falling into the hands of the invaders, and
burying their other possessions where they could not carry them
away. In point of fact the “scare” had no foundation whatsoever, and
the Zulus were quite as much alarmed by the actual approach of the
British troops as the Natalians had been by the imaginary Zulu army.
The worst immediate consequence of the mistake was the want, almost
amounting to famine, produced amongst the border Zulus by the loss of
their cattle. A later and more serious result has been that general
impression, which has long obtained credence at home in England,
that the colonists of Natal have not only been in fear of their
lives on account of the Zulus for many years, but have also had good
and sufficient reason for their alarm. But for this fixed, though
groundless idea, England would hardly have been in such a hurry to
send out additional troops for the protection of the colony as she
was in the summer of 1878; to her own great loss and to the very
considerable injury of the colony itself, not to speak of its unhappy
neighbours and heretofore friends the Zulus.
It is certainly true that during the year 1878 the inhabitants of
Natal did honestly feel great fear of the Zulus, and of a possible
invasion of the colony by them, the alarm in many cases amounting
to absolute panic. But this feeling was produced by no warlike
menaces from our neighbours, no sinister appearances on our borders.
The panic—or “scare,” as it would popularly be called in Natal—was
forced upon the people by the conduct and language of their rulers,
by the preparations made for war, troops being sent for from England
“for defensive purposes” (as was so repeatedly asserted by both Sir
Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford, then Lieut.-General the Hon. F.
A. Thesiger), and by the perpetual agitation of the local newspaper
editors.
It is true indeed that a certain section of the colonists eagerly
desired war. To some the presence of the troops was a source of
actual fortune, to others the freedom and independence of so large
a body of black people, whom they could neither tax nor force to
work for them, was, and had long been, odious; the revenue to be
derived from a hut-tax levied upon the Zulus, and the cheap labour
to be obtained when their power and independence should be broken,
formed one of the chief subjects for speculation when the war was
first suggested. To others, again, the prospect of war was simply a
source of pleasurable excitement, a hunt on a large scale, martial
glory to be won, with just spice enough of danger to give zest to the
affair; as had been the case in the war just concluded in Kaffraria.
Naturally this feeling was commonest amongst the volunteers and
their friends. Some of them looked upon the matter in a light which
would meet with utter condemnation in any civilised society; but
many others, especially the young lads who filled up the ranks of
the volunteer corps, were simply dazzled by visions of military
distinction, excited by the popular phrases in perpetual use about
“fighting for their country, and doing their duty as soldiers,” to
the extent of losing sight altogether of the question as to whether
or no their country really required any defence at all.
Natal cannot honestly claim to be guiltless in bringing about the
war with the Zulus, and will hardly deny that in 1878 the prospect
was a most popular one amongst her sons. Perhaps Sir Bartle Frere
could not so easily have produced a war out of the materials which
he had at hand but for the assistance given him by the popular cry
in the colony, and the general fear of the Zulus, which called forth
England’s ready sympathy and assistance. But it must be remembered
that the panic was not a genuine one, nor even one like that of 1861,
produced by the folly of the people themselves. It was distinctly
imposed upon them by those in authority, whose policy was to bring
about a collision with the Zulus, and who then made use of the very
fears which they had themselves aroused for the furtherance of their
own purpose.
The subjugation of the Zulus and the annexation of their country,
formed part of a policy which has occupied the minds of certain
British statesmen for many years. The ambition of creating a South
African Empire, to be another jewel in Victoria’s crown, which, if
no rival, should at least be a worthy pendant to the great Indian
Empire, was a dazzling one, and towards that object all Government
action in South Africa has apparently tended since the year 1873.
When the idea was first conceived those only know who formed it, but
it took practical and visible form in 1873. In that year by crowning
the Zulu king we assumed a right to interfere in the internal
management of the country, thereby establishing a possible future
cause of offence, which, as the Zulus obstinately refused to put
themselves in the wrong by any sort of interference with us, was
necessary in order to bring about a state of things which should
eventually give us a sufficient excuse for taking possession of the
country altogether.
The origin of this performance was as follows. In the year 1856 a
great revolution took place in Zululand, and a civil war broke out
between two claimants to the heirship of the throne (then filled
by Umpande), namely, the present king, Cetshwayo, and his brother
Umbulazi. Cetshwayo was quite young at the time, and appears to have
been put forward by some ambitious warriors, who intended to rule in
his name, and did not expect the remarkable power and talent which he
afterwards developed.
Umbulazi’s party was beaten, he himself being killed in battle, great
carnage ensuing, and many fugitives escaping into Natal.
Amidst all the bloodshed and horror which naturally attends such
a warfare as this between savages, there stands out the singular,
perhaps unprecedented, fact that Cetshwayo, although victorious to
the extent of carrying the nation with him, not only never made any
attempt upon the old king, his father’s, life, but did not even
depose him or seize his throne. The old man lived and—nominally,
at all events—reigned for many years, though, owing to his age and
obesity, which was so great as to prevent his walking, he seems to
have been willing enough to leave the real authority in the hands of
his son, while retaining the semblance of it himself. He was treated
with all due respect by Cetshwayo and his followers until he died a
natural death in the year 1872, when Cetshwayo ascended the throne
which had long been virtually his own, and was proclaimed king of
Zululand. This was looked upon as a fitting time for a little display
of authority by ourselves, hence the friendly expedition to Zululand
of 1873, when we gave Cetshwayo to understand that, however it might
appear to him, he held his power from us, and was no true king till
we made him such. It was also rightly thought to be an opportunity
for suggesting to the Zulu king such reforms in the government of
his country as would naturally commend themselves to English ideas.
We considered, and with some reason, that capital punishment was an
over-frequent occurrence in Zululand, and that, on the other hand,
judicial trials before sentence should be the universal rule. It was
also desirable, if possible, to decrease the belief in witchcraft,
by which so much power was left in the hands of the witch-doctors
or priests;[5] and finally it was thought necessary to provide for
the safety of the missionaries resident in the land.[6] How far this
was a desirable step depends entirely on whether the men themselves
were earnest, self-sacrificing, peace-loving teachers of the gospel
of Christ, or mere traders for their own benefit, under the cloak
of a divine mission, ready to hail a bloody war. “Only the utter
destruction of the Zulus can secure future peace in South Africa ...
we have the approbation of God, our Queen, and our own conscience.”
(See letter from a missionary clergyman to Sir Bartle Frere,[7] dated
December 17th, 1878. (P. P. [C. 2316] p. 3.))
It was frequently asserted at the time in Natal that this coronation
ceremony (1st September, 1873) was nothing better than a farce,
and the way in which it was carried out seems hardly to have been
understood by the king himself. The Natalians were puzzled as to what
could be the meaning or intention of what seemed to them a hollow
show, and were on the whole rather inclined to put it down to Mr.
Shepstone’s supposed habit of “petting the natives,” and to “Exeter
Hall influences,” resulting in a ridiculous fuss on their behalf.
From Mr. Shepstone’s despatch on the subject of the coronation of
Cetshwayo (P. P. [C. 1137]), and from messages brought from the
latter to the Government of Natal after his father’s death, there
appears to have been a strong desire on the part, not only of the
people, but of the king himself, that his formal succession to the
throne should be unattended by bloodshed and disorder, such as had
ushered in the rule of his predecessors for several generations.
How greatly the character of the Zulu rule had improved in a
comparatively short period may be judged by a comparison of the fact
[p. 5, _ibid._] (mentioned by Mr. Shepstone), that during the reigns
of Chaka and Dingana (grandfather and great-uncle to Cetshwayo), all
the royal wives were put to death either before the birth of their
children, or with their infants afterwards, with the behaviour of
Cetshwayo, both to his father and to his father’s wives.[8] And Mr.
Shepstone himself speaks of Cetshwayo on the occasion of this visit
in the following manner:—“Cetywayo is a man of considerable ability,
much force of character, and has a dignified manner; in all my
conversations with him,” the Secretary for Native Affairs continues,
“he was remarkably frank and straightforward, and he ranks in every
respect far above any native chief I have ever had to do with.”
Throughout the despatch, indeed, Mr. Shepstone repeatedly speaks of
the king’s “frankness” and “sagacity,” in direct opposition to the
charges of craft and duplicity so recklessly brought against the
latter of late.
King Umpande died in October, 1872, having reigned nearly
thirty-three years, and on the 26th February, 1873, messengers from
Cetshwayo brought the news of his father’s death to the Governor
of Natal, requesting at the same time that Mr. Shepstone might be
sent to instal Cetshwayo as his successor,[9] in order that the
Zulu nation should be “more one with the government of Natal,”
and be “covered by the same mantle.” The message ended with the
request which Cetshwayo never lost an opportunity of making, that we
would protect his country from Boer aggressions.[10] “We are also
commissioned,” say the messengers, “to urge, _what has already been
urged so frequently_, that the government of Natal be extended so as
to intervene between the Zulus and the territory of the Transvaal
Republic.”
The mere fact that this proposition was frequently and earnestly
pressed upon the Natal Government by the Zulus, is in itself a proof
positive that the aggressions were not on their side. They desired
to place what they looked upon as an impassable barrier between the
two countries, and could therefore have had no wish themselves to
encroach.
Further messages passed between Cetshwayo and the Natal Government
upon the subject, until it was finally arranged that the coronation
should be performed by Mr. Shepstone, in Zululand, and, with a party
of volunteers as escort, he crossed the Tugela on the 8th August,
1873, accompanied by Major Durnford, R.E., Captain Boyes, 75th
Regiment, and several other officers and gentlemen.
Mr. Shepstone’s long despatch, already quoted from, and in which
he describes, with true native minuteness, the most trivial
circumstances of the journey, and subsequent proceedings, gives the
impression that he looked upon his mission as a service of danger to
all concerned. It was, however, carried out without any break in the
friendly relations between the Zulus and his party, who returned to
Pietermaritzburg “without unpleasant incident” on the 19th September.
The coronation mission was carried out—how far _successfully_
entirely depends upon the results expected or desired by those
in command. The king himself, while looking upon the fact of his
recognition as sovereign of Zululand by the English as important,
is quite keen enough to have detected certain elements of absurdity
in the proceedings by which they invested him with his dignity.
There was perhaps a little good-humoured scorn in his reception of
the somewhat oddly-chosen presents and marks of honour offered him.
Without losing that respect for and faith in the English which has
always characterised his dealings with them, he felt impatiently
that they were rather making a fool of him; especially when they
put upon his shoulders a little scarlet mantle—formerly a lady’s
opera-cloak—the curtailed dimensions of which made him ridiculous
in his own eyes; and upon his head a pasteboard, cloth, and tinsel
crown, whose worthlessness he was perfectly capable of comprehending.
Mr. Shepstone’s despatch represents him as greatly impressed by the
ceremony, etc.; but the impression on the minds of many observers
was that he put up with much which both seemed and was trifling and
ridiculous, for the sake of the solid benefits which he hoped he and
his people would derive from a closer connection with the English.
The portion of Mr. Shepstone’s despatch, however, which it is
important that we should study with attention is that which refers to
the “coronation promises” (so called) of Cetshwayo, and treats of the
political subjects discussed between king and kingmaker.
Sir Bartle Frere repeatedly speaks of the transaction as “a solemn
act by the king, undertaken as the price of British support and
recognition;” of Cetshwayo as having “openly violated his coronation
promises;” of his “undoubted promises;” while Sir Garnet Wolseley,
in his speech to the assembled chiefs and people of the Zulu nation,
speaks of the coronation promises as though the want of attention
to them had been the chief, if not the only, cause of the king’s
misfortunes; and the same tone is taken in all late despatches on the
subject.
And now let us turn to Mr. Shepstone’s own report, prepared at the
time, and see whether we gather from it the impression that the
conditions of his treaty with Cetshwayo were thought of, or intended
by him, to stand as solemn and binding promises, of which the
infraction, or delay in carrying out, would render the king and his
people liable to punishment at our hands. After giving his reasons
for objecting to “formal or written” treaties with savages,[11] Mr.
Shepstone himself remarks, “Ours is an elastic arrangement.” This
is a singularly candid confession, of the truth of which there can
be little doubt. Whether such a term _should_ be applicable to the
treaties made by an English Government is quite another question, to
which we will leave the English public to find an answer. We have,
however, but to quote from Mr. Shepstone’s own despatch to prove the
convenient “elasticity” of his propositions, and how greatly they
have been magnified of late in seeking a quarrel against the Zulu
king. At p. 16 of the report, after enumerating the “arrangements
and laws” proposed by him, and heartily approved by the Zulus, Mr.
Shepstone remarks: “Although all this was fully, and even vehemently,
assented to, it cannot be expected that the amelioration described
will immediately take effect. To have got such principles admitted
and declared to be what a Zulu may plead when oppressed, was but
sowing the seed, which will still take many years to grow and
mature.” And at p. 17 he says: “I told the king that I well knew the
difficulties of his position, and that he could overcome them only
by moderation and prudence and justice, but without these they would
certainly overcome him.” And again (p. 18, par. 82) he explains that
when he left Natal he had looked upon the “charge” which he knew that
he would be expected to deliver to Cetshwayo on his installation, as
something in the nature of an ordination sermon, or bishop’s charge
to candidates for confirmation, likely to influence only in so far
as the consciences of those addressed might respond, etc.; but that,
on entering Zululand, he found that the people thought so much of
this part of the duty he had undertaken that he felt himself to have
“become clothed with the power of fundamental legislation,” and
thought it right to take advantage of the opportunity for introducing
improvements in the government of the people. “I have already
described my success,” he continues, “and I attribute it to the
sagacity of Cetywayo.”
But in all this there is no mention of “solemn promises,” to break
which would be an insult to the majesty of England, and an excuse
for war; nor is there, from beginning to end of the despatch, any
token that Mr. Shepstone looked upon them in that light, or had any
immediate expectation of proving the usefulness of his “elastic”
arrangement.
In describing his interviews and political discussions with the Zulu
king, Mr. Shepstone speaks repeatedly in high praise of the ability
and behaviour of the former. He says in one place: “Cetywayo received
us cordially as before.... Major Durnford and my son, with the Natal
Native Indunas, sat down with me to an interview with Cetywayo and
the councillors, that lasted for five hours without intermission. It
was of the most interesting and earnest kind, and was conducted with
great ability and frankness by Cetywayo. Theoretically, my business
was with the councillors who represented the nation; but, had it not
been for the straightforward manner in which Cetywayo insisted upon
their going direct to the point, it would have been impossible to
have got through the serious subjects we were bound to decide in the
time we did.”
Of the points discussed in this way the most important was that
which, a little later, led directly up to the Zulu War—namely, the
aggressions of the Transvaal Boers and the disputed boundary between
them and the Zulus. “The whole of the afternoon,” says Mr. Shepstone,
“was occupied with this subject, about which he occasionally grew
very earnest, and declared that he and every Zulu would die rather
than submit to them—viz. the Boer encroachments. He reproached the
Government of Natal for not having taken up the Zulu cause, and
for not even having troubled themselves to examine whether their
statements were true or not, while they treated them as if without
foundation.”
In fact, on this, as on every other occasion, the Zulu king lost no
opportunity of protesting against the encroachments of the Boers,
lest his peaceable conduct towards these latter, maintained in
deference to the wishes of the Natal Government, should be brought
up against him later as a proof of their rights. Whatever may have
been the intentions and opinions of Mr. Shepstone on the subject of
the “coronation promises,” he left Cetshwayo unfettered in his own
opinion, having merely received certain advice as to the government
of his people from his respected friends the English, to whose wishes
he should certainly give full attention, and whose counsel he would
carry out as far as was, in his opinion, wise or feasible. As already
stated, the principal item of the English advice related to capital
punishment, which we, with some justice, considered a too frequent
occurrence in Zululand, especially in cases of supposed witchcraft,
this superstition being undoubtedly the bane of the country.
But in judging of the king’s acts in this respect, it should be
remembered that, to rule a nation without any assistance in the form
of gaols or fetters, capital punishment must needs be resorted to
rather more frequently than in our own country, where, indeed, it is
not so long since we hung a man for stealing a sheep, and for other
acts far short of murder. And as to the superstition concerning
witches, it can hardly have led to more cruelty and injustice in
Zululand than in civilised European countries, where at Trèves 7000
victims were burned alive for witchcraft; 500 at Geneva in three
months; 1000 in the province of Como; 400, at _once_, at Toulouse;
with many other like cases on official record.[12] The practice of
smelling out a witch, as it is called, is one to be put a stop to as
soon as possible by gradual and gentle means, and Cetshwayo himself
had arrived at that conclusion without our assistance, as shown in
his conversation with the native printer Magema, whose account of a
visit paid to the Zulu king appeared in “Macmillan’s Magazine” for
March, 1878.
But the custom of a people—the law of a land—is not to be done away
with or altered in an hour; nor could we English reasonably expect
such radical changes in the administration of a country to follow
our orders as immediately and naturally as we should expect a new
ordinance to be received by the natives of Natal living under our
own rule. Neither could we justly consider the non-fulfilment of
our wishes and commands a sufficient cause for attacking Zululand,
although such supposed non-fulfilment was the first, and for a long
time the only _casus belli_ which could be found against the Zulu
king.
The first occasion on which the solemnity of these “coronation
promises” was made of importance was in 1875, when Bishop Schreuder
undertook to pay Cetshwayo a visit for the purpose of presenting
him with a printed and bound copy of Mr. Shepstone’s Report upon
the coronation in 1873, and impressing him fully with the wishes of
the English Government. Even then, judging from Bishop Schreuder’s
account of his interview, neither king nor councillors were
thoroughly satisfied with the result.[13] Cetshwayo, while admiring
the exact report given of what took place during Mr. Shepstone’s
visit, objected that he had reserved his own royal prerogatives and
the right of putting criminals to death for certain serious crimes,
and pointed out that Mr. Shepstone had neglected to inform the Queen
of this fact.
Bishop Schreuder, from his own account, appears to have overruled all
objections with a very high hand, and almost forced the “book,” with
his own interpretation of it, upon the seemingly reluctant king, who,
he says, “evidently felt himself out of his depth.”