The kings, under the Anglo-Saxon monarchy, were at first called

_Heretogs_, leaders of armies; but it is a mistake to

explain and limit their prerogatives by the name which they bore.

The power of arms was then so great, and all other powers seemed

so inferior and subject to it, that they all fell under the

generic term which contained within itself nearly every idea of

force and empire. The most different powers were embraced under

this single denomination, and we must not suppose that the kings

limited their functions to those which it seems to indicate; the

Anglo-Saxon kings were not merely military leaders; they managed

all the internal administration of the realm, in concert with the

Wittenagemot. Their attributes were not more determinate than

those of that assembly. With it, they directed all the affairs of

the nation; and their surveillance, being perpetual, was more

close and active. They were addressed as the highest authority,

and also as possessing the most information on public affairs.

Thus the right of presiding over the general assemblies and

proposing the subjects for deliberation, belonged exclusively to

them.

The royal authority, however, not being sustained by a strong and

regular organization, decreased in power in proportion as the

great proprietors increased in influence and became firmly

established in their domains. Towards the end of the Anglo-Saxon

monarchy, the large landowners, sole masters on their own

estates, began to do everything by themselves. They coined money,

administered justice, and levied soldiers. And we must not

imagine that this assumption of sovereign rights by local

chieftains was regarded, by the people, as an act of iniquity and

violence: it was a necessity of the social condition of the

country. Royalty was no more capable of wielding all the central

power, than the nation was of maintaining and exercising all its

liberties.

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Lecture VI.

The true principle of representative government.

Error of classifying governments according to their external

forms.

Montesquieu's error with respect to the origin of the

representative system.

Necessary correlation and simultaneous formation of

society and government.

Rousseau's mistaken hypothesis of the social contract.

The nature of rightful sovereignty.

Confused and contradictory ideas entertained on this subject.

Societies, as individuals, possess the right of being placed

under laws of justice and reason.

Governments ought to be continually reminded of their

obligation to inquire into and conform to these laws.

Classification of governments on this principle.

Principle Of Representative Government.

I propose to examine the political institutions of modern Europe

in their early infancy, and to seek what they have in common with

the representative system of government. My object will be to

learn whether this form of government had then attained to any

degree of development, or even existed only in germ; at what

times, and in what places it first appeared, where and under what

circumstances it prospered or failed. I have just examined the

primitive institutions of the Anglo-Saxons. Before leaving our

consideration of England, it might be well for me to compare

these institutions with the essential type of representative

government, in order to see how they agree and in what they

differ. But this type is not yet in our possession. In order to

find it I shall revert to the essential principle of

representative government, to the original ideas out of which it

springs; and I shall compare this idea with the fundamental idea

that underlies Anglo-Saxon institutions.

{56}

Error Of Montesquieu.

The human mind is naturally led to judge of the nature of things,

and to classify them according to their exterior forms;

accordingly, governments have almost invariably been arranged

according to distinctions which do not at all belong to their

inherent character. Wherever none of those positive institutions

have been immediately recognized which, according to our present

notions, represent and guarantee political liberty, it has been

thought that no liberty could exist, and that power must be

absolute. But in human affairs, various elements are mingled:

nothing exists in a simple and pure state. As some traces of

absolute power are to be found at the basis of free governments,

so also some liberty has existed under governments to all

appearance founded on absolutism. No form of society is

completely devoid of reason and justice,--for were all reason and

justice to be withdrawn, society would perish. We may sometimes

see governments of apparently the most opposite character produce

the same effects. During the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries, representative government raised England to the

highest elevation of moral and material prosperity; and France,

during that same period, increased in splendour, wealth, and

enlightenment, under an absolute monarchy. I do not intend by

this to insinuate the impression that forms of government are

unimportant, and that all produce results of equal quality and

value; I merely wish to hint that we should not appreciate them

by only a few of their results, or by their exterior indications.

In order fully to appreciate a government, we must penetrate into

its essential and constituent principles. We shall then perceive

that many governments which differ considerably in their forms,

are referable to the same principles; and that others which

appear to resemble one another in their forms, are in fundamental

respects different. Wherever elections and assemblies have

presented themselves to view, it has been thought that the

elements of a representative system were to be found.

Montesquieu, looking at representative government in England,

endeavoured to trace it back to the old Germanic institutions.

"This noble system," he says, "originated in the woods."

Appearances deceived Montesquieu; he merely took into

consideration the exterior characteristics of representative

government, not its true principles and its true tendencies. That

is a superficial and false method which classifies governments

according to their exterior characteristics; making monarchy,

government by one individual; aristocracy, government by several;

democracy, government by the people, the sovereignty of all. This

classification, which is based only upon one particular fact, and

upon a certain material shape which power assumes, does not go to

the heart of those questions, or rather of that question, by the

solution of which the nature and tendency of governments is

determined.

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Society And Government.

This question is, "What is the source of the sovereign power, and

what is its limit? Whence does it come, and where does it stop?"

In the answer to this question is involved the real principle of

government; for it is this principle whose influence, direct or

indirect, latent or obvious, gives to societies their tendency

and their fate.

Where are we to look for this principle? Is it a mere

conventional arrangement by man? Is its existence anterior to

that of society?

The two facts--society and government--mutually imply one

another; society without government is no more possible than

government without society. The very idea of society necessarily

implies that of rule, of universal law, that is to say, of

government.

What then is the first social law? I hasten to pronounce it: it

is justice, reason, a rule of which every man has the germ within

his own breast. If man only yields to a superior force, he does

not truly submit to the law; there is no society and no

government. If in his dealings with his fellows, man obeys not

only force, but also a law, then society and government exist. In

the abnegation of force, and obedience to law, consists the

fundamental principle of society and government. In the absence

of these two conditions, neither society nor government can be

properly said to exist.

This necessary coexistence of society and government shows the

absurdity of the hypothesis of the social contract. Rousseau

presents us with the picture of men already united together into

a society, but without rule, and exerting themselves to create

one; as if society did not itself presuppose the existence of a

rule to which it was indebted for its existence. If there is no

rule, there is no society; there are only individuals united and

kept together by force. This hypothesis then, of a primitive

contract, as the only legitimate source of social law, rests upon

an assumption that is necessarily false and impossible.

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Principle Of Government.

The opposite hypothesis, which places the origin of society in

the family and in the right of the father over his children, is

less objectionable, but it is incomplete. There is, certainly, a

form of society among parents and their rising offspring; but it

is a society in some sort unilateral, and of which one of the

parties has not any true consciousness. Society, whether in the

family or out of the family, is only complete when all its

members, those who command as well as those who obey, recognize,

more or less vaguely, a certain superior rule, which is neither

the arbitrary caprice of will, nor the effect of force alone. The

idea of society, therefore, implies necessarily another idea,

that of government; and the idea of government contains in it two

others, the idea of a collection of individuals, and that of a

rule which is applicable to them,--a rule which constitutes the

right of the government itself; a rule which the individuals who

submit to it have not themselves created, and to which they are

morally bound to submit. No government ever totally disregarded

this supreme rule, none ever proclaimed force or caprice as the

only law of society. In seeking the principle of government, we

have found the principle of social right to be the primary source

of all legitimate sovereignty. In this law of laws, in this rule

of all government, resides the principle of government.

Two important questions now present themselves. How is the law

formed, and how is it applied? In this lies the distinctive

character of the various forms of government; in this they

differ.

Right of Sovereignty.

Even until modern times, the belief has prevailed that the

primitive and absolute right of law-making, that is, the right of

sovereignty, resides in some portion of society, whether this

right be vested in a single man, in several, or in all; an

opinion which has been constantly contradicted by facts, and

which cannot bear the test of reason. The right of determining

and enforcing a rule, is the right to absolute power; that force

which possesses this right inherently, possesses absolute power,

that is to say, the right of tyranny. Take the three great forms

of government, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, and see if a

case can be found in which the right of sovereignty was held by

one, by several or by all, in which tyranny did not necessarily

arise. Facts have been logically correct,--they have inferred

from the principle its necessary consequence.

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Such, however, is the force of truth, that this error could not

reign alone and absolutely. At the very time when men appeared to

believe, and did theoretically believe, that the primitive and

absolute power of giving law belonged to some one, whether

monarch, senate, or people, at the same time they struggled

against that principle. At all times men have endeavoured to

limit the power which they regarded as perfectly legitimate.

Never has a force, although invested with the right of

sovereignty, been allowed to develop that right to its full

extent. The janissaries in Turkey sometimes served, sometimes

abrogated, the absolute power of the Sultan. In democracies,

where the right of sovereignty is vested in popular assemblies,

efforts have been continually made to oppose conditions,

obstacles, and limits to that sovereignty. Always, in all

governments which are absolute in principle, some kind of protest

has been made against the principle. Whence comes this universal

protest? We might, looking merely at the surface of things, be

tempted to say that it is only a struggle of powers. This has

existed without doubt, but another and a grander element has

existed along with it; there is an instinctive sense of justice

and reason dwelling in every human spirit. Tyranny has been

opposed, whether it were the tyranny of individuals or of

multitudes, not only by a consciousness of power, but by a

sentiment of right. It is this consciousness of justice and

right, that is to say, of a rule independent of human will,--a

consciousness often obscure but always powerful,--which, sooner

or later, rouses and assists men to resist all tyranny, whatever

may be its name and form. The voice of humanity, then, has

proclaimed that the right of sovereignty vested in men, whether

in one, in many, or in all, is an iniquitous lie.

If, then, the right of sovereignty cannot be vested in any one

man, or collection of men, where does it reside, and what is the

principle on which it rests?

True Law Of Society.

In his interior life,--in his dealings with himself, if I may be

allowed the expression, as well as in his exterior life, and in

his dealings with his fellows,--the man who feels himself free

and capable of action, has ever a glimpse of a natural law by

which his action is regulated. He recognises a something which is

not his own will, and which must regulate his will. He feels

himself bound by reason or morality to do certain things; he

sees, or he feels that there are certain things which he ought or

ought not to do.

{60}

This something is the law which is superior to man, and made for

him--the divine law. The true law of man is not the work of man;

he receives, but does not create it; even when he submits to it,

it is not his own,--it is beyond and above him.

Man does not always submit; in the exercise of his free will and

imperfect nature, he does not invariably obey this law. He is

influenced by other principles of action than this, and although

he perceives that the motives which impel him are vicious,

nevertheless he often yields to them. But whether he obey or not,

the supreme law for man is always existent--in his wildest dreams

he recognises it, as placed above him.

We see, then, the individual always in presence of a law,--one

which he did not create, but which asserts its claim over him,

and never abandons him. If he enters into society with his

fellows, or finds himself thus associated, what other rule than

this will he possess? Should human society involve an abdication

of human nature? No; man in society must and does remain

essentially the same as in his individual capacity; and as

society is nothing but a collection of individuals, the supreme

law of society must be the same as that which exercises a

rightful control over individuals themselves.

Here, then, have we discovered the true law of society,--the law

of government;--it is the same law as that which binds

individuals. And as, for an individual, the true law is often

obscure, and as the individual, even when he knows it thoroughly,

does not always follow it implicitly; in the same manner with

regard to government, whatever it may be, its true law,--which

must ever reach it through the medium of the human mind, which is

ever biassed by passion and limited by frailty,--is neither at

all times apprehended nor always obeyed. It is then impossible to

attribute to one man or to several the possession of an inherent

right to sovereignty, since this would be to suppose that their

ideas and inclinations were in all cases correspondent to the

dictates of justice and of reason,--a supposition which the

radical imperfection of our nature will not allow us for a moment

to admit.

{61}

Classification Of Governments.

It is, however, owing to the same imperfection that men have

accepted, or rather created for themselves, idols and tyrants. A

law ready made for them has appeared more convenient than that

laborious and unremitting search after reason and justice which

they felt themselves obliged to undertake by the imperious voice

of that conscience which they could not entirely silence.

Nevertheless, men have never been able entirely to deceive their

conscience, or to stifle its utterances. Conscience defeats all

the arrangements of human ignorance or indifference, and forces

men to fight for themselves despite their own unwillingness.

Never, in fact, have men fully accepted the sovereignty, the

right of which they have admitted; and the impossibility of their

thus consenting to it, plainly indicates the superhuman principle

which sovereignty involves. In this principle we must seek for

the true distinction between governments.

The classification which I am about to present is not, then, one

that is merely arbitrary and factitious; it does not concern the

exterior forms, but the essential nature of governments. I

distinguish two kinds. First, there are those which attribute

sovereignty as a right belonging exclusively to individuals,

whether one, many, or all those composing a society; and these

are, in principle, the founders of despotism, although facts

always protest more or less strongly against the principle; and

absolute obedience on the one hand, and absolute power on the

other, never exist in full vigour. The second class of

governments is founded on the truth that sovereignty belongs as a

right to no individual whatever, since the perfect and continued

apprehension, the fixed and inviolable application of justice and

of reason, do not belong to our imperfect nature.

Representative government rests upon this truth. I do not say

that it has been founded upon the full reflective acknowledgment

of the principle in the form in which I have stated it.

Governments do not, any more than great poems, form themselves on

an _à priori_ model, and in accordance with defined

precepts. What I affirm is, that representative government does

not attribute sovereignty as inherently residing in any

person,--that all its powers are directed to the discovery and

faithful fulfilment of that rule which ought ever to govern their

action, and that the right of sovereignty is only recognised on

the condition that it should be continually justified.

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Aim Of Representative Government.

Pascal has said, "Plurality which does not reduce itself to

unity, is confusion. Unity which is not the result of plurality,

is tyranny." This is the happiest expression and the most exact

definition of representative government. The plurality is

society; the unity is truth, is the united force of the laws of

justice and reason, which ought to govern society. If society

remains in the condition of plurality, if isolated wills do not

combine under the guidance of common rules, if they do not all

equally recognise justice and reason, if they do not reduce

themselves to unity, there is no society, there is only

confusion. And the unity which does not arise from plurality,

which has been violently imposed upon it by one or many, whatever

may be their number, in virtue of a prerogative which they

appropriate as their exclusive possession, is a false and

arbitrary unity; it is tyranny. The aim of representative

government is to oppose a barrier at once to tyranny and to

confusion, and to bring plurality to unity by presenting itself

for its recognition and acceptance.

Let us now see, in the central fact of this method of government,

by what means it arrives at its end, and under what forms its

principle is developed.

Representative government, wherever it has existed or does exist,

is composed of different elements of power, equal among

themselves, although one of them, the monarchical or the

democratic, ordinarily retains certain peculiar rights. The

number and form of these powers are not necessarily determinate

or equal; in France, at the present time, there are three, the

royal power, the House of Peers, and the Chamber of Deputies.

These three powers emanate from different sources, and result

from different social necessities. Neither of them, isolated from

the rest, possesses a right of sovereignty: it is required of

them that they seek the legitimate rule in common, and they are

supposed to possess it only when they have found it in a united

deliberation, before or after action. Society owes submission to

this rule, thus discovered; but as these powers are not all fixed

and immutable, so the sovereignty of right does not reside

constantly among them. The elective principle, which is by its

very nature changeful, can alter its idea and purpose, and

exercise upon the other powers an influence that is periodically

variable.

{63}

If the different powers do not agree, they reduce themselves

immediately to inaction. The sovereignty which exists in its own

right then seems to hesitate to show itself, and government

remains in suspense. In order to extricate it from this state,

the right has been reserved to royalty of creating peers, and of

dissolving the Chamber of Deputies. The powers then proceed

afresh to seek for the true law, a work in which they ought not

to rest until they have found it. Thus, no power is judged to

possess fully the legitimate rule, which is rightfully the

principle of sovereignty. The electors themselves are not its

absolute interpreters, any more than are the peers, the deputies,

or the king. The electors do not say at the outset to their

deputies, "Such is our will: let that be the law." They enjoin

upon them nothing precise; they simply confer upon them the

mission of examining and deciding according to their reason. They

must necessarily trust in the enlightenment of those whom they

elect; election is a trial imposed on those who aspire to

political power, and a sovereign but limited right exercised by

those who confer political power upon such of the claimants as

they may select.

Political Rights Of The Nation.

From the political powers thus attributed to certain classes, let

us now pass to the political rights which are vaguely distributed

in the nation. These rights are among the essential conditions of

representative government. The publicity of the debates in the

deliberative assemblies imposes upon these powers the necessity

of commending themselves to that sense of reason and justice

which belongs to all, in order that every citizen may be

convinced that their inquiries have been made with fidelity and

intelligence, and that, knowing wherein they are deficient, he

may himself have the opportunity, if he has the capacity, to

indicate the remedy. Liberty opens up a career for this inquiry.

In this way, every citizen may aid in the discovery of the true

law. Thus does a representative government impel the whole body

of society,--those who exercise power, and those who possess

rights,--to enter upon a common search after reason and justice;

it invites the multitude to reduce itself to unity, and it brings

forth unity from the midst of plurality. The public

powers,--royalty, the deliberative houses, the electors,--are

bound and incessantly made to return to this work, by the

essential nature of their relations, and by the laws of their

action.

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Effects Of Publicity.

Private citizens even can co-operate, by virtue of the publicity

of the debates, and the liberty of the press. I might pursue this

idea, and show that all the institutions which are regarded as

inherent in representative government, even those which have not

been regarded as assisting in the search for those general rules

which ought to preside in the conduct of government, are derived

from the same principle, and tend to the same result. The

publicity of judicial proceedings, and those who compose the

jury, for example, supply a guarantee for the legitimate

application of the law to particular cases. But our present

concern is especially to determine the principle of those

essential combinations by which a representative government is

constituted; they all proceed evidently from this fact, that no

individual is fully acquainted with and invariably consents to

that reason, truth and justice, which can alone confer the right

of sovereignty, and which ought to be the rule of sovereignty as

actually exercised. They compel all powers to seek for this rule,

and give to all citizens the right of assisting in this research,

by taking cognizance of the mode in which the powers proceed to

it, and in declaring themselves what they conceive to be the

dictates of justice and of truth. In other words, to sum up what

I have said, representative government rests in reality upon the

following series of ideas. All power which exists as a fact,

must, in order to become a right, act according to reason,

justice, and truth, the sole sources of right. No man, and no

body of men, can know and perform fully all that is required by

reason, justice, and truth; but they have the faculty to discover

it, and can be brought more and more to conform to it in their

conduct. All the combinations of the political machine then ought

to tend, on the one hand, to extract whatever of reason, justice,

or truth, exists in society, in order to apply it to the

practical requirements of government; and, on the other hand, to

promote the progress of society in reason, justice, and truth,

and constantly to embody this progress of society in the actual

structure of the government.

{65}

Lecture VII.

Comparison of the principles of different governments with the

true principle of representative government.

Aristocratic governments.

Origin and history of the word _aristocracy_.

Principle of this form of government; its consequences.

How the principle of representative government enters into

aristocratic governments.

Democratic governments.

Origin and consequences of the principle of the sovereignty of

the people.

This principle not identical with that of representative

government.

In what sense representative government is the government

of the majority.

Changes In Language And Society.

I have, in my previous lecture, shown the error of those

superficial classifications which only distinguish governments

according to their exterior characteristics; I have recognised

and separated with precision between the two opposite principles,

which are, both of them, the basis of all government; I have

identified representative government with one of these

principles; I have proved that it could not be deduced from the

other; I wish now to compare the principle of representative

government with the contrary principle, and to show the opposite

condition of governments which refer to it as their

starting-point. I will begin by an examination of that form of

government which is usually termed _aristocratic_.

Aristocratic Government.

There is a close connexion between the progressive changes that

may be observed in language and those that belong to society. The

word _aristocracy_ originally signified the empire of the

strong; [Greek text], were, at first, terms applied to those who

were physically the most powerful; then they were used to

designate the most influential, the richest, and finally the

best, those possessing the most ability or virtue. This is the

history of the successive acceptations of the word in the

language from which it is borrowed; the same terms which were

first applied to force, the superiority of force, came at length

to designate moral and intellectual superiority--virtue.

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Nothing can better characterise than this the progress of

society, which begins with the predominance of force, and tends

to pass under the empire of moral and intellectual superiority.

The desire and tendency of society are in fact towards being

governed by the best, by those who most thoroughly know and most

heartily respond to the teachings of truth and justice; in this

sense, all good governments, and pre-eminently the representative

form of government, have for their object to draw forth from the

bosom of society that veritable and legitimate aristocracy, by

which it has a right to be governed, and which has a right to

govern it.

But such has not been the historical signification of the word

_aristocracy_. If we take the word according as facts have

interpreted it, we shall find its meaning to be a government in

which the sovereign power is placed at the disposal of a

particular class of citizens, who are hereditarily invested with

it, their only qualification being a certain descent, in a manner

more or less exclusive, and sometimes almost completely

exclusive.

I do not inquire whence this system of government has derived its

origin; how, in the infancy of society, it has sprung almost

invariably from the moral superiority of its first founders; how

force, which was originally due to moral superiority, was

afterwards perpetuated by itself, and became a usurper; these

questions, which possess the highest interest, would carry me

away from my main point. I am seeking for the fundamental

principle of aristocratic government, and I believe it can be

summed up in the following terms; the right of sovereignty,

attributed in a manner if not entirely exclusive, yet especially

and chiefly to a certain class of citizens, whose only claim is

that of descent in a certain line.

This principle is no other than that of the sovereignty of the

people confined to a small number of individuals,--to a minority.

In both cases, the right to sovereignty is derived, not from any

presumed capacity to fulfil certain conditions, nor from

intellectual and moral superiority proved in any particular

manner, but from the solitary fact of birth, without any

condition. In the aristocratic system, an individual is born to a

position of sovereignty merely because he has been born into a

privileged class; according to the democratic system, an

individual is born to a position of sovereignty by the

circumstance that he is born into humanity. The participation in

sovereignty is in each case the result of a purely material fact,

independent of the worth of him who possesses it, and of the

judgment of those over whom it is to be exercised.

{67}

It follows evidently from this, that aristocratic governments are

to be classed among those which rest on the idea that the right

of sovereignty exists, full and entire, somewhere on the

earth;--an idea directly contrary, as we have seen, to the

principle of representative government.

Its Consequences.

If we look at the consequences of this idea,--such consequences

as have actually manifested themselves in the history of

governments of this kind,--we shall see that they are not less

contrary to the consequences, historical as well as natural, of a

representative government.

In order to maintain the right of sovereignty in the class to

which it is exclusively attributed, it must necessarily establish

a great inequality in fact, as well as in opinion, between this

class and the rest of the citizens. Hence arise all those

institutions and laws which characterise aristocratic

governments, and which have for their object to concentrate, into

the hands of the sole possessors of the sovereignty, all wealth

and enlightenment, and all the various instruments of power. It

is necessary that the sovereign class should not descend, and

that others should not be elevated; otherwise actual power

ceasing to approximate to rightful power, the legitimacy of the

latter would soon be questioned, and, after a short time, its

continuance endangered.

In the system of those governments which attribute to no

individual upon earth a right of sovereignty, and which impose on

the existing government the necessity of seeking continually for

truth, reason, and justice, as the rule and source of rightful

power, all classes of society are perpetually invited and urged

to elevate and perfect themselves. Legitimate forms of supremacy

are produced, and assume their position; illegitimate forms are

unmasked and deposed. Factitious and violent inequalities are

resisted and exhibited in their true colours; social forces are,

so to speak, brought into competition, and the forces which

struggle to possess them are moral.

{68}

A second consequence of the principle of aristocratic governments

is their avoidance of publicity. When each one of those who

participate in the rightful sovereignty possesses it by the mere

accident of birth, and exercises it on his own individual

responsibility, he need not recognise any one as claiming a right

to call him to account. No one has any right to inquire into the

use which he makes of his power, for he acts in virtue of a right

which no one can contest, because no one can deprive him of it.

It is a right which needs not to justify itself, since it is

connected with a fact that is palpable and permanent.

In the other system, on the contrary, publicity follows

necessarily from the principle of government; for since the right

to power is derived from superiority in the knowledge and

practice of reason, truth, and justice, which no one is supposed

to possess fully and at all times, it is imperative that this

right should justify itself both before it is assumed and all the

time that it is exercised.

_Conflict Of Good And Evil._

It would be easy thus, proceeding continually within view of real

facts, to compare the different consequences of the principle of

purely aristocratic governments and those resulting from the

principle of representative government, and to show that they are

always opposed to one another. We should thereby demonstrate most

completely the opposition of the principles themselves, and bring

their true nature into clearer light; but I have already said

enough on this point. And if any one asserts that I have too

rigorously insisted upon inferences to be drawn from the

principle of aristocratic governments, that the consequences

which I have depicted do never fulfil themselves in so complete a

manner, that, for example, the qualification of birth has never

held exclusive possession of a right to sovereignty, that never

has publicity been entirely quenched,--I freely concede all this.

At no time, in no place, has evil been allowed to gain exclusive

possession of society and government; struggle between principles

of good and evil is the permanent condition of the world. False

ideas may achieve a more or less extended, a more or less durable

success,--they can never extirpate their godlike assailants.

Truth is patient,--it does not easily surrender its hold on

society,--it never abandons its purpose,--it even exercises some

sway over that region where error reigns most despotically.

Providence never permits bad governments to become so bad as is

logically demanded by the principle upon which they rest.

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So we have seen institutions of justice and liberty existing and

even gaining a powerful existence, in the midst of societies

ruled by the principle of hereditary right; these institutions

have battled against the principle, and have modified it. When

the worse principle has prevailed, then have society and

government fallen into impotence and decay;--this is the history

of the Venetian republic. Elsewhere, the struggle has been

attended with happier results: the good principle has possessed

sufficient force to be able to introduce into the government

elements, which have made it vital, which have protected society

against the effects of the evil principle, which have even in

some sort saved the evil itself, rendering it tolerable by the

good with which it is associated. This is the history of England,

that striking example of the mixture and struggle of good and

evil principles. But their mixture, however intimate it may be,

does not prove that they are confounded in their interior

character. Good never springs from evil; and representative

government has not sprung in England, any more than elsewhere,

from the exclusive principle of aristocratic governments; it has

sprung from an entirely different principle; and so far from the

distinction which I established at the commencement being

compromised by the facts to which I have alluded, it is on the

other hand triumphantly confirmed by them.

I have just proved, by a comparison between the principle of the

aristocratic and that of the democratic form of government, that

they are essentially different; I intend now to show that there

is as fundamental a difference between the principle of

representative government, and that of democratic government.

Sovereignty Of The People.

No one has ever understood the sovereignty of the people to mean,

that after having consulted all opinions and all wills, the

opinion and will of the greatest number constitutes the law, but

that the minority would be free to disobey that which had been

decided in opposition to its opinion and will. And yet this would

be the necessary consequence of the pretended right attributed to

each individual of being governed only by such laws as have

received his individual assent. The absurdity of this consequence

has not always induced its adherents to abandon the principle,

but it has always obliged them to violate it. The sovereignty of

the people is contradicted at the outset, by its being resolved

into the empire of the majority over the minority.

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It is almost ridiculous to say that the minority may retire from

the majority; this would be to keep society continually on the

brink of dissolution. On every question the majority and the

minority would disagree, and if all the successive minorities

should retire, society would very soon exist no longer. The

sovereignty of the people then must necessarily be reduced to the

sovereignty of the majority only. When thus reduced, what does it

amount to?

Principle Of Democracy.

Its principle is, that the majority possesses right by the mere

circumstance of its being the majority. But two very different

ideas are included in the one expression--the majority; the idea

of an opinion which is accredited, and that of a force which is

preponderant. So far as force is concerned, the majority

possesses no right different from that possessed by force itself,

which cannot be, upon this ground alone, the legitimate

sovereignty. As to the expression of opinion, is the majority

infallible?--does it always apprehend and respect the claims of

reason and justice, which alone constitute true law, and confer

legitimate sovereignty? Experience testifies to the contrary. The

majority, by mere fact of its being a majority, that is to say,

by the mere force of numbers, does not then possess legitimate

sovereignty, either by virtue of power, which never does confer

it, nor by virtue of infallibility, which it does not possess.

The principle of the sovereignty of the people starts from the

supposition that each man possesses as his birthright, not merely

an equal right of being governed, but an equal right of governing

others. Like aristocratic governments, it connects the right to

govern, not with capacity, but with birth. Aristocratic

government is the sovereignty of the people in the minority; the

sovereignty of the people is aristocratic despotism and privilege

in the hands of the majority. In both cases, the principle is the

same;--a principle contrary, in the first place, to the fact of

the inequality established by nature, between the powers and

capacities of different individuals; secondly, to the fact of the

inequality in capacity, occasioned by difference of position, a

difference which exists everywhere, and which has its source in

the natural inequality of men; thirdly, to the experience of the

world, which has always seen the timid following the brave, the

incompetent obeying the competent,--in one word, those who are

naturally inferior recognising and submitting themselves to their

natural superiors.

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The principle of the sovereignty of the people, that is to say,

the equal right of all individuals to exercise sovereignty, or

merely the right of all individuals to concur in the exercise of

sovereignty, is then radically false; for, under the pretext of

maintaining legitimate equality, it violently introduces equality

where none exists, and pays no regard to legitimate inequality.

The consequences of this principle are the despotism of number,

the domination of inferiorities over superiorities, that is, a

tyranny of all others the most violent and unjust.

At the same time, it is of all others the most transient, for the

principle is impossible of application. After its force has spent

itself in excesses, number necessarily submits to capacity,--the

inferior retire to make room for the superior,--these enter

again into possession of their right, and society is

re-established.

Principle Of Representative Government.

Such cannot be the principle of representative government. No one

disputes that the true law of government is that of reason,

truth, and justice, which no one possesses but which certain men

are more capable than others of seeking and discovering. Faithful

to this aim, representative government rests upon the disposition

of actual power in proportion to the capacity to act according to

reason and justice, from whence power derives its right. It is

the principle which, by the admission of all, and by virtue of

its simple appeal to the common sense of the community, is

applicable to ordinary life, and to the interest of individuals

themselves. It is the principle which confers the sovereignty

over persons, families, property, only to the individual who is

presumed to be capable of using it reasonably, and which

withdraws it from him who is seen to be positively incapable.

Representative government applies to general interests, and to

the government of society, the same principle which the good

sense of the human race has led it to apply to individual

interests and to the control of each man's private life. It

distributes sovereignty according to the capacity required for

it, that is to say, it only places actual power, or any portion

of actual power, where it has discovered the presence of rightful

power, presumed to exist by certain symptoms, or tested by

certain proofs.

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It is remembered, that power though legitimate is not to be

conceded fully and completely to any one, and not only is it not

attributed to the mere fact of birth, but it cannot be allowed to

remain by itself in irresponsible isolation, which is the second

characteristic of representative government, by which, not less

than by the preceding, it is distinguished from the sovereignty

of the people.

Government Of The Majority.

It has been often said, that representative government is the

government of the majority, and there is some truth in the

assertion; but it must not be thought that this government of the

majority is the same as that involved in the sovereignty of the

people. The principle of the sovereignty of the people applies to

all individuals, merely because they exist, without demanding of

them anything more. Thus, it takes the majority of these

individuals, and says,--Here is reason, here is law.

Representative government proceeds in another way: it considers

what is the kind of action to which individuals are called; it

examines into the amount of capacity requisite for this action;

it then summons those individuals who are supposed to possess

this capacity, all such, and such only. Then it seeks for a

majority among those who are capable.

It is in this way, in fact, that men have everywhere proceeded,

even when they have been supposed to act according to the idea of

the sovereignty of the people. Never have they been entirely

faithful to it; they have always demanded for political actions

certain conditions, that is to say, indications of a certain

capacity. They have been mistaken, more or less, and have

excluded the capable, or invited the inefficient, and the error

is a serious one. But they have followed the principle which

measures right by capacity, even when they have professed the

principle that right is derived from the simple fact of

possessing a human nature. Representative government, then, is

not purely and simply the government of the numerical majority,

it is government by the majority of those who are qualified to

govern; sometimes assuming the existence of the qualification

beforehand, sometimes requiring that it should be proved and

exemplified.

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Representation And Democracy.

The peerage, the right to elect and to be elected, the royal

power itself, are attached to a capacity presumed to exist, not

only after certain conditions have been complied with, but by

reason of the position occupied by those men in whom the capacity

is presumed, in their relations to other powers, and in the

limits of the functions assigned to them. No one is recognised as

possessing an inherent right to an office or a function. Nor is

this all; representative government does not content itself with

demanding capacity before it confers power; as soon as the

capacity is presumed or proved, it is placed in a position where

it is open to a kind of legal suspicion, and where it must

necessarily continue to legitimatize itself, in order to retain

its power. According to the principle of the sovereignty of the

people, absolute right resides with the majority; true

sovereignty exists wherever this force is manifested; from this

follows necessarily the oppression of the minority, and such has,

in fact, generally been the result. The representative form of

government, never forgetting that reason and justice, and

consequently a right to sovereignty, do not reside fully and

constantly in any part of the earth, presumes that they are to be

found in the majority, but does not attribute them to it as their

certain and abiding qualities. At the very moment when it

presumes that the majority is right, it does not forget that it

may be wrong, and its concern is to give full opportunity to the

minority of proving that it is in fact right, and of becoming in

its turn the majority. Electoral precautions, the debates in the

deliberative assemblies, the publication of these debates, the

liberty of the press, the responsibility of ministers, all these

arrangements have for their object to insure that a majority

shall be declared only after it has well authenticated itself, to

compel it ever to legitimatize itself, in order to its own

preservation, and to place the minority in such a position as

that it may contest the power and right of the majority.

Thus, the considerations we have suggested show that a

representative form of government regards the individuals whom it

brings into activity, and the majority which it seeks, from quite

another point of view than that involved in the sovereignty of

the people. The latter admits that the right of sovereignty

resides somewhere upon the earth; the former denies it:--this

finds the right in question in a purely numerical majority; that

seeks it in the majority of those qualified to pronounce on the

subject:--the one attributes it fully and entirely to number; the

other is satisfied with the presumption that it is there, admits

at the same time that it may possibly not be there, and invites

the minority to substantiate its claims, securing, meanwhile,

every facility for its so doing.

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The sovereignty of the people sees legitimate power in the

multitude; representative government sees it only in unity, that

is to say, in the reason to which the multitude ought to reduce

itself. The sovereignty of the people makes power to come from

below; representative government recognises the fact that all

power comes from above, and at the same time obliges all who

assume to be invested with it to substantiate the legitimacy of

their pretensions before men who are capable of appreciating

them. The one tends to lower those who are superior, the other to

elevate those who are inferior, by bringing them into

communication with those who are naturally above them. The

sovereignty of the people is full at once of pride and of envy;

representative government renders homage to the dignity of our

nature, without ignoring its frailty, and recognises its frailty

without outrage to its dignity. The principle of the sovereignty

of the people is contrary to all the facts which reveal

themselves in the actual origin of power, and in the progress of

societies; representative government does not blink any one of

these facts. Lastly, the sovereignty of the people is no sooner

proclaimed, than it is compelled to abdicate its power, and to

confess the impracticability of its aims; representative

government moves naturally and steadily onward, and develops

itself by its very existence.

Principles Of Government.

So far, then, from deriving its existence from the principle of

the sovereignty of the people, representative government disowns

this principle, and rests upon an entirely different idea, and

one which is attended with entirely different consequences. It

matters little that this form of government has been often

claimed in the name of the sovereignty of the people, and that

its principal epochs of development have occurred at times when

that idea predominated; the reasons of this fact are easily

discovered. The sovereignty of the people is a great force which

sometimes interferes to break up an inequality which has become

excessive, or a power which has become absolute, when society can

no longer accommodate itself to them; as despotism sometimes

interferes, in the name of order, violently to restore a society

on the brink of dissolution.

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It is only a weapon of attack and destruction, never an

instrument for the foundation of liberty. It is not a principle

of government, it is a terrible but transient dictatorship,

exercised by the multitude,--a dictatorship that ceases, and that

ought to cease as soon as the multitude has accomplished its work

of destruction.

Briefly, to conclude: as the object of these lectures is to trace

the course of representative government in modern Europe wherever

it has found any footing, I have looked for the primal type of

this government in order to compare it with the government of the

Anglo-Saxon monarchy, which we have already examined, and with

the other primitive governments which we shall meet with in

Europe. In order to distinguish precisely the character of a

representative government, I have been obliged to go back to the

source of all government. I think I have shown that we must

classify all governments according to two different principles.

The one class, allied to justice and reason, recognises these

alone as their guides; and as it is not in the power of human

feebleness, in this world, to follow infallibly these sacred

leaders, these governments do not concede to any one the

possession of an absolute right to sovereignty, and they call

upon the entire body of society to aid in the discovery of the

law of justice and reason, which can alone confer it. The other

class, on the contrary, admitting a right inherent in man to make

a law for himself, thus degrade the rightful sovereignty; which,

as it belongs only to justice and reason, ought never to come

under the absolute control of man, who is ever too ready to usurp

sovereignty, in order to exercise it for the promotion of his

private interests, or for the gratification of his passions. I

have shown that a representative government alone renders homage

to true principles, and that all other governments, democratic as

well as aristocratic, ought to be arranged according to an

entirely different scheme of classification. I have now to enter

upon the examination of the exterior forms of representative

government, and to compare its principle with the historical

principle of the Anglo-Saxon monarchy, as it is exhibited before

us in its institutions.

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Lecture VIII.

The forms of a government are related to its principle, but are

swayed by circumstances, and vary according to different

degrees of civilization.

What are the forms essential to a representative government?

1st. Division of powers; why this is absolutely

essential to the principle of representative government;

2nd. Election;

3rd. Publicity.

Forms Of Government.

The forms of a government are immediately related to its

principle: the principle determines the forms, the forms reveal

the principle. It does not therefore follow that the forms

correspond exactly to the principle, nor that the principle can

only realize itself under a peculiar form. As the principle

itself is never alone nor omnipotent in its influence upon the

facts, forms are necessarily diverse and mingled. In proportion

as the action of any principle extends itself, the form which is

truly correspondent to it is developed; but, in the course of

this work, the principle embodies itself in the different forms

which correspond to the condition of those facts which, in their

aggregate, constitute society, and determine the position which

it occupies in the scale of civilization.

The same principle can then be contained, and act under different

forms. If the forms are the best that can be supplied for the

principle, considering the existing state of society, and if,

although they do not fully correspond to its nature, they insure

the constant and regular progress of its action,--there is no

blame that can be charged upon them; each epoch, each state of

society only allows of a certain development of the principle

upon which its government rests. What is the measure of

development possible to each epoch, and what is the form which

corresponds to it in the present, which will secure for the

future a more extended development, and which will bring with it

new forms? This is the whole extent of the question I mean, the

question concerning the present, the only one with which

political activity has to deal.

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Nevertheless there are certain forms of government which are the

general conditions of the presence and action of particular

principles. Wherever the principle exists, it necessarily

produces these forms; where they are wanting the principle does

not exist or will soon cease to exist; its action and progress

imperatively demand them: so far as they gain consistency at any

place, the principle which they suppose is latently present and

tends to become predominant.

Forms Of Representative Government.

What are the essential forms of the principle of representative

government? By what external indications may we recognize the

presence of this principle in a government? What conditions are

required in order that it may act and develop itself?

We may, if I mistake not, reduce to three the conditions

necessary, and the forms essential, to the representative system;

all three are perhaps not equally necessary; their simultaneous

existence is not perhaps indispensable in order to indicate the

existence and secure the development of the principle from which

they are derived. We may, however, justly consider them as

fundamental. These forms are: 1st. The division of powers; 2nd.

Election; 3rd. Publicity.

We have seen that no really existing power can be a rightful

power, except in so far as it acts according to reason and truth,

the only legitimate rule of action, the only source of right.

No existing power can fully know and constantly regard the

guidance of reason and truth according to which it is bound to

regulate its action. No actual power then is, or can be, in

itself, a power by inherent right. In other words, as no existing

power can be found that is infallible, there is none that may

retain its existence on the tenure of absolute right.

Such is, however, the condition of human things that they need,

as a last appeal, the intervention of a power which may declare

the law to be the rule of government, and which shall impose it

and cause it to be respected. In all the relations which the

social state admits and to which it gives birth, from domestic

order to political order, the presence of a power which may give

and maintain the rule of action, is a necessary condition of the

very existence of society.

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We see then the dilemma in which society is placed. No actual

power can vindicate a claim to become an absolute power; hence

the necessity, in order to meet particular emergencies, of a

power that is definite, that is to say, _actually_ absolute.

Problem Of Government.

The problem of government is--how to give society a guarantee

that the power, which is in operation absolute, to which all

social relations must necessarily be referred, shall be but the

image, the expression, the organ of that power which is

rightfully absolute and alone legitimate, and which is never to

be found localized in this world? This is also, as we have seen,

the problem which the representative system formally proposes to

itself, since all its arrangements assume the existence of this

problem and are framed with a purpose to resolve it.

To make actual power, as far as possible, identical with rightful

power, by imposing upon it the abiding necessity of seeking for

reason, truth, and justice--the sources of right; by investing it

with practical power only when it has proved, that is to say,

given a presumption of, its success in this search; and by

compelling it ever to renew and confirm this presumption under

penalty of losing power if it is unable to do so, this is the

course of the representative system,--this is the end at which it

aims and according to which it directs, in their relations and

their movement, all the resources which it brings into action.

In order to attain this end, it is indispensable that the

existing power should not be simple, that is to say, that it

should not be suffered to confine itself to one single

instrument. As no force can possess in itself fully the right to

authority, if there is one which possesses an absolute power, not

only will it abuse this power, but it will very soon claim it as

an inherent right. Alone it will become despotic, and in order to

sustain its despotism it will call itself legitimately sovereign;

and perhaps will end by believing and establishing the fiction.

Such is the corrupting effect of despotism, that it destroys

sooner or later, both in those who exercise it and in those who

submit to it, even the feeling of its illegitimacy. Whoever is

solitary in his sovereignty has only one step in order to become

accredited, as infallible.

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Alexander was right in wishing that he should be recognized as a

god; he deduced a consequence that strictly followed from the

fulness of the power which he possessed: and they also are right,

who, attributing sovereignty to the multitude, take for their

maxim, _Vox populi, vox Dei_. Everywhere where sovereignty

rests with a single power, whatever may be the nature of that

power, there is a danger that sovereignty will immediately be

claimed as a right.

Division Of Powers.

A division of the actual sovereignty is then a natural

consequence of the principle, that a right to sovereignty does

not belong to any person. It is necessary that there should be

several powers, equal in extent and supplementary to each other

in the exercise of actual sovereignty, in order that no one of

them may be led to arrogate to itself the sovereignty of inherent

right. The feeling of their reciprocal interdependence can alone

prevent them from regarding themselves as entirely irresponsible.

Further: it is only in this way that the ruling power can be

constrained to perpetuate its search for reason, truth, and

justice; that is, for the rule which should govern its action, in

order that it may become legitimate. The words of Pascal apply

not only to the formation of power, they extend also to its

exercise. Here are beings, individual or collective, who are

called upon to perform the functions of sovereignty in common,

each one under the supervision of his fellows. Do they possess

among them, or by the fact of their existence, the right to

power? No: they must seek it, they must on every opportunity

manifest the truth which they proclaim as law. Isolated and

distinct, they are only a multitude; when, after having

deliberated and laboured, they find a ground of agreement in a

common idea, from whence can proceed one will, then alone will

the true unity, which resides in reason, be evolved; then there

will be a presumption that the ruling power knows accurately and

is well disposed to that legitimate rule which alone confers

rightful power. If this work were not enforced, if this laborious

and common search for the true law were not the necessary result

of the reciprocal independence of the several powers, the end of

government would not be attained. All the relations of the four

great political powers which constitute, with us, the government

(that is, the king, the two houses of parliament, and the

electors) are intended to compel them to act in harmony, that is

to say, to reduce themselves to unity.

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Election And Publicity.

The introduction of an elective, that is, a moveable element,

into government, is as necessary as a division of forces to

prevent the sovereignty from degenerating in the hands of those

who exercise it into a full and permanent sovereignty of inherent

right. It is therefore the necessary result of a representative

government, and one of its principal characteristics. Accordingly

we see that actual governments which have aimed at becoming

absolute, have always endeavoured to destroy the elective

principle. Venice gave a memorable illustration of this tendency,

when, in 1319, it conferred an hereditary right on the grand

council. [Footnote 11]

[Footnote 11: This event is clearly and minutely related by

Daru, in his "_Histoire de Venise_" (Vol. i. pp.

449-464.)]

In the first age of governments, at the same time that we see

power come from, above, that is to say, acquire for itself by its

superiority, of whatever kind that may be, either ability,

riches, or courage,--we see it also obliged to make its title

recognised by those who can judge it. Election is the mode of

this recognition,--it is to be found in the infancy of all

governments; but it is generally abolished after a time. It is

when it reappears with sufficient energy to influence powerfully

the administration of society, that a representative government

is rising into being.

Theoretically, publicity is perhaps the most essential

characteristic of a representative government. We have seen that

it has for its object to call upon all individuals who possess

rights, as well as those who exercise powers, to seek reason and

justice, the source and rule of legitimate sovereignty. In

publicity consists the bond between a society and its government.

Looking, however, at facts, we find that of the elements

essential to a representative government, this is the last which

is introduced and gains a firm footing. Its history is analogous

to that of the elective principle. The _Champs de Mars_ and

_Mai_ were held in the open air: many persons were present

at them who took no part in the deliberation. The assembly of the

Lombards at Pavia took place _circumstante immensâ

multitudine_. It is probable that the same publicity attended

also the _Wittenagemot_ of the Saxons.

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Publicity In England.

When absolute or aristocratic government prevails, publicity

disappears. When representative government begins to be formed by

election, publicity does not at first enter into its

constitution. In England, the House of Commons was for a long

time a secret assembly; the first step towards publicity was to

cause its acts, addresses and resolutions, to be printed. This

step was taken by the Long Parliament under Charles I. Under

Charles II. its proceedings again became secret; some individuals

demanded, but in vain, the publication of the acts passed by the

House,--the demand was resisted as dangerous. It was not till

the eighteenth century that visitors were allowed to be present

at the sittings of the English Parliament: this is not now

granted as a right, and the demand of a single member who appeals

to the ancient law, is sufficient to clear the gallery. Publicity

has not then been invariably attached to a representative

government; but it flows naturally from its principles--it is

accordingly won almost necessarily, and may now be regarded as

one of its most essential features. This result is owing to the

press, which has rendered publicity easy without resorting to

tumultuous meetings.

We have found the fundamental principle and the exterior and

essential characteristics of a representative government; we have

learnt what it is that constitutes it and distinguishes it from

other governments: we may now pass to its history. We shall take

care to admit its existence only where we recognise the presence

or the approach of its true principles; and we shall be convinced

that its progress has ever been identical with the development of

these principles.

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Lecture IX.

Primitive institutions of the Franks.

Sketch of the history of the Frankish monarchy.

The Franks in Germany.

Their settlement in Belgium and in Gaul.

Character and authority of their chiefs after their

establishment in the Roman Empire.

Early Frankish chieftains.

Clovis: his expeditions, wars, and conquests.

Decisive preponderance of the Franks in Gaul.

Origin Of The Franks.

In order to pursue the object of this course, I now proceed to

give a sketch of the Franks similar to that which I have already

given of the Anglo-Saxons. I shall study with you their primitive

institutions, seek out their leading principle, and compare it

with that type of representative government which we have just

delineated. But before we enter upon the examination of Frankish

institutions, I think it advisable briefly to refer to the

leading events in the history of France. The institutions of a

people cannot be thoroughly understood without a knowledge of

their history. I shall devote this lecture to a view of the

establishment of the Frankish monarchy; on a future occasion we

will trace its progress under the first and second races of its

kings.

I shall not now delay to discuss the somewhat uncertain origin of

the Franks; there is reason to believe that, in Germany, they did

not constitute a separate and homogeneous nation. They were a

confederation of tribes settled in the country between the Rhine,

the Maine, the Weser, and the Elbe. The Romans seem to have been

long ignorant of their existence even after the conquest of Gaul,

and history mentions them, for the first time, during the reign

of Gordian, about the middle of the third century. A song,

composed in celebration of the victories of Aurelian had the

following refrain:--

"Mille Francos, mille Sarmatas,

Semel et semel occidimus."

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After this period, we find the different tribes of Franks

advancing from East to West with rather rapid progress. At the

beginning of the fourth century, we meet with the Salian Franks

settled in Belgium, and the Ripuarian Franks on the two banks of

the Rhine. These peoples established themselves on the frontiers

of Gaul, sometimes by force, and sometimes with the consent of

the emperors, who, after having defeated the barbarians,

frequently assigned them lands on which to settle. This was the

course pursued by Probus, Constantine, Julian, Constantius, and

many others.

The Frankish Chiefs.

The chiefs thus established in the Roman territory retained, over

their barbarian comrades, their ancient and independent

authority, and received at the same time, from the emperors,

certain titles to which were applied certain functions, and a

certain amount of authority over the Romans in their district.

Thus we find them adorned with the names of _Dux, Magister

militia, Comes littoris_, and so forth. Their position was

almost identical with that of the leaders of the wandering Tartar

tribes in the Russian empire, who are elected by the men of their

tribe, but receive their title and a certain jurisdiction from

the Emperor of Russia--retaining their independent life, but

bound at the same time to render military service, and to pay a

tribute of furs.

Childeric, the chief of a Frankish tribe at Tournai, had received

the title of _Magister militiæ_ from the empire. When, in

consequence of domestic quarrels and treason, he was forced to

take refuge in Thuringia, his tribe submitted in 460 to Egidius,

master of the Roman militia at Soissons. In 1653, the tomb of

Childeric was discovered at Tournai, and several pieces of money

were found in it, which are now deposited in the National

Library, at Paris.

At the termination of the fifth century, the epoch of the

dissolution of the empire, when the provinces were left,

according to the expression of Tacitus, _magis sine domino quam

cum libertate_, nearly all these local chieftains, Romans as

well as barbarians, became independent, and no longer recognised

the sovereignty of Rome. Siagrius, the son of Egidius, was

appointed King of the Romans at Soissons. He made war with

Clovis, in his own name and on his own account.

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The Frankish chiefs, who had thus become petty sovereigns,

penetrated still farther into the empire. Clodion, who had

settled at Cambrai, carried his incursions to the banks of the

Somme. Meroveus was present at the battle of Chalons-sur-Marne,

at which Attila was conquered.

Wars Of Clovis.

It was, however, under the command of their chieftain Clovis,

that these bands of Franks, who originally formed colonies on the

frontiers, entered Gaul definitively as conquerors. Clovis was

the son of Childeric, who reigned at Tournai; and he succeeded

his father in 481. He probably wielded a certain amount of

authority in the name of the empire. Saint Remy, in a letter,

gives him the title of _Magister militiæ_. Other Frankish

chiefs were, about this period, almost in the same position as

Clovis: Ragnachar ruled at Cambrai, Sigebert at Cologne, and

Renomer at Mans. Clovis was the most ambitious, the ablest, and

the most fortunate of them all.

His nearest neighbour was Siagrius, who governed at Soissons. In

486, Clovis sent him a defiance; Siagrius accepted it, and

appointed the battle-field at Nogent, near Soissons. Siagrius was

conquered, and took refuge with Alaric, king of the Visigoths,

who gave him up to his conqueror. In 491, Clovis conquered the

district of Tongres, now the district of Liege. In 496, he

penetrated still further in the same direction; he entered the

country of the Alemanni, against whom Sigebert, king of Cologne,

had requested his assistance. He defeated them at Tolbiac, and

became a Christian in consequence of this victory. A party of the

conquered Alemanni took refuge in Rhœtia, under the protection of

Theodoric, king of the Ostrogoths: there, under the name of

Suevi, they became the stem of the Suabians. Another body

remained on the banks of the Rhine, and became subject to

Sigebert and Clovis. Thus this chieftain extended his dominion in

the vicinity of the Rhine. At the same time he overcame most of

the Frankish chiefs, his neighbours, and subjected their tribes

to his power. In 497, he led an expedition against the Armoricans

in the West. In 500, he fell upon the Burgundians in the East,

took advantage of their dissensions, and gained a victory between

Dijon, and Langres. In 507, he advanced into the centre of

France, through Anjou and Poitou; near Poitiers, he attacked

Alaric II., king of the Visigoths, and killed him. He penetrated

as far as Angoulême, Bordeaux, and Toulouse; and boasted of

having conquered Aquitaine. In 508, Clovis received the title of

_Patrician_ from Anastasius, the Emperor of the East. In

509, he returned to the Rhine, defeated his ancient ally,

Sigebert, king of Cologne, and subjugated the Ripuarian Franks.

In 511, he died, after having led his Frankish warriors, and

extended his dominion, over the various parts of Gaul.

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The wars and conquests of Clovis had little resemblance to what

we understand by the same words at the present day. The principal

object of the Frankish expeditions was to make booty, and carry

off slaves; this is what was called conquest in those days. The

victor sometimes imposed a tribute; but there resulted from his

victory hardly any permanent possession, and no civil settlement.

Among other proofs of this assertion, I may instance the small

number of the warriors who accompanied Clovis, who was never

attended, on his expeditions, by more than five or six thousand

men. Now, with this number, no civil settlement, not even a

military occupation, was possible. When the conqueror had

withdrawn, the conquered people gradually resumed their

independence--a new chieftain arose. Barely did the conquerors

settle in the lands which they had subjected; thus it was

necessary incessantly to make the same conquests over again.

For a detailed narrative of these events, I refer you to the

general histories of France, especially to the work of M.

Sismondi.

Nowhere do we obtain a better picture of the manners of the

Greeks in the heroic age than that supplied by the Iliad. A

similar authority, with reference to the expeditions and manners

of the Germanic people, exists in the poem of the Nibelungen.

There you will best be able to obtain a correct knowledge and

thorough comprehension of the state of society, and the nature of

the wars at this epoch.

Death Of Clovis.

At the death of Clovis, in 571, the Frankish monarchy was

definitively established; for he had made the Frankish name and

people the most formidable and least contested power in Gaul.

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Lecture X.

Division of territory among the sons of the Frankish kings.

Rapid formation and disappearance of several Frank kingdoms.

Neustria and Austrasia; their geographical division.

Early predominance of Neustria.

Fredegonde and Brunehaut.

Elevation of the _Mayors of the Palace_.

True character of their power.

The Pepin family.

Charles Martel.

Fall of the Merovingians.

Successors Of Clovis.

I have already explained to you how we must understand the

historical phrase which attributes to Clovis the foundation of

the French monarchy. In the sense and within the limits which I

have indicated, Clovis, at his death, was king of the whole of

France, excepting the kingdoms of the Burgundians and Visigoths.

After his decease, each of his four sons received a portion of

his dominions. Theodoric ruled at Metz, Chlodomir at Orleans,

Childebert at Paris, and Clotaire at Soissons. The nature of this

division has given rise to considerable dissension among learned

men; but I think the question may be easily solved. In order to

retain his power, it was necessary for the chieftain or king to

possess large private domains; in all his warlike expeditions, he

acquired for himself large tracts of territory; Clovis had thus

obtained immense landed property wherever he had made a conquest.

At his death, these estates were divided among his children, as

were also his other possessions, flocks, herds, jewels, money,

treasures of all kinds: these supplied their owners with the

surest means of attaining power. Moreover, it was the custom of

the Frankish kings to associate their sons with them in the

government, by sending them to reside in that district or

province which was afterwards to constitute their kingdom. They

thus endeavoured to secure the prevalence of hereditary right

over election. The sons of the king became in their turn the

natural chieftains of the countries in which they actually

possessed the most power. Thus we find that Clotaire II., in 622,

associated with himself his son Dagobert, and sent him to

Austrasia. Dagobert did the same, in 633, for his son Sigebert.

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Partitions Of The Realm.

From this division of private domains and participation in royal

power, it was easy to pass to the political partition of the

kingdom. It is more difficult to discover whether these

partitions were made by the dying king, in his own authority, or

by the national assembly. At a later period, under the second

race, we find Pepin, Charlemagne and Louis the Debonnair,

positively obtaining the consent of the assembly of barons to the

division of their states among their children. Pacts are not so

clear and authentic under the Merovingians. However, as the

accession of the second race was a return to old Germanic

manners, it is probable that, in the time of Clovis and his

successors, every heir, on receiving his portion, was obliged to

gain the consent of the chiefs of the country. Five partitions of

this kind occurred under the Merovingians; in 511, after the

death of Clovis; in 561, after Clotaire I.; in 638, after

Dagobert I.; in 656, after Clovis II. Prom 678 to 752, the whole

monarchy was actually united under the authority of the Pepin

family, who were originally _Mayors of the Palace_ of

Austrasia, and nominally under that of titular kings, the first

four and the sixth of whom descended from the kings of Neustria,

and the fifth and seventh from those of Austrasia. The kingdoms

which were constituted by the five partitions which I have just

mentioned, were those of Metz, Orleans, Paris, Soissons,

Austrasia, Burgundy, Neustria, and Aquitaine.

I shall not here speak of the vicissitudes and perpetual

dismemberments of these various kingdoms at various times. I

should have only to relate a long series of wars and murders. The

ancient kingdom of Burgundy was conquered by the children of

Clovis I.; a new kingdom of Burgundy arose, in which the kingdom

of Orleans was incorporated. The new kingdom of Burgundy was

invaded, sometimes by the kings of Neustria, sometimes by those

of Austrasia. The kingdom of Aquitaine appears for a moment only

under Childebert II., son of Clotaire II., in 628, and about 716,

under Eudes, duke of Aquitaine, who declared himself an

independent monarch. At length, these four kingdoms disappeared;

the fundamental conflict and division was between the kingdoms of

Neustria and Austrasia, the two largest, and last surviving.

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Neustria And Austrasia.

The geographical division of the kingdoms of Neustria and

Austrasia is uncertain and variable. We find the kings of

Austrasia possessing countries far distant from the centre of

their government--countries, too, which seem to be naturally

placed by their position under the sway of the kings of Neustria.

Thus, they were the masters of Auvergne, and their dominion

extended almost as far as Poitou. These incoherent possessions

had their origin in the frequent expeditions of the two countries

against each other, or into distant lands which belonged to

neither of them. We can, however, obtain some few distinct

boundary lines; the forest of Ardennes separated Austrasia from

Neustria; Neustria comprised the country between the Meuse and

the Loire; Austrasia consisted of that between the Meuse and the

Rhine.

This division had a far greater importance than that of a mere

geographical division; and there is a deeper cause for the

successive disappearance of the other Frankish kingdoms, and the

final predominance of these two.

The countries which composed Austrasia were the first which were

inhabited by the Franks. They adjoined Germany, and were

connected with those portions of the Frankish confederacy which

had not crossed the Rhine. They were, therefore, the cradle, the

first fatherland, of the Franks. Moreover, after their

expeditions, these tribes frequently returned with their booty to

their ancient settlement, instead of establishing themselves in

their new conquests. Thus Theodoric, son of Clovis, in the fifth

century, led a great expedition into Auvergne, and returned

afterwards to Austrasia. Roman civilization and manners had been

almost completely expelled from that bank of the Rhine; the

ancient German manners predominated there. In the countries which

composed Neustria, on the other hand, the Franks were less

numerous, more scattered, more separated from their ancient

fatherland and fellow-countrymen. The ancient inhabitants of the

country surrounded them on every side. The Franks were there like

colonies of barbarians transported into the midst of Roman

civilization and a Roman people. This state of things could not

but lead to a far more profound and reasonable distinction

between the two kingdoms, than could be occasioned by a purely

geographical division. On one side was the kingdom of the

Germano-Franks, on the other that of the Romano-Franks.

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Predominance Of Neustria.

Historic testimony positively confirms this probable deduction

from facts. Austrasia is termed _Francia Teutonica_, and

Neustria, _Francia Romana_. The German language prevailed in

the former country, and the Roman in the latter. Finally, under

the first race of kings, events bear the evident impress of this

fundamental distinction, or rather, they are its natural result.

When considering them in a general manner, it is impossible to

recognize this character. I shall now give a summary of the

principal proofs.

I. The original predominance of the kingdom of Neustria. This is

an incontestable fact. Four kings, after Clovis, and before the

destruction of the royal authority by the Mayors of the Palace,

united the whole Frankish monarchy under one head. These were

kings of Neustria; Clotaire I., from 558 to 561; Clotaire II.,

from 613 to 628; Dagobert I., from 631 to 638; and Clovis II.,

from 655 to 656. This predominance of Neustria was the natural

result, 1st, Of the establishment of Clovis in Neustria; 2ndly,

Of the central position of that kingdom with reference to the

rest of Gaul; 3rd, Of the superior civilization and wealth which

accrued to it from its Roman population; 4th, Of the rapid

extension which the royal authority obtained in it, in

consequence of the prevalence of Roman ideas and customs; 5th, Of

the continual fluctuations occasioned in Austrasia, by the

proximity of the German barbarians, by wars against the

Thuringians and Saxons, and by other causes.

II. The state of the two kingdoms, during the epoch of Fredegonde

and Brunehaut, from 598 to 623. The struggle was constant between

Neustria and Austrasia, under the name of these two queens. The

power of Chilperic and of Fredegonde in Neustria was greater than

that of the kings of Austrasia and of Brunehaut. Fredegonde acted

upon a country in which the only Roman administration still

prevailed; Brunehaut endeavoured in vain to overcome the rude

independence of the chiefs of the German bands, who had become

large landed proprietors. Her boldness and ability failed in its

opposition to the Austrasian and Burgundian aristocracy.

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The Austrasian aristocracy formed a secret alliance with that of

Neustria. The fall and death of Brunehaut were evidently a

triumph of the Austrasian aristocracy, which, being stronger and

more compact than that of Neustria, imposed upon Clotaire II. the

execution of his queen. The remnants of Roman despotism were

overcome in Austrasia by the German aristocracy, and the

consequences of that event were the enfeeblement of the royal

authority and the predominance of Austrasian influence.

The Mayors Of The Palace.

III. The elevation of the Mayors of the Palace, and the fall of

the Merovingian race, are the third proof of the great fact which

I have mentioned. The elevation of the Mayors of the Palace must

be ascribed to the same causes in both kingdoms. It is an error

to interpret this fact as the conflict of the victorious Franks

against the Gauls and Romans. These last, more moulded to

despotism, had found a ready access to the court of the barbarian

kings, and it has been inferred from this, that it was in order

to counteract their influence, that the German aristocracy

created the Mayors of the Palace. This is an error; the Mayors of

the Palace were the work and instrument of the barbarian

aristocracy, whether Roman or Gallic, in opposition to the royal

authority.

It has also been said that the kings were desirous of attaching

to themselves one of the most powerful members of the territorial

aristocracy, in order to control or oppress the others. This

might have been the case originally, but the Mayor of the Palace

soon found it more advantageous to make himself the leader and

instrument of the nobility. He promoted their interests, and

assumed the character of a protector to the large proprietors

with whom, finally, his appointment rested. From this time forth,

the royal authority was almost a dead letter.

The same phenomenon is observable in both kingdoms; but the

Austrasian aristocracy was more purely German, and more compact,

than that of Neustria. It was consequently more powerful, and its

Mayors of the Palace became more deeply rooted in their

authority. Thus we behold the family of Pepin gain the royal

power by a progressive elevation, from 630 to 752. This family

was descended from Carloman, the wealthy proprietor of the domain

of Haspengau, situated on the Meuse, between the district of

Liege and the duchy of Brabant. It was thoroughly German, and

naturally placed itself at the head of the Franco-German

aristocracy.

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Fall Of The Merovingians.

The fall of the Merovingians was, therefore, the work of

Austrasia, and, as it were, a second conquest of Roman France, by

Germanic France. The kings of Roman France were unable to

maintain their position, and the Neustrian Mayors of the Palace,

the leaders of a mingled aristocracy of Franks and Gauls, were

incompetent to take their place. It was from the banks of the

Rhine and from Belgium, that is, from the ancient fatherland of

the Franks, that the new conquerors came--and these conquerors

were the chiefs of a purely Germanic aristocracy.

Charles Martel.

This was, undoubtedly, the true character of the fall of the

Merovingians, and of the elevation of the Carlovingians, who

founded a new Frankish monarchy in that Gaul in which the

Neustrian Franks had so greatly degenerated. Thus we shall

perceive, at this epoch, and in consequence of this revolution, a

marked return towards the primitive institutions and manners of

the Franks. This is perceptible, indeed, even in the manner in

which the revolution was effected. The details of this event

fully confirm what we have first said regarding the general

progress of affairs. The Pepin family had laboured for a century

to place itself at the head of the Frankish nation. It derived

its support not merely from the great landed aristocracy, but

also from the patronage of the warriors employed in military

expeditions. The development of the power of this family, in the

first point of view, was the work of Pepin the Old and of Pepin

de Heristal; under the second, it was the work of Charles Martel

in particular. His continual wars against the Transrhenane

Germans, against the Saracens, and against the petty tyrants of

the interior, rendered him a more powerful warrior-chief than any

of his ancestors. But Charles Martel employed other means also to

attach his companions to his person. He seized the property of

the church, and distributed it amongst them. He did not take this

property, however, in so absolute a manner as is supposed. The

various churches were in the habit of farming out their property

for a fixed annual income, and ecclesiastical estates thus farmed

out were called _precaria_.

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Frequently the kings, when desirous of rewarding one of their

chiefs, ordered a chapter to farm out an estate to the favourite

for a very moderate rent, under the title of a _precarium_.

Charles Martel, at first, merely generalised this practice. A

very large number of his comrades received from him favours of

this kind; in the first instance, they received the

ecclesiastical estates only for two or three years; but, when

that term had expired, the tenants were unwilling to restore what

they had appropriated to themselves by the habit of enjoyment.

The conflict of the church against the usurping proprietors long

perplexed the the kings of the second race. As they often

required the help of the clergy, they strove to appease their

complaints. Pepin the Short and Charlemagne restored to them a

large portion of their property which had formerly been granted

to their warriors as _precaria_; or at least, increased the

amount paid to the church by the new proprietors, who obstinately

refused to consider themselves mere tenants.

Pepin.

The predominance of the Pepin family had commenced before the

time of Charles Martel, by their possessing the hereditary office

of Mayor of the Palace. During the life of that great chieftain,

there were several inter-reigns in Austrasia and Neustria, and he

continued to exercise the supreme authority with the simple title

of Duke of the Franks. At his death, his children, Pepin and

Carloman, divided the kingdom between them, Pepin, still

preserving some respect for appearances, made Childeric III. king

in Neustria; and soon, by the abdication of his brother Carloman,

he found himself Duke of Austrasia, as well as the all-powerful

Mayor of the Palace in Neustria. Such was, however, the influence

already possessed by the idea of the hereditary legitimacy of the

crown, that Pepin did not venture to seize, in the name of force

alone, upon the throne which was considered to belong rightfully

to the descendants of Clovis. He sought to justify his employment

of force by popular election, and an appeal to religion. As the

head of an aristocracy, he was obliged frequently to defer to its

will, and to give it a share of authority. He revived the ancient

assemblies of the large landowners, and restored to them their

part in public affairs.

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Thenceforward he might consider himself certain of his election;

but even this did not suffice him. He thought that his usurpation

needed a more august and sacred sanction. He gained over to his

interests Boniface, bishop of Mayence, and charged him to sound

Pope Zachary, who, on his side, was hard pressed by the Lombards,

and needed the assistance of the Frankish chieftain. When Pepin

was sure of the pontiff's concurrence, he sent Burckhardt, bishop

of Wurtzburg, and Fulrad, abbot of St. Denis, to propose to him

this question, in the form of a case of conscience. "When there

is a king in fact and a king by right, which is the true king?"

The pope replied, that he who actually exercised the royal

authority ought also to possess the royal title. In 752, Pepin

convoked the national assembly at Soissons; he was there elected

king, and afterwards consecrated by Bishop Boniface. In 754, Pope

Stephen III. made a journey into France, and again consecrated

Pepin with his two sons and his wife Bertrade. The pope ordered

the Franks, on pain of excommunication, to take none as kings who

did not belong to the family of Pepin, and the Franks swore an

oath: _Ut nunquam de alterius lumbis regem in ævo præsumant

eligere_.

A second dynasty was thus established almost in the same manner

as the first had been. The principal warrior-chief, the most

powerful of the large landowners, has himself elected by his

companions, confines future elections to members of his own

family, and obtains the sanction of religion to his election. He

holds the actual power from his fathers and from himself; he is

desirous of holding the rightful power from God and from the

people. German manners and institutions reappear, but in

association with Christian ideas. Here is a second conquest of

Gaul, accomplished by German warriors, and sanctioned, in the

name of the Roman world, no longer by the Emperor, but by the

Pope. The church has inherited the moral ascendancy of the

empire.

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Lecture XI.

General character of events under the Carlovingian Empire.

Reign of Pepin the Short.

Reign of Charlemagne.

Epoch of transition.

Reigns of Louis the Débonnair and Charles the Bald.

Norman invasions.

The last Carlovingians.

Accession of Hugh Capet.

Tendency To Centralization.

I have sketched the general progress of events in Frankish Gaul,

under the Merovingians; I have now to give a similar outline of

the reign of the Carlovingians. I shall enter neither into an

examination of the institutions, nor a detailed narrative of

occurrences; I shall seek to sum up the facts in the general fact

which includes them all.

The general tendency of events under the Merovingians was towards

centralization; and this tendency was natural. At that period, a

society and a state were labouring to form and create themselves;

and societies and states can be created only by the

centralization of interests and forces. The conquests and

authority of Clovis, however fleeting and incomplete they may

have been, indicate this need of centralization, which was then

pressing upon Roman and barbarian society. After the death of

Clovis, his dominions were dismembered, and formed into distinct

kingdoms; but these kingdoms could not remain separate; they

continually tended to reunite, and soon became reduced in number

to two, which finally coalesced. A similar process took place in

reference to the authority in the interior of each state. The

royal power attempted at first to be the centralizing principle,

but did not succeed; the aristocracy of the chiefs, the great

landowners, laboured to organize itself, and to produce its own

government; it produced it, at length, in the form of the Mayors

of the Palace, who eventually became kings. After two hundred and

seventy-one years of labour, all the Frankish kingdoms were

reunited into one. The supreme power was more entirely

concentrated in the hands of the king, aided by the concurrence

of the national assemblies, than it had ever been previously.

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Under Pepin the Short and Charlemagne, this centralization was

maintained, extended and regulated; and it appeared to gain

strength. New countries, new peoples, were incorporated into the

Frankish state. The relations of the sovereign with his subjects

became more numerous and regular. New bonds of union were

established between the supreme power, its delegates, and its

subjects. A state and a government seemed likely to be formed.

Tendency To Dissolution.

After the death of Charlemagne, affairs presented quite another

aspect, and assumed a contrary direction. In proportion as a

tendency to the centralization, either of the different states

among themselves, or of the internal power of each state, had

been visible under the rule of the Merovingian race, in just that

proportion did a tendency to the dismemberment, to the

dissolution, both of the states themselves and of the power in

each state, become evident under the Carlovingians. Under the

Merovingians, you have seen that five successive dismemberments

took place, none of which was able to last; after the death of

Charlemagne, the kingdoms once separated do not reunite. Louis

the Debonnair divided the empire among his children, in 838, and

made vain efforts to maintain some unity therein. The treaty of

Verdun, in 843, definitively separated the three monarchies.

Charles the Fat, in 884, made an attempt to unite them again; but

this attempt also failed--reunion was impracticable.

In the interior of each state, and particularly in France, the

same phenomenon was manifested. The supreme power which, under

the Merovingians, had tended to become concentrated in the hands,

either of the kings, or of the Mayors of the Palace, and which

had seemed to have attained this end under Pepin and Charlemagne,

took a contrary direction from the reign of Louis the Debonnair,

and tended constantly to dissolution. The great landed

proprietors who, under the first race, had been naturally urged

to coalesce against the royal authority, now laboured only to

elevate themselves, and to become sovereigns in their own

domains. The hereditary succession of benefices and offices

became prevalent. Royalty was nothing more than a direct

lordship, or an indirect and impotent suzerainty. Sovereignty was

dispersed; there no longer existed any state, or head of the

state.

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The history of the Carlovingians is nothing but the struggle of

declining royalty against that tendency which was continually

robbing and contracting it more and more. This was the dominant

character, the general progress of events, from Louis the

Debonnair to Hugh Capet. I shall now refer to the principal facts

of this epoch; in them I shall find proofs of the general fact

just stated.

Pepin The Short.

I. Pepin the Short (752-768). As this monarch had risen to power

by the aid of the large landowners, the clergy, and the pope, he

was obliged, during the whole course of his reign, to treat with

consideration those powers which had supported him. He frequently

convoked national assemblies, and frequently met with opposition

from them. It was not without extreme difficulty that he

prevailed upon his chieftains to make war against the Lombards,

at the request of Pope Stephen III. In order to retain the

support of the clergy, Pepin ordered the holders of

ecclesiastical benefices to perform the conditions annexed to

their tenure of them; he lavished, donations upon the churches,

and greatly augmented the importance of the bishops. It is from

Zachary's answer to Pepin, that the popes have assumed to deduce

their historic right to make and unmake kings. Pepin thus

favoured the aggrandizement of the aristocracy, the clergy, and

the papacy,--three powers which had been very useful, and were

still of great service to him, which he knew how to manage and

restrain, but which, under other circumstances, would assuredly

labour to render themselves independent of the royal power, and

would promote the dismemberment, after having assisted in the

concentration of the kingdom. The moment most favourable for the

development of these powers had arrived. They placed themselves

at first at the service of the king, who was useful to them, and

knew how to make them serviceable to himself; and thus they

became able to free themselves from dependence upon him, and

henceforward to act alone and on their own account.

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Charlemagne.

II. Charlemagne (768-814). Epochs of transition, in the history

of society, have this singular characteristic, that they are

marked sometimes by great agitation, and sometimes by profound

repose. It is well worth while to study the causes of this

difference between epochs which are fundamentally similar in

nature, and which do not constitute a fixed and durable state of

society, but only a passage from one state to another. When the

transition occurs from a state of things which has long been

established and is doomed to destruction, to a new state of

things which it will be necessary to create, it is generally full

of agitation and violence. When, on the other hand, there exists

no previous state of society, which from its long duration is

difficult to overthrow, the transition is only a momentary halt

of society, fatigued by the disorder of its previous chaotic

state, and by the labour of creation. This was the character of

the reign of Charlemagne. The whole country of the Franks,

wearied by the disorders of the first dynasty, and not having yet

originated the social system which was destined to issue

naturally from their conquest--I mean the feudal régime--stood

still for a time under the government of a great man who procured

for it greater order and more regular activity, than it had ever

known before. Until then, the two great powers which agitated the

country--the great landowners and the clergy--had not been able

to take a settled position. The royal authority was hostile to

them, and they attacked it. Charlemagne knew how to restrain and

satisfy them, and contrived to keep them employed without placing

himself in their power. This knowledge constituted his strength,

and was the cause of the temporary order which he established

throughout his empire. In a future lecture, when studying the

institutions of his epoch, we shall see what was the

characteristic feature of his government. I am speaking now only

of the fact itself--of the singular circumstance of the authority

of a very powerful king being interposed between an age in which

royalty was held in slight esteem, and an age in which it almost

ceased to be of any importance. Charlemagne made of barbarian

monarchy all that he possibly could. He possessed within himself,

in the necessities of his mind and life, an activity

corresponding to the general exigencies ol his age, which,

indeed, surpassed them. The Franks desired war and booty;

Charlemagne desired conquests, in order to extend his renown and

dominion; the Franks were unwilling to be without a share in

their own government; Charlemagne held frequent national

assemblies, and employed the principal members of the territorial

aristocracy as dukes, counts, _missi dominici_, and in other

offices.

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The clergy were anxious to possess consideration, authority, and

wealth; Charlemagne held them in great respect, employed many

bishops in the public service, bestowed on them rich endowments,

and attached them firmly to him, by proving himself a munificent

friend and patron of those studies of which they were almost the

only cultivators. In every direction towards which the active and

energetic minds of the time turned their attention, Charlemagne

was always the first to look; and he proved himself more warlike

than the warriors, more careful of the interests of the church

than her most devout adherents, a greater friend of literature

than the most learned men, always foremost in every career, and

thus bringing everything to a kind of unity, by the single fact

that his genius was everywhere in harmony with his age, because

he was its most perfect representative, and that he was capable

of ruling it because he was superior to it. But the men who are

thus before their age, in every respect, are the only men who can

gain followers; Charlemagne's personal superiority was the

indispensable condition of the transitory order which he

established. Order did not at that time spring naturally from

society; the victorious aristocracy had not yet attained the

organization at which it aimed. Charlemagne, by keeping it

employed, diverted it temporarily from its object. When

Charlemagne was dead, all the social forces which he had

concentrated and absorbed became in want of aliment; they resumed

their natural tendencies, their intestine conflicts; they began

once more to aspire to the independence of isolation, and to

sovereignty in their own neighbourhood.

Louis The Debonnair.

III. Louis the Debonnair (814-840). As soon as Louis became

emperor, he lost the success which had attended him as king of

Aquitaine. Facts soon gave proof of that tendency to dissolution

which pervaded the empire of Charlemagne, and which dispersed the

authority which he had been able to retain entire in his own

hands. Louis gave kingdoms to his sons, and they were continually

in revolt against him. The great landholders, the clergy, and the

pope--those three social forces which Charlemagne had so ably

managed and restrained--escaped from the yoke of Louis the

Debonnair, and acted sometimes in his favour, and sometimes

against him.

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The clergy loaded him with reproaches, and forced him to do

public penance at Worms, in 829. An attempt was made, in 830, to

make him a monk, after the assembly at Compiègne, where he had

confessed his faults; and he was deposed, in 833, by another

assembly at Compiègne, in pursuance of a conspiracy into which

Pope Gregory IV. had entered. During the whole course of this

reign, nothing held together, everything was disjoined; both the

states which constituted the empire, and the great social forces,

lay and ecclesiastical, in each state. Each of these forces

aspired to render itself independent. Louis the Debonnair

presents a singular spectacle, in the midst of this dissolution,

attempting to practise as a scholar the maxims of government laid

down by Charlemagne, enacting general laws against general

abuses, prescribing rules for the guidance of all those forces

which had escaped from his hands, and even endeavouring to

correct the particular acts of injustice which had been committed

under the preceding reign. But the kings, the great landowners,

the bishops,--all had acquired a feeling of their own importance,

and refused to obey an emperor who was no longer Charlemagne.

Charles The Bald.

IV. Charles the Bald (840-877). The dissolution which had

commenced under Louis the Debonnair continued under his son

Charles the Bald. His three brothers, [Footnote 12] relying

alternately upon the pretensions of the clergy and of the large

landholders, disputed with him for the vast empire of

Charlemagne.

[Footnote 12: Lothaire, Pepin, and Louis the Germanic, the

three elder sons of Louis the Debonnair.]

The bloody battle of Fontenay, fought on the 25th of June, 841,

made Charles the Bald king of Neustria and Aquitaine, that is, of

France. His reign is nothing but a continual alternation, a scene

of futile efforts to prevent the dismemberment of his dominions

and of his power. At one time, he robs the clergy in order to

satisfy the avidity of the great landholders, whose support he is

anxious to gain; at another time, he spoils the landholders in

order to appease the clergy, of whose assistance he stands in

need. His capitulars contain hardly anything but these impotent

alternations. The hereditary succession of benefices and

appointments became triumphant, and every chieftain laid the

foundation of his own independence.

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The Normans.

V. The Normans. This is the generic name of the German and

Scandinavian tribes, who inhabited the shores of the Baltic.

Their maritime expeditions may be traced back to a very remote

period. We meet with them under the first dynasty of Frankish

kings; they frequently occur towards the end of the reign of

Charlemagne, and under Louis the Debonnair; and they continually

appear under Charles the Bald. They constituted a fresh cause of

the dismemberment of the empire, and of the royal authority. In

the ninth century, the Frankish Gauls present the same appearance

which the Roman Gauls had offered four centuries before: that of

a government incapable of defending the country, and expelled or

retiring in every direction, and of barbarians pillaging,

imposing tribute, withdrawing on payment of large sums of money,

and continually reappearing to levy fresh contributions.

Nevertheless, a notable difference is to be remarked between

these two epochs. In both, the central government was equally

incapable and worn out; but, in the ninth century, there existed

within the Frankish territory a host of chieftains, who, though

lately barbarian invaders themselves, had become independent, and

were surrounded by warriors who defended themselves against the

new invaders with far greater energy than the Roman magistrates

had done, and who took advantage of the disturbed state of

society to consolidate firmly their own individual sovereignties.

Among these chieftains, we meet with Robert the Strong, the

ancestor of the Capetian family, who became Duke of Neustria, in

861, and was killed in 866, while defending Neustria against the

Normans. The Normans definitively established themselves in

Neustria, in 912, under Charles the Simple, who yielded the

province to their chief Rollo, and gave him his daughter Grisella

in marriage.

VI. Charles the Fat. In 884, Charles the Fat, son of Louis the

Germanic, temporarily collected under his rule nearly all the

dominions of Charlemagne. The maintenance of this new

concentration of territory and power was impossible, and it was

dissolved even before the death of Charles the Fat.

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VII. In 888, Eudes, and in 923, Raoul, made themselves kings. The

first, a count of Paris, was the son of Robert the Strong, and

assumed the title of king, at the national assembly held at

Compiègne. The second was Duke of Burgundy, and husband of Emma,

the grand-daughter of Robert the Strong, and sister of Hugo the

Great, Duke of France. These kings were not, like the Mayors of

the Palace at the termination of the first dynasty, the

representatives of a powerful aristocracy. The landed aristocracy

of the tenth century had no further need of representation; no

power could struggle effectively against them. Every great

landowner was absolute master in his own estates, and the kings

were only great barons, who, having become independent, assumed

the title of kings, with the aid of their vassals. A portion of

the lords who had thus become independent, remained indifferent

to quarrels which did not disturb their rights and their power.

They cared little whether there was a king, or who was king. The

descendants of Charlemagne retained for some considerable time a

party of adherents, for the idea and feeling of the rightfulness

of a hereditary succession to the crown, that is, of legitimacy,

were already powerful; but in 987, the conflict ceased, and Hugh

Capet became king.

Tendency To Dissolution.

The general fact which characterizes this epoch,--a tendency to

dismemberment and dissolution,--is frequently met with in the

course of the history of the human race. At first, we see the

interests, forces, and ideas which exist in society, labouring to

become united, to concentrate themselves, and to produce a

suitable form of government. When this concentration has been

once effected, and this government has been once produced, we

find that, at the end of a certain time, it becomes exhausted and

incapable of maintaining it entirely; new interests, new forces,

and new ideas, which do not harmonize with each other, arise and

come into action; then the dissolution begins, the elements of

society become separated, and the bonds of government are

relaxed. A conflict commences between the forces which tend to

separation, and the authority which strives to maintain union.

When the dissolution shall be consummated, then will begin a new

work of concentration.

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Formation And Dissolution.

This occurred after the fall of the second dynasty in France. The

prevalence of the feudal system had caused the dissolution of the

government and the state; the government and the state laboured

to reconstitute themselves, and to regain their unity and

consistency. This great work was not definitively accomplished

until the reign of Louis XIV.; the social forces had then become

once more concentrated in the hands of royalty. Our own times

have witnessed a fresh dissolution.

What we observe, then, during the years from 481 to 987, is a

general phenomenon, characteristic of the progress of the human

race. This phenomenon occurs not only in the political history of

societies, but also in every occupation in which the activity of

man finds exercise. In intellectual order, for example, we find

at first that chaos reigns; the most divergent attempts to

resolve the great questions of the nature and destiny of man, are

made in the midst of the universal ignorance. By degrees,

opinions become assimilated, a school is formed, founded by a

superior man; it is joined by almost all men of mind. Ere long,

in the midst of this very school, diverse opinions arise,

contend, and become separated; dissolution begins once again in

intellectual order, and will continue until a new unity is

formed, and regains the empire.

Such, also, is the course of nature herself in her great and

mysterious operations. This continual alternation of formation

and dissolution, of life and death, recurs in all things, and

under all forms. Spirit gathers matter together and gives it

animation,--uses, and then abandons it. It falls a prey to some

fermentation, after which it will reappear under a new aspect, to

receive once more that spirit which alone can impart to it life,

order, and unity.

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Lecture XII.

Ancient institutions of the Franks.

They are more difficult of study than those of the

Anglo-Saxons.

Three kinds of landed property; allodial, beneficiary,

and tributary lands.

Origin of allodial lands.

Meaning of the word allodium.

Salic land amongst the Franks.

Essential characteristics of the allods.

Primitive Institutions Of The Franks.

The primitive institutions of the Franks are much more difficult

of study than those of the Anglo-Saxons.

I. In the Frankish monarchy, the old Gallo-Roman people still

subsisted; they in part retained their laws and customs; their

language even predominated; Gaul was more civilised, more

organised, more Romanised than Great Britain, in which nearly all

the original inhabitants of the country were either destroyed or

dispersed.

II. Gaul was divided among various barbarian peoples, each of

whom had its own laws, its own kingdom, its own history; the

Franks, the Visigoths, the Burgundians; and the continual

alternations of the Frankish monarchy between dislocation and

re-union, long destroyed all unity in its history.

III. The conquerors were dispersed over a much larger extent of

territory; and central institutions were weaker, more diverse,

and more complicated.

IV. Of the two systems of social and political order, contained

in the cradle of modern nations--I mean the feudal system and the

representative system--the latter has long prevailed in England,

while the former long maintained its sway in France. The ancient

national institutions of the Franks were absorbed into the feudal

system, in whose train came absolute power. Those of the Saxons,

on the other hand, were more or less maintained and perpetuated,

to end at length in the representative system, which rendered

them clear by giving them due development.

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Perhaps, also, the difficulty of the study of the ancient

Frankish institutions arises in some measure from the fact that

we possess more documents respecting the Franks than respecting

the Saxons. Because we are acquainted with more facts, we have

greater trouble in harmonizing them. We believe we are better

informed because we know less.

Such being the case, I wish to state with precision the object of

my researches, so as not to lose time in useless digressions. I

do not propose that we should study together either the state of

Frankish society in all its departments, or the history of all

its vicissitudes. I am desirous to investigate and explain to

you, first, what constituted in France, from the fifth to the

tenth century, the political part of the nation, possessing

political rights and liberties; and secondly, by what

institutions these rights were exercised, and these liberties

guaranteed. We shall frequently be obliged to make excursions

beyond these limits in search of the facts necessary to the

solution of the questions contained therein; but we shall not

dwell long upon such extraneous matter.

In the pursuit of this study, we shall find the works of German

authors of incontestable utility. A principal cause of the errors

of the leading French writers who have treated of the subject, is

that they have attempted to derive all our institutions from

Germany, from the condition of the Franks before the invasion,

and that, at the same time, they have been unacquainted with the

language, the history, and the learned researches of the purely

German peoples, that is, of the nations which have most

thoroughly retained the primitive elements of Frankish society,

and which formed a considerable portion of the Frankish monarchy.

Views Of Hullmann.

Dr. Hullmann, a professor at the University of Bonn, has written

a book on the origin of the various social states or conditions,

the object of which is to prove that all modern social order,

political as well as civil, derives its origin from the

circumstance, that the peoples of modern times have been

agriculturists, devoted to the possession and fixed cultivation

of land. This view, although incomplete, is of much importance.

It is certain that, in the history of Europe, ever since the fall

of the Roman Empire, the condition of persons has been closely

connected with that of landed property, and that the one throws

light upon the other. Though all history would not prove that

this has been the case from the beginning, yet the long-continued

predominance of the feudal system, which consists precisely in

the intimate connection and amalgamation of the relations of

lands with those of persons, would alone be sufficient to

demonstrate it unquestionably.

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Condition Of Lands.