THE PROBLEM: HISTORICAL (_CONTINUED_)
The conclusion of the centuries of intricate and unsatisfactory relations
between these two countries was, to quote the words of another, that
“Japan saw herself deposed from the position in Korea to which her
victories entitled her, by a nation which appeared to be both an upstart
and a usurper on the Sea of Japan.”[22] For three and a quarter centuries
Russia had been advancing through Asia at the average rate of 20,000
square miles annually; and now, in the endeavor, in itself laudable, to
secure an outlet on the Pacific for her Asiatic possessions, she began
extending her customary policy over Manchuria and the Peninsula. It is
doubtful whether the Korean King, when he took refuge in the Russian
Legation at Seoul, was really alarmed for his personal safety; it is
certain that he hated intensely the reform measures which had been forced
upon him, and the men among his own subjects who were committed to
those measures. His life was, however, never in any real danger at this
period. His presence and his position at the Russian Legation, during his
entire stay there, was lacking in all semblance of royal dignity. He was
himself in the virtual custody of a foreign power. The different Cabinet
Ministers had their places assigned in the dining-room of the Legation,
behind screens;—“all except one lucky individual who secured quarters
for his exclusive use in an abandoned out-house where wood and coal were
usually stored.”
There began now a game of manœuvring and intrigue in which, for some
years to come, the Japanese were to be at a large disadvantage. The
King, who has always shown himself irrevocably committed to the peculiar
methods of Korean politics, within two weeks of the day on which he had
taken refuge in the Russian Legation, began secretly communicating with
the Japanese Minister. The Russian Minister at that time, who has been
pronounced “probably the most adroit representative of her interests whom
Russia ever had in Korea,” proclaimed himself an unwilling victim of the
King’s fear, which he regarded as hysterical, but could not, in common
decency, fail to respect. The Japanese were in no position to resent the
insult or to foreguard against the menace which all this involved.
Not unnaturally, the Russian representative undertook promptly to avail
his country of the especially favorable opportunity for promoting its
interests in the Far East which was offered by the intimate relations
of protection established over the Korean Government. For it should
never be lost out of mind that until years after these events, whoever
had dominating influence with the Korean monarch controlled, in largest
measure, the Korean Government. M. Waeber, among other material benefits,
secured valuable mining and timber concessions for his countrymen; it
was also, probably, due to his influence that the Korean troops which
had been trained by the Japanese, were disbanded. There then followed a
radical change in the policy of Japan, which is described as follows by
Hershey:[23]
In the summer of 1896 Japan formally departed from her
policy of the past two decades of upholding the independence
and integrity of Korea by her own efforts, and sought the
co-operation of Russia toward the same end. On May 14th, the
Russian and Japanese Ministers at Seoul concluded a memorandum
which fixed the number and disposition of Japanese troops in
Korea. On June 9, 1896, the Yamagata-Lobanoff protocol was
signed at St. Petersburg. It was thereby agreed:
(1) That the Japanese and Russian governments
should unite in advising the Korean Government to
suppress all unnecessary expenses and to establish
an equilibrium between expenditure and revenue. If,
as a result of reforms which should be considered
indispensable, it should become necessary to have
recourse to foreign debts, the two governments should
of a common accord render their support to Korea.
(2) The Japanese and Russian governments should try
to abandon to Korea, in so far as the financial and
economic situation of that country should permit,
the creation and maintenance of an armed force
and of a police organized of native subjects, in
proportion sufficient to maintain internal order,
without foreign aid. (3) Russia was to be permitted
to establish a telegraph line from Seoul to her
frontier; the Japanese Government being allowed to
administer those lines already in its possession.
(4) In case the principles above expounded require a
more precise and more detailed definition, or if in
the future other points should arise about which it
should be necessary to consult, the representatives
of the two governments should be instructed to
discuss them amicably.
The Protocol of June, 1896, was no sooner signed than Russia proceeded
to violate its terms. In the same month she tried to gain control of the
Korean army by placing it under Russian instruction and discipline; in
the same year, she urged the request that the disposal of all the Korean
taxes and customs be placed in the hands of M. Kir Alexeieff. This plan
was partly carried through the following year, and Mr. J. McLeavy Brown
was dismissed from the position of Financial Adviser and General Director
of Customs for Korea, although he was soon after formally restored to
the latter office, the control of which he had never been, in fact,
induced to surrender. In August of 1897, M. de Speyer succeeded M.
Waeber as the Representative of Russia (_Conseiller d’Etat_) in Korea;
his conduct of Russian affairs, which seems to have been quite devoid of
the conciliatory policy of his predecessor, lost for his country many of
the advantages which had already been secured. Besides the inducement
from this fact, the recent acquisition of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan
seemed to make it desirable for Russia, for the time being at least, to
conciliate Japan. And Japan, on her part, definitively committed herself
to the effort to conciliate Russia, while at the same time safeguarding
her own important, and indeed essentially vital, interests in the
Peninsula. Accordingly there was concluded between the two nations the
Nishi-Rosen Protocol of August 25, 1898.
That instrument was as follows:
ARTICLE I.—The Imperial governments of Japan and Russia
definitely recognize the sovereignty and entire independence
of Korea, and mutually engage to abstain from all direct
interference in the affairs of that country.
ARTICLE II.—Desiring to remove every possible cause of
misunderstanding in the future, the Imperial governments of
Japan and Russia mutually engage not to take any measure
regarding the nomination of military instructors and financial
advisers without having previously arrived at a mutual accord
on the subject.
ARTICLE III.—In view of the great development of the commercial
and industrial enterprise of Japan in Korea, as also the
considerable number of Japanese subjects residing in that
country, the Russian Imperial Government shall not impede the
development of commercial and industrial relations between
Japan and Korea.
Five days later—namely, on August 30th—Marquis Ito, who was visiting in
Korea, and had been cordially received by the Emperor and invited to
dine with him, publicly reaffirmed the policy for which His Imperial
Majesty of Japan and he himself, as His Majesty’s subject, wished to be
responsible, in a speech delivered at a dinner given at the Foreign
Office. On that occasion the Marquis spoke as follows:
YOUR EXCELLENCIES AND GENTLEMEN:
I thank you sincerely for the kind words in which the Acting
Minister of Foreign Affairs has just addressed me on your
behalf, but at the same time I am constrained to say that I
do not deserve the high compliments which he chose to confer
upon me. Allow me to avail myself of the present opportunity to
say a few words concerning the attitude of Japan toward this
country. You doubtless know that in 1873 a group of Japanese
statesmen advocated the despatch of a punitive expedition to
Korea, a proposal to which I was uncompromisingly opposed from
the outset, because I deemed such a war not only uncalled for,
but contrary to the principles of humanity. You may imagine the
magnitude of the excitement occasioned by this question, when
I tell you that the split which it caused in the ranks of the
Japanese statesmen led to a tremendous civil war a few years
afterward. The point to which I wish to direct your attention
is that His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Government did not
hesitate to reject what it considered to be an unjust proposal
even at such gigantic risk.
Japan’s policy toward Korea has since been unchanged; in other
words, her object has always been to assist and befriend this
country. It is true that at times incidents of an unpleasant
nature unfortunately interfered with the maintenance of
unsuspecting cordiality between the two nations. But I may
conscientiously assure you that the real object of the Japanese
Government has always been to render assistance to Korea in her
noble endeavors to be a civilized and independent state.
I am sincerely gratified to see that to-day Korea is
independent and sovereign. Henceforth it will be Japan’s
wish to see Korea’s independence further strengthened and
consolidated; no other motive shall influence Japan’s conduct
toward this country. On this point you need not entertain the
slightest doubt.
Japan’s good wishes for Korean independence are all the
more sincere and reliable because her vital interests are
bound up with those of your country. A danger to Korean
independence will be a danger to Japan’s safety. So you will
easily recognize that the strongest of human motives, namely
self-interest, combines with neighborly feelings to make Japan
a sincere well-wisher and friend of Korean independence.
Let me repeat once more that Korea may rest assured of the
absence of all sinister motives on Japan’s part. Friendship
between two countries in the circumstances of Japan and Korea
ought to be free from any trace of suspicion and doubt as to
each other’s motives and intentions. In conclusion, allow me to
express my heartful hope that you may long remain in office and
assiduously exert yourselves for the good of your sovereign and
country.
With the coming of M. Pavloff to Korea as its Representative, in
December, 1898, the diplomacy of Russia in this part of the Orient
abandoned the traditional method of patient, persistent effort at
advance, together with more or less perfect assimilation of the new
tribes and peoples brought under its control, and adopted the more
brilliant but dangerous policy of a swift promotion of obviously
selfish schemes by a mixture of threats and cajolery. It is not even
now certain how far this policy was supported by, or even known to, the
home government of Russia. The war with Japan, to which these acts led
steadily and irresistibly forward, seemed, only in its actual results, to
reveal at all fully to this Government what its representatives had been
doing in the Far East.
Among the various attempts of M. Pavloff and his coadjutors to obtain
concessions for themselves and for their country, those which looked
toward the establishment of a Russian naval base in certain localities of
the Korean coast were threatening to Japan. “But Russia’s conduct on the
Northern frontier of Korea along the Tumen and Yalu rivers was”—to quote
again from Hershey—“the greatest source of anxiety to Japan.”
In 1896 Russia had obtained valuable mining concessions in
two districts near the port of Kiong-hung at the mouth of
the Tumen River, and later sought to extend her influence in
that region. More important and dangerous, however, to the
interests of Japan were the attempts of Russia to obtain an
actual foothold on Korean territory at Yong-am-po on the Korean
side of the Yalu River. As far back as 1896, when the King
was a guest of the Russian Legation, a Russian merchant had
obtained timber concessions on the Uining Island in the Sea of
Japan and on the Tumen and Yalu rivers. The concession along
the Yalu was to be forfeited unless work was begun within five
years in the other two regions. This condition does not appear
to have been complied with when the Korean Government was
suddenly notified on April 13, 1903, that the Russian timber
syndicate would at once begin the work of cutting timber on the
Yalu. Early in May sixty Russian soldiers in civilian dress,
later increased by several hundred more, were reported to have
occupied Yong-am-po, a point rather remote from the place where
actual cutting was in progress. At the same time there was
taking place a mysterious mobilization of troops from Liaoyang
and Port Arthur toward Feng-hwang-cheng and Antung on the other
side of the Yalu. Early in June four Russian warships paid a
week’s visit to Chemulpo. In August M. Pavloff appears to have
been on the point of obtaining an extension of the Yong-am-po
lease, but this was prevented by the receipt of an ultimatum
from the Japanese Minister. Mr. Hayashi threatened that if the
Korean Government were to sign such a lease, Japan would regard
diplomatic relations between the two countries as suspended,
and would regard herself as free to act in her own interests.
In this connection it should be said, that while the Korean Government
did not formally renew the lease, the Emperor did secretly enter into an
arrangement with M. Pavloff concerning Yong-am-po, practically conceding
all that was asked on Russia’s behalf. This document was discovered after
the war began and hastily cancelled by the Emperor, of his own accord,
upon the recommendation of the Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Meantime another conflict of interests between Russia and Japan was
developing and contributing to the same result—namely, the Russo-Japanese
war. This was the so-called “Manchurian Question.” It is not necessary
for the purposes of our narrative to trace with any detail the origin
and different stages of that succession of successful intrigues and
encroachments upon foreign territory which had been for some time carried
on with the Chinese by methods similar to those now being employed in
Korea. Some of the more salient points in the history of the preceding
period of nearly a half-century need, however, to be called to mind.
In 1860, when the allied forces occupied Peking, the Russian Minister,
General Ignatieff, by a brilliant stroke of diplomacy, secured for his
country the cession of the maritime province of Manchuria, with 600 miles
of coast, and the harbor of Vladivostok, down to the mouth of the Tumen.
For this he gave nothing in return beyond the pretence that it was in his
power to bring pressure upon the allies and thus secure their more speedy
evacuation of the Chinese capital.
Thirty years later, after the new province had been developed and
the harbor of Vladivostok converted into a powerful fortress, Russia
determined upon building an all-rail route across Siberia, and
immediately began to press for other concessions in Chinese territory
that in 1897 resulted in the association which constructed what is now
known as the Manchurian Railway. This enterprise was ostensibly a joint
affair of the two countries; but it has been fitly described as “only
a convenient bonnet” for an essentially Russian undertaking. Russian
engineers now came in large numbers to Manchuria; Russian Cossacks
accompanied them for purposes of their protection. Later in the same
year the seizure by Germany of Kiao-chau, in satisfaction for outrages
committed upon German missionaries, was followed by Russia’s request
to the Chinese Government for permission to winter her fleet at Port
Arthur. In March of the next year Japan had the added mortification,
bitterness, and cause for alarm, of seeing Russia demand and obtain from
China a formal lease of the same commercial and strategic points of
the peninsula of Liao-tung of which Russia, by combining with Germany
and France, had deprived Japan when she had won them by conquest in
war. These enterprises in Manchuria were financed by the Russo-Chinese
Bank, an institution which had recently been founded in the Far East
as a branch of the Russian Ministry of Finance. So important is this
last-mentioned fact that one writer places upon M. Pokotiloff, Chief of
the Russo-Chinese Bank in Berlin, the responsibility for the whole Port
Arthur episode, and declares it was he who dictated the policy of Russia
in Manchuria after the Boxer uprising.[24]
The occupation of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan (renamed Dalny) was
accompanied by assurances from the Russian Government—chiefly designed
to quiet Great Britain and Japan—that it had “no intention of infringing
the rights and privileges guaranteed by existing treaties between China
and foreign countries;” and that no interference with Chinese sovereignty
was contemplated. To the objections raised when it proceeded to fortify
Port Arthur, the reply was made that Russia “must have a safe harbor for
her fleet, which could not be at the mercy of the elements at Vladivostok
or dependent upon the good-will of Japan.” Under this plea she refused
to change the status of Port Arthur as a closed and principally military
port. The effect of all this upon the attitude of public feeling in Japan
toward Russia can easily be imagined. Even when, in August, 1899, the
port of Dalny was declared “open” by an Imperial ukase, regulations with
respect to passports and claims to a monopoly of mining rights continued
to lessen the confidence of other nations in Russia’s good faith with
respect to the occupation of Manchuria. It is now sufficiently well
established that during this period secret agreements between Li Hung
Chang and the Russian Government were made which enlarged the special
privileges of Russia in Manchuria. Meantime, also, her military hold was
being strengthened; so that by December, 1898, she had 20,000 men at her
two ports, while Cossack guards—“the pennons on their lances showing a
combination of the Russian colors and the Chinese dragon”—were patrolling
the railway line and protecting the work of fortification at Port Arthur.
During these years the Japanese Government was watching with quiet but
painful solicitude the movements going forward in China. When Marquis
Ito visited Peking and the Yangtse provinces in the summer of 1898,
he was received with marked attention, especially by the reform party
among the leading Chinese officials; but the baleful influence of the
Dowager-Empress, and of the party opposed to everything likely to
curtail their power, arrested the attempts at _rapprochement_ between
China and Japan. It was the so-called “Boxer Movement,” however, which
gave to Russia a new claim of right to interfere in Chinese affairs and
to establish more firmly than ever before her special privileges in
Manchuria. The history of this movement—of the way in which Russia dealt
with its extension into Manchuria, of the siege of Peking and the doings
of the allied forces, and of the subsequent behavior of the Russians
with regard to the evacuation of Manchuria—is now well known, or easily
accessible, by all students of the period.
In spite of repeated promises to evacuate the points seized and held by
Russian forces when, after the relief of the Legations, these forces
were withdrawn from Peking and Chi-li to be concentrated in Manchuria,
and in disregard of the interests of the other allies, the policy of
keeping all that she had gained, and of gaining more as far as possible,
was steadily pursued by Russia. On November 11, 1900, an agreement was
made between the Representative of Admiral Alexeieff and the Tartar
General at Mukden, the most significant point of which was the promise
of the Chinese official to provide the Russian troops with lodging and
provisions, to disarm and disband all Chinese soldiers and hand over
all arms and ammunition to the Russians, and to dismantle all forts and
defences not occupied by the Russians.
It was the probable effect of a continued occupation of Manchuria by
Russia upon their business interests which led Great Britain and America
to wish that the repeated Russian assurances of good faith toward China
and toward all foreign nations should manifest themselves in works. The
case could not be wholly the same with Japan. Her interests of trade
were, indeed, if not at the time so large, more close and vital than
those of any other nation outside of China. But her other interests were
incomparable. So that when Russia failed to carry out her engagements,
even under a convention which was so much in her favor, there was a
revival of suspicion and apprehension on the part of the Japanese
Government and the Japanese people. Manchuria and Korea both pointed an
index finger of warning directed toward Russia.
It was to further a peaceful adjustment of all the disturbed condition
of the interests of Russia and Japan in the Far East that Marquis Ito
went, on his way home from his visit to the United States, at the end
of 1901, on an unofficial mission to St. Petersburg. The failure of
the overtures which he bore discouraged those of the leading Japanese
statesmen who were hoping for some reconciliation which might take the
shape of allowing Russian ascendency in Manchuria and Japanese ascendency
in Korea. It also strengthened the conviction which prevailed among
the younger statesmen that the St. Petersburg Government regarded
Manchuria as not only its fortress in the Far East, but also as its path
to the peninsula lying within sight of Japan’s shores. “The Japanese
Government,” says Mr. D. W. Stevens, “at last felt that the vital
interests of Japan might be irrevocably jeopardized in Korea as well
as in Manchuria, if it continued to remain a mere passive spectator
of Russian encroachments; and in August, 1903, it resolved to take
a decisive step. In the most courteous form and through the usual
diplomatic channels Japan intimated at St. Petersburg that her voice
must be heard, and listened to, in connection with Far Eastern questions
in which her interests were vitally concerned.” The answer of Russia
was the appointment of Admiral Alexeieff as Viceroy over the Czar’s
possessions in the Far East, with executive and administrative powers of
a semi-autocratic character.
But let us return to Korea and inquire: What was the policy with which
its Emperor and his Court met the exceedingly critical situation into
which the country was being forced by the conflict going on between
Russia and Japan both within, and just outside of, its borders? The
answer is not dubious. It was the policy, in yet more aggravated form,
of folly, weakness, intrigue, and corruption, both in the administration
of internal affairs and also in the management of the now very delicate
foreign relations. The Emperor was—to use the descriptive phrase of
another—enjoying “an orgy of independence.” The former restraints
which had been imposed upon him by Chinese domination, by the personal
influence of the Tai Won Kun, or of the Queen, by his fears of the
reformers, and even by any passive emotional impulses of his own, leading
to reformation, were now all removed. While he was a “guest” at the
Russian Legation there was certainly no direct influence exerted by his
hosts, to assist, advise, or guide him into better ways. It was not the
policy of Russia to effect—at least for the present or immediately
prospective occasion—any moral betterment of the administration of
Korean home and foreign affairs. Under the regency of his father, the
Government had been cruel, despotic, and murderous toward both native
and foreign Christians. But the Tai Won Kun had some regard for ancient
common laws and usages. Under him the people were reasonably sure of such
rights, protection, and privileges of public domain, as their ancestors
had enjoyed. The public granaries were kept full against the time of
famine. The timber and fire-wood on the hills was not given over to
any one who could bribe or cajole the corrupt officials; and the line
of demarcation between royal and popular rights was more clearly drawn
and better understood. But now all this was changed for the worse. The
King declared himself the sole and private owner—to dispose of as he
saw fit—of all the properties which had formerly been considered as
belonging to the state. Low-born favorites appropriated or laid waste
the public domain. The country’s resources were wasted; the people were
subjected to new and irregular exactions, levied by irregular people for
illegal purposes. A succession of the most consummate rascals which ever
afflicted any country came into virtual control. They were endowed with
offices purchased or extorted from the head ruler. Eunuchs were sent out
from the palace on “still hunts,” so to speak, to discover any kind of
property which, by any pretext whatever, could be claimed; and to seize
such property in the name of His Majesty, or of the King’s concubine,
Lady Om, or of some one of the Imperial Princes. Laws which were intended
to promote the ends of justice were twisted from their purpose and made
to serve the ends of plunder. Such privileges as that of coining and
counterfeiting the currency were sold to private persons.
Then began also that squandering of the nation’s most valuable resources
which, under the name of “concessions” to foreigners who generally allied
themselves for this end with corrupt Korean officials, has continued down
to the present time; and the adjustment of which is still giving the
Resident-General and his judicial advisers some of their most serious
problems. To quote the description of this period by a distinguished
foreigner, long in the Korean service: “Nothing in this country is
safe from the horde which surrounds His Majesty and seemingly has his
confidence. Public office is bought and sold without even the pretence
of concealment. Officials share with the palace the plunder which they
extort from the people. So and So (naming a prominent Korean Official)
is said to owe his influence there largely to the fact that out of every
ten thousand _yen_ which he collects he surrenders seven thousand to
the Emperor, retaining only three for himself. With his colleagues it
is usually the other way, about.” According to the same authority, many
kinds of property which were formerly regarded as belonging to the state
were now being appropriated to the Emperor’s use, or to that of his
favorites, without any pretext, under the rule that “might makes right.”
Torturing, strangling, and decapitation, were no infrequent methods of
accomplishing the imperial will; though it should be said that these
favors were somewhat impartially distributed. Sometimes it was the secret
strangling in prison of such patriots as An Kyun-su and Kwan Yung-chin,
on the night of May 27, 1900—than which, it has truly been said, “no more
dastardly crime ever stained the annals of this or any other government”:
sometimes it was the torturing and execution of such unspeakable rascals
as the ex-court-favorites, Kim Yung-chun (1901), Yi Yong-ik, and Yi
Keun-tak (1902). In a word, _the period of “independence,” to which the
Emperor has been lately imploring his own subjects and the civilized
world to restore him, was the period in which he took what, and gave
away what, and did what he chose, under the basest influences; for the
most worthless or mischievous ends, without law or pretence of justice
or goodness of heart, to the lasting disgrace and essential ruin of the
nation_.
Such is a summary of the doings during the years preceding the
Russo-Japanese war, on the part of the Korean Emperor and his Court.
“Through all this period,” says Mr. Hulbert,[25] “Russian influence was
quietly at work securing its hold upon the Korean Court and upon such
members of the government as it could win over. The general populace
was always suspicious of her, however, and always preferred the rougher
hand of Japan to the soft but heavy hand of Russia.” The threatening
nature of the situation created by these Russian encroachments was as
well understood at Washington and London as at Tokyo. It was intimately
connected with the Manchurian question to the untangling of which Mr. Hay
had devoted so much thought.
But Russia’s action in Manchuria, threatening as it was to the interests,
not alone of Japan but also of other foreign powers, did not call upon
the Japanese Government for armed interference.[26] As the behavior of
Japan showed during the Boxer troubles in China, she had learned caution
with respect to fighting the battles of civilized Europe and America, at
her own expense and without show of gratitude from others.
As we have already seen, the most threatening feature of the situation
for Japan was Russia’s activity upon the Yalu, especially at Yong-am-po.
In the interests of peace Mr. Hay supplemented his efforts to maintain
the principle of the open door and equal opportunity in Manchuria, by
an earnest endeavor (which had Lord Lansdowne’s cordial support) to
fend off the impending quarrel between Japan and Russia. Since all the
Treaty Powers were interested in the matter of treaty ports in Korea,
the method that most readily suggested itself was the opening of Wiju
and Yong-am-po, which would remove any question of the latter place
being used as a military or naval base. The request was reasonable from
every point of view, since Wiju, as the market town, and Yong-am-po,
as the port, were naturally the complement, on the Korean side of the
Yalu, of Antung then recently declared an open port on the Manchurian.
Indeed, other considerations apart, some such action was imperatively
necessary from the Korean standpoint, inasmuch as an open port in Chinese
territory, without a corresponding port of entry in neighboring Korean
territory, could not fail to be prejudicial to the interests of Korea.
Accordingly the American and British representatives at Seoul were
instructed to urge upon the Korean Government the necessity of opening
these ports.
This was done, but the attempt to persuade the Emperor met with strenuous
opposition on M. Pavloff’s part, and finally failed, apparently because
of the incapacity of His Majesty’s nearest advisers to grasp the real
significance of the crisis and the momentous effect which the decision
must have upon Korea’s fortunes. The struggle was a fierce one while it
lasted and, among other minor results, led to the resignation of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs. The gentleman who succeeded him, as Acting
Minister, was disposed to favor the opening of the ports, in spite of the
strong opposition of the palace coterie. He went so far as to prepare
letters to the foreign representatives declaring the ports open, and was
actually about sending them out, on his own responsibility, when he was
stopped, partly by a peremptory order from the palace, and partly by
the persuasion of his friends who represented to him the great personal
danger he would incur by such a step.
The narrative of this official throws a curious side-light upon M.
Pavloff’s methods and shows in an interesting way his persistence, even
at a time when the correspondence between Russia and Japan preceding the
war had reached a critical stage, in endeavoring by every means at his
command to carry through the very intrigue which formed the _gravamen_
of Japan’s strongest reason for complaining. It is easy, in the light
of what has happened, to condemn this action; but even at the time it
must have seemed to impartial observers more like the infatuation of a
desperate gambler than the well-considered moves of a shrewd diplomatist.
It was all done, too, in support of a transparent subterfuge, namely:
that Russia had no arrangement with Korea which gave to the proposed
use of Yong-am-po any other character than that of an entirely peaceful
occupation for legitimate commercial purposes; and that her agents had
done absolutely nothing in the way of preparing the place for military
occupation. When he was urging upon the Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs reasons for not opening Yong-am-po, the latter enquired: “Why
have you staked off such a large extent of territory, and why are you
building a fort?” M. Pavloff instantly denied in emphatic terms that
anything of the kind had been done. “For the past ten days,” quietly
replied the Korean official, “I have had two men whom I trust thoroughly
on the spot, and my question is the result of telegraphic reports I
have received from them.” The interview did not continue, but within
forty-eight hours his scouts reported to the Acting Minister that all the
stakes had been removed. There had not been time, they said, thoroughly
to remove all traces of works upon the fortifications, but that as much
of the works as possible had been levelled and the whole covered up with
loose earth, tree-trunks and branches. Such effrontery seems incredible;
but these are facts, and others like them equally typical of M. Pavloff’s
methods could be recited. It is doubtful whether even his own government
knew all the circumstances, or was fully aware, until it was too late,
what he had done and was continuing to do to arouse Japanese suspicion
and resentment.
The negotiations having in view the peaceful adjustment of the
conflicting interests of Russia and Japan in the Far East, which
were begun by the latter country in the summer of 1903, were further
continued. Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, was
informed by Baron Komura, who was then Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs, that the recent conduct of Russia at Peking, in Manchuria, and
in Korea, was the cause of grave concern to the Government at Tokyo.
“The unconditional and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia
would,” said Baron Komura, “create a state of things prejudicial to the
security and interests of Japan. The principle of equal opportunity would
thereby be annulled, and the territorial integrity of China be impaired.
There is, however, a still more serious consideration for the Japanese
Government; that is to say, if Russia was established on the flank of
Korea it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that
empire, or at least would make Russia the dominant power in Korea. But
Korea is an important outpost in Japan’s line of defence, and Japan
consequently considers its independence absolutely essential to her own
repose and safety. Moreover, the political as well as the commercial and
industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are
paramount over those of other Powers. These interests and this influence
Japan, having regard to her own security, cannot consent to surrender to,
or share with, another Power.”
In view of these reasons, Mr. Kurino was instructed to present the
following note to Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs: “The Japanese Government desires to remove from the relations
of the two empires every cause of future misunderstanding, and believes
that the Russian Government shares the same desire. The Japanese
Government would therefore be glad to enter with the Russian Imperial
Government upon an examination of the condition of affairs in the regions
of the extreme East, where their interests meet, with a view of defining
their respective special interests in those regions. If this suggestion
fortunately meets with the approval, in principle, of the Russian
Government, the Japanese Government will be prepared to present to the
Russian Government their views as to the nature and scope of the proposed
understanding.”
The consent of Count Lamsdorff and the Czar having been obtained,
on August 12th articles were prepared and submitted by the Japanese
Government which it wished to have serve as a basis of understanding
between the two countries. The essential agreements to be secured by
these articles were: (1) A mutual engagement to respect the independence
and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires, and to
maintain the “open door” in these countries; and (2) a reciprocal
recognition of Japan’s preponderating interests in Korea and of Russia’s
special interests in Manchuria. These demands were not altered in any
very important way by Japan during all the subsequent negotiations. It
was their persistent rejection by Russia, together with her long delays
in replying while she was meantime making obvious preparations of a
war-like character, which precipitated the tremendous conflict that
followed some months later. In her first reply with counter proposals
which was made nearly eight weeks later through Baron Rosen, the Russian
Minister at Tokyo, Russia not only reduced Japan’s demands regarding
Korea, but even proposed new restrictions upon her in that country. But
what was equally significant, the counter-proposals took no account
of the demand for an agreement as to the independence and territorial
integrity of the Chinese empire, or as to the policy of the “open door”
in Manchuria and Korea. On the contrary, they required Japan expressly
to recognize Manchuria as “in all respects outside her sphere of
interest.” Meantime Russia was increasing her commercial and military
activity in both the territorial spheres where the question of interests
and rights was under dispute.
In the second overture of October 30th, several important concessions
were made by Japan, to which on December 11th Russia replied with
a repetition of the former counter-proposal—omitting, however, the
offensive clause regarding Manchuria and inserting the Japanese proposal
relating to the connection of the Korean and the Chinese-Eastern
railways. Ten days later the Japanese Government presented a third
overture in which Baron Komura tried to make it clear to the Russian
Government that Japan desired “to bring within the purview of the
proposed arrangement all those regions in the Far East where the
interests of the two empires meet.” But when the reply of Russia was
received in Tokyo on January 6, 1904, it was found that not only was
there no mention made of the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria,
but that Russia again insisted upon Japan’s regarding the “Manchurian
Question” and the littoral of Manchuria as quite outside her sphere
of interest. Russia, indeed, agreed “not to impede Japan or the other
Powers in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges acquired by them
under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of
settlements”; but only on condition that Japan would agree not to use
any part of the territory of Korea for strategical purposes, and also to
the establishment of a neutral zone in Northern Korea. In spite of the
fact that the two governments were still as far apart as at the beginning
in regard to the most vital points of interest, Japan made another and
fourth attempt. This overture was presented to Count Lamsdorff on January
13th and, in spite of the urgent request for an early reply, this did
not come until February 7, the day following the severing of diplomatic
relations between the two countries. Negotiations were then ended; appeal
was now made to the “arbitrament of war,” so-called.
It is not our purpose to discuss in detail the question of rights, as
involved in these negotiations, whether from the political or the moral
point of view, or to consider whether Japan’s method of initiating
hostilities was in accordance with law, or with precedent as established,
if such it can be said to be, by the usage of civilized nations. In both
regards we believe, however, that the claims of Japan to have the right
upon her side are in all important particulars defensible. But having
begun the war with Russia it can be seen that to secure free passage for
her troops through Korea, and to secure Korea in the rear of her troops
as they passed to the front, were necessities imposed upon Japan in a
yet more absolute and indisputable fashion than was the undertaking of
the war itself. If it was necessary in order to maintain the integrity
and free, peaceful development of Japan that, all other means having
failed, she should resort to arms in the effort to check the dangerous
encroachments of Russia in Manchuria and Korea, it was immediately and
essentially necessary for any measure of success in this last resort,
that she should gain and hold control over the conduct of the Korean
Court and the Korean populace during the war. What were the nature and
the habitual modes of behavior of both Court and people has already
been made clear; more information on these subjects will be afforded in
subsequent chapters. As to danger of treachery we may note in passing
that, while friendship was being protested to the face of the Japanese in
Korea, a boat was picked up in the Yellow Sea, late in January, 1904—that
is, a few days before the outbreak of the war—which bore a Korean
messenger with a letter to Port Arthur asking for Russian troops to be
sent to Korea. The resort to valuable concessions as a bribe for foreign
influence became at once, on the beginning of hostilities, more active
even than before. On this latter point we quote the words of Mr. D. W.
Stevens:
The outbreak of the war created a veritable storm of terror
in the ranks of Korean officialdom. Many of its members who
were known as Russian sympathizers fled to the country; a few
took refuge in the houses of foreign friends. Palace circles
were in particular profoundly agitated. There was a curious
manifestation of the trend of the Korean official mind toward
the belief that political support can be bought. Those were
golden days for the foreigner who, willing to trade upon
Korean ignorance and credulity, cared to let it be understood,
either openly or tacitly, that his government would appreciate
favors shown to himself. One foreign minister was surprised
by the offer of a mining concession which before that he had
unsuccessfully tried to obtain. Having due regard for his own
and his country’s reputation he naturally declined. Others,
private individuals, were not so scrupulous; and there are
to-day extant exceptionally favorable public grants, both
claimed and actually enjoyed, which were thus, as it has been
put, “obtained in the shadow of the war.”
At this time the Emperor was dominated by the influence of a courtier
named Yi Yong-ik, whose foreign affiliations were wholly Russian. The
Palace coterie, even including this man’s bitter political enemies, was
almost entirely pro-Russian. But the Emperor was also, of course, much
afraid of the Japanese, who were now near at hand, whereas the Russians
and their Korean coadjutors had either fled the country or gone into
retirement. For the time being, therefore, Japan had control of the
Imperial environment. Meantime, one of two courses only seemed open
to the Japanese themselves: they could either set aside the Emperor
and his untrustworthy officials, and assume complete control of Korean
affairs; or they could make some sort of arrangement which would secure
an alliance with Korea. If faithful to this alliance, the Emperor would
be assured of his personal safety and of his throne; and the country
would be placed definitively under Japanese protection. The leaders in
Japan knew perfectly well that His Korean Majesty was anti-Japanese and
characteristically false and treacherous; but they hoped by moderation
to win him over to at least a partial and temporary fulfilment of the
obligations under which he would be placed by the adoption of the more
friendly course.
There were also military reasons why a sort of protectorate and alliance
seemed necessary; and if possible in a way to avoid the troubles of a
forcible annexation. For, very special and momently imminent dangers
threatened the construction and use of the railway by which the Japanese
were transporting their troops and supplies through Korea to the seat of
the war. In several instances armed attacks were made upon the workmen
and the track was torn up. In another connection it will be shown that
the charge of extreme cruelty and wholesale slaughter made by Mr.
Hulbert[27] (and illustrated by a picture designed to excite pathos),
because the Japanese military authorities executed some of the leaders
of these dangerous riots, is quite unwarranted by the facts. The same
thing may be said of the charge that the _Po-an_, or “Society for the
Promotion of Peace and Safety,” was illegally and wantonly suppressed
by the Japanese in July of 1904. The simple truth is that this society
bore about the same relation to the cause of “peace and safety” which
has been borne during the past two years by the several associations for
intrigue and murder which have masqueraded under titles suggestive of the
most noble schemes for promoting the interests of patriotism, education,
morals and religion. It must be either a dull or a prejudiced mind,
indeed, that can take in the atmosphere of Korean politics for even a
few months—not to say, years—of residence in the land, and not understand
the threatening significance of these _associations_. On the other hand,
the question of propriety in dealing summarily with those who persist in
tearing up the tracks of a military road in time of war may confidently
be left to those who are experienced in such matters.
Indeed, with regard to the entire conduct of affairs by the Japanese
during this period, we may ask the question, and give the answer, of Mr.
Whigham:[28] “What, then, is Japan to do? Is she to sit down and watch
the Russian flood descending on her fields without attempting to set up a
barrier? The answer is very simple. Japan must take Korea and do it very
quickly, too.”
It was such a situation of extreme peril and emergency which compelled
the Japanese Government to secure formal recognition in an agreement
with the Korean Government—so far as such a thing as government then
existed in Korea—that should admit of no misunderstanding. This necessity
gave rise to the Conventions of February 23, 1904, and of August 22 of
the same year. The latter of these conventions was the logical sequence
and supplement of the former. By the first of the Protocols[29] it
was designed to secure necessary reforms in the administration of
Korea and, besides, such an alliance between the two governments that
Japan should guard the Korean Emperor and his people against foreign
aggressions in the future and secure for herself the furtherance of
her military operations against Russia. Of more permanent importance
still was the prevention in the future of all such experiences as she
had passed through in 1894-1895, and was passing through at the present
time. The Convention of February, however, was no sooner concluded than
His Majesty began plotting to prevent its going into effect. With the
conduct of military matters he was indeed powerless to interfere; but
every attempt at reform met with either his passive resistance or open
opposition. This attitude of his made necessary the additional provisions
stipulated in the supplementary Protocol of August 22, 1904.[30] In this,
provision was made for the appointment by the Korean Government of a
Japanese recommended by the Japanese Government as “Financial Adviser,”
and of some foreigner, also to be recommended by the Japanese Government,
as “Adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs.” The appointees to
these positions were Mr. Megata and Mr. D. W. Stevens.
But still the intrigue and treachery of His Majesty went on. In spite of
the excellent service of Mr. Megata in straightening out the confusion
of the Korean finances, and in utter disregard of Mr. Stevens’ advices
and endeavors to make the new Protocols both appear, and actually to
be, greatly to the advantage of the Emperor and of his country, the
imperial ways remained unchanged. His own Foreign Ministers were either
disregarded or made tools of intrigue. Even after the Treaty of November,
1905, His Majesty sent secret telegrams from the Palace ordering the
Foreign Ministers of other Governments to pay no attention to the
directions of his own Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the latter was
arranging for the closing of the Legations according to the terms of
the Treaty. During the entire war he was in secret communication with
Japan’s enemies, while claiming Japan’s protection under the Protocols of
February and August, 1904. This treacherous correspondence was carried
on through emissaries at Shanghai; and large sums of money, which the
Japanese Financial Adviser had somehow to provide, were wasted upon
these futile efforts to change the course of events. Indeed, in this
correspondence and in the distribution of this money, it is probable
that the chief agent in Shanghai was the same person as the chief agent
of Russia herself.
The subsequent history of the relations of Japan and Korea, as these
relations resulted through the events of July, 1907, in establishing a
protectorate which placed all important Korean affairs, both internal and
foreign, under the control of the Japanese Resident-General, cannot be
understood or judged without keeping the necessity and the significance
of these Protocols steadily in mind. Of the Convention of February, 1904,
Lawrence significantly says:[31]
Japan took the earliest opportunity of regularizing her
position by a Protocol negotiated with the native Government,
and communicated with Tokyo to her Legations abroad on February
27th. In this, the last of the long series of diplomatic
agreements relating to the subject, the fiction of Korean
independence is still kept up, while the fact of Japanese
control is further accentuated. By the third Article Japan
“guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the
Korean Empire”; and by the second she covenants to ensure “the
safety and repose of the Imperial Household of Korea.” The
Korean Government, on its part, covenants to adopt the advice
of Japan in regard to improvements in administration, and to
give full facilities for the promotion of any measures the
Japanese Government may undertake to protect Korea against
foreign aggressions or internal disturbances. It also agrees
that for the promotion of these objects Japan may occupy
strategic points in Korean territory.
The effect of this agreement has been to place the resources
of Korea at the disposal of Japan in the present war. The
victorious army which forced the passage of the Yalu so
brilliantly on May 1st was landed at Korean ports, concentrated
on Korean soil, and supplied from Korean harbors. In the
political sphere Korea has denounced, as having been made
under compulsion, all her treaties with Russia and all
concessions granted to Russian subjects. On the other hand,
Russia has declared that she will regard as null and void
all the acts of the Korean Government while under Japanese
tutelage, and her newspapers loudly proclaim that, if our
(English) neutrality were genuine, we should raise objections
against the Protocol, as being inconsistent with the Treaty
of 1902, whereby we, in conjunction with Japan, mutually
recognize the independence of Korea. In reality there is no
inconsistency, because, as we have just seen, it is clear
from the first Article of the Treaty that the independence is
not an ordinary independence, but a diplomatic variety which
was perfectly consistent with recurring interventions to ward
off foreign aggression and put down domestic revolt. In other
words, it was a dependent independence, or no independence
at all, and such it remains under the agreement of February,
1904. That instrument undoubtedly establishes a Japanese
Protectorate over Korea, and the beauty of Protectorates is
their indefiniteness. As Professor Nye, the great Belgian
jurist, says in his recently published work on _Le Droit
International_: “Le terme ‘protectorat,’ désigne la situation
créée par le traité de protection.... Le protectorat a plus ou
moins de développement; rien n’est fixé dans la théorie; il est
cependant un trait caracteristique commun aux Etats protégés
c’est qu’ils ne sont pas entièrement indépendants dans leurs
relations avec les autres Etats.” These words exactly fit the
condition of Korea under its recent agreement with Japan.
Indeed, the description might be extended to its internal
affairs also. Susceptibilities are soothed, and possibly
diplomatic difficulties are turned, by calling it independent;
but in reality it is as much under Japanese protection as Egypt
is under ours; all state-paper description to the contrary
notwithstanding.
The new Treaty of August 22, 1904, shows that this is fully understood at
Tokyo. A financial adviser and a diplomatic adviser are to be appointed
by the Korean Government on the recommendation of Japan, and nothing
important is to be done in their departments without their advice. No
treaties with Foreign Powers are to be concluded, and no concessions
to foreigners granted, without previous consultation with the Japanese
Government.
That the view of this authority as to the significance of the Conventions
of 1904 is not the view of any individual alone has been clearly
demonstrated by the acceptance of its conclusions, in a practical way,
though the official action of foreign governments since the date of the
conventions themselves.
In particular it is to be noted that the Government of the United States
has expressed an opinion touching the effect in international law upon
the status of Korea of the February and August Protocols which is
substantially identical with that of Professor Lawrence. Before there was
any occasion for a formal expression of opinion a significant indication
of the views of the Department of State upon the subject could be found
in the Foreign Relations for 1904. Over the Protocols as published
therein may be found the caption “Protectorate by Japan over Korea.”
(437 _f._) Later on, Secretary Root had occasion expressly to state this
opinion. This was when, in December, 1905, Mr. Min Yung-chan, whilom
Korean Minister to France, came to the United States for the purpose
of protesting against recognition by the United States of the Treaty
of November 17th of the same year. In a letter to Mr. Min, explaining
the reasons which made it impossible for the American Government not to
recognize the binding force of that instrument, the Secretary added that
there was another and a conclusive reason against interference in the
matter. This reason, he said, was to be found in the circumstance that
Korea had _previously_ concluded with Japan two agreements which, in
principle and in practice, established a Japanese Protectorate in Korea,
and to the force of which in that particular the Treaty of November 17
added nothing.
To this view of the virtual significance of these earlier Protocols
there is only to be opposed the demonstrably false assertions of the
now ex-Emperor and the opinions and affirmations—quite unwarranted as
the next chapter will show—of writers like Mr. Hulbert, Mr. Story, and
other so-called “foreign friends” of His Majesty. These assertions and
opinions are certainly not made any more credible by the willingness of
their authors to denounce the President and Acting Foreign Minister of
the United States in Korea, and, by implication, all the other heads of
foreign governments who neither share their opinion, nor approve of their
conduct in support of the opinion![32]
By the Treaty of Portsmouth the Russian Government not only definitely
relinquished all the political interests she had previously claimed to
possess in Korea, but also recognized in all important particulars the
rights acquired in the same country by Japan through the Conventions of
February and August, 1904. Article Second of the Treaty stipulates: “The
Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea
paramount political, military and economical interests, engages neither
to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection and
control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find it necessary to
take in Korea.”
Thus did the war with Russia, which was fought over the relations
between Japan and Korea as an issue of supreme importance, terminate the
second main period in the history of these relations. The Chino-Japan
war removed forever that foreign influence which had continued through
centuries, not only to prevent the immediate realization of a true
national independence on the part of Korea, but also to unfit the Korean
Government to maintain such independence when conferred upon it as the
gift of another nation. The Russo-Japanese war terminated the attempt of
a more powerful foreign nation to supersede the controlling influence
of Japan in Korea. At the same time it gave a convincing further
demonstration of Korea’s inherent and hopeless inability to control
herself, under any existing conditions of her government or of her system
of civilization. Thus the provisions for a Japanese Protectorate, which
shall secure for both nations the largest possible measure of good,
offered to the Marquis Ito his difficult problem as Imperial Commissioner
to Korea in November, 1905.