By LIEUTENANT G. W. MENTZ, of the U. S. Navy.
Many intelligent people in our country know nothing whatever of the navy.
We are not a warlike nation, and our people are engaged in peaceful
pursuits. The majority are so busied with matters which have no
connection with nautical affairs that they have no time for reflection
upon any such subject.
A great many of our fellow countrymen have never seen the ocean, have
never seen anything in the shape of a ship except a river steamboat.
Not seeing the navy, not hearing of it in these piping times of peace,
having no dealings with it or with ships, never coming in contact with it
in any way, and not understanding anything about it, they never trouble
themselves with it, and care nothing for it, just as almost every one
naturally does with any subject in which he is not personally interested.
But how can our people in the interior be influenced to interest
themselves in a subject which really is of vital importance to them, and
almost as much so as to those living on the seaboard?
They are told, year after year, that our coasts and our lakes
are undefended, that a navy is absolutely necessary, that in its
present state it could not stand a chance with the navy of even a
fourth-rate power; yet they never care enough about it to instruct
their representatives in Congress to put the country in a secure state
of defense, and unless so instructed by the people, our politicians
will never do anything but dilly-dally with every subject of national
importance.
We are slapped in the face, first on one side then on the other, and
kicked about by nations which are picayunish in their resources in
comparison with ourselves, and yet we take it all with indifference or a
faint protest.
We are a strange combination as a nation; the same men who would resent
an insult individually, or so provide themselves with weapons that no one
would _dare_ insult them, when taken collectively as a nation pitifully
ask to be “let off” the moment the British lion shows his teeth, or the
Prussian eagle raises his claws.
But it is not intended to appeal to the sentiment of the people of the
United States, or to their sense of honor to rouse their interest in the
navy. That has been tried too often, and has failed in every case, until
truly patriotic men (and thank God there are a few such men left) have
almost given up in despair, if not in disgust. This article will, it is
hoped, prove, on other grounds than sentiment, the absolute necessity of
a navy in time of peace by showing what it does when we are not at war.
Every one knows the navy has something to do with the defenses of the
country, but—
What is the use of a navy in time of peace?
What does it do?
What does it consist of?
Who manages it?
How much does it cost us taxpayers?
Do we get any return for our money? and the like, are questions which
every one, in his capacity of an American citizen, has a right to ask,
and which should be answered in such a way that every school boy could
understand.
It is easily understood by those of our countrymen living even in those
parts of our land most remote from either ocean washing our shores, that
a navy is necessary in time of war with a foreign country, and that then
it would protect our coasts and prevent an invasion of our soil, and keep
the enemy’s war ships from destroying our cities, or from blockading
our ports, and thus give the grain and beef—“the production of which is
the very life and soul of the West”—an opportunity to get out of the
country, and to their markets; for it requires no great reasoning powers
to understand that with the enemy hovering around our ports with his
ships of war, no shipment of grain and beef could take place.
But the navy protects those same interests in time of peace, and in this
way:
Suppose _no_ nation had a navy, and that _no_ armed force existed on the
sea, what would be the result?
We would want to export our surplus grain and beef, and hundreds of
other articles which we raise in excess of our needs in this country and
exchange them for tea and coffee and other articles which we can not
raise. We can not send them by rail across the ocean, we have to employ
ships. _We can not get along without ships._
Even in this age of steam and telegraph, can any one doubt that with no
armed force to protect the ships with their valuable cargoes and small
crews of two dozen or more men, that the pirate would not again infest
the seas and prey upon commerce? Steam and the telegraph would aid him
just as much as they would the merchant. But, it might be argued, arm the
crews of the merchant ship, put guns and gunners on board. If you do that
you have a navy, and a much more expensive and inefficient one than by
the present methods.
The navies of the world drove the pirate from the seas. He became a
universal enemy, and was hunted down by the war ships of all civilized
nations, and there was no dissenting voice among them upon this one
question of piracy. To prevent his return the existence of a naval force
was necessary _and the display of such a force is all that prevents his
return now_.
Of those who believe there would be no piracy did no navies exist in this
age of enlightenment and of rapid communication, it might be asked if
they thought property would at all be safe in any of our cities if the
police were withdrawn from its protection. What is it that prevents many
a thief from robbing property when he finds it apparently unprotected,
_sees_ no policemen as he looks up and down the street? It is his
knowledge that the city _has_ a police force, and that a policeman may be
in the near vicinity, though not in sight.
_It is this moral effect of the existence of an armed force_ which
prevents many robberies being committed on shore, and it is the same with
the ocean.
_Without an armed force on the ocean to protect cargoes in time of peace
the temptation to become suddenly rich, and without any one knowing how,
would be too great to be resisted. The navy is the police of the seas,
and one class of property should be protected just as much as another.
Shipping is entitled to the same treatment and care as any other form of
invested capital._
Acknowledging then that it is the existence of war vessels on the seas
that prevents piracy and insures the safety of our cargoes of grain and
beef, and other articles in their transit across the ocean, and that a
navy in this way protects commerce in time of peace, _then, is it just
that ONE nation should bear all the expense of keeping up a sufficient
show of force in the shape of a navy to prevent the return of the
pirates? All nations who have property on the ocean, or ships carrying
cargoes from port to port, must aid in thus protecting the seas in
proportion to the value of property sailing the ocean. And the maritime
powers of the world must assist each other against the common enemy, just
as the police of one country assist those of another in procuring and
bringing to justice the extraditional criminals._
It is not right or just for a country to have a merchant marine without a
corresponding navy to protect it; it is unjust to other nations, and we
have the second largest merchant marine in the world, and hardly rank as
_fifth_ as a naval power.
The country in time of peace, in the early stages of its existence,
when our navy was as large in proportion to the inhabitants as it is
now, had practically merchant ship after merchant ship seized, not by
individuals, but by nations which possessed more powerful navies, and the
number of ships so seized by France alone counts up in the hundreds, and
France is a friend of the United States if we have one in Europe.
It seems to be natural that the unprotected should be imposed upon.
Wherever we glance throughout nature we find the mighty preying upon the
weak, and even in the very plants the weaker are crowded out and must
give way to the stronger. This is true of men, and it is likewise true of
nations. For a proof consider the number of nations England has crowded
out. We, too, have crowded out the Indian.
I suppose the Bey of Tunis would still be imposing upon our merchants in
the Mediterranean if we had not aroused ourselves and shown him what a
naval force could do, and made him respect it.
Many Americans engaged in commerce are temporarily resident abroad, and
although they may be most law abiding, there still occur times when they
are imposed upon, and in some cases incarcerated or maltreated, even
murdered. The government owes these men protection. It is the solemn duty
of the government to see that they are justly treated; and this can be
done, in many cases, in no better way than by a show of force. One small
gunboat in a port where one of our fellow citizens has been imposed upon
will do more toward setting him right than thousands of appealing or
of threatening words from a distance. There are hundreds of instances
on record in the Navy and State Departments which might be cited in
illustration of this, but the following will serve the purpose. They are
taken from recent editions of the Washington _National Republican_:
In the spring of 1858 the United States steamer “Fulton,”
mounting six guns, was cruising in the West Indies. Information
reached the commander that a revolution had broken out at
Tampico; that the town was besieged, and that American merchant
vessels were detained in the river. The “Fulton” proceeded with
all despatch to Tampico, and found affairs as had been reported.
Tampico is situated six miles up the river of that name. The
revolutionary and besieging party was within three miles of the
city, and had established a custom house at the mouth of the
river. Five American merchant vessels were in the river at the
time. They had paid the necessary custom house dues at Tampico,
and started down the river to proceed to sea. Upon approaching
the mouth of the river they were directed to anchor until they
had paid additional custom house dues. To this, of course, the
American captains positively refused, as they had already paid
the necessary legal dues. Consequently the vessels were detained
under the guns of the besieging party, and had not the United
States steamer “Fulton” made her appearance they would continue
to have been detained. The commander of the “Fulton” demanded
their instant release, which was complied with, and the vessels
proceeded to sea accordingly.
One of the captains was very spunky, and gave those Mexicans a
piece of his mind. For this he was taken out of his vessel and
put in prison. The excuse for this which the Mexicans gave was
that a small signal gun, which a man could easily carry, was
found on board, and this was considered contraband. The commander
of the “Fulton” went in person, demanded the release of this
captain, took him off in his gig, and restored him to his vessel.
Gen. Gaza, of the besieging forces, hadn’t an idea that there was
an American man-of-war within a thousand miles of Tampico when
he committed these high-handed proceedings, and he was greatly
astonished when the “Fulton” made her appearance. It does not
always matter so much about the size of a man-of-war on hand upon
these occasions. A six or eight gun vessel may suffice, and will
often effect the service required quite as well as a frigate.
What is necessary is the sight of the American ensign and pennant
backed by a few guns.
In September, 1873, a revolution of a violent character broke out
at Panama, and the city was besieged. Whenever there is trouble
on the Isthmus they make a “dead set” at the railroad. In case
of war the government of Colombia guarantees to protect and
preserve neutrality upon the Panama railroad. Upon this occasion
the governor of Panama declared his inability to protect the
railroad. The commander-in-chief of the United States naval
forces in the Pacific happened to be at Panama just in the “nick
of time,” with two good sized men of war, the “Pensacola” and
“Benicia,” and upon his own responsibility landed 250 men—seamen
and marines—divided between the Panama railroad station and the
custom house. The city of Panama and the Panama railroad were
in imminent danger of being destroyed. The show of forces had
the desired effect, without the necessity of firing a shot. Once
the revolutionary party approached, with an attempt, apparently,
to come upon the railroad, but a bold front shown by the United
States forces evidently caused them to change their minds.
Four lines of steamers of four different nations were then
running and connecting with the Panama railroad, viz.: American,
English, French, and German. Passengers, freights, and specials
continually passed over the road in safety and without
interruption. These troubles lasted for a fortnight, when the
insurrectionary forces retired and broke up, and the United
States naval forces were withdrawn to their ships.
For these services the United States naval commander-in-chief
received the thanks of the Panama Railroad Company, the several
Pacific Mail Steamship Companies, and all the consuls and foreign
merchants.
These are a few instances of which the writer is cognizant of
what the navy does in time of peace. Scarcely a naval officer
of moderate experience and length of service but has witnessed
similar scenes in different parts of the world. They do not
attract the attention of the public, and naval officers are not
apt to blow their own trumpets.—_March 13, 1884._
* * * * *
Under the Napoleon dynasty, when Murat was king of Naples,
several American merchant vessels, with valuable cargoes, were
captured and confiscated under protest, and taken into Neapolitan
ports. The entire proceedings were pronounced arbitrary and
thoroughly illegal. In course of time Napoleon and all his
dynasties went under, and Naples and the Neapolitans were
restored to their possessions and the government of their country
once more. But the government of Naples was held responsible for
the seizure and consequent loss to their owners of these vessels
and cargoes, although these flagrant acts were committed under
the French.
After a lapse of time a thorough investigation and an estimate of
losses were made. A demand for indemnity was made and positively
refused. Several years elapsed when Gen. Jackson became President
of the United States, and he, with his accustomed emphasis,
repeated the demand, which was again refused. In the year 1832
Gen. Jackson appointed a special minister (Hon. John Nelson, of
Maryland) to Naples to press this demand. Commodore Daniel T.
Patterson (who commanded the naval forces and coöperated with
Gen. Jackson at New Orleans) was at this time commander-in-chief
of the United States Mediterranean squadron, consisting of three
fifty-gun frigates and three twenty-two-gun corvettes. The writer
of this was a midshipman in the squadron.
It was arranged that one ship at a time should make her
appearance at Naples. The commodore went in first, and a week
after another ship arrived. Mr. Nelson then made the demand as
directed by his government. It was refused. At the end of a
week a third ship appeared, and so continued. The Neapolitan
government became alarmed, began to look at the condition of
the forts, mounted additional guns, built sand bag batteries,
and kept up a constant drilling of their troops. When the fifth
ship arrived the government gave in, acknowledged the claim, and
ordered it to be paid just as the sixth ship entered the harbor.
The amount was not so large—about $350,000—but there was a great
principle involved. This money was owing to owners, captains,
and crews of American merchant vessels, whose property had been
illegally and unjustly taken from them.
And it may be asked when and whether they would ever have
received it had it not been for the United States navy. This
fully illustrates one of Nelson’s maxims: “To negotiate with
effect a naval force should always be at hand.”—_About April 4,
1884._
* * * * *