FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
By the Protocols of February and August, 1904, and still more perfectly
by the Convention of November, 1905, Japan became the sole official
medium for communication between Korea and all other foreign Powers.
Indeed, as the history of the relations between the two countries—already
narrated in summary form—abundantly shows, thus much of control over
Korean affairs had been demonstrated to be necessary for the welfare
of both. But apart from considerations which are fitted to influence
the judgment of either Japanese or Koreans, the question arises: How is
the Protectorate of Japan likely to affect other foreigners in their
relations to Korea? At present the foreign interests concerned in the
solution of the general problem are chiefly of two orders: they are the
interests of trade and commerce, and the missionary interests. The larger
diplomatic controversies, except so far as these may possibly arise
in adjusting these two classes of interests, have now, it would seem,
been satisfactorily arranged for some time to come. The recent treaties
concluded between Japan on the one side, and Great Britain, France,
and Russia on the other, all expressly guarantee respect for Japan’s
control over the peninsula. In addition to the arrangement for a sort
of reciprocal “hands-off” from each other’s possessions and “paramount
interests” in the Far East, into which France and Russia have entered,
Great Britain has pledged her support in defence of the Protectorate.
All these nations have, moreover, solemnly committed themselves to the
maintenance of the integrity of the Empire of China and to the policy of
the so-called “open door.” How unlikely it is, then, that the Japanese
Government should proceed at once to violate treaty obligations which it
has itself been at such pains and expense of men and money to secure, and
the maintenance of which, to the satisfaction of its foreign allies, so
intimately concerns its own future welfare.
These same Conventions which confer certain rights upon the Japanese
Government in Korea just as plainly put this Government under certain
solemn obligations. The foreign Powers have, strictly speaking, no
diplomatic corps at Seoul. Their Ambassadors and Ministers at Tokyo are
their representatives for Korea as well as for Japan. All foreign Powers
are represented by officials residing in the capital city of Korea who
have consular functions only. Since, however, such functions must, in
general, be exercised on the spot, and since other business can often
be transacted only there, with any tolerable degree of convenience, the
Consuls at Seoul are admitted to correspond with the Residency-General
and with the various subordinate Residencies. Naming them in the order
of their seniority, Belgium, China, Great Britain, Russia, France, and
the United States are now (in 1907) each represented by a Consul-General,
and Italy by a Consul. “Where foreign rights of any kind,” says Mr.
Stevens—who in saying this speaks both as Adviser to the Korean Council
of State and also as Counsellor to the Resident-General—“are threatened
or molested, it is the duty of the Japanese Government to furnish
safeguards or to provide a remedy. The Japanese Government has the
right to employ for that purpose all the machinery which the laws of
Korea place in its hands; and it would seem logically to follow, also,
that where such means prove inadequate, it is the right, as well as the
duty, of the Japanese Government to insist that the deficiency shall be
supplied by appropriate legislation or by such other method as may be
reasonable and just under the circumstances.”
It does not follow from this, however, that either the rights of the
Japanese Government allow, or their obligations compel, it to go to any
length demanded by foreign business men, or concessionaires, or even by
foreign missionaries, in promoting their real or fancied interests, or in
redressing their fancied as well as their real wrongs. There are plainly
limits to be observed in meeting demands and requests of this character.
It may be the duty of the Japanese Government, for example, to secure
and defend all the mining and other concessions made to foreigners which
can prove themselves to have been honestly obtained and administered in
substantial accord with the initial contract. Inasmuch as few concessions
of any sort among those obtained from the last Emperor can stand the
test of honesty, or even of tolerable freedom from corruption, it will
doubtless be well for the Japanese Government not to be over-scrupulous
or too curiously enquiring in many cases. But it certainly is not
its duty to allow the Imperial treasury to be plundered _ad libitum_
by contracts made, and concessions obtained, through combinations of
corrupt Korean officials with greedy and unscrupulous foreigners. Again:
it may be the duty of the Japanese Government to protect a certain
“freedom of the press,” in the case of publications owned and managed
by foreigners, even if printed in the vernacular and distributed widely
among the more ignorant and excitable of the native population. It is
certainly greatly to the credit of the Japanese officials to have borne
so quietly the slanderous and abusive attacks upon their government of
one such publication in Seoul. But surely there may be a limit here also.
Undoubtedly that limit was reached, when the vernacular edition of this
publication excited the natives to sedition, revolt, and assassination,
especially at so critical a juncture in the national affairs as occurred
during the spring and summer of 1907. Possibly, there is also a limit
beyond which misrepresentation and falsehood directed against individuals
not connected with the government ought not to be allowed to pass.[79]
It must also be remembered that the success of the Residency-General
in the economic, educational, and judicial reform of Korea depends
largely upon husbanding and developing the resources of Korea. In all
this, Mr. Megata, the Financial Adviser, has been the right-hand man of
Marquis Ito, the Resident-General. If these resources are squandered,
or “conceded” in such a way as to deprive the Korean Government and the
Korean people of the natural wealth of their own land, then the plans
for every kind of reform will be crippled, if not wholly thwarted. To
encourage legitimate business with all nations is for the advantage of
both the Japanese and the Korean Governments; such a policy is directly
in the line of Marquis Ito’s intentions for the reform and uplifting of
the economic condition of the peninsula. No one person would suffer so
severely in mind and in reputation as would the Resident-General himself
if this policy failed through any fault of his own or of his country’s
administration in Korea. But, on the other hand, to check the evil
consequences of illegitimate schemes of promotion already accomplished,
and to prevent the initiation of such schemes in the future, is an
equally necessary part of this policy.
On the whole subject of the attitude of the Japanese Government toward
foreign business interests in Korea the following lengthy quotations may
be considered as authoritative:
The foreign trade of Korea has been steadily increasing,
especially during the past six years. Making due allowance
for the increase of imports brought about by the war, the
proportion of normal increase gives every sign of healthy
growth. Japan’s trade is much the largest. Korean exports go
almost exclusively to Japan, except ginseng, which is sent
to China. Of the imports from Japan a large proportion are
foreign, as Japan is put down in the Customs Returns as the
country from which the importation was made, the country of
origin not being given. As Japan is the place of transhipment
for much of the trade, and as much of it passes through
Japanese hands, it would be difficult to differentiate. There
are certain important staples, however, concerning which there
can be no ambiguity—American kerosene, for example, which
practically monopolizes the market. Rails and railway equipment
also come from foreign countries, the cars and engines from the
United States. As Korea increases in wealth and her purchasing
capacity grows correspondingly, there will be a field for other
machinery, modern farming implements among the rest, no doubt.
American and European enterprise has not been so conspicuous
in the field of ordinary commercial enterprise as in other
directions. Concessions of one kind and another have attracted
more attention than trade and commerce. The most conspicuous
and successful undertaking of this kind is the Oriental
Consolidated Mining Company at Unsan in Northern Korea,
originally American; now it is generally understood to be
largely English in ownership. This was the first mining
concession ever granted to foreigners in Korea. His Majesty
the Emperor was originally a half owner in the company, but
sold out his interest for 300,000 _yen_ and a payment of 25,000
_yen_ per annum. The company’s concession covers a large area,
and the capital is $5,000,000, American money. At the outset
the enterprise did not look very promising, but by skilful
management it grew until it reached its present important
proportions.
It would probably be idle to attempt an analysis of the
advantages and disadvantages to Korea of enterprises of this
kind. Certainly, if there are any advantages, the Unsan
concession should be a favorable example. That it has been of
great advantage to Korea is at least an open question. On the
one side, in its favor, may be set the large amounts annually
expended by the company in wages, etc. This is undoubtedly a
good thing while it lasts; but gold mines are exhausted sooner
or later, and the benefits they confer are only temporary. The
abandoned mining sites in America, no matter how prosperous in
their day, can hardly be instanced as examples of prosperity
for the people of the country in which they are located, who
are _not_ owners of successful mines.... Against this, and
other like enterprises, may be cited, for one thing, the
disadvantage of the wholesale destruction of timber. The
country about Unsan has been practically denuded of timber, and
in an agricultural country like Korea this is undoubtedly an
evil.
This much has been said of the effects of the operations of a
successful company, conducted on a conservative basis, merely
to show that the advantages of the development of Korean
resources about which so much has been said, are not unmixed
blessings. The matter is of some importance in the light of all
that has been published of late upon the subject.... English
and German companies each obtained a mining concession, but
neither proved financially successful. Japanese also obtained
one concession, in which American capital is at present
interested.... The system of granting mining concessions
was open to so many objections that foreign representatives
frequently importuned the Korean Government to issue mining
regulations under which the mineral resources of the country
could be systematically developed. Nothing was done, however,
until after the establishment of the Residency-General,
when a mining law was passed. This law provides for mining
under proper safeguards as regards public and private
interests. Under the old system, or rather lack of system, the
concessionaire could do practically what he pleased within
the limits of his concession. Now he must conform to laws and
regulations which permit him to carry on his business under
conditions which promote the interests and conserve the rights
of all concerned.
The business methods which have developed in Korea since
intercourse with foreigners began are the natural outgrowth of
the circumstances and of the practices prevailing before that
time. Reference is not here intended to ordinary commercial
transactions, but to that species of business which has its
rise in government favors and thrives by government patronage.
In a country where the Government is the fountain-head of
favors of every description, it was perhaps inevitable that
the results should be those which we see in Korea. Viewed from
the most favorable standpoint they certainly leave much to be
desired. The Government, or, as has really been the actual
fact, the Emperor, has been persuaded to enter into a number
of business enterprises, both public and private, not a single
one of which has been successful and every one of which has
been the occasion of loss either to the public treasury or to
His Majesty’s privy purse. Undertakings of various kinds—wooden
manufactories, glass factories, railways, etc.—have been
projected, but have gone no further than the stage of involving
the employment of foreign directors, assistants, and the like,
and have stopped there. Sometimes foreign experts have been
employed who were really capable of conducting the business for
which their services were secured. They have come to Korea,
only to discover that no preparations have been made to carry
on the enterprises with which they were to be connected. In
other cases, the persons engaged to oversee the projected
enterprises have been notoriously incompetent, and the
whole affair has smacked largely of fraud from beginning to
end. It would require too much space to recount the various
undertakings of a public nature which have been attempted and
have ignominiously failed. The result has been monotonously
the same in every instance—namely, the payment by the Korean
Government of large sums of money for useless material and for
services never rendered. Another source of heavy loss has been
the contracts made on behalf of the Government for all sorts of
things—rice that was never needed, arms and ammunition which
were worthless, railroad material which was never delivered,
and so on through the long list of wasteful expenditure of the
public funds. It is something hardly capable of direct proof,
but there is no reasonable doubt that almost every one of these
enterprises had its inspiration in the desire for illicit gain
by one or another of the officials interested. The explanation
of the foreigners interested may be summed up in the phrase,
“that is the way business is done in Korea.” The Empire has
been the happy hunting-ground for the foreign business man
not over-scrupulous as to the methods by which money was to
be made. Equally it has held out golden opportunities to the
promoter and hunter for “concessions.” This does not include
those foreigners who are willing to take the chances of
success and the pecuniary risks inseparable from enterprises
like mining, for example, but that other class of promoters
who desire to get something for nothing, and then sell it to
others. The gentlemen who have so much to say about “enlisting
foreign capital” in the development of Korea’s resources will
generally be found upon investigation to be prepared only to
“enlist” some one else’s capital. The promoter has his uses,
no doubt, and, as a pioneer in new fields, unquestionably
accomplishes good in some cases. Unfortunately, in Korea
the results of his activities can hardly be classed in this
category.... Especially is this true of those enterprises with
which His Majesty has been most prominently identified as an
investor. As before said, they have invariably resulted in
heavy losses to the privy purse. Various explanations have been
given for this, but the fact remains and cannot be disputed.
Others have prospered, but so far as His Majesty is concerned,
the balance has always been on the debit side of the ledger.
If it were necessary to multiply instances of the injury done to the
economic interests of the Korean people, and of the difficulty of
adjusting in any half-satisfactory way the claims of foreign promoters
and concessionaires, it could easily be done upon good evidence. But
mention of a few such instances only—with the suppression of names and
details, for obvious reasons—will suffice to convince the reader, however
“patriotic” in such matters, who has even the semblance of a candid mind.
Prominent among examples is that of a foreign company of contractors,
who have obtained from the Korean Government a variety of claims, such
as public-utility franchises, and a mining concession. Of the former,
one franchise had cost the Privy Purse of the Korean Emperor not less
than 600,000 _yen_ up to 1902; and when it was sold to satisfy a mortgage
held by these same contractors, although Mr. J. McLeavy Brown, at the
time Commissioner-General of Customs, who had been appointed to audit the
accounts, recommended that items aggregating 1,100,000 _yen_ should be
disallowed, and gave his judgment to the effect that foreclosure would be
a grave injustice to His Majesty, the latter was induced to buy one-half
of the property at 750,000 _yen_. The whole of the same property not long
before had been offered at 800,000 _yen_! This public utility still fails
to yield a dollar in dividends to the royal investor.
Another franchise of this same company has been sold, without any
investment of capital on their part, to an English company for £15,000
cash and £50,000 in fully paid-up ordinary shares. Under the apparent
impression that they have even yet not sufficiently profited from
the Privy Purse of the Emperor and the national treasury of this
poverty-stricken land, the same company is bringing all possible
“influence” to bear in order to validate their claims to a “Mining
Concession.” With regard to this last claim, which is still contested, it
is enough for our purposes to say that it was surreptitiously obtained;
that the stipulation which required a capital of $1,000,000 fully paid up
at the time of incorporation has been violated; and that the provision
which guarantees that no other mining concession should be made to any
one, native or foreign, until these concessionaires had made their
choice, is plainly _contra bonos mores_. Moreover, negotiations have been
entered into by this company for the sale of this concession to another
foreign syndicate.
The mining claim of these foreign promoters, although it has not yet
been wholly adjusted is, indeed, a _cause célèbre_ on account of the
large sums involved; but it only illustrates a special combination of the
elements which are found, with a difference of mixture, in all the cases
of this general character. There was the foolish and wanton Emperor, who
has little intelligent care for the material or other interests of his
people; the crafty and corrupt Koreans, officials and ex-officials; the
land rich in unexplored and undeveloped resources, and the “enterprising”
foreigner, unscrupulous as to his methods and ready to utilize—either
truly or falsely—his alleged “influence” with the officials of his own
Government. Another case, in which all the participants were Koreans with
the exception of one foreigner, has also been charged to the account of
the Japanese Government on the debit side. This foreigner, having put
forth the claim to be a mining engineer (he was in truth only a miner—a
so-called “three-_yen_-a-day” man), associated himself with a Korean,
popularly known as “Pak the liar,” and through the latter obtained the
assistance at Court of a powerful official and his friends. A “company”
was formed, which obtained from the Emperor an elaborate document of
the “franchise” sort, giving them the exclusive right to find coal-oil
where no coal-oil was, to bottle mineral water from springs which have no
valuable qualities to their water, and to export coal which was totally
unfit for export. Appeals were constantly made, and answered, for funds
to further this enterprise, until His Majesty became tired, and the whole
affair was wound up. This was done by paying the foreigner 12,000 _yen_
claimed as back pay. He then departed to his native land to complain that
the Japanese were inimical to the investment of foreign capital in Korea.
The net result was a few thousand tons of coal taken from one small
mine—sold, but the proceeds never accounted for; an expenditure from the
Privy Purse variously estimated at from 300,000 _yen_ to 400,000 _yen_;
and the enrichment of certain Korean officials and ex-officials. For
all this Mr. Megata, the Japanese Financial Adviser, had to provide the
money. The “Poong Poo” Company itself never had any money to put into its
“promoting” schemes.
That the charge of favoring their own countrymen in the matter of
concessions and monopolies, which has been somewhat freely made abroad
against the Japanese Government in Korea, is not justifiable, the
following proof may be cited. At some time between January 15 and January
29 of 1905, Mr. Yi-chai-kuk, then Minister of the Imperial Household
of Korea, recognized and signed no fewer than twenty-three concessions
granted to one Yi-Sei-chik, a Korean, and his four Japanese associates.
These concessions included the consolidation of taxation on land, the
utilization of the water-ways for various purposes, and state monopolies
of tobacco, salt, kerosene, etc. Imperial orders were secretly given to
the same Yi to raise a foreign loan of several million _yen_ for the
purpose of detecting the secrets of the Military Headquarters stationed
in Korea, as well as of the Tokyo Government, and to make reports about
them.[80]
These iniquitous transactions in which Koreans and Japanese were
concerned were made, when discovered, the occasion of a memorandum of
protest. This memorandum reminded the Korean Government and Court that
they have often been unfaithful to the “general plan of administrative
reform,” based upon the compact made between Korea and Japan, by granting
to foreigners various important concessions in secret ways. With a view
of putting an end to any further recurrence of such complications, an
express Agreement was entered into, August, 1904, by which “it was
stipulated that, in case of granting concessions to foreigners, or of
making contracts with foreigners, the Imperial Governments should first
be informed and consulted with.” The memorandum then goes on to express
profound regret that “His Majesty and his Court” had attempted by these
concessions, “in defiance of this provision, a breach of faith.” Then
follows the demand upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Korea to take
the following steps:—
1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, after stating to His
Majesty the above facts and reasons, shall announce in a most
public way under the Imperial order that the concessions above
mentioned are null and void, as they have failed to observe the
provisions of the Agreement between Korea and Japan.
2. It shall also be most publicly announced under the Imperial
order that, in any case of granting concessions to foreigners,
either the Korean Government or the Court shall first consult
with the Imperial Government.
This memorandum bears date of July 11, 1905. But this instance of the
most decisive steps taken by the Japanese Government to prevent its
own subjects from profiting by secret and corrupt alliance with Korean
officials, for the obtaining of concessions and contracts, is by no
means an isolated one. In truth, _the Japanese Protectorate is more
severe in dealing with such cases where Japanese are concerned, than
where other foreigners have the chief interests_. And repeatedly has the
Resident-General assured his own countrymen that they must expect no
favors in business schemes for exploiting Korea to their own advantage,
but to the injury of the Koreans themselves. Indeed, he has publicly
declared to all such Japanese: “_You have me for your enemy._”
More recently effective measures have been enacted and put into force
to make impossible the recurrence of the old-time ways of robbing Korea
by schemes for “promoting” her business enterprises and by secret ways
of obtaining concessions. Among such measures is the safeguarding of
the “Imperial black seal” (the Emperor’s private seal), which could
formerly be used to plunder the treasury without the knowledge or consent
of its legalized guardians, or even of the Emperor himself. Under the
new regulations, the black seal cannot be legally used except with the
knowledge and attestation of the Minister of the Household and his
Imperial Treasurer.
Among the other foreign relations into which Japan has entered, to
substitute for Korea, is the protection of Korean emigrants. Although
Korea needs, and can for a long time to come support, all its own
natural increase of native population, and several millions of foreign
immigrants besides, the complete lack of opportunity for “getting ahead”
in their native land caused a considerable exodus of her own population
some six or seven years ago. At the instance of an American, about 8,000
Korean men and 400 Korean women emigrated to Hawaii. In 1905 a Mexican
prevailed upon 1,300 natives to go to Mexico. This experience led the
Korean Government, in April, 1905, to issue an order prohibiting the
emigration of Korean laborers. Under the Japanese Protectorate, however,
in July, 1906, “An Emigrant Protection Law,” with detailed rules for its
operation, was enacted, which came into force on the 15th of September of
the same year.
With regard to all foreign relations with Korea, whether of legitimate
business, of commerce, or of emigration, the civilized world is
undoubtedly much better off now that their custody is in the hands of
the Japanese Residency-General. In our judgment the same thing is true
of those moral and religious interests represented by the missionary
bodies already established, or to be established in the future, in
the Korean peninsula. This is not, indeed, the opinion of all the
missionaries themselves. As regards the whole subject of the effect of
the Protectorate upon mission work—past, present, and future—there is
a difference of opinion among the missionaries themselves. As to the
attitude of Marquis Ito there can be no reasonable doubt. His expressions
of feeling and intention have been frequently mentioned in the earlier
chapters of this book. The missionary problem will be discussed, apart,
in a later chapter.
As to the general feeling of the Koreans themselves toward foreigners,
the following quotations are believed to express the truth:
Since the inauguration of foreign intercourse the anti-foreign
feeling of which the Tai Won Kun was so prominent an exponent,
appears to have died out. Possibly it may linger still in the
minds of some of the old-fashioned Confucian scholars, but not
to any appreciable extent. Formerly it was, no doubt, possible
to excite the people against foreigners for slight cause; but
exhibitions of anti-foreign sentiment in recent times appear to
have been officially instigated, as, for example, the massacre
of the French missionaries and their converts, for which the
Tai Won Kun is held responsible. More intimate intercourse with
the representatives of Western civilization, and especially
missionary labor which has been so genuinely successful, seem
to have eliminated anything like a general feeling of dislike
for foreigners.
The case of the Japanese stands by itself in this regard.
Much has been written of the ancient hatred of Koreans for
Japanese. Traces of that feeling may linger, but that it is an
ineradicable national trait, as some would seem to hold, hardly
seems possible. Koreans and Japanese have lived together in
complete amity and good fellowship in the past, and there is
no good reason why they should not live side by side on the
best of terms in the future. Certainly none in the sentiment
of dislike on one side, for the origin of which we must go
back nearly three centuries. The practical difficulty, the
dislike which really counts, is of more modern origin. Korea
and Japan have been jostled together, as it were, by two wars
in recent times, and the weaker of the two has suffered—a
circumstance to be regretted, no doubt, but still inevitable.
Korea has experienced some of the evils which follow in war’s
train; and while they were not nearly so disastrous as has been
represented, they have left a feeling of dislike and distrust
for those who are held responsible. This was to have been
expected and counted upon; for the remedy we must await the
wider and more intelligent comprehension of the real meaning
of the new order of things. When it is finally understood that
even-handed justice is the rule, that the life and property of
every man, no matter how humble, are safe under the law, and
that the presence of the alien does not mean licensed extortion
and oppression, we shall not hear anything more of that racial
hatred upon which so much stress has been laid.