In a recent advertisement, Professor Ward’s work entitled as above was
characterized as “one of the most important contributions to philosophy
made in our time in England,” and this was joined with the prophecy
that it “may even do something to restore to philosophy the prominent
place it once occupied in English thought.” Along with laudatory
expressions, I have observed in some notices reprobation of the manner
adopted by Professor Ward in his attack upon my views--I might almost
say upon me; and one of the reviewers gives examples of the words he
uses--“ridiculous,” “absurd,” “blunder,” “nonsense,” “amazing fallacy,”
“our oracle.”
When, some time ago, I glanced at one of the volumes, I came upon a
passage which at once stamped the book by displaying the attitude
of the writer; but, being then otherwise occupied, I decided not to
disturb myself by reading more. Now, however, partly by the reviews I
have seen, and partly by the comments of a friend, I have been shown
that I can not let the book pass without remark. The assumption that a
critic states rightly the doctrine he criticises is so generally made,
that in the absence of proof to the contrary his criticisms are almost
certain to be regarded as valid. And when the critic is a Cambridge
Professor and an Honorary LL. D., the assumption will be thought fully
warranted.
* * * * *
Let me set out by quoting some passages disclosing the kind of feeling
by which Professor Ward’s criticisms are influenced, if not prompted.
In his preface he says:--
“When at length Naturalism is forced to take account of the facts
of life and mind, we find the strain on the mechanical theory is
more than it will bear. Mr. Spencer has blandly to confess that
‘two volumes’ of his _Synthetic Philosophy_ are missing, the
volumes that should connect inorganic with biological, evolution.”
Respecting the first of these sentences, I have only to remark that I
have said (as in _First Principles_, § 62) and repeatedly implied,
that force or energy in the sense which a “mechanical theory” connotes,
can not be that Ultimate Cause whence all things proceed, and that
there is as much warrant for calling it spiritual as for calling it
material. As was asserted at the close of that work (p. 558), the
“implications are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic;
and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic”; and as
was contended in the _Principles of Sociology_, § 659, “the Power
manifested throughout the Universe distinguished as material, is the
same Power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness.”
But it is to the second sentence I here chiefly draw attention. Whether
or not there be a sarcasm behind the words “blandly to confess,” it
is clear that the sentence is meant to imply some dereliction on my
part. Now in the programme of the Synthetic Philosophy, the division
dealing with inorganic nature was avowedly omitted, “because even
without it the scheme is too extensive”; and this undue extensiveness
was so conspicuous that I was thought absurd or almost insane. Yet I
am now tacitly reproached because I did not make it more extensive
still--because an undertaking deemed scarcely possible was not made
quite impossible. When blamed for attempting too much, it never entered
my thoughts that I might in after years be blamed for not attempting
more.
Repeated reference to _First Principles_ as “the stereotyped
philosophy” are manifestly intended by Professor Ward to reflect on
me, either for having left that work during many years unchanged, or
for implying that no change is needed. Much as I dislike personal
explanations, I am here compelled to make them. If, in 1896, when the
ten volumes constituting the Synthetic Philosophy were completed, I
had done nothing toward revision of them, the omission would not have
been considered by most men a reason for complaint. The facts, however,
are, that in 1867 I issued a recast and revised edition of _First
Principles_; in 1870 an edition of the _Principles of Psychology_, of
which half was revised, and ten years later an enlarged edition of
the same work; in 1885 a revised edition of the first volume of the
_Principles of Sociology_; and now I have fortunately been able to
finish a revised and enlarged edition of the _Principles of Biology_.
Any one not willfully blind might have seen that when persisting, under
great difficulties, in trying to execute the entire work as originally
outlined, it was not practicable at the same time to bring all earlier
parts of it up to date. Professor Ward, however, thinks that I should
have sacrificed the end to improve the beginning, or else that I
should have found energy enough to re-revise an earlier volume while
writing the later ones; and my failure to do both prompts sarcastic
allusions.[A]
[A] Candor often brings penalties, as witness the
announcement “stereotyped edition.” When another thousand
of a work has been ordered, the printers do not always
refer to the author for correction of the title-page,
but, as a matter of course, put “second edition,” or
“third edition,” as the case may be. When my attention
has been drawn to such matters, however, I have directed
that the words “stereotyped edition” shall be put on the
title-page if the printing is from plates, and if the work
is unaltered: objecting to a usage which betrays readers
into the false belief that new matter is forthcoming. I
did not perceive that an antagonist might transform the
words “stereotyped edition” into an assertion that the work
needed no changes. Experience should have warned me that
adverse interpretations are inevitable wherever they are
possible. To the question--“Why did you stereotype?” the
obvious reply is--“From motives of economy.”
In further illustration of the feeling Professor Ward brings to his
task, I may quote the following passage, in which he interposes
comments on my mode of writing:--
“By the persistence of Force [capital F], we really mean the
persistence of some Power [capital P] which transcends our
knowledge and conception. The manifestations, as recurring
either in ourselves or outside of us, do not persist; but that
which persists is the Unknown Cause [capitals again] of these
manifestations.”
The matter itself is trivial enough. It is worth noticing only as
indicating a state of mind. Supposing even that capitals were in such
cases inappropriate--supposing even that small initial letters would
have been more appropriate; it is clear that only one having a strong
_animus_ would have gone out of his way to notice it.
After thus enabling the reader to judge in what temper the criticisms
of Professor Ward are made, I may pass on.
* * * * *
As implied at the outset, my intention is not to discuss Professor
Ward’s own philosophy--the less so because I discussed a like
philosophy nearly a generation ago. His position is that “Once
materialism is abandoned and dualism found untenable, a spiritualistic
monism remains the one stable position. It is only in terms of mind
that we can understand the unity, activity, and regularity that
nature presents. In so understanding we see that Nature is Spirit.”
(_Preface._) This was the position of Dr. Martineau in 1872 (and
probably is now). He argued, that to account for this infinitude of
physical changes everywhere going on, “Mind must be conceived as
there,” “under the guise of simple Dynamics.” My criticisms on this
view, given in an essay entitled “Mr. Martineau on Evolution,” can not
here be repeated. But I held then, as I hold now, that “the Ultimate
Power is no more representable in terms of human consciousness than
human consciousness is representable in terms of a plant’s functions.”
Briefly the result is, that in saying “Nature is Spirit” (capital N and
capital S!), Professor Ward implies that he knows all about it; while
I, on the other hand, am sure that I know nothing about it.
* * * * *
And now, passing to my essential purpose, let me exemplify Professor
Ward’s controversial method. Specifying an hypothesis of the late Dr.
Croll (who, he thinks, had “incomparably more right to an opinion on
the question” than I have), he says, that it “at least recognizes a
problem with which Mr. Spencer scarcely attempts to deal--I mean the
evolution of the chemical elements. It thus suffices to convict Mr.
Spencer’s work of a certain incompleteness” (i., 190). Apparently
the words “scarcely attempts” refer to a passage in the above-named
essay, “Mr. Martineau on Evolution,” where several reasons are given
for thinking that the “so-called elements arise by compounding and
recompounding.” More than this has been done, however. The evolution
of the elements, if not systematically dealt with within the limits of
the Synthetic Philosophy, has not been ignored. In an essay on “The
Nebular Hypothesis” (_Essays_, i., pp. 156-9), it is argued, that
“the general law of evolution, if it does not actually involve the
conclusion that the so-called elements are compounds, yet affords _a
priori_ ground for suspecting that they are such”; and five groups of
traits are enumerated which support the belief that they originated by
a process of evolution like that everywhere going on. But the point I
here chiefly emphasize is that, having reflected upon me for omitting
two volumes, Professor Ward again reflects upon me for having omitted
something which one of these volumes would have contained. “Sir, you
have neglected to build that house which was wanted! Moreover, you have
not supplied the stairs!”
* * * * *
From a sin of omission let us pass to a sin of commission. Professor
Ward quotes from me the sentence--“The absolutely homogeneous must
lose its equilibrium; and the relatively homogeneous must lapse into
the relatively less homogeneous.”--_First Principles_, p. 429. Then
presently he writes:--
“In truth, however, homogeneity is not necessarily instability.
Quite otherwise. If the homogeneity be absolute--that of Lord
Kelvin’s primordial medium, say--the stability will be absolute
too. In other words, if ‘the indefinite, incoherent homogeneity,’
in which, according to Mr. Spencer, some rearrangement _must
result_, be a state devoid of all qualitative diversity and without
assignable bounds, then, as we saw in discussing mechanical ideals,
any ‘rearrangement’ can result only from external interference; it
can not begin from within” (i., 223).
And then he goes on to argue that “Thus, the very first step in Mr.
Spencer’s evolution seems to necessitate a breach of continuity. This
fatal defect, &c.” (_ibid._).
Observe the words “without assignable bounds”--without knowable limits,
infinite. So that the law of the instability of the homogeneous is
disposed of because it does not apply to an infinite homogeneous
medium. But since infinity is inconceivable by us, this alleged
case of stable homogeneity is inconceivable too. Hence the proposal
is to shelve the law displayed in all things we know, because it
is inapplicable to a hypothetical thing we can not know, and can
not even conceive! Now let me turn to the essential point. This
nominally-exceptional case was fully recognized by me in the chapter
he is criticising. In § 155 of _First Principles_ (p. 429), it is
written:--
“One stable homogeneity only, is hypothetically possible. If
centers of force, absolutely uniform in their powers, were diffused
with absolute uniformity through unlimited space, they would remain
in equilibrium. This, however, though a verbally intelligible
supposition, is one that can not be represented in thought; since
unlimited space is inconceivable.”
So that this nominal exception which Professor Ward urges against me as
a “fatal defect,” was set forth by me thirty-seven years ago!
A somewhat more involved case may next be dealt with. Professor Ward
writes:--
“Moreover, on the physical assumption from which Mr. Spencer sets
out, viz., that the mass of the universe and the energy of the
universe are fixed in quantity--which ought to mean are finite
in quantity--there can be no such alternations [of evolution and
dissolution] as he supposes” (i., 192).