Immediately after the change of administration in 1885, the pressure
began for the ousting of Republican office-holders and the substitution
of Democrats in their places. While I claim to have earned a position
which entitles me to resent the accusation that I either openly or
covertly favor swift official decapitation for partizan purposes, I
have no sympathy with the intolerant people who, without the least
appreciation of the meaning of party work and service, superciliously
affect to despise all those who apply for office as they would those
guilty of a flagrant misdemeanor. It will indeed be a happy day when
the ascendancy of party principles, and the attainment of wholesome
administration, will be universally regarded as sufficient rewards
of individual and legitimate party service. Much has already been
accomplished in the direction of closing the door of partizanship as
an entrance to public employment; and though this branch of effort in
the public interest may well be still further extended, such extension
certainly should be supplemented by earnest and persuasive attempts to
correct among our people long-cherished notions concerning the ends
that should be sought through political activity, and by efforts to
uproot pernicious and office-rewarding political methods. I am not sure
that any satisfactory progress can be made toward these results, until
our good men with unanimity cease regarding politics as necessarily
debasing, and by active participation shall displace the selfish and
unworthy who, when uninterrupted, control party operations. In the
meantime, why should we indiscriminately hate those who seek office?
They may not have entirely emancipated themselves from the belief that
the offices should pass with party victory; but even if this is charged
against them, it can surely be said that in all other respects they are
in many instances as honest, as capable, and as intelligent as any of
us. There may be reasons and considerations which properly defeat their
aspirations, but their applications are not always disgraceful. I have
an idea that sometimes the greatest difference between them and those
who needlessly abuse them and gloat over their discomfiture, consists
in the fact that the office-seekers desire office, and their critics,
being more profitably employed, do not. I feel constrained to say
this much by way of defending, or at least excusing, many belonging
to a numerous contingent of citizens, who, after the 4th of March,
1885, made large drafts upon my time, vitality, and patience; and I
feel bound to say that in view of their frequent disappointments, and
the difficulty they found in appreciating the validity of the reasons
given for refusing their applications, they accepted the situation
with as much good nature and contentment as could possibly have been
anticipated. It must be remembered that they and their party associates
had been banished from Federal office-holding for twenty-four years.
I have no disposition to evade the fact that suspensions of officials
holding presidential commissions began promptly and were quite
vigorously continued; but I confidently claim that every suspension
made was with honest intent and, I believe, in accordance with the
requirements of good administration and consistent with prior executive
pledges. Some of these officials held by tenures unlimited as to their
duration. Among these were certain internal-revenue officers who, it
seemed to me, in analogy with others doing similar work but having a
limited tenure, ought to consider a like limited period of incumbency
their proper term of office; and there were also consular officials
and others attached to the foreign service who, I believe it was
then generally understood, should be politically in accord with the
administration.
By far the greater number of suspensions, however, were made on
account of gross and indecent partizan conduct on the part of the
incumbents. The preceding presidential campaign, it will be recalled,
was exceedingly bitter, and governmental officials then in place were
apparently so confident of the continued supremacy of their party that
some of them made no pretense of decent behavior. In numerous instances
the post-offices were made headquarters for local party committees and
organizations and the centers of partizan scheming. Party literature
favorable to the postmasters’ party, that never passed regularly
through the mails, was distributed through the post-offices as an item
of party service, and matter of a political character, passing through
the mails in the usual course and addressed to patrons belonging to
the opposite party, was withheld; disgusting and irritating placards
were prominently displayed in many post-offices, and the attention
of Democratic inquirers for mail matter was tauntingly directed to
them by the postmaster; and in various other ways postmasters and
similar officials annoyed and vexed those holding opposite political
opinions, who, in common with all having business at public offices,
were entitled to considerate and obliging treatment. In some quarters
official incumbents neglected public duty to do political work,
and especially in Southern States they frequently were not only
inordinately active in questionable political work, but sought to do
party service by secret and sinister manipulation of colored voters,
and by other practices inviting avoidable and dangerous collisions
between the white and colored population.
I mention these things in order that what I shall say later may be
better understood. I by no means attempt to describe all the wrongdoing
which formed the basis of many of the suspensions of officials that
followed the inauguration of the new administration. I merely mention
some of the accusations which I recall as having been frequently made,
by way of illustrating in a general way certain phases of pernicious
partizanship that seemed to me to deserve prompt and decisive
treatment. Some suspensions, however, were made on proof of downright
official malfeasance. Complaints against office-holders based on
personal transgression or partizan misconduct were usually made to
the Executive and to the heads of departments by means of letters,
ordinarily personal and confidential, and also often by means of verbal
communications. Whatever papers, letters, or documents were received
on the subject, either by the President or by any head of department,
were, for convenience of reference, placed together on department
files. These complaints were carefully examined; many were cast aside
as frivolous or lacking support, while others, deemed of sufficient
gravity and adequately established, resulted in the suspension of the
accused officials.
Suspensions instead of immediate removals were resorted to, because
under the law then existing it appeared to be the only way that
during a recess of the Senate an offending official could be ousted
from his office, and his successor installed pending his nomination
to the Senate at its next session. Though, as we have already seen,
the law permitted suspensions by the President “in his discretion,” I
considered myself restrained by the pledges I had made from availing
myself of the discretion thus granted without reasons, and felt bound
to make suspensions of officials having a definite term to serve, only
for adequate cause.
It will be observed further on that no resistance was then made to the
laws pertaining to executive removals and suspensions, on the ground
of their unconstitutionality; but I have never believed that either
the law of 1867 or the law of 1869, when construed as permitting
interference with the freedom of the President in making removals,
would survive a judicial test of its constitutionality.
Within thirty days after the Senate met in December, 1885, the
nominations of the persons who had been designated to succeed officials
suspended during the vacation were sent to that body for confirmation,
pursuant to existing statutes.
It was charged against me by the leader of the majority in the Senate
that these nominations of every kind and description, representing
the suspensions made within ten months succeeding the 4th of March,
1885, numbered six hundred and forty-three. I have not verified this
statement, but I shall assume that it is correct. Among the officials
suspended there were two hundred and seventy-eight postmasters,
twenty-eight district attorneys, and twenty-four marshals, and among
those who held offices with no specified term there were sixty-one
internal-revenue officers and sixty-five consuls and other persons
attached to the foreign service.
It was stated on the floor of the Senate, after it had been in session
for three months, that of the nominations submitted to that body to
fill the places of suspended officials fifteen had been confirmed and
two rejected.
Quite early in the session frequent requests in writing began to issue
from the different committees of the Senate to which these nominations
were referred, directed to the heads of the several departments having
supervision of the offices to which the nominations related, asking the
reasons for the suspension of officers whose places it was proposed to
fill by means of the nominations submitted, and for all papers on file
in their departments which showed the reasons for such suspensions.
These requests foreshadowed what the senatorial construction of the
law of 1869 might be, and indicated that the Senate, notwithstanding
constitutional limitations, and even in the face of the repeal of the
statutory provision giving it the right to pass upon suspensions by the
President, was still inclined to insist, directly or indirectly, upon
that right. These requests, as I have said, emanated from committees of
the Senate, and were addressed to the heads of departments. As long as
such requests were made by committees I had no opportunity to discuss
the questions growing out of such requests with the Senate itself,
or to make known directly to that body the position on this subject
which I felt bound to assert. Therefore the replies made to committees
by the different heads of departments stated that by direction of
the President they declined furnishing the reasons and papers so
requested, on the ground that the public interest would not be thereby
promoted, or on the ground that such reasons and papers related to a
purely executive act. Whatever language was used in these replies,
they conveyed the information that the President had directed a denial
of the requests made, because in his opinion the Senate could have no
proper concern with the information sought to be obtained.
It may not be amiss to mention here that while this was the position
assumed by the Executive in relation to suspensions, all the
information of any description in the possession of the Executive or in
any of the departments, which would aid in determining the character
and fitness of those nominated in place of suspended officials, was
cheerfully and promptly furnished to the Senate or its committees when
requested.
In considering the requests made for the transmission of the reasons
for suspensions, and the papers relating thereto, I could not avoid the
conviction that a compliance with such requests would be to that extent
a failure to protect and defend the Constitution, as well as a wrong to
the great office I held in trust for the people, and which I was bound
to transmit unimpaired to my successors; nor could I be unmindful of a
tendency in some quarters to encroach upon executive functions, or of
the eagerness with which executive concession would be seized upon as
establishing precedent.
The nominations sent to the Senate remained neglected in the committees
to which they had been referred; the requests of the committees for
reasons and papers touching suspensions were still refused, and it
became daily more apparent that a sharp contest was impending. In
this condition of affairs it was plainly intimated by members of the
majority in the Senate that if all charges against suspended officials
were abandoned and their suspensions based entirely upon the ground
that the spoils belonged to the victors, confirmations would follow.
This, of course, from my standpoint, would have been untruthful and
dishonest; but the suggestion indicated that in the minds of some
Senators, at least, there was a determination to gain a partizan
advantage by discrediting the professions of the President, who, for
the time, represented the party they opposed. This manifestly could be
thoroughly done by inducing him to turn his back upon the pledges he
had made, and to admit, for the sake of peace, that his action arose
solely from a desire to put his party friends in place.
Up to this stage of the controversy, not one of the many requests made
for the reasons of suspensions or for the papers relating to them had
been sent from the Senate itself; nor had any of them been addressed
to the President. It may seem not only strange that, in the existing
circumstances, the Senate should have so long kept in the background,
but more strange that the Executive, constituting a coördinate branch
of the Government, and having such exclusive concern in the pending
differences, should have been so completely ignored. I cannot think
it uncharitable to suggest in explanation that as long as these
requests and refusals were confined to Senate committees and heads
of departments, a public communication stating the position of the
President in the controversy would probably be avoided; and that, as
was subsequently made more apparent, there was an intent, in addressing
requests to the heads of departments, to lay a foundation for the
contention that not only the Senate but its committees had a right to
control these heads of departments as against the President in matters
relating to executive duty.
On the 17th of July, 1885, during the recess of the Senate, one George
M. Duskin was suspended from the office of District Attorney for the
Southern District of Alabama, and John D. Burnett was designated as
his successor. The latter at once took possession of the office, and
entered upon the discharge of its duties; and on the 14th of December,
1885, the Senate having in the meantime convened in regular session,
the nomination of Burnett was sent to that body for confirmation.
This nomination, pursuant to the rules and customs of the Senate, was
referred to its Committee on the Judiciary. On the 26th of December,
that committee then having the nomination under consideration, one of
its members addressed a communication to the Attorney-General of the
United States, requesting him, “on behalf of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate and by its direction,” to send to such member
of the committee all papers and information in the possession of the
Department of Justice touching the nomination of Burnett, “also all
papers and information touching the suspension and proposed removal
from office of George M. Duskin.” On the 11th of January, 1886, the
Attorney-General responded to this request in these terms:
The Attorney-General states that he sends herewith all papers,
etc., touching the nomination referred to; and in reference to
the papers touching the suspension of Duskin from office, he
has as yet received no direction from the President in relation
to their transmission.
At this point it seems to have been decided for the first time that
the Senate itself should enter upon the scene as interrogator. It
was not determined, however, to invite the President to answer this
new interrogator, either for the protection and defense of his high
office or in self-vindication. It appears to have been also decided at
this time to give another form to the effort the Senate itself was to
undertake to secure the “papers and information” which its Committee
had been unable to secure. In pursuance of this plan the following
resolution was adopted by the Senate in executive session on the 25th
of January, 1886:
Resolved, That the Attorney-General of the United States be,
and he hereby is, directed to transmit to the Senate copies of
all documents and papers that have been filed in the Department
of Justice since the 1st day of January, a.d. 1885, in relation
to the conduct of the office of District Attorney of the United
States for the Southern District of Alabama.
The language of this resolution is more adroit than ingenuous. While
appearing reasonable and fair upon its face, and presenting no
indication that it in any way related to a case of suspension, it
quickly assumes its real complexion when examined in the light of
its surroundings. The requests previously made on behalf of Senate
committees had ripened into a “demand” by the Senate itself. Herein is
found support for the suggestion I have made, that from the beginning
there might have been an intent on the part of the Senate to claim
that the heads of departments, who are members of the President’s
Cabinet and his trusted associates and advisers, owed greater obedience
to the Senate than to their executive chief in affairs which he
and they regarded as exclusively within executive functions. As to
the real meaning and purpose of the resolution, a glance at its
accompanying conditions and the incidents preceding it makes manifest
the insufficiency of its disguise. This resolution was adopted by the
Senate in executive session, where the entire senatorial business done
is the consideration of treaties and the confirmation of nominations
for office. At the time of its adoption Duskin had been suspended for
more than six months, his successor had for that length of time been
in actual possession of the office, and this successor’s nomination
was then before the Senate in executive session for confirmation.
The demand was for copies of documents and papers in relation to the
conduct of the office filed since January 1, 1885, thus covering a
period of incumbency almost equally divided between the suspended
officer and the person nominated to succeed him. The documents and
papers demanded could not have been of any possible use to the Senate
in executive session, except as they had a bearing either upon the
suspension of the one or the nomination of the other. But as we have
already seen, the Attorney-General had previously sent to a committee
of the Senate all the papers he had in his custody in any way relating
to the nomination and the fitness of the nominee, whether such papers
had reference to the conduct of the office or otherwise. Excluding,
therefore, such documents and papers embraced in the demand as related
to the pending nomination, and which had already been transmitted, it
was plain that there was nothing left with the Attorney-General that
could be included in the demand of the Senate in its executive session
except what had reference to the conduct of the previous incumbent
and his suspension. It is important to recall in this connection the
fact that this subtle demand of the Senate for papers relating “to the
conduct of the office” followed closely upon a failure to obtain “all
papers and information” touching said suspension, in response to a
plain and blunt request specifying precisely what was desired.