a. Introduction
Defendants who were in high positions in the German medical service
rejected responsibility for the alleged criminal conduct of their
subordinates. The prosecution argued that it “would be an unforgivable
miscarriage of justice to punish the doctors who worked on the victims
in the concentration camps while their superiors, the leaders,
instigators, and organizers go free.” The prosecution, for example,
argued that Karl Brandt held supreme authority over all medical services
in Germany, both military and civilian; that Handloser was the Chief of
the Medical Services in the Wehrmacht; that Rostock was Karl Brandt’s
deputy charged with the task of “centrally coordinating and directing
the problems and activities of the entire medical and health service” in
the field of science and research; that Schroeder was the Chief of the
Medical Service of the Luftwaffe; that Genzken was the Chief of the
Medical Service of the Waffen SS; that Blome was the Deputy Reich Health
Leader; and that these men were clearly responsible for the acts of
their subordinates in their respective sectors.
The prosecution’s summation of evidence on this question has been taken
from the closing statement which appears below on pages 926 to 936.
Extracts from the final pleas for the defendants Karl Brandt, Schroeder,
Rostock, and the closing briefs for Handloser, Genzken, and Blome appear
on pages 936 to 957.
b. Selection from the Argumentation of the Prosecution
_EXTRACT FROM THE CLOSING STATEMENT OF THE
PROSECUTION_[139]
* * * * *
_The Responsible Leaders of the Medical Services_
In view of the clear and overwhelming proof, it can only be concluded
that the practice of experimentation on concentration camp inmates
without their consent was an organized and systematic program. It is,
therefore, appropriate to consider whether we have in this dock the
leaders of the German medical services without whom these crimes would
not have been possible. It would be an unforgivable miscarriage of
justice to punish the doctors who worked on the victims in the
concentration camps while their superiors, the leaders, organizers, and
instigators go free. It has been established beyond controversy that
these things could not have happened without cover from the top. Who,
then, were these men on the top? Their survivors, with one exception,
are all in this dock.
In the number one seat we have the defendant Karl Brandt. He held
supreme authority over all the medical services in Germany, both
military and civilian. He joined the Nazi Party in January 1932 and the
SS in 1934, in which he rose to the rank of Gruppenfuehrer [Major
General]. In the latter year, at the age of 30, he became the attending
physician to Adolf Hitler and retained this position until 1945. His
close personal relationship to the Fuehrer explains his rapid rise to
power. On the day Poland was invaded in 1939, Hitler ordered Brandt and
Philipp Bouhler, the Chief of the Chancellery of the Fuehrer, to carry
out the so-called Euthanasia Program.
Aside from his personal influence and intimate connection with Hitler,
Brandt’s greatest power in the medical services came from his position
as General Commissioner and later Reich Commissioner of the Health and
Medical Services. As a result of the disastrous winter campaign in the
East in 1941, Hitler established for the first time a medical and health
official under his direct control by decree of 28 July 1942. This decree
made Brandt the supreme authority over all medical services in Germany.
It stated in part as follows:
“I empower Professor Dr. Karl Brandt, subordinate only to me
personally and receiving his instructions directly from me, to
carry out special tasks and negotiations, to readjust the
requirements for doctors, hospitals, medical supplies, etc.,
between the military and the civilian sectors of the Health and
Medical Services.
My plenipotentiary for Health and Medical Services is to be kept
informed about the fundamental events in the Medical Services of
the Wehrmacht and in the Civilian Health Service. He is
authorized to intervene in a responsible manner.” (_NO-080,
Pros. Ex. 5._)
By the same decree chiefs were also commissioned for the Medical
Services of the Wehrmacht and the Civilian Health Service. The defendant
Handloser became Chief of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht, while
Dr. Leonardo Conti, State Secretary for Health and the Reich Health
Leader, was made Chief of the Civilian Health Services. Brandt was the
superior of both Handloser and Conti, and through them had extensive
powers over the Army, Navy, Luftwaffe, Waffen SS, and Civilian Medical
Services. Brandt stood at the apex of power. He was subordinated to no
one save the Fuehrer. He was the man to act for the Fuehrer in medical
matters. The decree authorized Brandt “to intervene in a responsible
manner” and directed that he be kept informed of “fundamental events”.
Certainly nothing could be more fundamental than a policy of performing
medical experiments involving the torture and death of involuntary human
subjects.
On 5 September 1943 Hitler issued a second decree empowering Brandt
“with centrally coordinating and directing the problems and activities
of the entire medical and health services * * *”. (_NO-081, Pros. Ex.
6._) The order expressly stated that Brandt’s authority covered the
field of medical science and research. Shortly following the issuance of
this decree, the defendant Rostock was appointed by Brandt as Chief of
the Office for Science and Research, with plenary powers in that field.
Finally, on 25 August 1944, the Fuehrer elevated Brandt to Reich
Commissioner for the Health and Medical Services and stated that in this
capacity “his office ranks as highest Reich authority.” Brandt’s
position was thus equivalent to that of a Reich Minister. He was
authorized “to issue instructions to the offices and organizations of
the State, Party, and Wehrmacht, which are concerned with the problems
of the Medical and Health Services”. (_NO-082, Pros. Ex. 7._) It is
clear that this decree was issued to resolve a struggle for power
between Brandt and Conti. Certainly the decree does no more than give
Brandt a more august title and restate his powers, powers which he had
already received as early as July 1942. Brandt testified that it merely
“strengthened” his position. A service regulation issued by Keitel for
Handloser, as Chief of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht, at a time
when Brandt was still General Commissioner, provided that Handloser was
subject to the “general rules of the Fuehrer’s Commissioner General for
the Medical and Health Services” and that Brandt had to be informed of
the “basic events” in the field of the Medical Services of the
Wehrmacht. In a pretrial affidavit the defendant Handloser stated that
after he became Chief of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht on 28
July 1942 “Brandt was my immediate superior in medical affairs.”
(_NO-443, Pros. Ex. 10._) Schroeder stated that “Karl Brandt, Handloser,
and Rostock were informed of the medical research work conducted by the
Luftwaffe.” (_NO-449, Pros. Ex. 130._) In addition to his position as
General and Reich Commissioner of the Health and Medical Services,
Brandt was also a member of the Presidential Council of the Reich
Research Council, an organization which gave financial support for
criminal experiments.
In the number two seat is the defendant Handloser who held supreme power
over the medical services of all branches of the Wehrmacht. Early in
1941 he was appointed Army Medical Inspector and Army Physician [Army
Medical Chief (Heeresarzt)]. He held these positions until September
1944 and as such had complete command over the entire Army Medical
Services which was by far the largest of the medical branches of the
Wehrmacht. In his capacity as Army Medical Inspector, Handloser had
subordinated to him the Consulting Physicians of the Army, the Military
Medical Academy, the Typhus and Virus Institutes of the OKH at Krakow
and Lemberg [Lvov], and the Medical School for Mountain Troops at St.
Johann. He attained the rank of Generaloberstabsarzt, the highest
military medical rank.
On 28 July 1942, Handloser was elevated to the newly created position of
Chief of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht. This was the same decree
which appointed Brandt General Commissioner, to whom Handloser, on the
military side, and Conti, on the civilian side, were subordinated.
Handloser was charged with the coordination of the Medical Services of
the Wehrmacht and all organizations and units subordinated or attached
to the Wehrmacht, including the Medical Services of the Waffen SS. Prior
to this decree there were four separate medical branches of the
Wehrmacht, the Army, Luftwaffe, Navy, and Waffen SS, each operating
independently of the other. Pursuant to this decree, Handloser was
appointed to coordinate and unify their operations and was directly
responsible to Keitel as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht
(OKW). He had authority over the Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Luftwaffe,
and Waffen SS Medical Services, and all organizations and services
employed within the framework of the Wehrmacht, and over “_all
scientific medical institutes, academies, and other medical institutions
of the services of the Wehrmacht and of the Waffen SS_.” [Emphasis
added.] (_NO-227, Pros. Ex. 11._) He was the adviser of the Chief of the
Supreme Command and of the Wehrmacht in all questions concerning the
medical services of the Wehrmacht and of its health guidance. In the
field of medical science, his duties were to carry out uniform measures
in the field of health guidance, _research and combating of epidemics_,
and all medical matters which required a uniform ruling among the
Wehrmacht, and further, _in the evaluation of medical experiences_.
One of the principal means used by the defendant Handloser in
coordinating scientific research was the joint meeting of consulting
physicians of the four branches of the Wehrmacht. At the Second Meeting
East of Consulting Physicians in December 1942 at the Military Medical
Academy, Handloser himself pointed out quite clearly the task of the
Chief of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht in unifying medical
scientific research. In addressing the full meeting he said:
“The demands and extent of this total war, as well as the
relationship between needs and availability of personnel and
material, require measures, also in military and medical fields,
which will serve the unification and unified leadership. It is
not a question of ‘marching separately and battling together’,
but marching and battling must be done in unison from the
beginning in all fields.
“As a result, with respect to the military sector, the Wehrmacht
Medical Service and with it the Chief of the Medical Services of
the Wehrmacht came into being. Not only in matters of personnel
and material—even as far as this is possible in view of special
fields and special tasks which must be considered—but also with
a view to medical scientific education and research, our path in
the Wehrmacht Medical Service must and will be a unified one.
Accordingly, the group of participants in this Second Work
Conference East, which I have now opened, is differently
composed from the First Work Conference in May of this year.
Then it was a conference of the army; today the three branches
of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen SS and Police, the Labor Service
and the Organization Todt are participating and unified.
“You will surely permit that I greet you with a general welcome
and with the sincere wish that our common work may be blessed
with the hoped for joint success.
“I would, however, like to extend a special greeting to the
Reich Chief of Health Services, Under Secretary Conti, who holds
the central leadership of medical services in the civilian
sector. I see in his presence not only an interest in our work
themes, but the expression of his connection with the Wehrmacht
Medical Service and his understanding of the special importance
of the Wehrmacht in the field as well as at home. I need not
emphasize that we are as one in the recognition of the necessity
to assure and ease the mind of the soldier, that he need not
worry about the physical well-being of the homeland as far as
this is within the realm of possibility in wartime.” (_NO-922,
Pros. Ex. 435._)
Again, at the Fourth Meeting of Consulting Physicians in May 1944 the
defendant Karl Brandt stressed the importance of Handloser’s position,
saying—
“Generaloberstabsarzt Handloser, you, a soldier and a physician
at the same time, are responsible for the use and the
performance of our medical officers.
* * * * *
“I believe, and this probably is the sole expectation of all
concerned, that this meeting which today starts in Hohenlychen
will be held for the benefit of our soldiers. The achievements
to date of your physicians, Herr Generaloberstabsarzt, confirm
this unequivocally, and their readiness to do their share makes
all of us proud and—I may also say—confident.
* * * * *
“It is good simply to call these things by their names and to
look at them as they are. This meeting is the visible expression
of it—it is, it shall be, and it must be so in every respect;
the consulting physicians are gathered around their medical
chief. When I look at these ranks, you Generaloberstabsarzt
Handloser, are to be envied; medical experts, with the best and
most highly trained special knowledge, are at your disposal for
care of the soldiers. In reciprocal action between yourself and
your medical officers, the problem of our medical knowledge and
capacity are kept alive.” (_NO-924, Pros. Ex. 437._)
This was no accolade paid to a man without power and influence. If
Handloser is not responsible for the crimes committed by the medical
services of the Wehrmacht, and especially of the Army and Luftwaffe,
then no one is responsible.
In the number three seat we have the defendant Rostock who, as Brandt’s
special deputy, was charged with the task of “centrally coordinating and
directing the problems and activities of the entire Medical and Health
Services” in the field of science and research. Even prior to his
appointment to that position in the fall of 1943, Rostock was one of the
responsible leaders of the German medical profession. In 1942 he was
appointed Dean of the Medical Faculty of the University of Berlin. In
the same year he became consulting surgeon to Handloser as the Army
Medical Inspector. He attained the rank of Generalarzt. As Chief of the
Office for Science and Research under Brandt, it was Rostock’s task to
coordinate scientific research in Germany. He received reports as to the
issuance of research assignments by the various agencies in Germany and
determined which of such assignments should be considered “urgent”. He
also served as Brandt’s alternate on the Reich Research Council.
In the number four seat we have the defendant Schroeder, who from 1
January 1944 until the end was the Chief of the Medical Service of the
Luftwaffe. From 1935 until February 1940 Schroeder was Chief of Staff to
his predecessor, Erich Hippke as Luftwaffe Medical Inspector. From
February 1940 until January 1944 he served as Air Fleet Physician of Air
Fleet 2, when he replaced Hippke as Chief of the Medical Service of the
Luftwaffe. Simultaneously he was promoted to the rank of
Generaloberstabsarzt. As Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe,
all medical officers of the German Air Force were subordinated to him.
His position and responsibility are clear and unequivocal.
In seat number five is the defendant Genzken, who, as Chief of the
Medical Service of the Waffen SS, was one of the highest ranking medical
officers in the SS. He joined the Nazi Party in 1926 and in 1936 he went
on active duty with the SS in the Medical Office of the SS Special
Service [disposal] Troops [SS Verfuegungstruppe], which subsequently
became the Waffen SS. In the spring of 1937 the Medical Office of the SS
was enlarged and split into two departments. Genzken was made director
of the department charged with the supply of medical equipment to and
the supervision of medical personnel in the concentration camps. In this
capacity he was the medical adviser to the notorious Eicke, predecessor
of Pohl as the commander of all concentration camps. Sachsenhausen,
Dachau, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Flossenbuerg, and Neuengamme, among
others, were under the medical supervision of Genzken. Few men could
have been better advised as to the systematic oppression and persecution
of the hapless prisoners of these institutions.
In May 1940, Genzken became Chief of the Medical Office of the Waffen SS
in the SS Operational Headquarters, with the rank of Oberfuehrer. The SS
Operational Headquarters was subordinated to Gruppenfuehrer Hans
Juettner and was one of the twelve main offices of the Supreme Command
of the SS. While Juettner was Genzken’s military superior, his technical
or medical superior was Reichsarzt SS Grawitz for whom he served as
deputy on many occasions. In 1942 his position became known as Chief of
the Medical Service of the Waffen SS, Division D of the SS Operational
Headquarters. He attained the rank of Gruppenfuehrer in the SS and
Generalleutnant of the Waffen SS [major general]. Among the offices
subordinated to Genzken was that of the Chemical and Pharmaceutical
Service under Blumenreuter and Hygiene under the defendant Mrugowsky.
Mrugowsky was attached to Genzken’s office as a hygienist in 1940 and
was at the same time Chief of the Hygiene Institute of the Waffen SS
which, in turn, was subordinated to Genzken. On 1 September 1943, the
Medical Service of the SS was reorganized and, among other things,
Blumenreuter, Mrugowsky, and the Hygiene Institute of the Waffen SS were
transferred to the Office of the Reichsarzt SS, Grawitz. Thereafter the
direct subordination was to Grawitz rather than to Genzken.
And then there is the defendant Blome, Gruppenfuehrer [Major General] in
the SA, Deputy Reich Health Leader, Deputy Leader of the Reich Chamber
of Physicians and the National Socialist Physicians Association,
Representative for the Department of Medical Study, Plenipotentiary in
the Reich Research Council, and Chief of Research on Bacteriological
Warfare. As the closest associate of Conti, he cannot be omitted from
the list of the powerful. Conti was the highest authority in the field
of civilian health administration. The decree of 28 July 1942, signed by
Hitler, concerning the reorganization of the medical services, defines
the position of Conti as follows:
“In the field of civilian health administration the State
Secretary in the Ministry of Interior, and the Chief of the
Health Administration of the Reich [Reichsgesundheitsfuehrer],
Dr. Conti, is responsible for coordinated measures. For this
purpose he has at his disposal the competent departments of the
highest Reich authorities and their subordinate offices.”
(_NO-080, Pros. Ex. 5._)
There was not a single medical question which did not reach the Reich
Health Department of the Nazi Party and the Reich Chamber of Physicians,
subordinated to which were all physicians in Germany, with the exception
of those on active Service with the armed forces and in the SS. As a
member of the Reich Research Council, Blome was personally connected
with plans and enterprises involving criminal medical experimentation.
These were the responsible leaders of the medical services of Germany.
Who, then, is missing from this illustrious gathering? During the course
of the trial, we have frequently heard mentioned the names of Conti and
Grawitz. Indeed, the defendants would have us believe that in these two
men, together with Hitler and Himmler, resided the exclusive
responsibility for the manifold crimes with which we are here concerned.
I hardly need call attention to the fact that all are dead. All of them
took their own lives rather than face the bar of justice. No one can
deny that those men were, indeed, guilty. But this in no way serves to
exonerate these defendants, who all played important roles in the mad
scheme. It is a curious thing that not one of the defendants has pointed
an accusing finger at a living man. If they are to be believed, all the
guilty parties to these crimes are dead. According to them, justice must
seek retribution only from the cadavers. The Luftwaffe defendants have
been strangely silent as to Hippke, who, but for a belated capture,
would have a prominent seat in the dock. Those defendants who worked
with the dead criminals—such as Gebhardt, Mrugowsky, and Poppendick
with Grawitz, and Blome with Conti—ask the Tribunal to say that their
association was honorable and pure, that their work was in another
field, that their masters’ crimes come as a great surprise and were
never known to them. The evidence proves, however, that they not only
knew of and supported these crimes, but also took a personal part in
them.
In connection with the responsible positions of these defendants and
most particularly of Karl Brandt and his assistant Rostock, Handloser,
Schroeder, Genzken, and Blome, I wish to call the Tribunal’s attention
to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
_In re Yamashita_.[140] On 25 September 1945, Yamashita, the Commanding
General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in
the Philippine Islands was charged with violation of the laws of
war.[141] He thereafter pleaded not guilty, was tried, found guilty as
charged, and sentenced to death by hanging. A petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court purporting to show that
Yamashita’s detention was unlawful for the reason, among others, that
the charge preferred against him failed to charge him with a violation
of the laws of war.
The charge stated that Yamashita, between 9 October 1944 and 2 September
1945, in the Philippine Islands, “while commander of armed forces of
Japan at war with the United States of America and its Allies,
unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to
control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to
commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the
United States and of its Allies and dependencies, particularly the
Philippines; and he * * * thereby violated the laws of war.” The
military commission[142] which tried Yamashita found that atrocities and
other high crimes had been committed by members of the Japanese Armed
Forces under his command, that they were not sporadic in nature but in
many cases were methodically supervised by Japanese officers, and that
during the period in question Yamashita failed to provide effective
control of his troops as was required by the circumstances. The Supreme
Court stated the question for their decision in the following language:
“It is not denied that such acts directed against the civilian
population of an occupied country and against prisoners of war
are recognized in international law as violations of the law of
war * * *. But it is urged that the charge does not allege that
petitioner has either committed or directed the commission of
such acts, and consequently that no violation is charged against
him. But this overlooks the fact that the gist of the charge is
an unlawful breach of duty by the petitioner as an army
commander to control the operations of the members of his
command by ‘permitting them to commit’ the extensive and
widespread atrocities specified. The question then is whether
the law of war imposes on an army commander a duty to take such
appropriate measures as are within his power to control the
troops under his command for the prevention of the specified
acts which are violations of the law of war and which are likely
to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled
soldiery, and whether he may be charged with personal
responsibility for his failure to take such measures when
violations result.”
The Court held that the charge was sufficient and that the law of war
“plainly imposed on petitioner, who at the time specified was military
governor of the Philippines, as well as commander of the Japanese
forces, an affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his
power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war
and the civilian population. This duty of a commanding officer has
heretofore been recognized, and its breach penalized by our own military
tribunals.”
This decision is squarely in point as to the criminal responsibility of
those defendants in this dock who had the power and authority to control
the agents through whom these crimes were committed. It is not incumbent
upon the prosecution to show that this or that defendant was familiar
with all of the details of all of these experiments. Indeed, in the
Yamashita case, there was no charge or proof that he had knowledge of
the crimes. In the case before the International Military Tribunal,
proof was submitted that the Reichsbank, of which the defendant Funk was
president, had received from the SS the personal belongings of victims
who had been exterminated in concentration camps. In that connection the
Tribunal said in its judgment:
“Funk has protested that he did not know that the Reichsbank was
receiving articles of this kind. The Tribunal is of the opinion
that he either knew what was being received or was deliberately
closing his eyes to what was being done.”[143]
But we need not discuss the requirement of knowledge on the facts of
this case. It has been repeatedly proved that those responsible leaders
of the German medical services in this dock not only knew of the
systematic and criminal use of concentration camp inmates for murderous
medical experiments, but also actively participated in such crimes. Can
it be held that Karl Brandt had no knowledge of these crimes when he
personally initiated the jaundice experiments by Dohmen in the
Sachsenhausen concentration camp and the phosgene experiments of
Bickenbach? Can it be found that he knew nothing of the criminal
Euthanasia Program when he was charged by Hitler with its execution? Can
it be said that Handloser had no knowledge when he participated in the
conference of 29 December 1941 where it was decided to perform the
Buchenwald typhus crimes, when reports were given on criminal
experiments at meetings called and presided over by him? Was Rostock an
island of ignorance when he arranged the program for and presided over
the meetings at which Gebhardt and Fischer lectured on their
sulfanilamide experiments, when he classified as “urgent” the criminal
research of Hirt, Haagen, and Bickenbach? Did Schroeder lack knowledge
when he personally requested Himmler to supply him with inmates for the
sea-water experiments? Can it be found that Genzken had no knowledge of
these crimes when the miserable Dr. Ding was subordinated to and
received orders from him in connection with the typhus experiments in
Buchenwald, when his office supplied Rascher with equipment for the
freezing experiments? Was Blome insufficiently informed in the face of
proof that he collaborated with Rascher in the blood coagulation
experiments, issued a research assignment to him on freezing experiments
and to Hirt on the gas experiments, as well as performed bacteriological
warfare and poison experiments himself?
No, it was not lack of information as to the criminal program which
explains the culpable failure of these men to destroy this
Frankenstein’s monster. Nor was it lack of power. Can anyone doubt that
Karl Brandt could have issued instructions to Handloser and Conti that
doctors subordinated to them were not to experiment on concentration
camp inmates? It is no excuse to say that Hitler and Himmler approved
the policy and that his efforts may have failed. Certainly they approved
it. But the fact is that Brandt also approved of and personally
participated in the program. He was the “highest Reich authority” in the
medical services, not Himmler. The medical services were Brandt’s
primary function, while Himmler had a few other tasks to keep him busy,
such as running the SS, the Ministry of Interior, the German Police, and
the Home Army, to mention a few.
Nothing could have been easier for Handloser than to issue a general
directive that officers of the Medical Services of the Wehrmacht were to
keep out of concentration camps. If he could not have done so, then we
must conclude that no one could have. Handloser had no peer in the
military medical services. And what Handloser could have done for all
the branches of the Wehrmacht, Schroeder, Genzken, and Blome could have
done with respect to the Luftwaffe, the Waffen SS, and the Reich Health
Department.
The conclusion is inescapable that the crimes of these responsible
leaders is a hundredfold greater than that of the wretches who executed
the murderous experiments in the concentration camps. Theirs was the
power, the opportunity, and the duty to control and their failure is
their everlasting guilt.
c. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense
_EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT
KARL BRANDT_[144]
* * * * *
To what extent is the defendant Karl Brandt implicated in the medical
experiments?
The prosecution says he is implicated in almost all of them and refers
to his position and his connections. They state that he was the highest
Reich authority in the medical sphere; there, however, they are misled
by an error of the translator, for Karl Brandt only had the powers,
regulated in a general way, of an “Oberste Reichsbehoerde” [highest
Reich agency], but the execution of these powers was restricted to
special cases.
This appears from the three known decrees and from the explanation
thereof given by the witnesses. Moreover Karl Brandt was not given these
functions until 1944, when these experiments were practically finished,
as is shown by the time schedule submitted to the Tribunal for
comparison.
It has been proved that the defendant Karl Brandt himself in a broadcast
publicly called his position as Reich Commissioner that of a
“differential” (coordinator). In fact, Karl Brandt’s task was not to
order but to adjust; it was a task designed to fit his character.
We have also learned from the presentation of evidence that the
defendant Karl Brandt did not have the machinery at his disposal for
issuing orders which was necessary for a supreme Reich authority; he
lacked the staff and the means. No one who is acquainted with a
government administration will think it possible under these
circumstances that the defendant Karl Brandt might have been able to
enforce his point of view against the resistance of the old agencies; no
one will even think it probable that anything would have been done to
facilitate such an attempt of the “new master.”
Consequently, Karl Brandt’s position was not such as to justify the
conclusion drawn by the prosecution about his general knowledge. There
was no official channel by which everything had to come to his
knowledge, for he was not the superior of other authorities.
It is true that the defendant Karl Brandt was supposed to be informed
about fundamental matters, that he had the right to intervene, etc. But
these were only possibilities, not in conformity with conditions in
practice. We have seen that Conti opposed him and that Himmler
prohibited direct contact with Karl Brandt within his sphere.
Therefore, Karl Brandt can be brought into connection only with the
events in which he participated directly.
Here it is striking first of all that the defendant Karl Brandt, who is
supposed to have been the highest authority, appears only very rarely.
* * * * *
Now the prosecution endeavors to establish a connection of Karl Brandt
with the other experiments via the Reich Research Council. It is true
that one can establish such a connection theoretically on paper, but the
links of the chain break when one examines them closely. Only the head
of the specialized department [Fachspartenleiter] judged the so-called
research assignments, and he only investigated whether the aim was
necessary for war, not how the experiment was to be carried out. He
could not inform others of matters which he did not get to know himself.
The defendant Karl Brandt is charged further with not having protested
in one case when he heard about deaths caused by experiments on persons
sentenced to capital punishment in the well-known lecture on
sulfanilamide. I must point out that even if this experiment had been
inadmissible, silence would not be a crime for assent after the act is
without importance in criminal law and one can be connected with plans
and enterprises only as long as they have not come to an end.
Now the prosecution has introduced in its closing brief the new charge
by which it holds the defendant Karl Brandt responsible for negligence.
In this respect I should like to point out that no indictment for
negligence has been brought in and that the concept of a crime against
humanity committed by negligence cannot exist.
It will, therefore, be sufficient to emphasize that the alleged
negligence depends on the existence of an obligation of supervision and
the right to give orders through other agencies. In every state the
spheres of competency are separated and it is not possible for everyone
to interfere in everything because everyone is responsible for
everything.
The prosecution says that the defendant Karl Brandt ought to have used
his influence and have availed himself of his intimate relationship to
Hitler to stop the experiments. Even presuming that he was aware of the
facts as crimes, his guilt would not be of a legal but only of a
political or moral nature.
Till now nobody has been held criminally responsible for the conduct of
a superior or a friend; however, the Tribunal only has to consider the
question of criminal law.
But in fact these close relations did not exist; the defendant Karl
Brandt was the surgeon who had to be in attendance on Hitler; Dr.
Morell, the latter’s personal physician, soon tried to undermine the
confidence placed in Karl Brandt so that he was charged with commissions
which removed him farther and farther from the sphere of his medical
activity.
The alleged intimate relations were eventually crowned by the dictation
of a death sentence against Karl Brandt without his having been granted
even a consultation on the charges advanced against him.
* * * * *
_EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT
SCHROEDER_[145]
* * * * *
Your Honors, a clear distinction must be made between the periods when
Professor Schroeder was not yet Chief of the Medical Service of the
Luftwaffe and the time when he held that office. We are concerned here
with the period from the beginning of 1940 to the end of 1943. During
that period Professor Dr. Schroeder was the leading medical officer of
Airfleet 2, and as such continually on service outside Germany. It was
only from 1 January 1944 onwards that he held the position of Chief of
Medical Service of the Luftwaffe.
This shows clearly that Professor Dr. Schroeder cannot be held
responsible for all experiments in concentration camps which were
carried out prior to 1 January 1944. His sphere of duties was confined
to the medical care of the airfleet units under him and he was without
any official points of contact with the Medical Inspectorate unless the
latter was competent for his position as an airfleet doctor.
To give a picture of Professor Schroeder’s duties at that time, I draw
attention to the fact that the personnel strength of Airfleet 2 amounted
to 200,000 to 300,000 men.
When dealing with Professor Schroeder’s responsibility for the
high-altitude experiments in Dachau, the prosecution had overlooked the
fact that at the time in question, Professor Schroeder was airfleet
doctor and maintained that during that time he was, after Professor Dr.
Hippke, the Medical Chief, the second highest medical officer of the
Luftwaffe. From that circumstance, the prosecution draws the inference
that Professor Schroeder, as the second highest medical officer, was the
obvious deputy for Hippke and, therefore, had to know about the most
important events concerning the Medical Inspectorate.
The defendant Professor Schroeder has in his defense proved beyond doubt
that he was not the most senior medical officer after Hippke and,
therefore, not Hippke’s deputy. As Generalarzt and Generalstabsarzt he
simply had the rank next to that of the Medical Chief, as did the other
five airfleet doctors. Above him in rank were two Generalstabsaerzte,
namely Generalstabsarzt Dr. Neumueller and Dr. Blaul. The former had his
office in Berlin and was in fact Hippke’s deputy if and when necessary.
Professor Dr. Schroeder has also refuted the further assumption of the
prosecution that his relations with Professor Dr. Hippke had been
particularly close, for which reason Hippke had informed him about the
high-altitude experiments. In particular the witness Dr. Augustinick,
Schroeder’s personal adjutant during his service as an airfleet doctor,
confirmed that relations between Hippke and Schroeder were extremely
tense and unpleasant and that they confined themselves to discussing
only the necessary things on the occasion of their highly infrequent
official meetings.
* * * * *
Your Honors, if one surveys the conduct of Professor Schroeder during
the entire period from 1940 until the end of the war, one will not be
able to find one single piece of evidence to show that Professor
Schroeder at any time or in any manner violated the duties which the
calling of a physician or medical ethics prescribed for him. In no
instance did he act in a manner which could not stand examination by a
court. One may well claim that he never disregarded the maxim of
Hippocrates “primum nil nocere,” but preserved it as a guiding principle
of his actions as a doctor and officer of the medical services of the
German Luftwaffe.
The prosecution has failed to prove that Schroeder ever ordered such an
experiment during the period of time covered by the charges of the
prosecution, or that he participated or had knowledge of any such
experiment. It has not even been proved that it was possible or
necessary for him to gain knowledge of such experiments. Professor
Schroeder has clearly explained why he could not gain such knowledge.
For the whole period of time from 1942 to the end of 1943 the
responsibility must rest on Professor Hippke, but not on Professor
Schroeder.
* * * * *
_EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT
ROSTOCK_[146]
* * * * *
In the opening statement General Taylor said that the Reich Commissioner
for the Medical and Health System was to be regarded as the supreme
Reich authority. (_Tr. p. 19._) The emphasis on this word is confusing
and contradicts the authentic Document NO-082, Prosecution Exhibit 7
which states, “In this capacity his agency is a supreme Reich
authority.” In this decree, then, the word “the” is missing. But this is
most essential. For the decree signifies that it is one of many “supreme
Reich authorities,” whereas the type of expression chosen by General
Taylor must lead one to conclude that it was the only “supreme Reich
authority” in the Department of Health. But, as the evidence has shown,
this was not true. In his opening statement on 9 December 1946 (_Tr. p.
19_) General Taylor said: “Rostock’s position comprised the activities
of the medical societies, the medical universities, and the Reich
Research Council.”
During this trial none of the numerous German medical societies, with
the exception of Ahnenerbe, have been attacked. I want to point out here
that, first of all, the Ahnenerbe cannot be considered as a medical
society, as is proved beyond doubt by the plan of organization submitted
to this Tribunal. (_Sievers 2, Sievers Ex. 4_; _Sievers 3, Sievers Ex.
6_.) And let me point out that Rostock testified (_Tr. p. 3296_) that
during the war he did not know this society or even its name, and that
on 11 April 1947 the witness Sievers stated (_Tr. p. 5788_) that
Ahnenerbe’s medical institutes for scientific research of military value
were not subordinate to the Commissioner General for the Medical and
Health System, that means, were not subordinate to the office directed
by Rostock.
Neither were the medical universities subject to his supervision. They
were subordinate to the Reich Ministry of Education.
I shall deal with the Reich Research Council later on. First, I would
like to deal with the _Office for Science and Research_. As far as the
incorporation into the German state machinery of the Office of the
Commissioner General or the Reich Commissioner for the Medical and
Health Services is concerned, I refer to Dr. Servatius’ statements.
Without a doubt, the prosecution has gained the wrong impression of the
extent, actual activity, and influence on other agencies of the Office
for Science and Research.
Rostock has dealt with this question in detail during direct
examination. The Tribunal will certainly still have a recollection of
his statement. Rostock actually had no supervisory authority over
research work of the branches of the Wehrmacht and the SS.
Brandt’s, and thus also Rostock’s, commission did not comprise all
medical affairs but only special tasks as was testified quite clearly
here by the witness Lammers on 7 February 1947. (_Tr. p. 2667._) And the
assignment given Rostock did not include supervision of practical
research. (_Tr. p. 2449._) On 23 April 1947 Professor Rose quite
correctly described the situation in Germany (_Tr. p. 6300_) when he
said that the central planning of medical research in Germany is a
phantom born 1½ years after the end of the war. True, attempts were made
to correct the impossible situation created by the lack of a central
direction of science in Germany. Attempts were made but the leading
German politicians recognized the importance of science too late.
Germany did not have an institution with the competency and the
financial means of the American “Office of Scientific Research and
Development” under Dr. Vannevar Bush which, under the direction of the
same man, was taken over into the United States’ peace organization
under the name of “Joint Research and Development Board.” The
relationship of Rostock’s agency to the SS must be discussed briefly,
for all experiments which play a part in these proceedings were, after
all, carried out in concentration camps which came under the
jurisdiction of the SS. Rostock himself was never a member of the SS.
Apart from that, he had no other relations of any kind with the SS. When
the agency of the Commissioner General for the Medical and Health System
was created, Hitler, in the presence of Himmler, made it quite clear to
Karl Brandt that in his (Karl Brandt’s) capacity of Commissioner General
the SS was not his affair. (_Tr. p. 2324._) The practical execution of
this directive has been expressly confirmed by Genzken. (_Tr. p. 3780._)
Furthermore, the decree of 25 August 1944 (_NO-082, Pros. Ex. 7_), which
lists the agencies to which the Reich Commissioner for the Medical and
Health System could give directives, does not mention the SS. Genzken
also testified that no direct connections existed between Genzken’s and
Brandt’s offices. According to the numerous affidavits submitted by
Genzken (_Genzken 1, Genzken Ex. 3_; _Genzken 9, Genzken Ex. 9_;
_Genzken 6, Genzken Ex. 10_; _Genzken 8, Genzken Ex. 11_; _Genzken 3,
Genzken Ex. 12_; _Genzken 5, Genzken Ex. 13_; _Genzken 16, Genzken Ex.
14_; _Genzken 17, Genzken Ex. 15_; _Genzken 15, Genzken Ex. 16_) only
Grawitz was competent for scientific research within the SS. Genzken
also testified that Rostock never gave instructions in research affairs
to the SS. (_Tr. p. 3780._)
Gebhardt testified on 4 March that Grawitz was never subordinate to Karl
Brandt and that Brandt never even had the right to give directives to
Grawitz. (_Tr. p. 3977._) He testified further that Himmler wanted to
create a “science exclusively for the SS” and that the university people
had resisted that attempt. However, Rostock must quite definitely be
considered an exponent of university scientists. The proof for the
correctness of Himmler’s intention of a “science exclusively for the SS”
is contained in a letter, dated 22 September 1942, from SS
Gruppenfuehrer Berger to the Reich Leader SS. (_Karl Brandt 120, Karl
Brandt Ex. 35._)
When in the instruction of 15 May 1944 (_NO-919, Pros. Ex. 460_) Himmler
fixed the formalities for the carrying out of experiments on prisoners,
it was natural that the names of Rostock or Karl Brandt were not
mentioned in it. This instruction was not sent to Karl Brandt even for
information purposes as is revealed by the document itself. This should
be sufficient proof that Rostock had no influence on research activities
within the SS or the concentration camps. During discussion of the
individual experiments it has already been pointed out that he did not
even know of them.
In regard to research commissions given to the medical chiefs of the
Luftwaffe, Schroeder had claimed (_NO-449, Pros. Ex. 130_)—and during
cross-examination he was again reproached for this document (_Tr. p.
3695_)—that all research assignments had to go through Rostock’s
office. In his affidavit Schroeder testified that this was an erroneous
description. (_Rostock 11, Rostock Ex. 10._) In another interrogation on
27 February 1947 by Dr. Krauss (_Tr. p. 3695_) Schroeder expressly
confirmed the correctness of this affidavit. For it had only been agreed
that a carbon copy of the research commission given out would be sent to
Rostock. His approval of the assignment of commissions was not required.
The witness Wuerfler, too, confirmed this during his cross-examination
by Dr. Krauss on 19 February 1947. (_Tr. p. 3142._) And in his
affidavit, Becker-Freyseng testified that the Luftwaffe did not
commission Rostock’s office to carry out research by way of experiments
on human beings. (_Rostock 10, Rostock Ex. 9._)
During the hearing of evidence on 2 June 1947 in the case of
Becker-Freyseng, it was discussed in detail how research commissions
happened to come about, how reports were made on them and that the means
by which results were obtained were not prescribed; and that a real
control by the agency giving out the commissions was neither exercised
nor possible. I refer to the transcript which contains significant
testimony in this connection. (_Tr. pp. 8317, 8320, 8321, 8324-8326._)
And now I would like to turn to the problems connected with the _Reich
Research Council_. Here the prosecution has charged Rostock with
responsibility because from the beginning of 1944 on he was Brandt’s
deputy in his capacity as a member of the presiding council of this
body. The fact itself is not, but the responsibility, especially in the
sense of penal law or morals, must be denied. I deny the prosecution’s
assertion, leading up to Mr. McHaney’s statement of 10 December 1946
(_Tr. pp. 96 and 144_), that Rostock exercised a “supervisory control”
over the Reich Research Council or—on the occasion of submitting a
letter from Rascher about freezing experiments (_NO-432, Pros. Ex.
119_)—that the “Reich Research Council as a whole is implicated in a
criminal manner.”
The question of the Reich Research Council has been cleared up
sufficiently during the examinations of Karl Brandt, Rostock, Blome,
Sievers, as well as by the affidavits of the Chief of the Managing
Committee of the Reich Research Council, Mentzel. (_Rostock 13, Rostock
Ex. 12_; _Sievers 42, Sievers Ex. 43_.) As the crux emerges in this
connection the fact that those responsible for the assignment of
research commissions were, exclusively, the managers of the special
sections and their authorized agents and plenipotentiaries who in turn
were directly responsible to Hermann Goering.[147] Rostock was not among
them. The members of the presiding board had no supervisory duty over
and no right to issue directives to the managers of the special
sections.
The members of the presiding board were informed about research carried
out through the printed reports, the so-called “Red Booklets.” It can be
assumed “that the prosecution is in possession of these booklets. The
entire files of the Reich Research Council were handed over to the
American authorities by Professor Osenberg and some documents from these
files have been submitted during this trial.”
* * * * *
If the “Red Booklets” contained a single paragraph which could be used
to prove the prosecution’s claims, it can be assumed with certainty that
these booklets would have been submitted here. But this was not done.
From this the conclusion can be drawn with certainty that the members of
the Presiding Council of the Reich Research Council did not receive any
information about criminal experiments. And, as quoted before in this
connection, Mr. McHaney himself admitted during the cross-examination of
Rostock that he did not believe that, for example, Haagen informed the
Reich Research Council about his experiments in the concentration camps.
Haagen made detailed statements on the coming into being of research
commissions in general and, also in particular, on that of the
commissions he gave out, and on the right and the duty of control held
by the agency giving the commission. (_Tr. pp. 9417-9419._)
* * * * *
_EXTRACTS FROM THE CLOSING BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT
HANDLOSER_
* * * * *
It is the duty of the Inspector of the Army Medical Service, as Chief of
the Army Medical Service, to insure within the scope of his official
supervision that the intermediate superiors are able to perform their
duties. He also has to see to it that the military information and
report channels are well organized in order to guarantee the required
survey of the _whole_ complex and the reporting and immediate
investigation of unusual _individual_ cases. This requires the greatest
possible care in the _selection_ of the subordinate leading medical
officers, as well as periodic inspections to be carried out by the
officers selected.
Professor Handloser has submitted an affidavit to this Tribunal
concerning the reporting systems pertaining to military medical matters
of the Wermacht branches. (_Handloser 65, Handloser Ex. 62._)
This document reveals the exemplary organization of the Message and
Report Organization, including the sphere of the consulting expert
physicians. The handling of the reports on “special occurrences” seems
to me to be of special importance for the problem under discussion here.
It was a standing order for the whole Wehrmacht that every office,
including the offices of the medical service, had to report to the
superior office immediately and by the quickest method each occurrence
of each circumstance outside the bounds of normal events. (_Handloser
65, Handloser Ex. 62._)
Professor Handloser as Inspector of the [Army] Medical Service and
Surgeon General [Army Medical Chief (Heeresarzt)] was the Chief of the
Medical Service for all fronts and the zone of the interior and was
responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Army and to the Commander
of the Replacement Army. The 26,500 medical officers of the army were
subordinated to him. His field of office and the extent of his work
were, therefore, extremely wide.
To handle such a large field of work properly—in Handloser’s case it
also included the office of the Chief of Army Medical Service—a
division of labor had to be made into time, space, and facts. The
organization and the progress of work in the sphere of the Army Medical
Inspector and the Chief of the Army Medical Service was explained by
Professor Handloser in his affidavit. (_Handloser 29, Handloser Ex. 4._)
According to this the basic and most important questions were dealt with
and decided upon in any case by Professor Handloser as the chief of the
highest office. In this connection I refer to the testimony of Dr.
Wuerfler (_Tr. p. 3135_) and affidavit of Schmidt-Bruecken. (_Handloser
62, Handloser Ex. 58._) Special attention has to be paid here to
incoming mail (messages, reports, letters). In the Handloser affidavit
(_Handloser 29, Handloser Ex. 4_), the following is stated:
“All letters and packages, unless they were marked ‘secret’ or
‘top secret’ (Mil.) went to the registry. Here they were opened,
the date stamp was affixed by the registrar who simultaneously
marked the letter for delivery to the Chief of Staff, or to the
various section chiefs direct. The Chief of Staff in turn marked
those communications which were to be submitted to the medical
chief with a cross in colored pencil.
“Secret and top secret (Mil.) material was handled in a special
manner. This material was entered in a journal, and then
directed to the attention of the Chief of Staff who in turn
determined which documents were to be submitted to, or brought
to the attention of, the medical inspector immediately or after
they had been dealt with.”
This arrangement could be made without prejudicing a regular settlement
since the authorities in question were under the command of specially
qualified people (department chiefs) headed by the Chief of Staff who
supervised the daily business routine and was responsible for all
business matters.
With regard to Handloser it must be borne in mind that during the war he
was very rarely present in the head office (Berlin). Owing to
Handloser’s double function as an army doctor and Army Medical Chief,
and furthermore as a result of the division of the Army Medical
Inspectorate into two parts for the front and the zone of the interior,
Handloser necessarily had to spend most of his time at army headquarters
and at the front. He could only be present in Berlin for about one-tenth
of the time. (_Tr. p. 3135._) Furthermore, it became necessary to staff
the offices at home with specially qualified medical officers since they
had to act mainly on their own initiative in performing their tasks.
The Chief of Staff of the Army Medical Inspectorate, for instance, was a
Generalarzt; the chiefs of the individual departments were Oberstaerzte.
In order to do justice to the burden and the responsibility which
Handloser had been shouldering, one must visualize the tasks and scope
of work connected with the Medical Inspectorate. Owing to the war these
tasks had been intensified to the utmost limits, there was the expansion
of the theaters of operation and the personal problems of 26,500 medical
officers. One will also realize that Handloser could only attend to the
most important and the most basic problems.
The Chief of Staff and the departmental chiefs, as was their duty,
determined which matters were of sufficient basic and vital importance
to be referred for decision to the Army Medical Chief.
It must be considered most unlikely for the highest authority (i. e.,
the chief) of a large sphere of activity to have knowledge of all
happenings within this sphere.
Furthermore, actual facts do not confirm that the person exercising the
_highest powers_ of command within the military hierarchy of the army is
in some degree the originator of all orders executed by a subordinate in
his hierarchy. If an order has been issued, one must determine who of
all the supervising chiefs of the offices in this hierarchy is the
originator responsible, under criminal law, for this order. If _no_
special order was issued one must examine whether the incriminating
behavior on the part of the defendant personally was prompted by
circumstances within the scope of responsibility, under criminal law
(such as orders and regulations which rendered possible the criminal
behavior of a subordinate or appropriate consent to commit the criminal
offense, _before_ its initiation or its completion).
Only if the prosecution maintains and proves (_a_) that the behavior of
a subordinate constitutes a punishable offense, and (_b_) that _this_
action in particular was the result of an order issued by the superior,
or of his consent given prior to the offense, can the defendant be
charged as an abettor, offender, accomplice, or participator.
This exhausts all possible modes of behavior _prior_ to the criminal
offense. Whatever happened afterwards _cannot_ have any relevant bearing
on this legal evidence. This is _impossible_ since all causality is
lacking.
With regard to the question of a possible offense against the duties of
a supervisor, the following must be said: According to Art. 147 of the
German Military Penal Code “Whoever neglects to carry out the task
incumbent upon him of supervising his subordinates either intentionally
or through negligence” is liable to punishment. According to German
theory and judicial practice, the application of this law presupposes
the existence of a _direct_ relationship between superior and
subordinate.
If anything inadmissible or punishable happens in the sphere of duty
this might be attributed to the fact that the supervising official
neglected his duty, but it is also possible that it occurred through no
fault of the supervising official. In the first instance the supervising
official is liable to punishment according to Art. 147 of the Military
Penal Code; this, however, does not apply in the latter case. The
question only arises of whether in the former case the supervising
official has to answer _before criminal law_ for the action of his
subordinate. This must be answered in the negative. An offense against
the duties of service supervision constitutes in itself an offense. It
does _not_ automatically demand that the supervising official should be
punished for the criminal offense committed by the subordinate, for
according to the criminal laws of all civilized countries, a person can
only be made responsible before criminal law for an offense committed by
_himself_, i. e., if the supervising official can be considered an
accomplice or participant in the crime of a subordinate. Only _thus_ can
the passage of count one, 3 of the indictment be understood. This
provides for a responsibility before criminal law for others, “for whose
actions the defendants are responsible.”
The prerequisites for this case have been set forth above.
* * * * *
_The position of Professor Handloser as Chief of the Armed Forces Medical
Service_
* * * * *
The prosecution asserts that Handloser as Chief of the German Armed
Forces Medical Service had the _supreme supervision_ and _command_ of
the medical services of the three branches of the armed forces as well
as of the Waffen SS. This is a _fundamental_ error which is based on the
incomprehensible statement of the chief prosecutor in his opening
statement:
“Under the OKW came the High Commands of the three branches of
the Wehrmacht—the Navy (OKM), the Army (OKH), and the Air Force
(OKL).”
From the verdict of the IMT, I quote the following in regard to the
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) who was the
superior of the defendant Handloser:
“Keitel [as Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces]
did not have command authority over the three Wehrmacht branches
* * *.”[148]
From this the prosecution should have drawn the logical conclusion that,
if the superior of Handloser, Keitel, had no powers of command over the
three branches of the armed forces and their supreme commanders, then
Professor Handloser, as his subordinate, also could have had no powers
of command over the medical chiefs attached to the staff of the supreme
commanders. The evidence has corroborated this. (_Tr. pp. 2860-3,
3129-30, 3219, 3557._)
The prosecution refers for proof of the contrary only to the statement
of the former Air Force Chief Hippke in another trial. According to that
Hippke is supposed to have testified that Professor Handloser had been
his _professional_ superior. The incorrectness of this statement is
proved by the opposing testimonies given under oath by Professor Dr.
Schroeder who succeeded Hippke and of Generalarzt Dr. Hartleben (_Tr.
pp. 3219-20, 3225_), as well as of Generalarzt Dr. Wuerfler (_Tr. pp.
3129-30_). The evidence submitted, combined with the contents of the
decree of 1942, has shown that it was the duty of the Chief of the Armed
Forces Medical Service to direct the adjustment of _personnel_ and
_material_ affairs within the branch of the armed forces as is evidenced
by the first sentence of the decree. Within the scope of this sphere of
duties, Professor Handloser was charged with the combination or—as it
was generally called—the coordination of all _common_ problems in the
field of the Armed Forces Medical Service. The task of coordination
given Professor Handloser did not mean that thereby all common problems
automatically _came under his jurisdiction_. It was rather his duty to
examine _which_ part of the immense medical service was suitable for
coordination. Generalarzt Dr. Wuerfler has aptly called this a “program
of future fields of endeavor”. In this connection see also Professor
Schroeder (_Tr. pp. 3557, 3558_). Whenever Handloser thought that a
certain department was suitable for coordination, he tried to reach an
agreement with the medical chiefs of the branches of the armed forces;
for since he had no powers of command, the coordination could only take
place in conjunction with the medical chiefs. After coordination had
been accomplished, he was empowered to issue “directives” in this field
which did not have the character of an order. Hartleben replies to the
question of my colleague Dr. Steinbauer:
“Directives give general guiding principles, an order must be
carried out to the letter.”
Wuerfler expresses the same in the following manner:
“A superior has the authority to give orders. One can only speak
of a right to issue directives where there exists no authority
to give orders and no relationship of superiority.”