THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
We have considered many parts of the world and many aspects of the
present world settlement to see what seeds of future war may now be
germinating and what means we have of making them harmless. And in every
case we are brought back to the one great creative idea which this war
has produced, the League of Nations. The earlier notions of the League,
as issued, for example, about the year 1909 by certain American bodies,
centred upon the development of compulsory mediation or arbitration and
the setting up of a recognized permanent Court of International Law. The
flaw in this conception, operating alone, is a certain rigidity and
barrenness. It left states to work separately until they quarrelled or
saw a quarrel approaching, and only then, when the atmosphere was
already bad, it expected them to meet and accept arbitration. A great
addition to this was Sir Edward Grey's conception, already put in
practice during the Balkan Wars, of an extended _entente cordiale_
embracing all Europe and America. In his time France and England,
England and America, England and Italy, had formed a habit of cordiality
and frank dealing. When any trouble arose, the ambassadors had the habit
of meeting freely and discussing the trouble with perfect frankness,
almost as members of the same Ministry might do. This tendency was
helped by the enormous increase in international conferences,
commissions, and bureaux. And during the Balkan crisis of 1912-13 it was
in process of being extended to include Germany. Thus there was the
habit of frequent coöperation and mutual confidence. Unfortunately, this
friendly spirit depended on all parties being generally content with the
present condition of affairs; Germany was not content, and so the
_entente_ idea was balked. Under the League the nations are already
forming a habit of consultation and coöperation on non-controversial
matters which should be of immense help in dealing with differences
when they arise. Another great formative idea was contributed by General
Smuts, the principle of the mandate. He foresaw that there would be at
the end of the war an immense appropriation of tropical colonies; he
knew that the rivalry of the Great Powers for the possession of such
colonies was one of the chief sources of international strife; and he
saw that the right outlet was to put an end to the treatment of colonies
as "possessions" or mere sources of wealth to the colonizing Power. The
populations that are not able to stand alone should be taken in trust by
the whole League of Nations, which should appoint a particular Power in
each particular case to carry out the trust. Again, the great stirring
of discontent among the labouring classes in almost all parts of the
world led to the formation of a special International Commission on
Labour, which has so far met with great success. It will in general have
the effect of raising the conditions of the most backward peoples to
something like the level of the best.
And lastly, when all these things were in train, the policy for which
both Great Britain and the late Czar of Russia had striven so long and
vainly would at last become feasible, and the nations might consent to
disarm.
Thus the Covenant of the League, an unpretentious but well-considered
document, the result of repeated criticism and study by many of the best
minds in Europe and America, attempts to meet and check all the visible
and predictable causes of war.
There should be no wars of ambition. They are to be met by absolute
coercion. The League can make it certain that deliberate war undertaken
for national aggrandizement will end, not in profit, but in ruinous
loss.
There should be no wars caused by the irresistible desire to escape from
foreign oppression or intolerable conditions. They are made unnecessary
by provisions enabling any oppressed nation to lay its case before the
Assembly or Council and obtain such redress as the most disinterested
tribunal can give.
A war which is caused by the emergence of some clash of interest or
unforeseen dispute between two states cannot, in the nature of things,
be made absolutely impossible. The League opposes to that danger, not a
blank wall, but, as it were, a series of springs calculated to exhaust
its force; a court for points of law, mediation for points of policy,
compulsory delay and reconsideration for all disputes whatsoever. It
will be a strange dispute which, given honest intentions on both sides,
lasts through all the checks provided by Articles XII to XVII and
plunges nations into war at the end of them.
Wars caused by rivalry for the possession of colonies and rebellions
caused in colonies by unjust exploitation are, as far as regards
mandated areas, provided against by Article XXII; for the other colonial
territories, which do not come under a mandate, at least the way of
safety is shown.
Wars caused, or made more likely, by the mutual prejudices of nations,
by their habit of working always apart and in secrecy, are met by the
immense field of international coöperation which the League proposes,
and its absolute insistence upon frank interchange of information.
Wars caused by exclusive tariffs or national monopolies of material are
in part provided against by Articles XXII and XXIII and in part by XI.
Wars which might be caused by domestic revolutions, as in Russia, are
made less likely by the Labour Commission, which assures a remedy for
any labour conditions in a particular country which are so bad as to
incur the active condemnation of the world.
But it is impossible by mere enumeration to be sure of meeting all the
causes from which some new war may start. The League, in the last
resort, falls back on the mutual trust and good-will of its members, and
particularly of its members' representatives, secured partly by the
common interest in peace and partly by the habit of coöperation for
ordinary affairs. The _esprit de corps_ of the League's permanent
Secretariat, with a professional interest in the preservation of peace
and good-will, is a new and important factor in the world's life. Any
member of the League has the right to bring to the attention of the
Assembly or Council "any circumstance whatever affecting international
relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good
understanding between nations upon which peace depends."
In America the Covenant of the League is apt to be represented as a
terribly drastic and tyrannical document. Cartoons show John Bull, or
some equally repulsive abstraction, dressed in khaki, dragging away
American youths to fight enemies of the League in remote parts of Asia
or Africa. But on this side of the Atlantic it is generally criticized
for not being drastic enough. It does not make war formally impossible.
It does not bind all its members to make war on any Covenant-breaker. It
does not even bind any member of the League to accept the decision of
the majority. It leaves its members almost as free as if they were
outside. They are pledged to accept, if they ask for it, a decision of
the International Court; they are pledged to the principle of mandate;
they are pledged to boycott any deliberate war-maker. But that is
practically all. The League's true weapon is not force, but publicity.
The truth is, and it is a truth of fundamental importance in political
matters, that no structure can be more rigid than the material of which
it is made. Engagements between human beings must needs be as elastic as
human nature itself. Had the Covenant laid down that every member of the
League was to make war or peace, or change its foreign policy, in
obedience to the majority of the Council or Assembly and in disregard of
the wishes of its own parliament, the result would have been either that
no nations would join such a League or that, if they did, the League
would break at the first strain.
The principles laid down in the Covenant are, in the judgment of the
present writer, principles long recognized and absolutely right. If
generally acted on, they will prevent war. If generally neglected and
broken, they will allow wars to ensue. This fact seems to be pretty
generally recognized among the more reputable statesmen of Europe. But
it remains unfortunately true that they are principles implying a
considerably higher standard of international morality than has
hitherto been consistently observed by any nations, even the best. If
absolute fidelity to the Covenant by all its signatories were necessary
for the peace of the world, the world would have a very poor prospect
before it. What we must aim at is as much fidelity as possible. There
are great difficulties. America is absent. Germany and Russia are
absent. France cannot yet quite escape from her war psychology. But if
Great Britain is faithful, it will be hard for other nations to be
obviously and grossly false. The European neutrals, like Switzerland,
Holland, and Norway, will be clear voices for justice and fair dealing.
The beaten nations, when once admitted, will probably be on the same
side, since when wrong-doing begins it is the weak who are first to
suffer. And, after all, all human beings have a strong dislike of
injustice, when they do not directly gain by it. The great majority of
the fifty-one members of the League will be disinterested on most
questions of dispute, and will therefore form a good tribunal of
opinion.
But the mere clash of contrary selfishnesses produces no sound
equilibrium. The League will not succeed unless in some of the great
nations, above all in Great Britain, there are at the head of affairs
statesmen who believe firmly in the principles of the League and are
capable both of effort and of self-sacrifice for the sake of them, and
behind the statesmen a strong and intelligent determination in the mass
of the people to see that the League is made genuinely the leading force
in international politics.
The present disorder of the world is one of those in which the remedy is
not obscure, but perfectly ascertained. The only difficulty lies in
applying it. The nations of the world must coöperate; and for that they
must trust one another; and for that the only way is for each Government
separately to be worthy of trust.
It will be long, no doubt, before this end is consummated or even
approached. The foregoing pages have shown how far from perfect is the
practice of even the most stable and advanced nations. And the
tendencies set up by the war, with its infinite reactions and
ramifications, are almost all such as to make vastly more difficult in
each case the necessary effort towards good faith and good-will. Yet, if
the difficulties are greater, the necessity is greater also; and after
all the war has brought its inspirations as well as its corruptions. The
craving for this Peace which has not come is, I believe, still the
unspoken and often unconscious motive of millions who seem, at first
glance, to be only brawling for revenges or revolutions; it lies, like a
mysterious torment, at the heart of this storm-tossed and embittered
world, crying for it knows not what.
THE END
BOOKS FOR FURTHER READING
The Series published by the American Association for International
Conciliation, 1-150, comprising the text of all the most important
official statements, treaties, agreements, etc., dealing with
International Affairs.
The League of Nations Union pamphlets for Study Circles: _The League and
its Guarantees_, by Gilbert Murray; _The League in the East_ by Arnold
Toynbee; _The League and Labour_, by Delisle Burns; _Economic Functions
of the League_, by Norman Angell; _Mandates and Empire_, by Leonard
Woolf; _The Future of the Covenant_, by G. Lowes Dickinson.
_The League of Nations, Nine Essays_, by Viscount Grey and others.
Oxford University Press, 1919.
_The Idea of a League of Nations_, H. G. Wells and others, for the
Research Committee of the League of Nations Union. Oxford Press, 1917.
_Economic Foundations of Peace_, J. L. Garvin. Macmillan, 1917.
Report of the International Financial Conference, printed for the League
of Nations. Brussels, 1920.
Complete Official Proceedings of the same, 3 vols. London and Brussels.
Report of the Economic Conference summoned by the Fight the Famine
Council.
_Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey_, Gilbert Murray. Clarendon Press,
Oxford.
_A Century of British Foreign Policy_, G. P. Gooch and Canon Masterman.
Allen and Unwin.
_Economic Consequences of the Peace Treaty_, J. Maynard Keynes.
Macmillan, 1919.
_The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty_, B.
M. Baruch. Harpers, 1920.
_The Choice Before Us_, G. Lowes Dickinson. Allen and Unwin, 1918.
_Causes of International War_, G. Lowes Dickinson. Swarthmore Press.
_International Politics_, Delisle Burns. Methuen, 1920.
_International Government_, L. S. Woolf. Allen and Unwin.
_Empire and Commerce in Africa_, L. S. Woolf. Allen and Unwin.
_The War of Steel and Gold_, H. N. Brailsford. 1913.
_After the Peace_, by H. N. Brailsford. 1920.
_The Eastern Question_, J. A. R. Marriott. Oxford Press, 1917.
The Official Reports of the First Meeting of the Assembly of the League
of Nations, Nov. 15-Dec. 18, 1920, are most instructive, and will
probably be published in book form.
The Riverside Press
CAMBRIDGE . MASSACHUSETTS
U.S.A.
Transcriber's Notes
Original spelling, including that of proper names retained.
Minor punctuation errors and omissions corrected.
Page 105 "for the conside ation" ==> "for the consideration"
End of Project Gutenberg's The Problem of Foreign Policy, by Gilbert Murray