The House committee on foreign affairs yesterday directed
Representative Lamb to report to the House the following:
_Resolved_, That the President be directed to bring to
the attention of the government of Venezuela the claim
of John E. Wheelock, a citizen of the United States, for
indemnity for gross outrages and tortures inflicted upon
him by an officer of said Venezuelan government, and to
demand and enforce in such manner as he may deem best an
immediate settlement of said claim.
The report accompanying the resolution says: “Your committee
is of the opinion that more vigorous measures than diplomatic
correspondence are necessary to secure justice for the citizen of
the United States thus grievously wronged.” Mr. Wheelock’s claim
is for $50,000.—_April 18, 1884._
Even the missionary, the peaceful man of God, in his commendable work
of extending the teachings of the Bible to semi-civilized people, often
carries his life in his hand, and many have asked for the protection of a
man-of-war.
Numbers of American missionaries in China can tell with what joy they
have hailed “the good old flag backed by a few guns.”
Since the massacre of foreigners (mostly missionaries) in Tientsin,
China, in June, 1870, that place has scarcely ever been without the
presence of an American war vessel, and missionaries resident there will
not hesitate to acknowledge the feeling of security such a vessel brings
with her, and the necessity of such a show of force.
While England is very prompt in redressing the wrongs of those of her
subjects resident abroad, the United States is very derelict, and the
difference in the respect shown by foreigners to Americans and Englishmen
is very marked in consequence.
But there are other reasons than those of policing the sea and protecting
our citizens abroad, why a navy is necessary in time of peace.
It requires time to build ships and guns, and to train men to handle
them, and we must be prepared with suitable weapons to meet any enemy who
may declare war against us.
Wars come upon us when least expected, and even we, who are advocates
of settling all difficulties with foreign nations by arbitration, and
who pride ourselves upon maintaining only a small army and navy, cannot
escape the horrors of war.
If there is any truth in the saying that “History repeats itself,” then
the time for us to be at war is close at hand.
We are young as a nation, and although our tendencies have been peaceful,
and although we have almost, _have_ sacrificed our honor, yet, in spite
of all that, we have never had a reign of peace for a longer period than
thirty-five years, and in the one hundred and odd years of our existence,
we, the “peaceful nation,” have had _four foreign wars_. Two with Great
Britain, one with France, and one with Mexico. Can any one believe we
will never have another foreign war?
We are not prepared for war, and in time of peace we should prepare for
war.
As stated above, we rank as a fifth-rate naval power, and our next war
is going to be a foreign war—(for we will hardly fight among ourselves
again)—and _then the navy will have to do most, if not all, of the
fighting_.
Our resources are not as great as our people in their fancied security
believe. For instance, the whole number of deep-sea sailor men from whom
we could draw recruits, is only 60,000, including foreigners sailing
under the American flag. These men are untrained for war purposes, and
as much so as any man you might pick up in the streets is untrained as a
cavalry man or artillery man, although he may have had some experience in
riding a horse or in shooting birds with a shot gun.
The tendencies of the present age are to wars of short duration, and in
our next war we will be “knocked out” in as comparatively short a time as
Mr. Sullivan “knocks out” his opponents, unless we are better prepared
than we are at present.
“At present England could bring, in thirty days, the greater part of her
immense iron clad fleet to operate upon our coast, and the damage which
this force could inflict upon the seaboard, and indirectly upon the whole
country would be incalculable. In thirty days we would have paid in the
way of ransom money and in the value of property destroyed the value of
a dozen navies, to say nothing of the national disgrace, and a complete
cessation of foreign and coastwise trade. In thirty days we could do
nothing, _absolutely nothing_ in the way of improvising a coast defense.
Our naval vessels could not be recalled from foreign stations, and if
they could their weakness and small number would only insure certain
defeat.”
It takes a year to build even a simple unarmored ship, whose thin sides
of 10-16 of an inch can be penetrated by modern guns at a distance of
several miles;
And three years to build such iron clads as most of the South American
states even, possess;
And a year to build a modern steel gun of any power;
When all the skilled labor and appliances for manufacturing the material
are at hand.
But our workmen, though skilled in other things, are not skilled in
making the requisite kind of metal either for guns or armor, and in
putting it together when it is obtained. We have not the immense steam
hammers and plant for such colossal work.
Our country is exposed on all sides—Pacific, Atlantic, and lakes.
The country that goes to war with us is not going to treat us as the
militia did the rioters in Cincinnati the other day, remain inactive
until we can arm ourselves.
If England is to be our enemy (and there is no reason why she should not
be, for she has never shown her friendship for us except by words. In her
actions she has proved an enemy, and we must never forget the blockade
runners and the “Alabama,” and the fact that is largely due to her, that
our civil war lasted so long), she will attack us both on the Atlantic
coast and on the great lakes.
In the latter region she is much better prepared to injure us now, and we
in a worse condition to prevent it, than in 1812.
Profiting by her experience, she is preparing a waterway that will admit
her gunboats to the very heart of our country. It requires no close
observation to realize that other motives than those of commerce induced
England to purchase and expend millions of money upon the Welland Canal,
and that it gives her a great strategical advantage.
That is one advantage she has over us, should the war be carried to the
lakes.
Another is, the mouth of the St. Lawrence River—the route from the sea to
the lakes—lies wholly within British territory.
Still another is, we have signed an agreement with England not to
maintain more than one small gunboat on the lakes, and not to build any
war vessels on the lakes.
In the interests of economy we have practically cut ourselves off from
the right or privilege to construct what we please in our own territory.
Next, it may be presumed, we will be asking permission to sneeze.
With the Welland Canal and the agreement not to build war vessels on the
lakes, we have placed ourselves at great disadvantage.
That agreement does not affect England, for she possesses a waterway
for her gunboats from the sea to the lakes. Our only waterway from the
sea to the lakes, the Erie Canal, is not deep enough, nor are its locks
large enough, for gunboats. England has one hundred such vessels which
she could assemble at Montreal upon the _slightest_ suspicion of war, and
when the time came for action, they would proceed via the Welland Canal,
and destroy Buffalo, Erie, Cleveland, Sandusky, Toledo, and all the other
great cities on the lakes before we could improvise an effective defense,
and certainly before we could build _one_ ship to oppose her fleet. The
“Michigan” would not be effective, the English fleet would soon sink
her. It might be argued that Buffalo and the other ports would furnish
merchant steamers in an emergency, which could serve as improvised
gunboats. But even if such vessels could successfully oppose a fleet
of vessels built specially for war purposes, the guns, equipments and
ammunition are not on hand to be put on board such ships, even if they
were to be found conveniently moored to the docks at Buffalo, nor are
the trained crews to be found at a moment’s notice, and those men who
are trained would be needed to move the regular ships of the navy on the
seaboard, where the enemy would be even more vigorous in his operations.
Many people have a misconception of the effectiveness of the torpedo.
The torpedo is certainly a powerful and destructive weapon when it works
all right, but you might plant torpedoes all over some of our harbors,
and still they would not protect the cities from destruction, nor prevent
the enemy from landing and capturing the city, in spite of the torpedoes.
At New York there is no necessity for a fleet to _enter_ the harbor to
destroy the city. There is a place south of Long Island, nine miles
distant from the City Hall in New York, where there is plenty of water
for a fleet of the largest ironclads to take up its position, from which
it could batter down Brooklyn and New York. Some of the modern guns send
shot weighing 2,000 lbs. (one ton) eleven miles.
Then too, there might appear a foreign Farragut to PASS the torpedoes,
losing perhaps some of his vessels, but still having enough left to
accomplish his object.
The torpedo is by no means a _sure_ weapon. During the war of the
Rebellion the ship “Ironsides” was stationary for one hour directly over
a torpedo which had a 5,000 lb. charge of powder, at Charleston. It
failed to explode despite every effort of the operator on shore to get it
to do its work.
_If_ a ship happens to pass directly over a torpedo, and
_If_ the operator touches the firing key at exactly the right moment, and
_If_ the connection between the electrical battery and the torpedo fuse
is all right, and
_If_ the fuse itself is in good condition, and
_If_ the charge in the torpedo has not deteriorated, the torpedo _may_
explode and blow up the ship.
Too many “ifs” to make this a reliable weapon, and one to be solely
depended upon.
Torpedoes, or submarine mines, unless protected by batteries, to prevent
the enemy from quietly picking them up, are of no use whatever except to
cause delay.
It is the custom in modern wars for the victor to demand of the
vanquished large war indemnities, so that the people who are whipped
not only suffer great losses incident to war itself, but must pay the
expenses both they and their conquerors have incurred, and the people
have to pay this in the shape of taxes.
Now, no one believes we are going to be conquered, but this is how an
enemy’s fleet off New York, for instance, will affect all the people in
the United States.
They would send a shot or two in the vicinity of the city, from their
position south of Long Island, just to show what they _could_ do, and
threaten to destroy the city if a tribute of anywhere from $100,000,000
to $200,000,000 is not forthcoming in twenty-four hours. It would be
paid, as that amount does not anywhere near represent the value of
property in New York City. The United States government would have to
return this amount to the citizens who advanced it, for according to the
constitution the government must provide for the common defense of the
country. Then it would fall back on the taxpayers again, and _they_ would
have to pay it.
All that could be prevented by having the proper defense always ready.
The other important cities on the coasts are as vulnerable to attack as
New York.
Just think of the billions of property which in this way is at the mercy
of an enemy.
We forget that English soldiers once destroyed our capitol.
They could do it now, and think of the vast amount of money in the
treasury at Washington which would fall into their hands, and the value
of the property that would be destroyed, and of the valuable papers that
would be lost.
“There is no insurance against the great evils of war so certain and
CHEAP as the preparations for defense and offense.”
We are less likely to be attacked if our great seaboard and lake cities
are defended by heavy rifled guns, by ironclads and torpedoes, and if we
have enough cruisers to threaten an enemy’s commerce, and can take the
offensive at once.
Offense, with the proper weapons, is the best kind of defense.
We must have a suitable navy to attack our enemy before he can get to our
coast, and before he can either destroy or blockade our ports.
Our policy being a peaceful one, we are not going to engage in war
except in self defense, and we do not need to keep up a large naval
establishment in time of peace, _but what we have should be the very
best that can be obtained, and each individual ship and gun, and the
personnel, should be of the most effective kind_.