PRE-WAR AND POST-WAR CAUSES OF STRIFE
The war has left behind it a great number of small wars or guerrillas.
Most of them have their explanation in some ordinary excess of
nationalism or revenge or greed. The Serbs, intoxicated with their new
greatness, are still causing war in Albania and Montenegro. The
Rumanians recently invaded Hungary, in spite of all the thunders of the
Peace Conference, because they had been robbed by Austria-Hungary and
wanted revenge and reparation. The Hungarians have alarmed all their
neighbours and forced them into a defensive alliance, which now calls
itself the "Little Entente." The Lithuanians and Poles have fought, but
been reconciled by the mediation of the League of Nations. The Armenians
have been massacred again, under the eyes of the French army of
occupation in Cilicia, where they had gathered under a repeated
guarantee of safety given by France and England. The Turkish
Nationalists are holding out very unsuccessfully in the centre of
Anatolia against a Greek army carrying out the directions of the Supreme
Council. The Turkish peasants are increasingly reluctant to take arms
again. The Koreans have helplessly declared their right to independence
from Japan, and are apparently being reduced by a terrible persecution.
These are the mere belated effervescence of the passions of the Great
War. The hate and pride which are the basis of nationalism and which
were so violently stimulated by the events of the war cannot be expected
to die out at once. It was calculated a short time ago that there were
twenty-seven "wars" of one sort or another in progress. But they will
presumably simmer down as social conditions become more normal.
It is interesting to observe that two of the greatest causes of war,
according to the judgment of normal times, are now not actively
operating. Before 1914, if one was asked to name the main causes of
war, the answer would have been, first, competitive armaments, and,
second, protective tariffs and the competition for markets. These causes
will remain fully as dangerous for the future, but it so happens that
none of the existing wars is directly due to either.
I. ARMAMENTS
In one sense, indeed, armaments are actually operating now as a cause of
war. There are far too many firearms lying about. America, England, and
France have made very lavish gifts or sales of lethal weapons to various
bodies with whom they sympathized. And the arms have by no means always
stayed in the place for which they were intended. Guns which we sent to
Denikin were sold by corrupt officials to the Bolsheviks, and passed on
by them to the Afghans to use against us on the Indian frontier. Such
things cause some deaths and some laughter, but are not permanent evils.
No European nation, except those actually compelled, has made much
progress towards disarmament. It is said that Great Britain has
actually made the greatest reduction, but both in numbers of men and in
expenditure our standard is fantastically higher than what was forced
upon us by German competition in 1914. It is impossible to reduce our
forces in a really drastic way as long as our commitments are so large
and--perhaps we must add--our policy so inconsistent and provocative.
Peace with Russia, a settlement with Mesopotamia and Egypt on the lines
laid down by the Covenant and the Milner Report, the evacuation of
Ireland, the execution of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in India, and
the extension of similar reforms to Burmah and the much-suffering
Ceylon, will permit us really to envisage for the first time a
satisfactory measure of disarmament. The air force is already greatly
reduced. The vast size of the navy appears to be utterly unjustified, at
any rate by conditions in Europe. The French army is far beyond the
economic powers of France to support. The same seems to be true of
Italy, and is certainly true of Serbia, which is still calling
conscripts to the colours. Greece is vastly overarmed; but Greek
policy, though erring on the ambitious side, has probably been more
sagaciously guided under M. Venizelos than any in Europe. The fall of
that great man, due mainly to the prolonged economic distresses of
Greece, will probably cause a resurgence of Mustapha Kemal and the
Turkish nationalists. Meantime the Russian conscript army, though
apparently ill-armed and ill-supplied, is overwhelming in numbers and is
led by officers of the old régime, experienced and not absolutely
incompetent. The Russian army is far the greatest and, in a political
sense, the most dangerous, in the world.
But it is not the actual armaments, ruinous as they are, that are the
essential poison to civilized society. It is the competition in
armaments. That has now been abolished throughout Europe. Slowly,
unequally, reluctantly, the armaments which, in Lord Grey's words, went
uphill under the lead of Germany, are now, under the same lead, groping
their way downhill. There is only one great nation which, if words are
to be believed, thinks seriously of starting a competition in armaments.
It has been announced, more than once, by the American Government that,
like Germany in the years before 1914, they have arranged a naval
programme which will effectually put an end to the British command of
the seas and give the United States "world primacy" (see speech of Mr.
Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, in the _Times_ of September 1, 1920).
Since the British Empire is a scattered series of communities dependent
for their communications upon the sea, and in particular since the
population of Great Britain is absolutely dependent for its food on the
free use of sea transport, it has been generally acknowledged in Europe
that the sea-power of Great Britain was necessary to its existence.
British sea-power has never been challenged except by definite enemies
in pursuit of a definite war policy. If the United States were seriously
to embark on the same policy as the late German Government, it seems as
if all other causes of war must sink into insignificance beside this
gigantic and deliberate one. But, in spite of some bewildering
symptoms, it can hardly be believed that this conclusion is possible, at
any rate until America has definitely and finally refused to be a member
of the League of Nations.
Relations between Great Britain and America have of late been
dangerously strained, partly owing to causes outside our Government's
control, but in part owing to the scandal caused in America by certain
developments of the Peace Treaty, and by the excesses of the Government
forces in Ireland. A wise policy may help to heal this growing breach,
and if America accepts in some form or other membership of the League of
Nations, it ought to be possible in friendly discussion to arrive at
some understanding on the question of naval armaments.
The problem of armaments is put in the very forefront of the Covenant of
the League, immediately after the constitution of the League itself. By
Article VIII--
The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace
requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point
consistent with (_a_) national safety and (_b_) the enforcement by
common action of national obligations.
The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and
circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such
reduction for the consideration and action of the several
Governments.
Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at
least every ten years.
After these plans shall have been adopted by the several
Governments the limits of armament therein fixed shall not be
exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.
The article goes on to recognize that private munition factories are
objectionable, and must somehow be dealt with, and to lay down that all
members must interchange "full and frank information" about their
armaments and programmes. And the next article constitutes a permanent
Commission to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of
Article VIII and other similar matters.
The cautious language of the Covenant on this subject is due to the
inherent difficulty of the subject itself. It would be absurd to lay
down that every member of the League must disband its forces forthwith;
the League could hardly undertake to go to war in order to compel some
strong Power to disarm. And it is obvious that different nations need
different degrees of armament. The chief difficulty is that disarmament
ought in justice and prudence to be simultaneous all round. It is only
by the compulsion of a lost war that Germany has been compelled to
disarm while her enemies stand round her with large armies, and even in
Germany the process is evidently very difficult to enforce. Too many
rifles and machine guns have got loose in private hands. No League could
compel Poland or Rumania to disarm while the Red Army of Russia stood
waiting across the frontier; or compel Great Britain to disarm while the
northwest frontier of India is constantly attacked, while the Bolsheviks
are in Persia and British officials are besieged in Mesopotamia. This
difficulty will remain even when the world begins to settle down and the
countries of Europe are no longer governed by their War Offices. On the
other hand, economic pressure, as well as Liberal feeling, will make for
the reduction of armies and navies. It may be difficult to get
volunteers for military service, and it will certainly be dangerous to
impress conscripts. There will be a stronger and more genuine popular
demand for disarmament than for most of the desirable provisions of the
League Covenant, and Governments dependent on the popular will may find
their hands forced. But in the main disarmament must depend on the
restoration of confidence; though probably it is true in most cases that
if the disarmament comes first the confidence will follow.
II. MARKETS AND FOOD
The second of these great causes of war, protection and the competition
for markets, has somewhat changed its aspect since the comparative
exhaustion of the world supplies of food and raw material. Before the
war, nations chiefly wanted to sell. Markets were the great object of
ambition, and tariff walls the great means of offence. Great Britain, of
course, kept her doors everywhere open to the trade of the world. It is
one of the decisive marks to her credit in the apportionment of the
comparative guilt of the nations in preparing that international
atmosphere which made the war of 1914 possible. But if she had chosen at
any moment to close her doors, she could have injured grievously every
other great nation throughout the globe; and the British Tariff Reform
Campaign was one of the excuses used by the German Government to
frighten their people into a war spirit. When Austria wished to ruin
Serbia she simply put a prohibitive duty on the import of pigs.
Now, since the war, what most nations want is not in the first place
markets; it is food and raw materials. They have not, of course,
abolished their tariffs, but their first anxiety is to be able to buy
food. Austria does not want to keep out Serbian pigs. She begs for them,
and Serbia will not let her have them. The most consistently and
narrowly protectionist nations, like France or Australia, no longer
concentrate on forbidding their neighbours to sell to them. On the
contrary, they refuse to sell food and raw material to their neighbours.
The policy of keeping the food and raw materials of the British Empire
for British consumption is already widely advocated and has powerful
champions in the Government. As long as it is confined to palm kernels,
this policy, though bad from almost every point of view, is not fatal.
But if ever it were to be carried consistently through, it would mean
war. The British Empire holds such a vast extent of the earth's surface
that it has inevitably given hostages to fortune. So huge an empire can
only be tolerated if it behaves tolerably. If we keep to ourselves and
use for our own profit all the overwhelmingly large stores of food and
raw material which by our vast annexations of territory we now control,
thereby reducing other nations first to a stagnation of trade and then
to starvation, the natural and inevitable answer to such a proceeding
would seem to be a world crusade for our destruction.
This is the chief point, apparently, in which the influence of what is
called "capitalism" seems to be a direct cause of war. Great
capitalists, or those impersonal organizations of capital which seem
likely now to supersede the individual capitalist, are normally strong
influences for peace. They need peace for the success of their
undertakings and are in danger of ruin if war breaks out. But they do at
times stand to gain enormous sums by concessions and monopolies and by
control over materials which are the subject of an intense demand from
great masses of people. And no doubt one way in which they will seek to
get these monopolies and controls is by putting pressure on Governments
for so-called patriotic reasons to exclude foreign competition. This is
a very real danger.
The Covenant of the League of Nations has not dared to insist on free
trade. Obviously it could not, since the majority of the member nations
are against free trade. But it does lay down certain rules to check
aggressive protection.
All the territories transferred by the war from the possession of
Germany and Turkey to their conquerors are subjected to the principle of
mandate. They are not held as possessions. They are held "as a sacred
trust for civilization" with the express purpose of securing the
"well-being and development" of the native populations. In particular,
the mandatories agree to guarantee "equal opportunities for the trade
and commerce of other members of the League." As the membership of the
League is increased, this will practically ensure the "open door" to all
nations in the mandated areas. It seems also clearly to forbid the
establishment of national monopolies. If a mandatory finds copper-mines
or oil-wells in its territory, it is bound to develop them as "a trust
for civilization." Any profit it receives must be in the nature of wages
for work done. A mandatory may not exclude or hamper the trade of
another member of the League by tariffs,[5] much less keep the oil for
the exclusive use of itself and its friends, as is at present proposed
by England and France in Mesopotamia. The condemnation of this proposal
by the Assembly of the League in November, 1920, backed by a vigorous
protest from the United States, has, it may be hoped, made such a
violation of the Covenant impossible.
[Footnote 5: Except in Mandates C (Pacific Islands, etc.), where
Australia successfully refused to submit to any economic restrictions.
See, however, the definite pledge given by the Allied Reply, p. 78,
above.]
In territories not mandated as a result of the war, but otherwise
similar to the mandated areas, such as the pre-war colonies of the
various Powers, these rules, of course, do not hold. Yet it may be hoped
that at least they will be recognized as good rules, to which
approximation should be made as circumstances permit.
In all their dealings, moreover, members of the League agree (Article
XXIII) to "secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit,
and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League."
The language of this article is a little vague. One can trace in it the
influence of a struggle. But at least it forbids tariff wars, and it
gives the League a handle for interference in case of any very great
iniquity. It does not forbid national monopolies; but a monopoly in
foodstuffs which came near to inflicting famine on other members of the
League would, under it, at least give cause for remark. And no clause,
however strong, could in practice be sure of attaining more. The League
has to be built out of nations as they already exist, and the rules of
the League out of their public opinion. The real danger here, as in so
many other cases, lies not in the caution and moderation of the language
used in the Covenant, but first in the questionable sincerity of the
nations in carrying out the pledges signed by their representatives, and
secondly in the possibility that, through ill-will, or fear, or
self-interest, or mob-passion, or some other disastrous influence, the
ex-enemy Powers be not quickly included in the League. Not until all
Central Europe is in the League can the world begin to breathe freely.