Countless and inestimable are the chances of war. Those who read the
story, and still more those who share the dangers, of a campaign feel
that every incident is surrounded with a host of possibilities, any one
of which, had it become real, would have changed the whole course of
events. The influence of Fortune is powerfully and continually exerted.
In the flickering light of conflict the outlines of solid fact throw
on every side the vague shadows of possibility. We live in a world of
'ifs.' 'What happened,' is singular; 'what might have happened,' legion.
But to try to gauge the influence of this uncertain force were utterly
futile, and it is perhaps wise, and indisputably convenient, to assume
that the favourable and adverse chances equate, and then eliminate them
both from the calculation.
The 'Sirdar's luck' became almost proverbial in the Soudan. As the
account progresses numerous instances will suggest themselves. It was
lucky that the Dervishes did not harass the communications, or assail
Akasha before it was fortified. It was lucky that they fought at Firket;
that they retired from Berber; that Mahmud did not advance in January;
that he advanced in March; that he did not retire before the battle of
the Atbara; that the Khalifa did not hold the Shabluka; that he did not
attack on the night before Omdurman, and that he did attack at dawn.
But after Firket all things were contrary. One unexpected misfortune
succeeded another. Difficulties were replaced by others as soon as
they had been overcome. The autumn of 1896 was marked by delay and
disappointment. The state of the Nile, the storms, the floods,
the cholera, and many minor obstacles, vexed but did not weary the
commander. The victory at Firket was succeeded by a long pause in the
operations. The army had made one spring forward; it must now gather
energy for another. The preparations, however, proceeded rapidly. A
strong camp was formed at Firket. MacDonald's brigade occupied Suarda
two days after the fight, and this place now became the advanced
post, just as Akasha had been in the first phase of the campaign. The
accumuluation of stores at Firket and Suarda began forthwith. Owing
to the arrangements which had been made before the engagement it was
possible to collect within one week of the action two months' supplies
at Suarda for the garrison of 2,000 men, and one month's at Firket for
the 7,000 troops encamped there. Thereafter, however, the necessity of
hurrying the railway construction and the considerable daily demands of
9,000 men only allowed this margin to be increased very gradually.
The army had now passed beyond the scope of a camel, or other
pack-animal, system of supply, except for very short distances, and
it was obvious that they could only advance in future along either the
railway or a navigable reach of the river, and preferably along both.
From the Dal Cataract near Kosheh there is a clear waterway at high Nile
to Merawi. To Kosheh, therefore, the railway must be extended before
active operations could recommence. A third condition had also to be
observed. For the expulsion of the Dervishes from Kerma and Dongola it
was desirable that a flotilla of gunboats should co-operate with the
land forces. Four of these vessels--the Tamai, El Teb, the Metemma, and
the Abu Klea; and three steamers--the Kaibar, Dal, and Akasha, which it
was proposed to arm--had, since 1885, patrolled the river from Assuan to
Wady Halfa, and assisted in protecting the frontier from Dervish raids.
All seven were now collected at the foot of the Second Cataract, and
awaited the rise of the river to attempt the passage. To strengthen
the flotilla three new and very powerful gunboats had been ordered in
England. These were to be brought in sections over the railway to a
point above the Second Cataract, and be fitted together there. It
was thus necessary to wait, firstly, for the railway to reach Kosheh;
secondly, for the Nile to rise; thirdly, for the old gunboats to ascend
the Cataract; fourthly, for the new gunboats to be launched on the clear
waterway; and, fifthly, for the accumulation of supplies. With all of
these matters the Sirdar now busied himself.
The reconstruction of the railway to Akasha and its extension beyond
this place towards Kosheh was pressed forward. By the 26th of June
Akasha was reached. Thenceforward the engineers no longer followed an
existing track, but were obliged to survey, and to make the formation
for themselves. Strong fatigue parties from the Egyptian and Soudanese
battalions were, however, employed on the embankments, and the line
grew daily longer. On the 24th of July the first train ran across the
battlefield of Firket; and on the 4th of August the railway was working
to Kosheh.
Kosheh is six miles south of Firket, and consists, like most places
in the 'Military Soudan,' of little more than a name and a few ruined
mud-huts which were once a village. On the 5th of July the whole camp
was moved thither from the scene of the action. The reasons were clear
and apparent. Kosheh is a point on the river above the Dal Cataract
whence a clear waterway runs at high Nile to beyond Dongola. The camp at
Firket had become foul and insanitary. The bodies of the dead, swelling
and decaying in their shallow graves, assailed, as if in revenge, the
bodies of the living. The dysentery which had broken out was probably
due to the 'green' water of the Nile; for during the early period of the
flood what is known as 'the false rise' washes the filth and sewage off
the foreshore all along the river, and brings down the green and rotting
vegetation from the spongy swamps of Equatoria. The water is then
dangerous and impure. There was nothing else for the army to drink;
but it was undesirable to aggravate the evil by keeping the troops in a
dirty camp.
The earliest freight which the railway carried to Kosheh was the first
of the new stern-wheel gunboats. Train after train arrived with its
load of steel and iron, or with the cumbrous sections of the hull, and
a warship in pieces--engines, armaments, fittings and stores--soon lay
stacked by the side of the river. An improvised dockyard, equipped with
powerful twenty-ton shears and other appliances, was established, and
the work--complicated as a Chinese puzzle--of fitting and riveting
together the hundreds of various parts proceeded swiftly. Gradually the
strange heaps of parts began to evolve a mighty engine of war. The new
gunboats were in every way remarkable. The old vessels had been 90
feet long. These were 140 feet. Their breadth was 24 feet. They steamed
twelve miles an hour. They had a command of 30 feet. Their decks were
all protected by steel plates, and prepared by loopholed shields for
musketry. Their armament was formidable. Each carried one twelve-pounder
quick-firing gun forward, two six-pounder quick-firing guns in the
central battery, and four Maxim guns. Every modern improvement--such
as ammunition hoists, telegraphs, search-lights, and steam-winches--was
added. Yet with all this they drew only thirty-nine inches of water.
The contract specified that these vessels should be delivered at
Alexandria by the 5th of September, but, by exertions, the first boat,
the Zafir, reached Egypt on the 23rd of July, having been made in eight
weeks, and in time to have assisted in the advance on Dongola. The
vessels and machinery had been constructed and erected in the works in
London; they were then marked, numbered, and taken to pieces, and after
being shipped to Alexandria and transported to the front were finally
put together at Kosheh. Although in a journey of 4,000 miles they were
seven times transhipped, not a single important piece was lost.
The convenience of Kosheh on the clear waterway, and the dirty condition
of Firket, were in themselves sufficient reasons for the change of camp;
but another and graver cause lay behind. During the month of June an
epidemic of cholera began to creep up the Nile from Cairo. On the 29th
there were some cases at Assuan. On the 30th it reached Wady Halfa. In
consequence of this the North Staffordshire Regiment marched into camp
at Gemai. Their three months' occupation of the town had not improved
their health or their spirits. During the sixteen-mile march along the
railway track to Gemai the first fatal case occurred, and thereafter
the sickness clung to the regiment until the middle of August, causing
continual deaths.
The cholera spread steadily southward up the river, claiming successive
victims in each camp. In the second week of July it reached the new
camp at Kosheh, whence all possible precautions to exclude it had proved
vain. The epidemic was at first of a virulent form. As is usual, when
it had expended its destructive energy, the recoveries became more
frequent. But of the first thousand cases between Assuan and Suarda
nearly eight hundred proved fatal. Nor were the lives thus lost to be
altogether measured by the number. [The attacks and deaths from cholera
in the Dongola Expeditionary Force were as follow: British troops--24
attacks, 19 deaths; Native troops--406 attacks, 260 deaths;
Followers--788 attacks, 640 deaths.] To all, the time was one of trial,
almost of terror. The violence of the battle may be cheaply braved,
but the insidious attacks of disease appal the boldest. Death moved
continually about the ranks of the army--not the death they had been
trained to meet unflinchingly, the death in high enthusiasm and the
pride of life, with all the world to weep or cheer; but a silent,
unnoticed, almost ignominious summons, scarcely less sudden and far more
painful than the bullet or the sword-cut. The Egyptians, in spite of
their fatalistic creed, manifested profound depression. The English
soldiers were moody and ill-tempered. Even the light-hearted Soudanese
lost their spirits; their merry grins were seen no longer; their
laughter and their drums were stilled. Only the British officers
preserved a stony cheerfulness, and ceaselessly endeavoured by energy
and example to sustain the courage of their men. Yet they suffered
most of all. Their education had developed their imaginations; and
imagination, elsewhere a priceless gift, is amid such circumstances a
dangerous burden.
It was, indeed, a time of sore trouble. To find the servant dead in the
camp kitchen; to catch a hurried glimpse of blanketed shapes hustled
quickly to the desert on a stretcher; to hold the lantern over the grave
into which a friend or comrade--alive and well six hours before--was
hastily lowered, even though it was still night; and through it all to
work incessantly at pressure in the solid, roaring heat, with a mind
ever on the watch for the earliest of the fatal symptoms and a thirst
that could only be quenched by drinking of the deadly and contaminated
Nile: all these things combined to produce an experience which those who
endured are unwilling to remember, but unlikely to forget. One by one
some of the best of the field army and the communication Staff were
stricken down. Gallant Fenwick, of whom they used to say that he was
'twice a V.C. without a gazette'; Polwhele, the railway subaltern, whose
strange knowledge of the Egyptian soldiers had won their stranger love;
Trask, an heroic doctor, indifferent alike to pestilence or bullets; Mr.
Vallom, the chief superintendent of engines at Halfa; Farmer, a young
officer already on his fourth campaign; Mr. Nicholson, the London
engineer; long, quaint, kind-hearted 'Roddy' Owen--all filled graves in
Halfa cemetery or at the foot of Firket mountain. At length the epidemic
was stamped out, and by the middle of August it had practically ceased
to be a serious danger. But the necessity of enforcing quarantine
and other precautions had hampered movement up and down the line of
communications, and so delayed the progress of the preparations for an
advance.
Other unexpected hindrances arose. Sir H. Kitchener had clearly
recognised that the railway, equipped as it then was, would be at the
best a doubtful means for the continual supply of a large force many
miles ahead of it. He therefore organised an auxiliary boat service and
passed gyassas and nuggurs [native sailing craft] freely up the Second
Cataract. During the summer months, in the Soudan, a strong north
wind prevails, which not only drives the sailing-boats up against the
stream--sometimes at the rate of twenty miles a day--but also gratefully
cools the air. This year, for forty consecutive days, at the critical
period of the campaign, the wind blew hot and adverse from the south.
The whole auxiliary boat service was thus practically arrested. But in
spite of these aggravating obstacles the preparations for the advance
were forced onwards, and it soon became necessary for the gunboats and
steamers to be brought on to the upper reach of the river.
The Second Cataract has a total descent of sixty feet, and is about
nine miles long. For this distance the Nile flows down a rugged stairway
formed by successive ledges of black granite. The flood river deeply
submerges these steps, and rushes along above them with tremendous
force, but with a smooth though swirling surface. As the Nile subsides,
the steps begin to show, until the river tumbles violently from ledge to
ledge, its whole surface for miles churned to the white foam of broken
water, and thickly studded with black rocks. At the Second Cataract,
moreover, the only deep channel of the Nile is choked between narrow
limits, and the stream struggles furiously between stern walls of
rock. These dark gorges present many perils to the navigator. The most
formidable, the Bab-el-Kebir, is only thirty-five feet wide. The river
here takes a plunge of ten feet in seventy yards, and drops five feet at
a single bound. An extensive pool above, formed by the junction of two
arms of the river, increases the volume of the water and the force of
the stream, so that the 'Gate' constitutes an obstacle of difficulty and
danger which might well have been considered insurmountable.
It had been expected that in the beginning of July enough water would
be passing down the Second Cataract to enable the gunboats and steamers
waiting below to make the passage. Everything depended upon the rise of
the river, and in the perversity of circumstances the river this year
rose much later and slower than usual. By the middle of August, however,
the attempt appeared possible. On the 14th the first gunboat, the
Metemma, approached the Cataract. The North Staffordshire Regiment from
Gemai, and the 6th and 7th Egyptian Battalions from Kosheh, marched to
the 'Gate' to draw the vessel bodily up in spite of the current. The
best native pilots had been procured. Colonel Hunter and the naval
officers under Commander Colville directed the work. The boat had been
carefully prepared for the ordeal. To reduce, by raising the free-board,
the risk of swamping, the bows were heightened and strengthened, and
stout wooden bulwarks were built running from bow to stern. Guns and
ammunition were then removed, and the vessel lightened by every possible
means. A strop of wire rope was passed completely round the hull, and to
this strong belt the five cables were fastened--two on each side and
one at the bow. So steep was the slope of the water that it was found
necessary to draw all the fires, and the steamer was thus dependent
entirely upon external force. It was luckily possible to obtain a
direct pull, for a crag of black rock rose above the surface of the pool
opposite the 'Gate.' On this a steel block was fixed, and the hawser was
led away at right angles until it reached the east bank, where a smooth
stretch of sand afforded a convenient place for the hauling parties.
Two thousand men were then set to pull at the cables, yet such was the
extraordinary force of the current that, although the actual distance in
which these great efforts were necessary was scarcely one hundred yards,
the passage of each steamer occupied an hour and a half, and required
the most strenuous exertions of the soldiers. No accident, however,
occurred, and the six other vessels accomplished the ascent on
successive days. In a week the whole flotilla steamed safely in the open
water of the upper reach.
And now for a moment it seemed that the luck of the expedition had
returned. The cholera was practically extinct. The new gunboat Zafir
was nearly ready at Kosheh, and her imposing appearance delighted and
impressed the army. On the 23rd of August all the seven steamers which
had passed the Cataract arrived in a stately procession opposite the
camp. Almost at the same time the wind changed to the north, and a
cool and delicious breeze refreshed the weary men and bore southward
to Suarda a whole fleet of sailing boats laden with supplies, which had
been lying weather-bound during the previous six weeks at the head of
the rapids. The preparatory orders for the advance tinkled along the
telegraph. The North Staffordshire Regiment were, to the intense relief
of officers and men, warned to hold themselves in readiness for an
immediate move. The mounted troops had already returned to the front
from the camps in which they had been distributed. At last the miserable
delay was over.
From Kosheh to Kerma, the first Dervish position, the distance by river
is 127 miles. A study of the map shows that by land marches this can be
shortened by nearly forty-one miles; thirty miles being saved by cutting
across the great loop of the Nile from Kosheh to Sadin Fanti, and eleven
miles by avoiding the angle from Fereig to Abu Fatmeh. From Kerma
to Dongola, which latter town was the objective of the expedition, a
further distance of thirty-five miles must be traversed, making a total
of 120 miles by land or 161 by river. The long desert march from Kosheh
to Sadin Fanti was the only natural difficulty by land. Although the
river from Kosheh to Kerma is broken by continual rapids, it is, with
one interval, freely navigable at half Nile. The Amara Cataract, ten
miles beyond Kosheh, is easily ascended by sailing boats with a fair
wind, and by steamers without assistance. From Amara to the Kaibar
Cataract stretches a reach of sixty-five miles of open water. The Kaibar
Cataract is, during the flood, scarcely any hindrance to navigation; but
at Hannek, about thirty miles further on, the three miles of islands,
rocks, rapids, and broken water which are called the Third Cataract are,
except at high Nile, a formidable barrier, Once this is passed, there is
open water for more than 200 miles at all seasons to Merawi. The banks
of the river, except near Sadin Fanti, where the hills close in, are
flat and low. The Eastern bank is lined with a fringe of palm-trees
and a thin strip of cultivation, which constitutes what is called 'the
fertile province of Dongola.' On the other side the desert reaches the
water's edge. Along the right bank of this part of the river the army
was now to move.
The first act of the advance was the occupation of Absarat, and on the
23rd of August MacDonald's brigade marched thither from Suarda, cutting
across the desert to Sadin Fanti, and then following the bank of the
Nile. The occupation of Absarat covered the next movement. On the 26th
Lewis's brigade was ordered to march across the loop from Kosheh to
Sadin Fanti, and reinforce the brigade at Absarat. The distance of
thirty-seven miles was far too great to be accomplished without a system
of watering-places. This the Sirdar rapidly organised. Water-depots were
formed by carrying tanks and water-skins on camels to two points in the
desert, and replenishing them by daily convoys. But now a heavy calamity
descended on the arrangements of the General and the hopes of the
troops.
During the afternoon of the 25th the wind veered suddenly to the south,
and thereupon a terrific storm of sand and rain, accompanied by thunder
and lightning, burst over the whole of the Nubian desert, and swept
along the line of communications from Suarda to Halfa. On the next day a
second deluge delayed the march of Lewis's brigade. But late on the 27th
they started, with disastrous results. Before they had reached the
first watering-place a third tempest, preceded by its choking sandstorm,
overtook them. Nearly 300 men fell out during the early part of the
night, and crawled and staggered back to Kosheh. Before the column
reached Sadin Fanti 1,700 more sank exhausted to the ground. Out of one
battalion 700 strong, only sixty men marched in. Nine deaths and eighty
serious cases of prostration occurred, and the movement of the brigade
from Kosheh to Absarat was grimly called 'The Death March.'
The 'Death March' was the least of the misfortunes caused by the storms.
The violent rains produced floods such as had not been seen in the
Soudan for fifty years. The water, pouring down the broad valleys,
formed furious torrents in the narrower gorges. More than twelve miles
of the railway was washed away. The rails were twisted and bent; the
formation entirely destroyed. The telegraph wires were broken. The work
of weeks was lost in a few hours. The advance was stopped as soon as it
had been begun. At the moment when every military reason demanded speed
and suddenness, a hideous delay became inevitable.
In this time of crisis the success of the whole campaign hung in the
balance. Sir Herbert Kitchener did not then possess that measure of the
confidence and affection of his officers which his military successes
have since compelled. Public opinion was still undecided on the general
question of the war. The initial bad luck had frightened many. All
the croakers were ready. 'A Jingo Government'--'An incapable
general'--'Another disaster in the Soudan'--such were the whispers.
A check would be the signal for an outcry. The accounts of 'The Death
March' had not yet reached England; but the correspondents, irritated
at being 'chained to headquarters,' were going to see about that. And,
besides all this, there were the army to feed and the Dervishes to
fight. In this serious emergency, which threatened to wreck his schemes,
the Sirdar's organising talents shone more brilliantly than at any other
moment in this account. Travelling swiftly to Moghrat, he possessed
himself of the telephone, which luckily still worked. He knew the exact
position or every soldier, coolie, camel, or donkey at his disposal. In
a few hours, in spite of his crippled transport, he concentrated 5,000
men on the damaged sections of the line, and thereafter fed them until
the work was finished. In seven days traffic was resumed. The advance
had been delayed, but it was not prevented.
On the 5th of September the 1st (Lewis) and 2nd (MacDonald) Brigades
moved to Dulgo, and at the same time the remainder of the army began
to march across the loop from Kosheh by Sadin Fanti to Absarat. Every
available soldier had been collected for the final operation of the
campaign.
The Expeditionary Force was organised as follows:
Commander-in-Chief: The SIRDAR
The Infantry Division: COLONEL HUNTER Commanding
1st Brigade 2nd Brigade 3rd Brigade 4th Brigade
MAJOR LEWIS MAJOR MACDONALD MAJOR MAXWELL MAJOR DAVID
3rd Egyptians XIth Soudanese 2nd Egyptians 1st Egyptians
4th " XIIth " 7th " 5th "
IXth Soudanese XIIIth " 8th " 15th "
Xth "
Cavalry Brigade and Mounted Forces: MAJOR BURN-MURDOCH
Cavalry..... 8 squadrons
Camel Corps.... 6 companies
Horse Artillery... 1 battery
Artillery: MAJOR PARSONS
Field Artillery... 2 batteries
Maxims . ... 1 battery (British)
Divisional Troops: MAJOR CURRIE
North Staffordshire Regiment.... 1st Battalion
The Flotilla: COMMANDER COLVILLE
Gunboats... Zafir, Tamai, Abu Klea, Metemma, El Teb
Armed Steamers... Kaibar, Dal, Akasha
Total: 15,000 men, 8 war-vessels, and 36 guns
Thus thirteen of the sixteen battalions of the Egyptian Army were
employed at the front. Two others, the 6th and XIVth, were disposed
along the line of communication, holding the various fortified posts.
The 16th Battalion of reservists remained at Suakin. The whole native
army was engaged in the war, and the preservation of domestic order in
the capital and throughout the Khedive's dominions was left entirely to
the police and to the British Army of Occupation. By the 9th all four
brigades had reached the rendezvous at Dulgo; on the 10th the British
regiment, which it was determined to send up in the steamers, was moved
to Kosheh by rail from Sarras and Gemai. The Sirdar prepared to start
with the flotilla on the 12th.
But a culminating disappointment remained. By tremendous exertions
the Zafir had been finished in time to take part in the operations.
Throughout the army it was expected that the Zafir would be the feature
of the campaign. At length the work was finished, and the Zafir floated,
powerful and majestic, on the waters of the Nile. On the afternoon of
the 11th of September many officers and men came to witness her trial
trip. The bank was lined with spectators. Colville took command. The
Sirdar and his Staff embarked. Flags were hoisted and amid general
cheering the moorings were cast off. But the stern paddle had hardly
revolved twice when there was a loud report, like that of a heavy gun,
clouds of steam rushed up from the boilers, and the engines stopped. Sir
H. Kitchener and Commander Colville were on the upper deck. The latter
rushed below to learn what had happened, and found that she had burst
her low-pressure cylinder, a misfortune impossible to repair until a new
one could be obtained from Halfa and fitted.
In spite of this, however, the advance was not delayed. On the 13th the
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades occupied Kaderma. Here the flotilla overtook
them, and henceforward the boats on the river kept pace with the army on
the bank. Fareig was reached on the 14th, and as the numerous palms by
the water afforded a pleasant shade a halt of two days was ordered. On
the 16th the 4th Brigade arrived, and the concentration of the force was
then complete.
After the annihilation of his strong advanced post at Firket, the
Dervish Emir, Wad Bishara, concentrated his remaining forces in Dongola.
Here during the summer he had awaited, and in the middle of August
some small reinforcements under one Emir of low rank reached him from
Omdurman. The Khalifa, indeed, promised that many more should follow,
but his promises long remained unfulfilled, and the greatest strength
that Bishara could muster was 900 Jehadia, 800 Baggara Arabs, 2,800
spearmen, 450 camelmen, 650 cavalry--in all 5,600 men, with six small
brass cannon and one mitrailleuse gun. To augment in numbers, if not
in strength, this small force of regular soldiers, he impressed a large
number of the local tribesmen; but as these were, for the most part,
anxious to join the Government troops at the first opportunity, their
effect in the conflict was inconsiderable.
The first sign that the forces were drawing closer was the cutting of
the telegraph-wire by a Dervish patrol on the 6th of September. On
the 10th the Sirdar heard that Kerma was strongly held. On the 15th
of September the Egyptian cavalry first established contact with the
Dervish scouts, and a slight skirmish took place. On the 18th the whole
force advanced to Sardek, and as Bishara still held his position at
Kerma it looked as if an action was imminent. It was resolved to attack
the Dervish position at Kerma at dawn. Although it seemed that only four
miles separated the combatants, the night passed quietly. With the first
light the army began to move, and when the sun rose the spectacle of the
moving masses of men and artillery, with the gunboats on the right, was
inspiring. The soldiers braced themselves for the expected action. But
no sooner were the village and fort of Kerma visible than the report
passed along the ranks that they were deserted. Rumour was soon merged
in certainty, for on reaching Kerma it was found that the Dervishes had
evacuated the place, and only the strong, well-built mud fort attested
the recent presence of Bishara. Whither had he gone? The question was
not left unanswered.
Half a mile to the southward, on the opposite bank of the river, among
the groves of palm-trees ran a long and continuous line of shelter
trenches and loopholed walls. The flanks of this new position rested
on the deep morasses which extend from the river both on the north and
south sides of Hafir. A small steamer, a fleet of large gyassas and
other sailing vessels moored to the further shore explained what had
happened. Conscious of his weakness, the prudent Emir had adroitly
transported himself across the river, and had thus placed that broad
flood between his troops and their destruction.
Meanwhile the three gunboats--all that now remained of the armed
flotilla, for the Teb had run on a rock in the Hannek Cataract--were
steaming gradually nearer the enemy, and the army swung to the right,
and, forming along the river bank, became spectators of a scene of
fascinating interest. At half-past six the Horse battery unlimbered at
the water's edge, and began to fire obliquely up and across the river.
As soon as the first few shells had reached the Arab entrenchment the
whole line of shelter trenches was edged with smoke, and the Dervishes
replied with a heavy rifle fire. The distance was, however, too great
for their bad rifles and inferior ammunition, and their bullets,
although they occasionally struck the ground on which the infantry were
drawn up, did not during the day cause any loss to the watching army.
The Dervish position was about half a mile in length. As the gunboats
approached the northern end they opened fire with their guns, striking
the mud entrenchments at every shot, and driving clouds of dust and
splinters into the air. The Maxim guns began to search the parapets,
and two companies of the Staffordshire Regiment on board the unarmoured
steamers Dal and Akasha fired long-range volleys. Now, as on other
occasions throughout the war, the Dervishes by their military behaviour
excited the admiration of their enemies. Encouraged by the arrival in
the morning of a reinforcement from Omdurman of 1,000 Black Jehadia and
500 spearmen under Abdel Baki, the Dervish gunners stood to their guns
and the riflemen to their trenches, and, although suffering severely,
maintained a formidable fire.
The gunboats continued to advance, beating up slowly against the strong
current. As they came opposite Hafir, where the channel narrows to about
600 yards, they were received by a very heavy fire from guns placed in
cleverly screened batteries, and from the riflemen sheltered in deep
pits by the water's edge or concealed amid the foliage of the tops of
the palm-trees. These aerial skirmishers commanded the decks of the
vessels, and the shields of the guns were thus rendered of little
protection. All the water round the gunboats was torn into foam by the
projectiles. The bullets pattered against their sides, and, except where
they were protected by steel plates, penetrated. One shell struck the
Abu Klea on the water-line, and entered the magazine. Luckily it did not
explode, the Dervishes having forgotten to set the fuse. Three shells
struck the Metemma. On board the Tamai, which was leading, Commander
Colville was severely wounded in the wrist; Armourer-Sergeant Richardson
was killed at his Maxim gun, and on each boat some casualties occurred.
So hot was the fire that it was thought doubtful whether to proceed with
the bombardment, and the Tamai swung round, and hurried down the river
with the current and at full steam to report to the Sirdar. The
other gunboats remained in action, and continued to shell the Dervish
defences. The Tamai soon returned to the fight, and, steaming again up
the river, was immediately hotly re-engaged.
The sight which the army witnessed was thrilling. Beyond the flood
waters of the river, backed against a sky of staring blue and in the
blazing sunlight, the whole of the enemy's position was plainly visible.
The long row of shelter trenches was outlined by the white smoke of
musketry and dotted with the bright-coloured flags waving defiantly in
the wind and with the still brighter flashes of the guns. Behind the
entrenchments and among the mud houses and enclosures strong bodies of
the jibba-clad Arabs were arrayed. Still further back in the plain a
large force of cavalry--conspicuous by the gleams of light reflected
from their broad-bladed spears--wheeled and manœuvred. By the Nile
all the tops of the palm-trees were crowded with daring riflemen, whose
positions were indicated by the smoke-puffs of their rifles, or when
some tiny black figure fell, like a shot rook, to the ground. In
the foreground the gunboats, panting and puffing up the river, were
surrounded on all sides by spouts and spurts of water, thrown up by the
shells and bullets. Again the flotilla drew near the narrow channel;
again the watching army held their breath; and again they saw the
leading boat, the Metemma, turn and run down stream towards safety,
pursued by the wild cheers of the Arabs. It was evident that the
gunboats were not strong enough to silence the Dervish fire. The want of
the terrible Zafir was acutely felt.
The firing had lasted two hours and a half, and the enemy's resistance
was no less vigorous than at the beginning of the action. The Sirdar now
altered his plans. He saw that his flotilla could not hope to silence
the Dervishes. He therefore ordered De Rougemont--who had assumed
the command after Colville was wounded--to run past the entrenchments
without trying to crush their fire, and steam on to Dongola. To support
and cover the movement, the three batteries of artillery under Major
Parsons were brought into action from the swampy island of Artagasha,
which was connected at this season with the right bank by a shoal. At
the same time three battalions of infantry were moved along the river
until opposite the Arab position. At 9 A.M. the eighteen guns on the
island opened a tremendous bombardment at 1,200 yards range on the
entrenchments, and at the same time the infantry and a rocket detachment
concentrated their fire on the tops of the palm-trees. The artillery now
succeeded in silencing three of the five Dervish guns and in sinking
the little Dervish steamer Tahra, while the infantry by a tremendous
long-range fire drove the riflemen out of the palms. Profiting by
this, the gunboats at ten o'clock moved up the river in line, and,
disregarding the fusillade which the Arabs still stubbornly maintained,
passed by the entrenchment and steamed on towards Dongola. After this
the firing on both sides became intermittent, and the fight may be said
to have ended.
Both forces remained during the day facing each other on opposite sides
of the river, and the Dervishes, who evidently did not admit a defeat,
brandished their rifles and waved their flags, and their shouts of loud
defiance floated across the water to the troops. But they had suffered
very heavily. Their brave and skilful leader was severely wounded by
the splinters of a shell. The wicked Osman Azrak had been struck by a
bullet, and more than 200 Ansar had fallen, including several Emirs.
Moreover, a long train of wounded was seen to start during the afternoon
for the south. It is doubtful, however, whether Bishara would have
retreated, if he had not feared being cut off. He seems to have believed
that the Sirdar would march along the right bank at once to Dongola, and
cross there under cover of his gunboats. Like all Moslem soldiers, he
was nervous about his line of retreat. Nor, considering the overwhelming
force against him, can we wonder. There was, besides this strategic
reason for retiring, a more concrete cause. All his supplies of grain
were accumulated in the gyassas which lay moored to the west bank. These
vessels were under the close and accurate fire of the artillery and
Maxim guns on Artagasha island. Several times during the night the
hungry Dervishes attempted to reach their store; but the moon was bright
and the gunners watchful. Each time the enemy exposed themselves, a
vigorous fire was opened and they were driven back. When morning dawned,
it was found that Hafir was evacuated, and that the enemy had retreated
on Dongola.
Wad Bishara's anxiety about his line of retreat was unnecessary, for the
Sirdar could not advance on Dongola with a strong Dervish force on his
line of communications: and it was not desirable to divide the army and
mask Hafir with a covering force. But as soon as the Dervishes had left
their entrenchments the situation was simplified. At daybreak all the
Arab boats were brought over to the right bank by the villagers, who
reported that Bishara and his soldiers had abandoned the defence and
were retreating to Dongola. Thereupon the Sirdar, relieved of the
necessity of forcing the passage, transported his army peacefully to the
other bank. The operation afforded scope to his powers of organisation,
and the whole force--complete with cavalry, camels, and guns--was
moved across the broad, rushing river in less than thirty-six hours and
without any apparent difficulty.
The casualties on the 19th were not numerous, and in a force of nearly
15,000 men they appear insignificant. Commander Colville was wounded.
One British sergeant and one Egyptian officer were killed. Eleven native
soldiers were wounded. The total--fourteen--amounted to less than one
per thousand of the troops engaged. Nevertheless this picturesque and
bloodless affair has been solemnly called the 'Battle of Hafir.' Special
despatches were written for it. It is officially counted in records of
service as a 'general action.' Telegrams of congratulation were received
from her Majesty and the Khedive. A special clasp was struck. Of all the
instances of cheaply bought glory which the military history of recent
years affords, Hafir is the most remarkable.
The 20th and part of the 21st were occupied by the passage of the
army across the Nile. The troops were still crossing when the gunboats
returned from Dongola. The distance of this place by water from Hafir is
about thirty-six miles, and the flotilla had arrived opposite the
town during the afternoon of the 19th. A few shells expelled the small
Dervish garrison, and a large number of sailing vessels were captured.
The results of the movement of the gunboats to Dongola must, however, be
looked for at Hafir. In consequence of the Sirdar's manœuvre that place
was evacuated and the unopposed passage of the river secured.
Bishara continued his retreat during the 20th, and, marching all day,
reached Dongola in the evening. Wounded as he was, he re-occupied the
town and began forthwith to make preparations for the defence of its
considerable fortifications. The knowledge of his employment was not
hidden from his enemy, and during the 21st the gunboat Abu Klea,
under Lieutenant Beatty, R.N., arrived with the design of keeping him
occupied. Throughout the day a desultory duel was maintained between
the entrenchments and the steamer. At daylight on the 22nd, Beatty was
reinforced by another gunboat, and an unceasing bombardment was made on
the town and its defences.
Notwithstanding that the army did not finish crossing the river until
the afternoon of the 21st, the Sirdar determined to continue his advance
without delay, and the force accordingly marched twelve miles further
south and camped opposite the middle of the large island of Argo. At
daybreak the troops started again, and before the sun had attained its
greatest power reached Zowarat. This place was scarcely six miles from
Dongola, and, as it was expected that an action would be fought the next
day, the rest of eighteen hours was welcomed by the weary soldiers. All
day long the army remained halted by the palms of the Nile bank.
Looking through their glasses up the river, the officers might watch the
gunboats methodically bombarding Dongola, and the sound of the guns was
clearly heard. At intervals during the day odd parties of Dervishes,
both horse and foot, approached the outpost line and shots were
exchanged.
All these things, together with the consciousness that the culmination
of the campaign was now at hand, raised the excitement of the army to
a high pitch, and everyone lay down that night warmed by keen
anticipations. An atmosphere of unrest hung over the bivouac, and
few slept soundly. At three o'clock the troops were aroused, and at
half-past four the final advance on Dongola had begun.
It was still night. The full moon, shining with tropical brilliancy in a
cloudless sky, vaguely revealed the rolling plains of sand and the huge
moving mass of the army. As long as it was dark the battalions were
closely formed in quarter columns. But presently the warmer, yellower
light of dawn began to grow across the river and through the palms, and
gradually, as the sun rose and it became daylight, the dense formation
of the army was extended to an array more than two miles long. On the
left, nearest the river, marched Lewis's brigade--three battalions in
line and the fourth in column as a reserve. Next in order Maxwell's
three battalions prolonged the line. The artillery were in the centre,
supported by the North Staffordshire Regiment. The gunners of the Maxim
battery had donned their tunics, so that the lines and columns of yellow
and brown were relieved by a vivid flash of British red. MacDonald's
brigade was on the right. David's brigade followed in rear of the centre
as a reserve. The cavalry, the Camel Corps, and the Horse Artillery
watched the right flank; and on the left the gunboats steamed along the
river.
For two hours the army were the only living things visible on the smooth
sand, but at seven o'clock a large body of Dervish horse appeared on
the right flank. The further advance of half a mile discovered the Arab
forces. Their numbers were less than those of the Egyptians, but their
white uniforms, conspicuous on the sand, and the rows of flags of many
colours lent an imposing appearance to their array. Their determined
aspect, no less than the reputation of Bishara, encouraged the belief
that they were about to charge.
The disparity of the forces was, however, too great; and as the Egyptian
army steadily advanced, the Dervishes slowly retired. Their retreat was
cleverly covered by the Baggara horse, who, by continually threatening
the desert flank, delayed the progress of the troops. Bishara did
not attempt to re-enter the town, on which the gunboats were now
concentrating their fire, but continued to retire in excellent order
towards the south and Debba.
The Egyptian infantry halted in Dongola, which when they arrived they
found already in the hands of detachments from the flotilla. The red
flag with the Crescent and star waved once again from the roof of the
Mudiria. The garrison of 400 black Jehadia had capitulated, and were
already fraternising with their Soudanese captors, whose comrades in
arms they were soon to be. While the infantry occupied the town the
cavalry and Camel Corps were despatched in pursuit. The Baggara horse,
however, maintained a firm attitude, and attempted several charges to
cover the retreat of their infantry. In one of these an actual collision
occurred, and Captain Adams's squadron of Egyptian cavalry inflicted
a loss of six killed on the enemy at a cost to themselves of eight men
wounded. The cavalry and Camel corps had about twenty casualties in the
pursuit. But although the Dervishes thus withdrew in an orderly manner
from the field, the demoralising influence of retreat soon impaired
their discipline and order, and many small parties, becoming detached
from the main body, were captured by the pursuers. The line of retreat
was strewn with weapons and other effects, and so many babies were
abandoned by their parents that an artillery waggon had to be employed
to collect and carry them. Wad Bishara, Osman Azrak, and the Baggara
horse, however, made good their flight across the desert to Metemma,
and, in spite of terrible sufferings from thirst, retained sufficient
discipline to detach a force to hold Abu Klea Wells in case the retreat
was followed. The Dervish infantry made their way along the river to
Abu Hamed, and were much harassed by the gunboats until they reached the
Fourth Cataract, when the pursuit was brought to an end.
The Egyptian losses in the capture of Dongola and in the subsequent
pursuit were: British, nil. Native ranks: killed, 1; wounded, 25. Total,
26.
The occupation of Dongola terminated the campaign of 1896. About 900
prisoners, mostly the Black Jehadia, all the six brass cannon, large
stores of grain, and a great quantity of flags, spears, and swords
fell to the victors, and the whole of the province, said to be the
most fertile in the Soudan, was restored to the Egyptian authority.
The existence of a perpetual clear waterway from the head of the Third
Cataract to Merawi enabled the gunboats at once to steam up the river
for more than 200 miles, and in the course of the following month the
greater part of the army was established in Merawi below the Fourth
Cataract, at Debba, or at Korti, drawing supplies along the railway,
and from Railhead by a boat service on the long reach of open water.
The position of a strong force at Merawi--only 120 miles along the river
bank from Abu Hamed, the northern Dervish post--was, as will be seen,
convenient to the continuance of the campaign whenever the time should
arrive. But a long delay in the advance was now inevitable, and nearly
a year was destined to pass without any collision between the forces of
the Khedive and those of the Khalifa.
The success of the operations caused great public satisfaction in
England. The first step had been taken. The Soudan was re-entered. After
ten years of defensive war the Dervishes had been attacked, and it was
clear that when they were attacked with adequate forces they were not so
very terrible after all. The croakers were silent. A general desire
was manifested in the country that the operations should continue, and
although the Government did not yet abandon their tentative policy, or
resolve utterly to destroy the Khalifa's power, it was decided that, as
the road had so far been safe and pleasant, there was at present no need
to stop or turn back.
A generous gazette of honours was published. With a single exception,
which it would be invidious to specify, all the officers of the Egyptian
army were mentioned in despatches. Sir H. Kitchener, Colonel Hunter, and
Colonel Rundle were promoted Major-Generals for distinguished service
in the field; a special medal--on whose ribbon the Blue Nile is shown
flowing through the yellow desert--was struck; and both the engagement
at Firket and the affair at Hafir were commemorated by clasps. The
casualties during the campaign, including the fighting round Suakin,
were 43 killed and 139 wounded; 130 officers and men died from cholera;
and there were 126 deaths from other causes. A large number of British
officers were also invalided.