THE COMPACT
It will need no argument for those familiar with the habitual ways of
the Korean Government in dealing with foreign affairs to establish
the necessity that Japan should make more definite, explicit, and
comprehensive, the Protocols of February 23 and August 22, 1904.
Foreign affairs have always been with the Emperor and Court of Korea
a particularly favorable but mischievous sphere for intrigue and
intermeddling. The Foreign Office has never had any real control over
the agents of the government, who have been the tools of the Emperor in
their dealings with foreign Legations. The Korean Foreign Minister in
1905 was not an efficient and responsible representative of either the
intentions or the transactions of his own government; instructions were
frequently sent direct from the Palace to Ministers in other countries;
foreign Legations had, each one, a separate cipher to be used for
such communications; and there were several instances of clandestine
communication with agents abroad, even during the Russo-Japanese war.
To guard, therefore, against the repetition of occurrences similar to
those which had already cost her so dearly, Japan’s interests demanded
that her control over the management of Korea’s foreign affairs should be
undivided and unquestioned.
It was not, however, in the interests of Japan alone that the management
of Korea’s foreign affairs was to pass out of her own hands. It was
distinctly, as events are fast proving beyond a reasonable doubt, for
the advantage of Korea herself. In any valid meaning of the word, Korea
had never been “independent” of foreign influences, dominating over
her and corrupting the officials within her own borders. For centuries
these influences came chiefly from China; for a decade, chiefly from
Russia and other Western nations. The Treaty of 1905 was also, just as
distinctly—so, we believe, the events will ultimately prove—for the
advantage of these Western nations, and of the entire Far East.
It is, therefore, highly desirable, not only as vindicating the honor
of Marquis Ito and of the Japanese Government, but also as establishing
the Protectorate of Japan over Korea upon foundations of veracity and
justice, that the exact and full truth should be known and placed
on record before the world, concerning the Convention of November,
1905. This is the more desirable because of the gross and persistent
misrepresentations of the facts which have been repeated over and over
again—chiefly by the same persons—down to the time of the appearance of
the so-called Korean Commission at The Hague Conference of 1907.[33]
His Majesty the Emperor (now ex-Emperor) of Korea has, indeed, publicly
proclaimed his intention not to keep a treaty “made under duress” and
through fears of “personal violence”; he has also made it appear that
the signatures and the Imperial seal upon the document were fraudulently
obtained. Meantime, he has sedulously (and, we believe, with such
sincerity as his nature admits) cultivated and cherished the friendship
of the Japanese Resident-General who negotiated, and who has administered
affairs under, the Treaty. How he lost his crown, at the hands of his own
Ministry, for his last violation of the most solemn provisions of the
same treaty, is now a matter of universal history.
Marquis Ito arrived at Seoul, as the Representative of the Japanese
Government, to conclude a new Convention with Korea, during the first
week of November, 1905. He was the bearer of a letter from his own
Emperor to the Emperor of Korea, which frankly explained the object of
his mission. What follows is the substance of His Japanese Majesty’s
letter.
“Japan, in self-defence and for the preservation of the peace and
security of the Far East, had been forced to go to war with Russia;
but now, after a struggle of twenty months, hostilities were ended.
During their continuance the Emperor of Korea and his people, no doubt,
shared the anxiety felt by the Emperor and people of Japan. In the mind
of His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, the most absorbing thought and
purpose now was to safeguard the future peace and security of the two
Empires, and to augment and strengthen the friendly relations existing
between them. Unfortunately, however, Korea was not yet in a state of
good defence, nor was the basis for a system of effective self-defence
yet created. Her weakness in these regards was in itself a menace to
the peace of the Far East as well as to her own security. That this
was unhappily the case was a matter of as much regret to His Majesty
as it could be to the Emperor of Korea; and for this reason the safety
of Korea was as much a matter of anxiety to him as was that of his own
country. His Majesty had already commanded his Government to conclude the
Protocols of February and August, 1904, for the defence of Korea. Now, in
order to preserve the peace which had been secured, and to guard against
future dangers arising from the defenceless condition of Korea, it was
necessary that the bonds which united the two countries should be closer
and stronger than ever before. Having this end in view, His Majesty had
commanded His Government to study the question and to devise means of
attaining this desirable result. The preservation and protection of the
dignity, privileges, and tranquillity of the Imperial House of Korea
would, as a matter of course, be one of the first considerations kept in
view.
“His Majesty felt sure that if the Emperor of Korea would carefully
consider the general situation and its bearing upon the interests and
welfare of his country and people, he would decide to take the advice now
earnestly tendered to him.”
It should be noticed that this address from His Imperial Majesty of Japan
to the Korean Emperor—the sincerity of which cannot be questioned—is
pervaded with the same spirit as that which has characterized the
administration, hitherto, of the Japanese Residency-General.
Marquis Ito informed the Korean Emperor that he would ask for another
audience in a few days. His Majesty consented, adding that in the
meantime he desired carefully to study the letter from the Emperor of
Japan.[34]
On the 15th of November, Marquis Ito had a private audience which lasted
about four hours, and in which he frankly explained the object of his
mission.... The Emperor began the interview by complaining of certain
injuries done by the Japanese civil and military authorities during the
war. He dwelt at length upon past events, saying, among other things,
that he had not wished to go to the Russian Legation in 1895, but had
been over-persuaded by those about his person.
Marquis Ito replied that as he would remain in Korea for some time, there
would be ample opportunity for a full exchange of views regarding the
matters to which His Majesty referred. At the present moment he felt it
to be his imperative duty to beg His Majesty to hear the particulars
of the mission with which he had been charged by his Imperial Master.
From 1885 onward, he went on to say, Japan had earnestly endeavored to
maintain the independence of Korea. Unfortunately, Korea herself had
rendered but little aid in the struggle which Japan had maintained in her
behalf. Nevertheless, these efforts had preserved His Majesty’s Empire,
and, although there might have been causes of complaint, such as those to
which His Majesty had just referred, in justice to Japan it should not be
forgotten that in the midst of the great struggle in which she had been
engaged, it was unhappily not possible wholly to avoid such occurrences.
If His Majesty would consider all the circumstances, he would undoubtedly
realize that in the midst of the absorbing anxiety of that momentous
contest and of the heavy burdens it imposed upon Japan, whatever fault
might attach to her as regarded the matters of which His Majesty had
spoken was at least excusable. Korea, on the other hand, had borne but
a small portion of the burden created by the necessity of defending
and maintaining a principle in which she was as deeply interested as
Japan—namely, the peace and security of the Far East. Turning to the
future, however, it could be clearly perceived that in order effectively
to ensure the future peace and security of the Far East, it was
imperatively necessary that the bonds uniting the two countries should
be drawn closer. For that purpose, and with that object in view, His
Majesty the Emperor of Japan had graciously entrusted him with the task
of explaining the means which, after mature and careful deliberation, it
had been concluded should be adopted.
The substance of the plan which had been thus formulated might be summed
up as follows: ... The Japanese Government, with the consent of the
Government of Korea, to have the right to control and direct the foreign
affairs of Korea, while the internal autonomy of the Empire would be
maintained; and, of course, His Majesty’s Government, under His Majesty’s
direction, would continue as at the present time.
Explaining the objects of the Agreement thus outlined, the Marquis
pointed out that it would effectively safeguard the security and prestige
of the Imperial House of Korea, while affording the surest means of
augmenting the happiness and prosperity of the people. For the reasons
stated, and for these alone, the Marquis went on to say, he strongly
advised the Emperor to accept this plan; and, taking into account
the general situation, and the condition of Korea in particular, he
earnestly hoped that His Majesty would consent. The Japanese Minister was
authorized to discuss the details with His Majesty’s Ministers.
The Emperor in reply expressed his appreciation of the manifestation of
sincere good-will on the part of the Emperor of Japan, and his thanks.
Although he would not absolutely reject the proposal, it was his earnest
desire to retain some outward form of control over the external affairs
of Korea. As to the actual exercise of such control by Japan, and in what
manner it should be exercised, he had no objections to urge.
Marquis Ito enquired what was meant by “outward form.”
The Emperor replied, “the right to maintain Legations abroad.”
The Marquis then stated that, in accordance with diplomatic rules and
usage, there was in that case no difference between the form and the
substance of control. Therefore he could not accept the suggestion.
If Korea were to continue to have Legations abroad, she would in fact
retain control of the external relations of the Empire. The _status quo_
would be perpetuated; there would be constant danger of the renewal of
past difficulties; and again the peace of the East would be threatened.
It was absolutely necessary that Japan should control and direct the
external relations of Korea. This decision was the result of most careful
investigations and deliberations; it could not be changed. Marquis Ito
further stated that he had brought a memorandum of the agreement which it
was desired to conclude; and this he then handed to the Emperor.
The Emperor, having read it, expressed his implicit trust in Marquis
Ito, saying that he placed more reliance upon what he said than upon
the representations of his own subjects. [It may seem a strange comment
upon the working of His Majesty’s mind, but all my observations and
experiences, while in Korea, lead me to believe in the veracity of this
declaration. To the last, the Emperor trusted the word of the Marquis
Ito.]... If, however, he accepted the agreement and retained no outward
form of control over Korean foreign affairs, the relations of Japan and
Korea would be like those of Austria and Hungary; or Korea’s condition
would be like that of one of the African tribes.
Marquis Ito begged leave to dissent. Austria and Hungary were ruled by
one monarch; whereas in this case His Majesty would still be Emperor
of Korea, and would continue as before to exercise his Imperial
prerogatives. As for the presumed resemblance to an African tribe,
that could hardly be considered in point; since Korea had a Government
established for centuries and therefore a national organization and forms
of administration such as no savage tribe possessed.
The Emperor expressed appreciation of what the Marquis said, but repeated
that he did not care for the substance, and only wished to retain some
external form of control over Korea’s foreign affairs. He therefore hoped
that the Marquis would inform his Emperor and the Japanese Government of
this wish and would induce them to change the plan proposed; this wish
he reiterated a number of times. [There were undoubtedly two reasons,
entirely valid from his point of view, for the endeavor to secure this
change. The first was the very natural desire to “save his face”; and the
second was the—with him—scarcely less natural desire to leave room for
intrigue to contest the scope of the terms agreed upon while claiming to
be faithful to their substance.]
The Marquis stated that he could not comply with the request of His
Majesty. The draft was the definitive expression of the views of the
Japanese Government after most careful consideration, and could not
be changed as His Majesty desired. He then quoted the Article in the
Portsmouth Treaty wherein Russia recognizes the paramount political,
commercial, and economic interests of Japan in Korea. There was only
one alternative, he added: either to accept or to refuse. He could not
predict what the result would be if His Majesty refused, but he feared
that it might be less acceptable than what he now proposed. If His
Majesty refused, he must clearly understand this.
The Emperor replied that he did not hesitate because he was ignorant
of this fact, but because he could not himself decide at that moment.
He must consult his Ministers and ascertain also “the intention of the
people at large.”
The Marquis replied that His Majesty was, of course, quite right in
desiring to consult his Ministers, but he could not understand what was
meant by consulting “the intention of the people.” Inasmuch as Korea did
not have a constitutional form of government, and consequently no Diet,
it seemed rather a strange proceeding to consult “the intention of the
people.” If such action should lead to popular ferment and excitement and
possibly public disturbances, he must respectfully point out that the
responsibility would rest with His Majesty.
Finally, after some further discussion, the Emperor requested Marquis Ito
to have Minister Hayashi (who held the power to negotiate the proposed
agreement) consult with his own Minister for Foreign Affairs. The result
could be submitted to the Cabinet; and when that body had reached a
decision His Majesty’s approval could be asked.
Marquis Ito said that prompt action was necessary, and requested His
Majesty to summon the Minister for Foreign Affairs at once, and to
instruct him to negotiate and sign the agreement. The Emperor replied
that he would give instructions to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
to that effect. Marquis Ito stated that he would remain awaiting the
conclusion of that agreement, and would again request His Majesty to
grant him an audience.
Before this first audience ended the Emperor again asked Marquis Ito to
persuade His Majesty of Japan to consent that Korea should retain some
outward form of control over her foreign affairs; but again Marquis Ito
refused. This repeated refusal of Japan’s Representative to concede
anything whatever as an abatement of his country’s control in the future
over Korea’s relations to foreign countries distinctly reveals the nature
of the only treaty that could then possibly have been concluded between
the two Powers. On the following day, the 16th of November, Marquis Ito
had a conference with all of the Cabinet Ministers, except the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, who on the same day began negotiations with Minister
Hayashi. Marquis Ito explained fully to the Korean Ministers the object
of his mission and the views of his Government.
On the 17th of November, at 11 A. M., all of the Korean Ministers went
to the Japanese Legation, lunched there, and conferred with Mr. Hayashi
until 3 o’clock, when they adjourned to the Palace and held a meeting
in the Emperor’s presence. Their decision was, finally, to refuse to
agree to the Treaty in the form in which it had been proposed. Marquis
Ito was taking dinner with General Hasegawa, when, at 7.30, he received
a message from Mr. Hayashi conveying this intelligence and a request to
come to the Palace.[35] Accordingly, at 8 o’clock, he went to the Palace
in company with General Hasegawa, the latter’s aide, and the three or
four mounted gendarmes, who accompanied Marquis Ito wherever he went.
_There were no other Japanese guards or soldiers in attendance, and none
in the immediate vicinity of the Palace. The gendarmes who accompanied
the Marquis did not enter the Palace precincts, and all the gates and
entrances were guarded as usual by Korean soldiers, Korean gendarmes and
Korean policemen._ Precautions had indeed been taken to preserve order in
the city, as some outburst of mob violence was possible. The necessity
of this precaution was shown later in the night when an attempt was made
to set fire to the house of Mr. Yi Wan-yong, Minister of Education (now
Prime Minister). It was only when the conference was ended that, at the
express request of the Korean Ministers, a small number of gendarmes was
summoned to accompany them to their homes. [This precaution will not seem
excessive, or threatening of violence to others, in the eyes of one who,
like myself, has spent a period of two months in Korea, characterized by
repeated attempts to assassinate the Ministers, who always went guarded
by Korean and Japanese gendarmes. See pp. 66 _ff._]
Upon arriving at the Palace, Marquis Ito was informed by Mr. Hayashi
that, although His Majesty had ordered the Cabinet to come to an
agreement which would establish a cordial _entente_ with Japan, and
although the majority of the Cabinet Ministers were ready to obey His
Majesty’s commands, Mr. Han, the Prime Minister, persistently refused
to obey. Marquis Ito thereupon, through the Minister of the Household,
requested a private audience with His Majesty.
It should be explained here that during all of the proceedings, which
took place in the rooms on the lower floor of the “Library,” the Emperor
was in his rooms in the upper story, and was never personally approached
by any one except, as hereafter stated, by his own Ministers. It may also
be added, in explanation of the time of the conference, that it had been
His Majesty’s invariable practice for years to transact important public
business at night. He turned night into day in that regard and the
Cabinet Ministers had customarily been obliged to attend in turn at the
Palace and remain there all night long.
To the request for a private audience the Emperor replied that although
he would be pleased to grant an audience at once, he was very tired and
was suffering from sore throat—the plea of indisposition being one to
which he is accustomed to resort for avoiding audiences. Therefore he
preferred that Marquis Ito should consult with his Ministers whom he
would instruct to negotiate and conclude an agreement establishing a
cordial _entente_ between Korea and Japan. At the same time that the
Emperor requested the Marquis to consult with the Cabinet for that
purpose, the Minister of the Household informed the Cabinet Ministers
that His Majesty commanded them to negotiate with Marquis Ito.
Marquis Ito then turned to the Prime Minister, and, repeating what
Mr. Hayashi had told him, enquired whether the statement correctly
represented his attitude. The Prime Minister replied that it was correct.
His Majesty had often commanded him to come to an understanding with
the Japanese Minister, but he had refused. Then the other Ministers
had accused him of disloyalty in disobeying His Majesty’s commands. He
himself could not but feel that the accusation was well founded and, on
that account, he wished immediately to resign his office and to await the
Imperial punishment for his disobedience. As he had informed Marquis Ito
the day before, although he was perfectly well aware that Korea could not
maintain her independence by her own unaided efforts, he still wished
to retain the outward semblance of control over the Nation’s foreign
relations.
Thereupon Marquis Ito said that the last thought in his mind would be
to try to force the Prime Minister to do any thing which would destroy
his country. The Minister had said, however, that he wished to resign
because he had been disloyal in disobeying the Emperor’s commands. It
did not seem to him, the Marquis, that this was either a dignified, or
a sensible course for a Minister of State to adopt. The management of
public affairs required decision. If the Prime Minister could not come
to some understanding with Japan’s representatives, as his own Majesty
the Emperor had commanded him to do, he was seriously jeopardizing his
country’s interests. The Marquis could not believe that this was genuine
loyalty. There was only one alternative before the Prime Minister, either
to obey the Imperial order, or, carefully considering the gravity of the
situation, to do what he could to change the Imperial opinion. He then
asked the Prime Minister to request the other Ministers, in accordance
with the Emperor’s command, conveyed through the Minister of the
Household, to give their views regarding the proposed agreement. This the
Prime Minister proceeded to do.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pak Chi-sun (afterwards Acting
Prime Minister) stated that, as he had informed the Japanese Minister,
he was opposed to the treaty and did not wish to negotiate it; but if he
was ordered to do so, he would comply. The Marquis asked what he meant by
“ordered”; did he mean an Imperial order? Mr. Pak assented.
The Minister of Finance, Mr. Min Yong-ki, said that he was opposed to the
treaty. (He remained in office for a year and a half after the conclusion
of the treaty, considering, no doubt, that the Imperial command absolved
him from responsibility.)
The Minister of Education, Mr. Yi Wan-yong (now Prime Minister), replied
that he had already expressed his opinion fully in His Majesty’s
presence. The request of Japan was the logical result of existing
conditions in the East. The diplomacy of Korea, always changing,
had forced Japan into a great war which had entailed on her heavy
sacrifices, and in which, finally, she had been victorious. Korea must
accept the result and aid in maintaining the future peace of the East by
loyally co-operating with Japan.
The Minister of Justice, Mr. Yi Ha-yung (who had been Minister for
Foreign Affairs during the war), stated that, in his opinion, the
Protocols of February 23 and August 22, 1904, already gave Japan
practically all that she now asked. Consequently he did not think that
the new Treaty was necessary.
Marquis Ito then said to him that the opinion he had expressed at the
conference of the previous day was somewhat different, and that he
had appeared at that time to be in favor of the Treaty. The Minister
assented, but added that then, as now, he thought that the Protocols
would have been amply sufficient if Korea herself had faithfully observed
the obligations they imposed upon her.
The Minister of War, Mr. Yi Kun-tak, stated that in His Majesty’s
presence he had supported the Minister of Education in the position
described by the latter. Finally, however, he had cast his vote in favor
of the Prime Minister’s proposal that they should insist upon a Treaty
which retained to Korea the outward form of control over her foreign
relations. He would now agree to the proposed treaty, however.
The Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Yi Chi-yung, said that having
negotiated and signed the Protocol of February 23, 1904, he had naturally
associated himself with the Minister of Education in His Majesty’s
presence, and he now did the same.
The Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, Mr. Kwon Chong-hiun,
said that he had seconded the proposal of the Minister of Education and
was of course in favor of the Treaty. He desired, however, to suggest
several amendments.
After some further consultation, Marquis Ito turned to the Prime
Minister, and said that there were but two of the Ministers opposed to
the Treaty. The recognized method of deciding such questions was by a
majority vote, and, as the Prime Minister had seen, the majority of the
Cabinet were in favor of negotiating and concluding the Treaty. It was
the duty of the Prime Minister accordingly, bearing in mind the Imperial
command, to proceed to accomplish this result in due form. Thereupon
the Prime Minister, saying something about disloyalty, burst into tears
and went hastily into the next room. After a few moments Marquis Ito
followed him, and found him still greatly agitated. The Marquis spoke
to him gently, and, repeating his former arguments, tried to persuade
him that it was his duty as a loyal servant to obey the Imperial command
by assisting in the negotiation and conclusion of the Treaty. Finding,
however, that his efforts were fruitless, Marquis Ito returned to the
other room, leaving Mr. Han alone.[36]
After Mr. Han’s disappearance from the scene, and upon the Marquis’
return to the room, the latter addressed the Minister of the Household,
stating that, as he had seen, the Cabinet Ministers, with two exceptions,
had expressed their willingness to accept the Treaty in principle; and of
the two dissenting Ministers one, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had
said that he would sign the Treaty if he received the Imperial command
to do so. Turning then to the Ministers, he enquired whether they were
willing to proceed as commanded by His Majesty, with the consideration
of the Treaty, and of the amendments, which several of their number had
expressed a desire to present. The Ministers replied that they were
ready to do so, but wished the Minister of the Household to be present.
Accordingly the deliberations were conducted in the presence of that
official.
The Treaty was then considered in detail. The Minister of Education
proposed an amendment, stipulating that the functions of control to be
exercised by Japan should be confined _exclusively_ to administration of
the foreign relations of Korea. Marquis Ito replied that he could not
accept this amendment, but after some discussion proposed the insertion
of the word “primarily” in the Article.[37]
The Minister of Justice proposed an amendment stipulating that Japan
would guarantee to maintain the peace, security and prestige of the
Imperial Household. This Marquis Ito accepted and wrote the amendment
with his own hand.
After some further deliberation the treaty in its amended form was agreed
to. The Minister of the Household, accompanied by Mr. Yi Chi-yung,
Minister of Home Affairs, then took the document to the Emperor. After
a time they returned, saying that His Majesty was satisfied with the
instrument as amended and gave it his sanction. He instructed them to
say, however, that he desired to add one more amendment. It was to insert
in the preamble a stipulation to the effect that when Korea became able
again to exercise the functions surrendered to Japan by the Treaty, she
would be entitled to resume the control of her foreign relations. To this
proposal Marquis Ito assented, and again wrote the amendment with his own
hand. The two Ministers took the completed instrument to His Majesty,
and in a short time returned saying His Majesty was “quite satisfied and
approved the Treaty.”
The copyists then began preparing the copies for signature, and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs went to the telephone and ordered the clerk
in charge to bring the seal of the Foreign Office to the Palace.
The Minister of the Household, who had again repaired to the Imperial
presence, returned while this was going on with the following message
from the Emperor to Marquis Ito, which is here repeated verbatim:—“Now
that this new Agreement has been concluded our countries should mutually
congratulate each other. We feel tired, as we are not well, and shall
retire. You, who have reached an advanced age and have remained awake
until this late hour, must also be greatly fatigued. Please, therefore,
return to your home and sleep well.”
Marquis Ito returned thanks for this gracious message, but remained
until the Treaty had been copied and duly signed by Mr. Pak, the Korean
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese Minister.
He then returned to his hotel. In a short time the seal of the Foreign
Office was brought to the Palace, and Mr. Pak, with his own hand, affixed
it to the four copies of the instrument which had been made.[38]
The conclusion of the Treaty was not followed by any noticeably great
public excitement in Seoul. Crowds collected in the streets, and there
were one or two trifling brawls, but nothing of great consequence.
The policing of the streets was entirely in the hands of the Korean
gendarmes and the mixed force of Korean and Japanese police under the
direction of Mr. Maruyama, Police Adviser to the Korean Government. Nor,
in order to preserve the public peace, was there at any time necessary
any exhibition of a large force, either of police or of gendarmes in any
one locality. They went about singly or in twos or threes, and the crowds
were, as a rule, orderly.
The Convention thus concluded on November 17, 1905, with the object of
strengthening the principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires,
provides that the complete control and direction of Korean affairs shall
hereafter rest with the Japanese Government, and that a Resident-General
shall reside in Seoul, “primarily for the purpose of taking charge of
and directing matters relating to diplomatic affairs.” It also provides
for the appointment of Residents, subordinate to the Resident-General,
who shall occupy the open ports and such other places in Korea as the
Japanese Government may deem necessary. Article IV stipulates that
all treaties and agreements subsisting between Japan and Korea, not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Convention itself, shall continue
in force. Furthermore, Japan engages to maintain the welfare and dignity
of the Imperial House of Korea.
This is the substance of the Convention of 1905. Its effect was to
substitute Japan for Korea in all official relations with foreign Powers,
past as well as future. In other words, foreign nations must hereafter
deal directly and exclusively with Japan in everything affecting their
diplomatic relations with Korea. Japan, on her part, is equally bound
to respect and maintain all treaty rights and all treaty engagements
granted by Korea in the past. The “principle of solidarity which unites
the two Empires” implies, and in fact actually includes, even more
than this. While the functions of Japan’s direct and exclusive control
were primarily confined to matters connected with the direction of
foreign affairs, some measure of control over Korea’s domestic affairs
also is necessarily implied. It is not to be supposed, for example,
that Japan could permit internal disorders, or the perpetuation of
domestic abuses, or, in brief, any of those disturbing conditions which
had hitherto prevented Korean progress and development. International
control, dissociated from an orderly and progressive domestic policy,
is not practicable; it is not even conceivable. The complications
and embarrassments which would inevitably arise from such a complete
dissociation of the two functions of government would far outweigh
the advantages. One of the most fruitful sources of international
difficulties in Korea has always been found in domestic misgovernment.
Having assumed the responsibility and the obligations incident to the
direction of foreign affairs, Japan has the right to ask, and, if need
be, to insist, that her task shall not be made heavier by Korea herself.
This did not, indeed, imply, that Japan should assume charge of the
administrative machinery of the Korean Government, but that she should
enjoy the right to have recourse to those measures of guidance which
naturally and properly fall within the sphere of the duties she had
assumed. Fortunately, however, any discussion relating to this question
must of necessity be purely academic; since not only the Convention of
November 17th, but also the Protocols and other Agreements concluded
before that time give ample warrant for everything Japan has attempted or
accomplished in this regard.
If corroborative evidence is needed for the account just given of the
negotiations which ended in the Convention of November, 1905, and upon
the basis of which Marquis Ito, as the Representative of the Japanese
Government, had been conducting his administration in Korea up to the
time of the new Convention of July, 1907, it is afforded in fullest
measure in the following manner. A notable “Memorial” regarding the
circumstances under which the earlier agreement was formed was presented
to the Korean Emperor on the fifteenth of December of the same year; this
document lends the authority of all the other chief actors in this event
to every important detail of the account as already given.[39]
The memorialists were Pak Chi-sun, former Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Yi Wan-yong, Minister of Education; Kwan Chung-hiun, Minister of
Agriculture, Commerce and Industry; Yi Chi-yung, Minister of Home
Affairs; and Yi Kun-tak, Minister of War. The occasion of the memorial
was the agitation against the Treaty which was then at its height, and on
account of which these five Ministers were being denounced in petitions
to the Throne, and in the public press, as traitors to their country.
The purpose of the memorial was to show that the actual responsibility
for the conclusion of the Treaty rested with the Emperor himself. By
relating all the circumstances in detail (in particular the occurrences
at the conference on the evening of November 17th) the memorialists
brought this fact out into the boldest prominence. Their memorial was, in
effect, both a charge which fixed the responsibility for the Treaty on
the Emperor, and a challenge to the Emperor to deny that the Treaty was
concluded in accordance with his own orders. It was a challenge which His
Majesty did not accept; on the contrary, by approving the memorial, as he
did formally, he acknowledged the truth of the statements it contained.
_It was, indeed, officially published at the time, as approved by the
Emperor._[40] Moreover, this memorial was prepared by its authors and
presented to the Throne without the previous knowledge of the Japanese
authorities. In fact, it contained certain interesting and important
details of which they then learned for the first time.
The memorialists began with the statement that, by reason of His
Majesty’s generosity, they are entrusted with the responsibilities of
Ministers of State, although they do not merit such distinction. They
have seen the petitions denouncing them to the Emperor as traitors. Those
petitions affirm that the state has been destroyed; that the people
have become slaves; and that Korean territory is now the property of
another state. These opinions are indeed almost too absurd to be noticed;
but since they affect the independence and dignity of the nation, the
memorialists cannot permit them to pass without protest. The new Treaty
with Japan does not change the title of the Empire or affect its real
independence. The prestige of the Imperial House remains as before;
the social fabric of the Empire is unaffected; and the country is in a
peaceful condition. The only change is that the management of the foreign
affairs of the country has been placed under the control of a neighboring
state. Besides, the Treaty which brings about this result is by no means
a new arrangement. It is the direct result of the Protocols concluded in
1904, and does not differ from them in object or in principle. If these
persons who now so loudly proclaim their patriotism are really sincere
and courageous men, why did they not denounce those Protocols when
they were made and maintain their opposition with their lives? None of
them did that then; yet now they clamor for the abolition of all these
arrangements and for the restoration of the old order of things. It is
impossible to agree with them.
We desire, the memorialists go on to say, now to state the actual facts
of the conclusion of the new Treaty:
When the Japanese Envoy arrived in Korea all the people,
even the children, knew that a grave crisis had arisen. And
on the 15th of November when Your Majesty received the Envoy
he presented a most important document. On the following day
the Prime Minister, with the other members of the Cabinet,
except the Minister for Foreign Affairs, conferred with the
Envoy; while the Minister for Foreign Affairs did the same
with the Japanese Minister. At the former conference Sim
San-kiun, Imperial Treasurer (former Prime Minister and one
of the Emperor’s favorites), was also present. We discussed
the matter fully with the Envoy, but did not agree to the
proposals he made. In the evening we were received in audience
by your Majesty and reported all that had occurred. We stated
to your Majesty that if we went to the Japanese Legation the
next day, as had been proposed, we should continue to refuse
to accede to the Japanese proposals. On the next day, we went
in a body to the Legation and there conferred at length with
the Minister upon the subject. Finally, as we still refused to
concur in what the Minister proposed, he stated that further
conference would be a waste of time; that your Majesty alone
had authority to decide, and that he had asked for an audience
through the Minister of the Imperial Household. Thereupon the
whole party repaired to the Palace. Your Majesty received the
members of the Cabinet in audience, and we reported what had
happened at the Legation, and assured Your Majesty that we were
still prepared to continue to refuse to accede to the Japanese
demands. Your Majesty expressed anxiety regarding the course to
be adopted, and said that, as we could not refuse positively,
it would be better to postpone negotiations.
Then Yi Wan-yong addressed Your Majesty. He said that the
matter was one which vitally affected the state; and that all
of the vassals and servants of Your Majesty must refuse to
accept terms injurious to the state. But the relationship of
the monarch to his vassals is like that of a father to his
sons, and therefore the members of the Cabinet were bound by
every tie of duty to speak frankly to their Master. He must,
therefore, call His Majesty’s attention to the fact that the
visit of the Envoy to Korea, and the coming of the Japanese
Minister to the Palace that evening, had one object—and one
only—namely, the conclusion of the Treaty. Therefore it was
necessary to decide at once upon what was to be done; the
matter did not admit of procrastination. It is easy for us
eight Ministers to say “No”; but our refusal alone does not
decide the matter. We are vassals merely, and only the word of
the monarch is final. The Envoy will undoubtedly ask for an
audience. When that occurs, if Your Majesty continues firmly
to refuse to the end, it is all right. But if Your Majesty’s
generosity should at last induce you to yield, what shall be
done then? This is a question which we must consider and settle
beforehand. When Your Majesty received us in audience last
evening you expressed no opinion.
As the other Ministers said nothing, Yi Wan-yong went on to
explain that what he meant by studying the subject beforehand
was to examine the provisions of the Convention, several of
which he was of opinion should be changed. Concerning such
matters it was necessary to consult and to come to some
decision beforehand.
Then Your Majesty said that Marquis Ito had informed you that
if we wished to modify the wording of the Convention there was
a way to do so. Your Majesty thought that if we rejected the
Convention categorically, the good relations of Korea and Japan
could not be maintained, and, in Your Majesty’s opinion, it was
possible to have some of the Articles changed. Therefore, what
Yi Wan-yong had proposed was proper.
Upon that Kwan Chung-hiun said that the Minister of Education
had not advised His Majesty to accept the Convention, but to
consider the matter upon the supposition that some amendment
was possible. Your Majesty replied that you understood that,
but that the difference was not of practical consequence. The
other Ministers expressed the same opinion. Your Majesty then
called for a draft of the Convention and asked for opinions
regarding the amendments which should be made.
The memorial then goes on to consider the amendments[41] which it was
thought would be desirable, and which were those subsequently proposed at
the conference with Marquis Ito. The Emperor approved these amendments
and himself suggested an amendment to the effect that in Article I of
the convention the word “sole” in the sentence “shall have sole control”
should be omitted. [This word, it may be remarked in passing, appeared in
the original draft, but was not included in the Article as finally agreed
to.]
Finally, when these deliberations terminated, the Ministers collectively
addressed the Emperor, and stated that although they had conferred upon
the adoption of possible amendments, they were still prepared, if His
Majesty so ordered them, to refuse altogether to accept the Japanese
proposals. In reply the Emperor commanded them not to reject the Treaty
finally and conclusively. On leaving, Mr. Han, speaking as Prime
Minister, and Mr. Pak, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that they
would not disobey His Majesty’s commands.
Then follows the account of the Conference with Mr. Hayashi, in which it
is stated that the Prime Minister, while acknowledging that the Emperor
had ordered him and his colleagues to come to some arrangement with the
Japanese Minister, refused to consider any of the various proposals made
by the latter. After that Marquis Ito arrived and the account of what
happened subsequently, as given in the memorial, is the same in all
essential details as that related in the first part of this chapter.[42]
With regard to this Treaty as a whole no advocate of Japan will, of
course, claim that it was entered into by Korea with a willing heart—much
less, in a jubilant spirit. It is seldom, indeed, that treaties of any
sort are concluded between two countries with apparently conflicting
interests, where both are equally well satisfied with their terms. In all
cases in which one party is compelled on grounds of expediency, or of
fear that greater evils will follow the rejection of the terms proposed
by the other party, there is a sense in which it may be said that the
will is not free, but that the deed is done “under a sort of compulsion.”
But if all treaties made under such conditions may be repudiated when
conditions are changed, or if either of the parties to a treaty may
act with treachery, and without punishment, when called upon to carry
out faithfully the contracts thus entered into, the peace of the world
cannot be secured or even promoted by any number of treaties. A feeling
of regret and chagrin, especially on the part of the official classes
and, indeed, of the educated men of Korea in general, was to be expected.
So far as it was sincere and unselfish, the feeling was honorable; and
for it the Resident-General and all those agreeing with his policy have
never shown any lack of respect. But, as has already been made clear,
the important thing with the millions of Korea is not, who are Cabinet
Ministers, or who manages the foreign affairs of the country, or even who
is Emperor; for them the important thing is the character of the local
magistrates and the amount of their “squeezes.”
Protests and petitions followed the enactment of the Treaty of November,
1905. The Emperor refused to receive the petitions or to give audience to
the petitioners. And when two men, among the most sincere and blameless
of his subjects—General Min Yung-whong and Mr. Choi Ik-hiun—persisted
in petitioning to be punished (as would have been in accordance with
Korean custom under similar circumstances) for their disobedience to the
Emperor’s commands in refusing to accept the Treaty, the Emperor declined
to punish them. The petitioners then transferred their efforts from the
Palace to the Supreme Court, and were disappointed there also. One of
them, perhaps both, undertook to punish themselves by suicide. General
Min thus became the typical martyr of the period. He is described by one
who knew him well as “a man of amiable character, of dignified manners,
and pleasing address. He was known at one time as the ‘good Min,’ to
distinguish him from the other members of the family to which the late
Queen belonged.” But it has already been shown that, during the entire
course of Korea’s history, such men have almost always been without
sufficient influence, or strength of character, to serve their country
well and escape death—usually, at the hands of the Emperor or their
rivals, sometimes, however, by their own hands. For a time the air was
full of rumors of suicide and uprisings; but in fact there was little of
anything of the kind, even in Seoul; the stories of wholesale suicides
are false. Beyond Seoul, and outside of a few of the larger towns in
which greater numbers of the Yang-bans resided, there was scarcely any
excitement of any kind. The Treaty then went into effect, on the whole
quietly, under Marquis Ito who had negotiated it as the Representative of
Japan.
In this way the Japanese Government in Korea was substituted for the
Korean Government in all matters affecting the relations of foreign
countries, and their nationals, to the peninsula. The retirement of the
Foreign Legations followed logically and as a matter of course. It is
needless to say that this change of responsibility for the conduct of
these relations was accepted without dissent or formal protest from the
Governments of the civilized world. Indeed, with the exception of Russia,
all the nations supremely interested had acknowledged already that, under
the Protocols of 1904, Korea had lost its claim to be recognized as an
independent state in respect of its foreign affairs.