THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS _(continued)_
POST-SOCRATIC SCHOOL.
EPICURUS AND ZENO.
Philosophy, after the time of Aristotle, takes a new direction. In the
pre-Socratic schools, we have seen it was mainly a philosophy of nature;
in the Socratic school it was characterized as a philosophy of mind; and
now in the post-Socratic schools it becomes a philosophy of life--a
moral philosophy. Instead of aiming at the knowledge of real Being--of
the permanent, unchangeable, eternal principles which underlie all
phenomena, it was now content to aim, chiefly, at individual happiness.
The primary question now discussed, as of the most vital importance, is,
What is the ultimate standard by which, amid all the diversities of
human conduct and opinion, we may determine what is right and good in
individual and social life?
This remarkable change in the course of philosophic inquiry was mainly
due--
1st. _To the altered circumstances of the times_. An age of civil
disturbance and political intrigue succeeded the Alexandrian period. The
different states of Greece lost their independence, and became gradually
subject to a foreign yoke. Handed over from one domination to another,
in the struggles of Alexander's lieutenants, they endeavored to
reconquer their independence by forming themselves into confederations,
but were powerless to unite in the defense of a common cause. The Achæan
and Etolian leagues were weakened by internal discords; and it was in
vain that Sparta tried to recover her ancient liberties.
Divided amongst themselves, the smaller states invoked the aid of
dangerous allies--at one time appealing to Macedon, at another to Egypt.
In this way they prepared for the total ruin of Greek liberty, which was
destined to be extinguished by Rome.[763]
[Footnote 763: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," pp. 136-140.]
During this period of hopeless turmoil and social disorder, all lofty
pursuits and all great principles were lost sight of and abandoned. The
philosophic movement followed the downward course of society, and men
became chiefly concerned for their personal interest and safety. The
wars of the Succession almost obliterated the idea of society, and
philosophy was mainly directed to the securing of personal happiness; it
became, in fact, "the art of making one's self happy." The sad reverses
to which the Grecian mind had been subjected produced a feeling of
exhaustion and indifference, which soon reflected itself in the
philosophy of the age.
2d. In connection with the altered circumstances of the age, we must
also take account of _the apparent failure of the Socratic method to
solve the problem of Being_.
The teaching of Aristotle had fostered the suspicion that the dialectic
method was a failure, and thus prepared the way for a return to
sensualism. He had taught that individuals alone have a real existence,
and that the "essence" of things is not to be sought in the elements of
unity and generality, or in the _idea_, as Plato taught, but in the
elements of diversity and speciality. And furthermore, in opposition to
Plato, he had taught his disciples to attach themselves to sensation, as
the source of all knowledge. As the direct consequence of this teaching,
we find his immediate successors, Dicearchus and Straton, deliberately
setting aside "the god of philosophy," affirming "that a _divinity_ was
unnecessary to the explanation of the existence and order of the
universe." Stimulated by the social degeneracy of the times, the
characteristic skepticism of the Greek intellect bursts forth anew. As
the skepticism of the Sophists marked the close of the first period of
philosophy, so the skepticism of Pyrrhonism marked the close of the
second. The new skepticism arrayed Aristotle against Plato as the
earlier skeptics arrayed atomism against the doctrine of the Eleatics.
They naturally said: "We have been seeking a long time; what have we
gained? Have we obtained any thing certain and determinate? Plato says
we have. But Aristotle and Plato do not agree. May not our opinion be as
good as theirs? What a diversity of opinions have been presented during
the past three hundred years! One may be as good as another, or they may
be all alike untrue!" Timon and Pyrrhon declared that, of each thing, it
might be said to be, and not to be; and that, consequently, we should
cease tormenting ourselves, and seek to obtain an _absolute calm_, which
they dignified with the name of _ataraxie_. Beholding the overthrow and
disgrace of their country, surrounded by examples of pusillanimity and
corruption, and infected with the spirit of the times themselves, they
wrote this maxim: "Nothing is infamous; nothing is in itself just; laws
and customs alone constitute what is justice and what is iniquity."
Having reached this extreme, nothing can be too absurd, and they cap the
climax by saying, "We assert nothing; no, not even that we assert
nothing!"
And yet there must some function, undoubtedly, remain for the "wise man"
(sophos).
Reason was given for some purpose. Philosophy must have some end. And
inasmuch as it is not to determine speculative questions, it must be to
determine practical questions. May it not teach men to _act_ rather than
to _think_? The philosopher, the schools, the disciples, survive the
darkening flood of skepticism.
Three centuries before Christ, the Peripatetic and Platonic schools are
succeeded by two other schools, which inherit their importance, and
which, in other forms, and by an under-current, perpetuate the disputes
of the Peripatetics and Platonists, namely, the Epicureans and Stoics.
With Aristotle and Plato, philosophy embraced in its circle nature,
humanity, and God; but now, in the systems of Epicurus and "Zeno", moral
philosophy is placed in the foreground, and assumes the chief, the
overshadowing pre-eminence. The conduct of life--morality--is now the
grand subject of inquiry, and the great theme of discourse.
In dealing with _morals_ two opposite methods of inquiry were possible:
1. _To judge of the quality of actions by their_ RESULTS.
2. _To search for the quality of actions in the actions them selves_.
Utility, which in its last analysis is _Pleasure_, is the test of right,
in the first method; an assumed or discovered _Law of Nature_, in the
second. If the world were perfect, and the balance of the human
faculties undisturbed, it is evident that both systems would give
identical results. As it is, there is a tendency to error on each side,
which is fully developed in the rival schools of the Epicureans and
Stoics, who practically divided the suffrages of the mass of educated
men until the coming of Christ.
EPICUREANS.
Epicurus was born B.C. 342, and died B.C. 270. He purchased a Garden
within the city, and commenced, at thirty-six years of age, to teach
philosophy. The Platonists had their academic Grove: the Aristotelians
walked in the Lyceum: the Stoics occupied the Porch: the Epicureans had
their Garden, where they lived a tranquil life, and seem to have had a
community of goods.
There is not one of all the various founders of the ancient
philosophical schools whose memory was cherished with so much veneration
by his disciples as that of Epicurus. For several centuries after his
death, his portrait was treated by them with all the honors of a sacred
relic: it was carried about with them in their journeys, it was hung up
in their schools, it was preserved with reverence in their private
chambers; his birthday was celebrated with sacrifices and other
religious observances, and a special festival in his honor was held
every month.
So much honor having been paid to the memory of Epicurus, we naturally
expect that his works would have been preserved with religious care. He
was one of the most prolific of the ancient Greek writers. Diogenes
calls him "a most voluminous writer," and estimates the number of works
composed by him at no less than three hundred, the principal of which he
enumerates.[764] But out of all this prodigious collection, not a single
book has reached us in a complete, or at least an independent form.
Three letters, which contain some outlines of his philosophy, are
preserved by Diogenes, who has also embodied his "Fundamental
Maxims"--forty-four propositions, containing a summary of his ethical
system. These, with part of his work "On Nature," found during the last
century among the Greek MSS. recovered at Herculaneum, constitute all
that has survived the general wreck.
[Footnote 764: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xvi., xvii.]
We are thus left to depend mainly on his disciples and successors for
any general account of his system. And of the earliest and most
immediate of these the writings have perished.[765] Our sole original
authority is Diogenes Laertius, who was unquestionably an Epicurean. The
sketch of Epicurus which is given in his "Lives" is evidently a "labor
of love." Among all the systems of ancient philosophy described by him,
there is none of whose general character he has given so skillful and so
elaborate an analysis. And even as regards the particulars of the
system, nothing could be more complete than Laertius's account of his
physical speculations. Additional light is also furnished by the
philosophic poem of Lucretius "On the Nature of Things," which was
written to advocate the physical theory of Epicurus. These are the chief
sources of our information.
[Footnote 765: Some fragments of the writings of Metrodorus, Phædrus,
Polystratus, and Philodemus, have been found among the Herculanean
Papyri, and published in Europe, which are said to throw some additional
light on the doctrines of Epicurus. See article on "Herculanean Papyri,"
in Edinburgh Review, October, 1862.]
It is said of Epicurus that he loved to hearken to the stories of the
indifference and apathy of Pyrrhon, and that, in these qualities, he
aspired to imitate him. But Epicurus was not, like Pyrrhon, a skeptic;
on the contrary, he was the most imperious dogmatist. No man ever showed
so little respect for the opinions of his predecessors, or so much
confidence in his own. He was fond of boasting that he had made his own
philosophy--_he_ was a "self-taught" man! Now "Epicurus might be
perfectly honest in saying he had read very little, and had worked out
the conclusions in his own mind, but he was a copyist, nevertheless; few
men more entirely so."[766] His psychology was certainly borrowed from
the Ionian school. From thence he had derived his fundamental maxim,
that "sensation is the source of all knowledge, and the standard of all
truth." His physics were copied from Democritus. With both, "atoms are
the first principle of all things." And in Ethics he had learned from
Aristotle, that if an absolute good is not the end of a practical life,
_happiness_ must be its end.[767] All that is fundamental in the system
of Epicurus was borrowed from his predecessors, and there is little that
can be called new in his teaching.
[Footnote 766: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 236.]
[Footnote 767: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. vi]
The grand object of philosophy, according to Epicurus, _is the
attainment of a happy life_. "Philosophy," says he, "is the power by
which reason conducts men to happiness." Truth is a merely relative
thing, a variable quantity; and therefore the pursuit of truth for its
own sake is superfluous and useless. There is no such thing as absolute,
unchangeable right: no action is intrinsically right or wrong. "We
choose the virtues, not on their own account, but for the sake of
pleasure, just as we seek the skill of the physician for the sake of
health."[768] That which is nominally right in morals, that which is
relatively good in human conduct, is, therefore, to be determined by the
effects upon ourselves; that which is agreeable--pleasurable, is right;
that which is disagreeable--painful, is wrong. "The virtues are connate
with living pleasantly."[769] Pleasure (êdonê), then, is the great end
to be sought in human action. "Pleasure is the chief good, the beginning
and end of living happily."[770]
[Footnote 768: "Fundamental Maxims," preserved in Diogenes Laertius,
"Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxx.]
[Footnote 769: "Epicurus to Menæceus," in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of
the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxvii.]
[Footnote 770: Id., ib.]
The proof which Epicurus offers in support of his doctrine, "that
pleasure is the chief good," is truly characteristic. "All animals from
the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended with
pain, by their natural instincts, and without the employment of reason.
Therefore we, also, of our own inclination, flee from pain."[771] "All
men like pleasure and dislike pain; they naturally shun the latter and
pursue the former." "If happiness is present, we have every thing, and
when it is absent, we do every thing with a view to possess it."[772]
Virtue thus consists in man's doing deliberately what the animals do
instinctively--that is, choose pleasure and avoid pain.
[Footnote 771: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xxix.]
[Footnote 772: Id., ib., bk. x. ch. xxvii.]
"Every kind of pleasure" is, in the estimation of Epicurus, "alike
good," and alike proper. "If those things which make the pleasures of
debauched men put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which
arise about the heavenly bodies [supernatural powers], and death and
pain,... we should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devote
themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain, or grief (which is
the chief evil) from any quarter."[773] Whilst, however, all pleasures
of the body, as well as the mind, are equal in dignity, and alike good,
they differ in intensity, in duration, and, especially, in their
consequences. He therefore divides pleasure into two classes; and in
this, as Cousin remarks, is found the only element of originality in his
philosophy. These two kinds of pleasure are:
1. _The pleasure of movement, excitement, energy_ (êdonê en
kinêsei).[774] This is the most lively pleasure; it supposes the
greatest development of physical and mental power. "Joy and cheerfulness
are beheld in motion and energy." But it is not the most enduring
pleasure, and it is not the most perfect. It is accompanied by
uneasiness; it "brings with it many perturbations," and it yields some
bitter fruits.
[Footnote 773: "Fundamental Maxims," No. 9, in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives
of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxxi.]
[Footnote 774: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xxviii.]
2. _The second kind of pleasure is the pleasure of repose, tranquillity,
impassibility_ (êdonê katastêmatikê). This is a state, a "condition,"
rather than a motion. It is "the freedom of the body from pain, and the
soul from confusion."[775] This is perfect and unmixed happiness--the
happiness of God; and he who attains it "will be like a god among men."
"The storm of the soul is at an end, and body and soul are perfected."
Now, whilst "no pleasure is intrinsically bad,"[776] prudence
(phronêsis), or practical wisdom, would teach us to choose the highest
and most perfect happiness. Morality is therefore the application of
reason to the conduct of life, and virtue is wisdom. The office of
reason is to "determine our choices"--to take account of the duration of
pleasures, to estimate their consequences, and to regard the happiness
of a whole lifetime, and not the enjoyment of a single hour. Without
wisdom men will choose the momentary excitements of passion, and follow
after agitating pleasures, which are succeeded by pain; they will
consequently lose "tranquillity of mind." "It is not possible," says
Epicurus, "to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and
justly."[777] The difference, then, between the philosopher and the
ordinary man is this--that while both seek pleasure, the former knows
how to forego certain indulgences which cause pain and vexation
hereafter, whereas the ordinary man seeks only immediate enjoyment.
Epicurus does not dispense with virtue, but he simply employs it as a
means to an end, namely, the securing of happiness.[778]
[Footnote 775: Id., ib.]
[Footnote 776: "Fundamental Maxims," No. 7.]
[Footnote 777: Ibid., No. 5.]
[Footnote 778: Pressensé, "Religions before Christ," p. 141.]
Social morality is, like private morality, founded upon _utility._ As
nothing is intrinsically right or wrong in private life, so nothing is
intrinsically just or unjust in social life. "Justice has no independent
existence: it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself
wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or
sustaining any injury. Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has this
character only because there is joined with it the fear of not escaping
those who are appointed to punish actions marked with this
character."[779] Society is thus a contract--an agreement to promote
each other's happiness. And inasmuch as the happiness of the individual
depends in a great degree upon the general happiness, the essence of his
ethical system, in its political aspects, is contained in inculcating
"the greatest happiness of the greatest number."
If you ask Epicurus what a man shall do when it is clearly his immediate
interest to violate the social contract, he would answer, that if your
general interest is secured by always observing it, you must make
momentary sacrifices for the sake of future good. But "when, in
consequence of new circumstances, a thing which has been pronounced just
does not any longer appear to agree with utility, the thing which was
just... ceases to be just the moment it ceases to be useful."[780] So
that self-interest is still the basis of all virtue. And if, by the
performance of duty, you are exposed to great suffering, and especially
to death, you are perfectly justified in the violation of any and all
contracts. Such is the social morality of Epicurus.
With coarse and energetic minds the doctrine of Epicurus would
inevitably lead to the grossest sensuality and crime; with men whose
temperament was more apathetic, or whose tastes were more pure, it would
develop a refined selfishness--a perfect egoism, which Epicurus has
adorned with the name "tranquillity of mind--impassibility,"
(ataraxia).[781]
[Footnote 779: "Fundamental Maxims," Nos. 35, 36.]
[Footnote 780: Ibid., No. 41.]
[Footnote 781: It is scarcely necessary to discuss the question whether,
by making pleasure the standard of right, Epicurus intended to encourage
what is usually called sensuality. He earnestly protested against any
such unfavorable interpretation of his doctrine:--"When we say that
pleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the
debauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think
who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else
interpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from
pain, and the soul from confusion" ("Epicurus to Menæceus," in Diogenes
Laertius, "Lives," bk. x. ch. xxvii.). The most obvious tendency of this
doctrine is to extreme selfishness, rather than extreme sensuality--a
selfishness which prefers one's own comfort and case to every other
consideration.
As to the personal character of Epicurus, opinions have been divided
both in ancient and modern times. By some the garden has been called a
"sty." Epicurus has been branded as a libertine, and the name
"Epicurean" has, in almost all languages, become the synonym of
sensualism. Diogenes Laertius repels all the imputations which are cast
upon the moral character of his favorite author, and ascribes them to
the malignity and falsehood of the Stoics. "The most modern criticism
seems rather inclined to revert to the vulgar opinion respecting him,
rejecting, certainly with good reason, the fanatical panegyrics of some
French and English writers of the last century. Upon the whole, we are
inclined to believe that Epicurus was an apathetic, decorous, formal
man, who was able, without much difficulty, to cultivate a measured and
even habit of mind, who may have occasionally indulged in sensual
gratifications to prove that he thought them lawful, but who generally
preferred, as a matter of taste, the exercises of the intellect to the
more violent forms of self-indulgence. And this life, it seems to us,
would be most consistent with his opinions. To avoid commotion, to make
the stream of life flow on as easily as possible, was clearly the aim of
his philosophy."--Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 236.]
To secure this highest kind of happiness--this pure impassivity, it was
necessary to get rid of all superstitious fears of death, of
supernatural beings, and of a future retribution.[782] The chief causes
of man's misery are his illusions, his superstitions, and his
prejudices. "That which principally contributes to trouble the spirit of
men, is the persuasion which they cherish that the stars are beings
imperishable and happy (_i.e.,_ that they are gods), and that then our
thoughts and actions are contrary to the will of those superior beings;
they also, being deluded by these fables, apprehend an eternity of
evils, they fear the insensibility of death, as though that could affect
them...." "The real freedom from this kind of trouble consists in being
emancipated from all these things."[783] And this emancipation is to be
secured by the study of philosophy--that is, of that philosophy which
explains every thing on natural or physical principles, and excludes all
supernatural powers.
[Footnote 782: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. 1. 100-118.]
[Footnote 783: Epicurus to Herodotus, in Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of
the Philosophers," p. 453 (Bohn's edition).]
That ignorance which occasions man's misery is two-fold, (i.) _Ignorance
of the external world, which leads to superstition._ All unexplained
phenomena are ascribed to unseen, supernatural powers; often to
malignant powers, which take pleasure in tormenting man; sometimes to a
Supreme and Righteous Power, which rewards and punishes men for their
good or evil conduct. Hence a knowledge of Physics, particularly the
physics which Democritus taught, was needful to deliver men from false
hopes and false fears.[784] (ii.) _Ignorance of the nature of man, of
his faculties, powers, and the sources and limits of his knowledge_,
from whence arise illusions, prejudices, and errors. Hence the need of
Psychology to ascertain the real grounds of human knowledge, to explain
the origin of man's illusions, to exhibit the groundlessness of his
fears, and lead him to a just conception of the nature and end of his
existence.
[Footnote 784: "The study of physics contributes more than any thing
else to the tranquillity and happiness of life."--Diogenes Laertius,
"Lives," bk. x. ch. xxiv. "For thus it is that _fear_ restrains all men,
because they observe many things effected on the earth and in heaven, of
which effects they can by no means see the causes, and therefore think
that they are wrought by a _divine_ power. For which reasons, when we
have clearly seen that _nothing can be produced from nothing_, we shall
have a more accurate perception of that of which we are in search, and
shall understand whence each individual thing is generated, and how all
things are done without the agency of the gods."--Lucretius, "On the
Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 145-150.]
Physics and Psychology are thus the only studies which Epicurus would
tolerate as "conducive to the happiness of man." The pursuit of truth
for its own sake was useless. Dialectics, which distinguish the true
from the false, the good from the bad, on _à priori_ grounds, must be
banished as an unnecessary toil, which yields no enjoyment. Theology
must be cancelled entirely, because it fosters superstitious fears. The
idea of God's taking knowledge of, disapproving, condemning, punishing
the evil conduct of men, is an unpleasant thought. Physics and
Psychology are the most useful, because the most "agreeable," the most
"comfortable" sciences.
EPICUREAN PHYSICS.
In his physical theories Epicurus followed Leucippus and Democritus. He
expounds these theories in his letters to Herodotus and Pythocles, which
are preserved in Diogenes Laertius.[785] We shall be guided mainly by
his own statements, and when his meaning is obscure, or his exposition
is incomplete, we shall avail ourselves of the more elaborate statements
of Lucretius,[786] who is uniformly faithful to the doctrine of
Epicurus, and universally regarded as its best expounder.
The fundamental principle of his philosophy is the ancient maxim--"_de
nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil fosse reverti_;" but instead of employing
this maxim in the sense in which it is used by Parmenides, Anaxagoras,
Empedocles, and others, to prove there must be something self-existent
and eternal, or in other words, "that nothing which once was not can
ever of itself come into being," he uses it to disprove a divine
creation, and even presents the maxim in an altered form--viz., "nothing
is ever _divinely_ generated from nothing;"[787] and he thence concludes
that the world was by no means made for us by _divine_ power.[788]
Nature is eternal. "The universal whole always was such as it now is,
and always will be such." "The universe also is infinite, for that which
is finite has a limit, but the universe has no limit."[789]
[Footnote 785: "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.]
[Footnote 786: "De Natura Rerum."]
[Footnote 787: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i.]
[Footnote 788: Ibid.]
[Footnote 789: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xxiv.]
The two great principles of nature are a _vacuum_, and a _plenum._ The
plenum is _body_, or tangible nature; the vacuum is _space_, or
intangible nature. "We know by the evidences of the senses (which are
our only rule of reasoning) that _bodies_ have a real existence, and we
infer from the evidence of the senses that the vacuum has a real
existence; for if space have no real existence, there would be nothing
in which bodies can move, as we see they really do move. Let us add to
this reflection that one can not conceive, either in virtue of
perception, or of any analogy founded on perception, any general quality
peculiar to all beings, which is not either an attribute, or an
accident, of the body or of the vacuum."[790]
Of bodies some are "combinations"--concrete bodies--and some are
primordial "elements," out of which combinations are formed. These
primordial elements, out of which the universe is generated, are
"_atoms_" (atomoi). These atoms are "the first principles" and "seeds"
of all things.[791] They are "_infinite_ in number," and, as their name
implies, they are "_infrangible" "unchangeable_" and
"_indestructible."_[792] Matter is, therefore, not infinitely divisible;
there must be a point at which division ends.[793]
The only qualities of atoms are _form_, _magnitude_, and _density._ All
the other sensible qualities of matter--the secondary qualities--as
color, odor, sweetness, bitterness, etc.--are necessarily inherent in
form. All secondary qualities are changeable, but the primary atoms are
unchangeable; "for in the dissolution of combined bodies there must be
something _solid_ and _indestructible,_ of such a kind that it will not
change, either into what does not exist, or out of what does not exist,
but the change results from a simple displacement of parts, which is the
most usual case, or from an addition or subtraction of particles."[794]
[Footnote 790: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xxiv.]
[Footnote 791: Id., ib., bk. x. ch. xxv.]
[Footnote 792: Id., ib., bk. x. ch. xxiv.]
[Footnote 793: Id., ib.; Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l.
616-620.]
[Footnote 794: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xxiv.]
The atoms are not all of one _form_, but of different forms suited to
the production of different substances by combination; some are square,
some triangular, some smooth and spherical, some are hooked with points.
They are also diversified in _magnitude_ and _density_. The number of
original forms is "incalculably varied," but not infinite. "Every
variety of forms contains an infinitude of atoms, but there is not, for
that reason, an infinitude of forms; it is only the number of them which
is beyond computation."[795] To assert that atoms are of every kind of
form, magnitude, and density, would be "to contradict the phenomena;
"for experience teaches us that objects have a finite magnitude, and
form necessarily supposes limitation.
[Footnote 795: Id., ib.]
A variety of these primordial forms enter into the composition of all
sensible objects, because sensible objects possess different qualities,
and these diversified qualities can only result from the combination of
different original forms. "The earth has, in itself, primary atoms from
which springs, rolling forth cool _water_, incessantly recruit the
immense sea; it has also atoms from which _fire_ arises.... Moreover,
the earth contains atoms from which it can raise up rich _corn_ and
cheerful _groves_ for the tribes of men...." So that "no object in
nature is constituted of one kind of elements, and whatever possesses in
itself must numerous powers and energies, thus demonstrates that it
contains more numerous kinds of primary particles,"[796] or primordial
"seeds of things."
"The atoms are in a continual state of _motion_" and "have moved with
_equal rapidity_ from all eternity, since it is evident the vacuum can
offer no resistance to the heaviest, any more than the lightest." The
primary and original movement of all atoms is _in straight lines, by
virtue of their own weight_. The vacuum separates all atoms one from
another, at greater or less distances, and they preserve their own
peculiar motion in the densest substances.[797]
[Footnote 796: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 582-600.]
[Footnote 797: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xxiv.; Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 80-92.]
And now the grand crucial question arises--_How do atoms combine so as
to form concrete bodies?_ If they move in straight lines, and with equal
rapidity from all eternity, then they can never unite so as to form
concrete substances. They can only coalesce by deviating from a straight
line.[798] How are they made to deviate from a straight line? This
deviation must be introduced _arbitrarily_, or by some _external cause_.
And inasmuch as Epicurus admits of no causes "but space and matter," and
rejects all divine or supernatural interposition, the _new_ movement
must be purely arbitrary. They deviate _spontaneously,_ and of their own
accord. "The system of nature immediately appears _as a free agent_,
released from tyrant masters, to do every thing of itself spontaneously,
without the help of the gods."[799] The manner in which Lucretius proves
this doctrine is a good example of the petitio principii. He assumes, in
opposition to the whole spirit and tendency of the Epicurean philosophy,
that man has "a free will," and then argues that if man who is nothing
but an aggregation of atoms, can "turn aside and alter his own
movements," the primary elements, of which his soul is composed, must
have some original spontaneity. "If all motion is connected and
dependent, and a new movement perpetually arises from a former one in a
certain order, and if the primary elements do not produce any
commencement of motion by deviating from the straight line to break the
laws of fate, so that cause may not follow cause in infinite succession,
_whence comes this freedom of will_ to all animals in the world? whence,
I say, is this liberty of action wrested from the fates, by means of
which we go wheresoever inclination leads each of us? whence is it that
we ourselves turn aside, and alter our motions, not at any fixed time,
nor in any fixed part of space, but just as our own minds prompt?....
Wherefore we must necessarily confess that the same is the case with the
seeds of matter, and there is some other cause besides strokes and
weight [resistance and density] from which this power [of free movement]
is innate in them, since we see that _nothing is produced from
nothing_."[800] Besides form, extension, and density, Epicurus has found
another inherent or essential quality of matter or atoms, namely,
"_spontaneous" motion._
[Footnote 798: "At some time, though at no fixed and determinate time,
and at some point, though at no fixed and determinate point, they turn
aside from the right line, but only so far as you can call the least
possible deviation."--Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. ii. l.
216-222.]
[Footnote 799: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things" bk. ii. 1.
1092-1096.]
[Footnote 800: Id., ib., bk. ii. l. 250-290.]
By a slight "voluntary" deflection from the straight line, atoms are now
brought into contact with each other; "they strike against each other,
and by the percussion new movements and new complications
arise"--"movements from high to low, from low to high, and horizontal
movements to and fro, in virtue of this reciprocal percussion." The
atoms "jostling about, _of their own accord_, in infinite modes, were
often brought together confusedly, irregularly, and to no purpose, but
at length they _successfully coalesced_; at least, such of them as were
thrown together suddenly became, in succession, the beginnings of great
things--as earth, and air, and sea, and heaven."[801]
[Footnote 801: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. ii. l.
1051-1065.]
And now Lucretius shall describe the formation of the different parts of
the world according to the cosmogony of Epicurus. We quote from Good's
translation:
But from this boundless mass of matter first
How heaven, and earth, and ocean, sun, and moon,
Rose in nice order, now the muse shall tell.
For never, doubtless, from result of thought,
Or mutual compact, could primordial seeds
First harmonize, or move with powers precise.
But countless crowds in countless manners urged,
From time eternal, by intrinsic weight
And ceaseless repercussion, to combine
In all the possibilities of forms,
Of actions, and connections, and exert
In every change some effort to create--
Reared the rude frame at length, abruptly reared,
Which, when once gendered, must the basis prove
Of things sublime; and whence eventual rose
Heaven, earth, and ocean, and the tribes of sense.
Yet now nor sun on fiery wheel was seen
Riding sublime, nor stars adorned the pole,
Nor heaven, nor earth, nor air, nor ocean lived,
Nor aught of prospect mortal sight surveyed;
But one vast chaos, boisterous and confused.
Yet order hence began; congenial parts
Parts joined congenial; and the rising world
Gradual evolved: its mighty members each
From each divided, and matured complete
From seeds appropriate; whose wild discortderst,
Reared by their strange diversities of form,
With ruthless war so broke their proper paths,
Their motions, intervals, conjunctions, weights,
And repercussions, nought of genial act
Till now could follow, nor the seeds themselves
E'en though conjoined in mutual bonds, co
Thus air, secreted, rose o'er laboring earth;
Secreted ocean flowed; and the pure fire,
Secreted too, toward ether sprang sublime.
But first the seeds terrene, since ponderous most
And most perplext, in close embraces clung,
And towards the centre conglobating sunk.
And as the bond grew firmer, ampler forth
Pressed they the fluid essences that reared
Sun, moon, and stars, and main, and heaven's high wall.
For those of atoms lighter far consist,
Subtiler, and more rotund than those of earth.
Whence, from the pores terrene, with foremost haste
Rushed the bright ether, towering high, and swift
Streams of fire attracting as it flowed.
Then mounted, next, the base of sun and moon,
'Twixt earth and ether, in the midway air
Rolling their orbs; for into neither these
Could blend harmonious, since too light with earth
To sink deprest, while yet too ponderous far
To fly with ether toward the realms extreme:
So 'twixt the two they hovered; _vital_ there
Moving forever, parts of the vast whole;
As move forever in the frame of man
Some active organs, while some oft repose.[802]
[Footnote 802: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," b. v. l. 431-498]
After explaining the origin and causes of the varied celestial
phenomena, he proceeds to give an account of the production of plants,
animals, and man:
Once more return we to the world's pure prime,
Her fields yet liquid, and the tribes survey
First she put forth, and trusted to the winds.
And first the race she reared of verdant herbs,
Glistening o'er every hill; the fields at large
Shone with the verdant tincture, and the trees
Felt the deep impulse, and with outstretched arms
Broke from their bonds rejoicing. As the down
Shoots from the winged nations, or from beasts
Bristles or hair, so poured the new-born earth
Plants, fruits, and herbage. Then, in order next,
Raised she the sentient tribes, in various modes,
By various powers distinguished: for not heaven
Down dropped them, nor from ocean's briny waves
Sprang they, terrestrial sole; whence, justly _Earth_
Claims the dear name of mother, since alone
Flowed from herself whate'er the sight surveys.
E'en now oft rears she many a sentient tribe
By showers and sunshine ushered into day.[803]
Whence less stupendous tribes should then have risen
More, and of ampler make, herself new-formed,
In flower of youth, and _Ether_ all mature.[804]
Of these birds first, of wing and plume diverse,
Broke their light shells in spring-time: as in spring
Still breaks the grasshopper his curious web,
And seeks, spontaneous, foods and vital air.
Then rushed the ranks of mortals; for the soil,
Exuberant then, with warmth and moisture teemed.
So, o'er each scene appropriate, myriad wombs
Shot, and expanded, to the genial sward
By fibres fixt; and as, in ripened hour,
Their liquid orbs the daring foetus broke
Of breath impatient, nature here transformed
Th' assenting earth, and taught her opening veins
With juice to flow lacteal; as the fair
Now with sweet milk o'erflows, whose raptured breast
First hails the stranger-babe, since all absorbed
Of nurture, to the genial tide converts.
Earth fed the nursling, the warm ether clothed,
And the soft downy grass his couch compressed.[805]
[Footnote 803: The doctrine of "spontaneous generations" is still more
explicitly announced in book ii. "Manifest appearances compel us to
believe that animals, though possessed of sense, are generated from
senseless atoms. For you may observe living worms proceed from foul
dung, when the earth, moistened with immoderate showers, has contracted
a kind of putrescence; and you may see all other things change
themselves, similarly, into other things."--Lucretius, "On the Nature of
Things," bk. i. l. 867-880.]
[Footnote 804: Ether is the father, earth the mother of all organized
being.--Id., ib., bk. i. l. 250-255.]
[Footnote 805: Id., ib., bk. v. l. 795-836.]
A state of pure savagism, or rather of mere animalism, was the primitive
condition of man. He wandered naked in the woods, feeding on acorns and
wild fruits, and quenched his thirst at the "echoing waterfalls," in
company with the wild beast.
Through the remaining part of book v. Lucretius describes how speech was
invented; how society originated, and governments were instituted; how
civilization commenced; and how religion arose out of ignorance of
natural causes; how the arts of life were discovered, and how science
sprang up. And all this, as he is careful to tell us, without any divine
instruction, or any assistance from the gods.
Such are the physical theories of the Epicureans. The primordial
elements of matter are infinite, eternal, and self-moved. After ages
upon ages of chaotic strife, the universe at length arose out of an
_infinite_ number of atoms, and a _finite_ number of forms, by a
fortuitous combination. Plants, animals, and man were spontaneously
generated from ether and earth. Languages, society, governments, arts
were gradually developed. And all was achieved simply by blind,
unconscious nature-forces, without any designing, presiding, and
governing Intelligence--that is, without a God.
The evil genius which presided over the method of Epicurus, and
perverted all his processes of thought, is clearly apparent. The end of
his philosophy was not the discovery of truth. He does not commence his
inquiry into the principles or causes which are adequate to the
explanation of the universe, with an unprejudiced mind. He everywhere
develops a malignant hostility to religion, and the avowed object of his
physical theories is to rid the human mind of all fear of supernatural
powers--that is, of all fear of God.[806] "The phenomena which men
observe to occur in the earth and the heavens, when, as often happens,
they are perplexed with fearful thoughts, overawe their minds with a
dread of the gods, and humble and depress them to the earth. For
ignorance of natural causes obliges them to refer all things to the
power of the divinities, and to resign the dominion of the world to
them; because of those effects they can by no means see the origin, and
accordingly suppose that they are produced by divine influence."[807]
[Footnote 806: "Let us trample religion underfoot, that the victory
gained over it may place us on an equality with heaven" (book i.). See
Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxiv. pp.
453,454 (Bohn's edition); Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i.
l. 54-120.]
[Footnote 807: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. vi. l. 51-60.]
To "expel these fancies from the mind" as "inconsistent with its
tranquillity and opposed to human happiness," is the end, and, as
Lucretius believes, the glory of the Epicurean philosophy. To accomplish
this, God must be placed at an infinite distance from the universe, and
must be represented as indifferent to every thing that transpires within
it. We "must beware of making the Deity interpose here, for that Being
we ought to suppose _exempt from all occupation_, and perfectly
happy,"[808]--that is, absolutely impassible. God did not make the
world, and he does not govern the world. There is no evidence of design
or intelligence in its structure, and "such is the faultiness with which
it stands affected, that it can not be the work of a Divine power."[809]
Epicurus is, then, an unmistakable Atheist. He did not admit a God in
any rational sense. True, he _professed_ to believe in gods, but
evidently in a very equivocal manner, and solely to escape the popular
condemnation. "They are not pure spirits, for there is no spirit in the
atomic theory; they are not bodies, for where are the bodies that we may
call gods? In this embarrassment, Epicurus, compelled to acknowledge
that the human race believes in the existence of gods, addresses himself
to an old theory of Democritus--that is, he appeals to dreams. As in
dreams there are images that act upon and determine in us agreeable or
painful sensations, without proceeding from exterior bodies, so the gods
are images similar to those of dreams, but greater, having the human
form; images which are not precisely bodies, and yet not deprived of
materiality which are whatever you please, but which, in short, must be
admitted, since the human race believes in gods, and since the
universality of the religious sentiment is a fact which demands a
cause."[810]
[Footnote 808: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. x.
ch. xxv.; Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 55-60.]
[Footnote 809: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. v. l. 195-200.]
[Footnote 810: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i.
p. 431.]
It is needless to offer any criticism on the reasoning of Epicurus. One
fact will have obviously presented itself to the mind of the reflecting
reader. He starts with atoms having form, magnitude, and density, and
essays to construct a universe; but he is obliged to be continually
introducing, in addition, a "_nameless something_" which "remains in
secret," to help him out in the explanation of the phenomena.[811] He
makes life to arise out of dead matter, sense out of senseless atoms,
consciousness out of unconsciousness, reason out of unreason, without an
adequate cause, and thus violates the fundamental principle from which
he starts, "_that nothing can arise from nothing_."
EPICUREAN PSYCHOLOGY.
In the system of Epicurus, the soul is regarded as corporeal or
material, like the body; they form, together, one nature or substance.
The soul is composed of atoms exceedingly diminutive, smooth, and round,
and connected with or diffused through the veins, viscera, and nerves.
The substance of the soul is not to be regarded as simple and
uncompounded; its constituent parts are _aura_, heat, and air. These are
not sufficient, however, even in the judgment of Epicurus, to account
for _sensation_; they are not adequate to generate sensible motives such
as revolve any thoughts in the mind. "A certain fourth nature, or
substance, must, therefore, necessarily be added to these, _that is
wholly without a name_; it is a substance, however, than which nothing
exists more active or more subtile, nor is any thing more essentially
composed of small and smooth elementary particles; and it is this
substance which first distributes sensible motions through the
members."[812]
[Footnote 811: As, _e.g._, Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk.
iii. l. 260-290.]
[Footnote 812: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 237-250.]
Epicurus is at great pains to prove that the soul is material; and it
can not be denied that he marshals his arguments with great skill.
Modern materialism may have added additional illustrations, but it has
contributed no new lines of proof. The weapons are borrowed from the old
arsenal, and they are not wielded with any greater skill than they were
by Epicurus himself, I. The soul and the body act and react upon each
other; and mutual reaction can only take place between substances of
similar nature. "Such effects can only be produced by _touch_, and touch
can not take place without _body_."[813] 2. The mind is produced
together with the body, it grows up along with it, and waxes old at the
same time with it.[814] 3. The mind is diseased along with the body, "it
loses its faculties by material causes, as intoxication, or by severe
blows; and is sometimes, by a heavy lethargy, borne down into a deep
eternal sleep."[815] 4. The mind, like the body, is healed by medicines,
which proves that it exists only as a mortal substance.[816] 5. The mind
does not always, and at the same time, continue _entire_ and
_unimpaired_, some faculties decay before the others, "the substance of
the soul is therefore divided." On all these grounds the soul must be
deemed mortal; it is dissolved along with the body, and has no conscious
existence after death.
[Footnote 813: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. iii. l.
138-168.]
[Footnote 814: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 444-460.]
[Footnote 815: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 438-490.]
[Footnote 816: Id., ib., bk. iii. l. 500-520.]
Such being the nature of the soul, inasmuch as it is material, all its
knowledge must be derived from sensation. The famous doctrine of
perception, as taught by Epicurus, is grounded upon this pre-supposition
that the soul is corporeal. "The eidôla aporroiai--_imagines, simulacra
rerum, etc_., are, like pellicles, continually flying off from objects;
and these material 'likenesses,' diffusing themselves everywhere in the
air, are propelled to the perceptive organs." These images of things
coming in contact with the senses produce _sensation_ (aisthêsis). A
sensation may be considered either as regards its object, or as regards
him who experiences it. As regards him who experiences it, it is simply
a passive affection, an agreeable or disagreeable feeling, passion, or
sentiment (to pathos). But along with sensation there is inseparably
associated some knowledge of the object which excites sensation; and it
is for this reason that Epicurus marked the intimate relation of these
two phenomena by giving them analogous names. Because the second
phenomenon is joined to the first, he calls it
epaisthêsis--_perception_. It is sensation viewed especially in regard
to its object--_representative sensation_, or the "sensible idea" of
modern philosophy. It is from perception that we draw our general ideas
by a kind of prolepsis (prolêpsis) an anticipation or laying hold by
reason of that which is implied in sensation. Now all sensations are
alike true in so far as they are sensations, and error arises from false
reasoning about the testimony of sense. All knowledge is purely relative
and contingent, and there is no such thing as necessary and absolute
truth.
The system of Epicurus is thus a system of pure materialism, but not a
system of materialism drawn, as a logical consequence, from a careful
and unprejudiced study of the whole phenomena of mind. His openly avowed
design is to deliver men from the fear of death, and rid them of all
apprehension of a future retribution. "Did men but know that there was a
fixed limit to their woes, they would be able, in some measure, to defy
the religious fictions and menaces of the poets; but now, since we must
fear eternal punishment at death, there is no mode, no means of
resisting them."[817] To emancipate men from "these terrors of the
mind," they must be taught "that the soul is mortal, and dissolves with
the body"--that "death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is
devoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing to
us."[818] Starting with the fixed determination to prove that
"Death is nothing, and naught after death,"
he will not permit any mental phenomena to suggest to him the idea of an
incorporeal spiritual substance. Matter, under any form known to
Epicurus, is confessedly insufficient to explain sensation and thought;
a "nameless something" must be _supposed_. But may not "that principle
which _lies entirely hid, and remains in secret_"[819]--and about which
even Epicurus does not know any thing--be a spiritual, an _immaterial_
principle? For aught that he knows it may as properly be called
"_spirit_" as matter. May not _sensation_ and _cognition_ be the result
of the union of matter and spirit; and if so, may not their mutual
affections, their common sympathies, be the necessary conditions of
sensation and cognition in the present life? A reciprocal relation
between body and mind appears in all mental phenomena. A certain
proportion in this relation is called mental health. A deviation from it
is termed disease. This proportion is by no means an equilibrium, but
the perfect adaptation of the body, without injury to its integrity, to
the purposes of the mind. And if this be so, all the arguments of
materialism fall to the ground.
[Footnote 817: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. i. l. 100-118.]
[Footnote 818: Diogenes Laertius, Maxim 2, in "Lives of the
Philosophers," bk. x. ch. xxxi.]
[Footnote 819: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. iii. l.
275-280.]
The concluding portion of the third book, in which Lucretius discourses
on _death_, is a mournful picture of the condition of the heathen mind
before Christianity "brought life and immortality fully to light." It
comes to us, like a voice from the grave of two thousand years, to prove
they were "without hope." To be delivered from the fear of future
retribution, they would sacrifice the hope of an immortal life. To
extintinguish guilt they would annihilate the soul. The only way in
which Lucretius can console man in prospect of death is, by reminding
him that he will _escape the ills of life_.
"'But thy dear home shall never greet thee more!
No more the best of wives!--thy babes beloved,
Whose haste half-met thee, emulous to snatch
The dulcet kiss that roused thy secret soul,
Again shall never hasten!--nor thine arm,
With deeds heroic, guard thy country's weal!--
Oh mournful, mournful fate!' thy friends exclaim!
'One envious hour of these invalued joys
Robs thee forever!--But they add not here,
'_It robs thee, too, of all desire of joy_'--
A truth, once uttered, that the mind would free
From every dread and trouble. 'Thou art safe
The sleep of death protects thee, _and secures
From all the unnumbered woes of mortal life!_
While we, alas! the sacred urn around
That holds thine ashes, shall insatiate weep,
Nor time destroy the eternal grief we feel!'
What, then, has death, if death be mere repose,
And quiet only in a peaceful grave,--
What has it thus to mar this life of man?"[820]
[Footnote 820: Lucretius, "On the Nature of Things," bk. iii. l.
906-926.]
This is all the comfort that Epicureanism can offer; and if "the wretch
still laments the approach of death," she addresses him "with voice
severe"--
"Vile coward! dry thine eyes--
Hence with thy snivelling sorrows, and depart!"
It is evident that such a system of philosophy outrages the purest and
noblest sentiments of humanity, and, in fact, condemns itself. It was
born of selfishness and social degeneracy, and could perpetuate itself
only in an age of corruption, because it inculcated the lawfulness of
sensuality and the impunity of injustice. Its existence at this precise
period in Grecian history forcibly illustrates the truth, that Atheism
is a disease of the heart rather than the head. It seeks to set man free
to follow his own inclinations, by ridding him of all faith in a
Divinity and in an immortal life, and thus exonerating him from all
accountability and all future retribution. But it failed to perceive
that, in the most effectual manner, it annihilated all real liberty, all
true nobleness, and made of man an abject slave.
STOICISM.
The Stoical school was founded by Zeno of Citium, who flourished B.C.
290. He taught in the Stoa Poecile, or Painted Porch; and his disciples
thence derived the name of Stoics. Zeno was succeeded by Cleanthes (B.C.
260); and Cleanthes by Chrysippus (B.C. 240), whose vigorous intellect
gave unity and completeness to the Stoical philosophy. He is reported to
have said to Cleanthes,--"Give me your doctrines, and I will find the
demonstrations."[821]
[Footnote 821: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.
ch. vii.]
None of the writings of the early Stoics, save a "Hymn to Jupiter," by
Cleanthes, have survived. We are chiefly indebted to Diogenes
Laertius[822] and Cicero[823] for an insight into their system. The Hymn
of Cleanthes sheds some light on their Theology, and their moral
principles are exhibited in "The Fragments" of Epictetus, and "The Life
and Meditations" of Marcus Aurelius.
[Footnote 822: "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.]
[Footnote 823: "De Fm.," and "De Natura Deorum."]
The philosophy of the Stoics, like that of the Epicureans, was mainly a
philosophy of life--that is, a _moral_ philosophy. The manner in which
they approached the study of morals, and the principles upon which they
grounded morality, were, however, essentially different.
The grand object of Epicurus was to make the current of life flow on as
comfortably as possible, without any distracting thoughts of the past or
any disturbing visions of the future. He therefore starts with this
fundamental principle, that the true philosophy of life is to enjoy
one's self--the aim of existence is to be happy. Whatever in a man's
beliefs or conduct tends to secure happiness is _right_; whatever
awakens uneasiness, apprehension, or fear, is _wrong_. And inasmuch as
the idea of a Divine Creator and Governor of the universe, and the
belief in a future life and retribution, are uncomfortable thoughts,
exciting superstitious fears, they ought to be rejected. The Physics and
the Psychology of Epicurus are thus the natural outgrowth of his
Morality.
Zeno was evidently a more earnest, serious, and thoughtful man. He
cherished a nobler ideal of life than to suppose "man must do
voluntarily, what the brute does instinctively--eschew pain, and seek
pleasure." He therefore seeks to ascertain whether there be not some
"principle of nature," or some law of nature, which determines what is
right in human action--whether there be not some light under which, on
contemplating an action, we may at once pronounce upon its intrinsic
_rightness_, or otherwise. This he believes he has found in the
_universal reason_ which fashioned, and permeates, and vivifies the
universe, and is the light and life of the human soul. The chief good
is, confessedly, to live according to nature; which is to live according
to virtue, for nature leads us to that point.... For our individual
natures are all part of the universal nature; on which account, the
chief good is to live in a manner corresponding to one's own nature, and
to universal nature; doing none of those things which the common law of
mankind (the universal conscience of our race) forbids. _That common law
is identical with_ RIGHT REASON _which pervades every thing, being the
same with Jupiter_ (Zeus), _who is the regulator and chief manager of
all existing things_.[824] The foundation of the ethical system of the
Stoics is thus laid in their philosophy of nature--their Physiology and
Psychology. If, therefore, we would apprehend the logical connection and
unity of Stoicism, we must follow their order of thought--that is, we
must commence with their
PHYSIOLOGY.
Diogenes Laertius tells us that the Stoics held "that there are two
general principles in the universe--the _passive_ principle (to
naschon), which is matter, an existence without any distinctive quality,
and the _active_ principle (to poioun), which is the reason existing in
the passive, that is to say, God. For that He, being eternal, and
existing throughout all matter, makes every thing."[825] This Divine
Reason, acting upon matter, originates the necessary and unchangeable
laws which govern matter--laws which the Stoics called logoi
spermatikoi--generating reasons or causes of things. The laws of the
world are, like eternal reason, necessary and immutable; hence the
eimarmenê--the _Destiny_ of the Stoics, which is also one of the names
of the Deity.[826] But by Destiny the Stoics could not understand a
blind unconscious necessity; it is rather the highest reason in the
universe. "Destiny (eimarmenê) is a connected (eiromenê) cause of
things, or the reason according to which the world is regulated."[827]
[Footnote 824: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.
ch. liii.]
[Footnote 825: Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. lxviii.]
[Footnote 826: "They teach that God is unity, and that he is called
Mind, and _Fate_, and Jupiter."--Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. lxviii.]
[Footnote 827: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.
ch. lxxiv.]
These two principles are not, however, regarded by the Stoics as having
a distinct, separate, and independent existence. One is substance
(ousia); the other is quality (poios). The primordial matter is the
passive ground of all existence--the original substratum for the Divine
activity. The Divine Reason is the active or formative energy which
dwells within, and is essentially united to, the primary substance. The
Stoics, therefore, regarded all existence as reducible, in its last
analysis, to _one substance_, which on the side of its passivity and
capacity of change, they called _hyle_ (ylê);[828] and on the side of
its changeless energy and immutable order, they called God. The
corporeal world--physical nature--is "a peculiar manifestation" of God,
generated from his own substance, and, after certain periods, absorbed
in himself. Thus God, considered in the evolution of His power, is
nature. And nature, as attached to its immanent principle, is called
God.[829] The fundamental doctrine of the Stoics was a spiritual, ideal,
intellectual pantheism, of which the proper formula is, _All things are
God, but God is not all things_.
[Footnote 828: Or "matter." A good deal of misapprehension has arisen
from confounding the intellectual ylê of Aristotle and the Stoics with
the gross physical "matter" of the modern physicist. By "matter" we now
understand that which is corporeal, tangible, sensible; whereas by ylê,
Aristotle and the Stoics (who borrowed the term from him) understood
that which is incorporeal, intangible, and inapprehensible to sense,--an
"unknown something" which must necessarily be _supposed_ as the
condition of the existence of things. The _formal_ cause of Aristotle is
"the substance and essence"--the primary nature of things, on which all
their properties depend. The _material_ cause is "the matter or subject"
through which the primary nature manifests itself. Unfortunately the
term "material" misleads the modern thinker. He is in danger of
supposing the _hyle_ of Aristotle to be something sensible and physical,
whereas it is an intellectual principle whose inherence is implied in
any physical thing. It is something distinct from _body_, and has none
of those properties we are now accustomed to ascribe to matter. Body,
corporeity, is the result of the union of "hyle" and "form." Stobaeus
thus expounds the doctrine of Aristotle: Form alone, separate from
matter (ylê) is _incorporeal_; so matter alone, separated from form, is
not _body_. But there is need of the joint concurrence of both
these--matter and form--to make the substance of body. Every individual
substance is thus a totality of matter and form--a sinolon.
The Stoics taught that God is _oneliness_ (Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of
the Philosophers," bk. vii. ch. lxviii.); that he is _eternal_ and
_immortal_ (bk. vii. ch. lxxii.); he could not, therefore, be corporeal,
for "body _infinite, divisible,_ and _perishable_" (bk. vii. ch.
lxxvii.). "All the parts of the world are perishable, for they change
one into another; therefore the world is perishable" (bk. vii. ch.
lxx.). The Deity is not, therefore, absolutely identified with the world
by the Stoics. He permeates all things, creates and dissolves all
things, and is, therefore, _more_ than all things. The world is finite;
God is infinite.]
[Footnote 829: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.
ch. lxx.]
Schwegler affirms that, in physics, the Stoics, for the most part,
followed Heraclitus, and especially "carried out the proposition that
nothing incorporeal exists; every thing is essentially _corporeal_." The
pantheism of Zeno is therefore "_materialistic._"[830] This is not a
just representation of the views of the early Stoics, and can not be
sustained by a fair interpretation of their teaching. They say that
principles and elements differ from each other. Principles have no
generation or beginning, and will have no end; but elements may be
destroyed. Also, that elements have bodies, and have forms, _but
principles have no bodies, and no forms_.[831] Principles are,
therefore, _incorporeal._ Furthermore, Cicero tells us that they taught
that the universal harmony of the world resulted from all things being
"contained by one _Divine_ SPIRIT;"[832] and also, that reason in man is
"nothing else but part of the _Divine_ SPIRIT merged into a human
body."[833] It thus seems evident that the Stoics made a distinction
between corruptible _elements_ (fire, air, earth, water) and
incorruptible _principles_, by which and out of which elements were
generated, and also between corporeal and incorporeal substances.
[Footnote 830: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy," p. 140.]
[Footnote 831: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.
ch. lxviii.]
[Footnote 832: "De Natura Deorum," bk. ii. ch. xiii.]
[Footnote 833: Ibid, bk. ii. ch. xxxi.]
On a careful collation of the fragmentary remains of the early Stoics,
we fancy we catch glimpses of the theory held by some modern pantheists,
that the material elements, "having body and form," are a vital
transformation of the Divine substance; and that the forces of
nature--"the generating causes or reasons of things" (logoi
spermatikoi)--are a conscious transmutation of the Divine energy. This
theory is more than hinted in the following passages, which we slightly
transpose from the order in which they stand in Diogenes Laertius,
without altering their meaning. "They teach that the Deity was in the
beginning by _himself_".... that "first of all, he made the four
elements, fire, water, air, and earth." "The fire is the highest, and
that is called æther, in which, first of all, the sphere was generated
in which the fixed stars are set...; after that the air; then the water;
and the sediment, as it were, of all, is the earth, which is placed in
the centre of the rest." "He turned into water the whole substance which
pervaded the air; and as the seed is contained in the product, so, too,
He, being the seminal principle of the world, remained still in
moisture, making matter fit to be employed by himself in the production
of things which were to come after."[834] The Deity thus draws the
universe out of himself, transmuting the divine substance into body and
form. "God is a being of a certain quality, having for his peculiar
manifestation universal substance. He is a being imperishable, and who
never had any generation, being the maker of the arrangement and order
that we see; and who at certain periods of time _absorbs all substance
in himself and then reproduces it from himself_."[835] And now, in the
last analysis, it would seem as though every thing is resolved into
_force_. God and the world are _power, and its manifestation_, and these
are ultimately one. "This identification of God and the world, according
to which the Stoics regarded the whole formation of the universe as but
a period in the development of God, renders their remaining doctrine
concerning the world very simple. Every thing in the world seemed to be
permeated by the Divine life, and was regarded as the flowing out of
this most perfect life through certain channels, until it returns, in a
necessary circle, back to itself."[836]
[Footnote 834: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.
ch. lxviii., lxix.]
[Footnote 835: Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. lxx.]
[Footnote 836: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy," p. 141.]
The God of the Stoics is not, however, a mere principle of life
vitalizing nature, but an _intelligent_ principle directing nature; and,
above all, a _moral_ principle, governing the human race. "God is a
living being, immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his
happiness, unsusceptible of any kind of evil; having a foreknowledge of
the world, and of all that is in the world."[837] He is also the
gracious Providence which cares for the individual as well as for the
whole; and he is the author of that natural law which commands the good
and prohibits the bad. "He made men to this end that they might be
happy; as becomes his fatherly care of us, he placed our good and evil
in those things which are in our own power."[838] The Providence and
Fatherhood of God are strikingly presented in the "Hymn of Cleanthes" to
Jupiter--
[Footnote 837: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.
ch. lxxii.]
[Footnote 838: Marcus Aurelius, bk. iii. ch. xxiv.]
Most glorious of the immortal Powers above!
O thou of many names! mysterious Jove:
For evermore almighty! Nature's source!
Thou governest all things in their order'd course!
All hail to thee! since, innocent of blame,
E'en mortal creatures may address thy name;
For all that breathe, and creep the lowly earth,
Echo thy being with reflected birth--
Thee will I sing, thy strength for aye resound:
The universe, that rolls this globe around,
Moves wheresoe'er thy plastic influence guides,
And, ductile, owns the god whose arm presides.
The lightnings are thy ministers of ire;
The double-forked and ever-living fire;
In thy unconquerable hands they glow,
And at the flash all nature quakes below.
Thus, thunder-armed, thou dost creation draw
To one immense, inevitable law:
And, with the various mass of breathing souls,
Thy power is mingled, and thy spirit rolls.
Dread genius of creation! all things bow
To thee: the universal monarch thou!
Nor aught is done without thy wise control,
On earth, or sea, or round the ethereal pole,
Save when the wicked, in their frenzy blind,
Act o'er the follies of a senseless mind,
Thou curb'st th' excess; confusion, to thy sight,
Moves regular; th' unlovely scene is bright.
Thy hand, educing good from evil, brings
To one apt harmony the strife of things.
One ever-during law still binds the whole,
Though shunned, resisted, by the sinner's soul.
Wretches! while still they course the glittering prize
The law of God eludes their ears and eyes.
Life, then, were virtue, did they thus obey;
But wide from life's chief good they headlong stray.
Now glory's arduous toils the breast inflame;
Now avarice thirsts, insensible of shame;
Now sloth unnerves them in voluptuous ease,
And the sweet pleasures of the body please.
With eager haste they rush the gulf within,
And their whole souls are centred in their sin.
But, oh, great Jove! by whom all good is given!
Dweller with lightnings and the clouds of heaven!
Save from their dreadful error lost mankind!
Father! disperse these shadows of the mind!
Give them thy pure and righteous law to know;
Wherewith thy justice governs all below.
Thus honored by the knowledge of thy way,
Shall men that honor to thyself repay;
And bid thy mighty works in praises ring,
As well befits a mortal's lips to sing:
More blest, nor men, nor heavenly powers can be,
Than when their songs are of thy law and thee.[839]
[Footnote 839: Sir C. A. Elton's version, published in "Specimens of
Ancient Poets," edited by William Peters, A. M., Christ Church, Oxford.]
PSYCHOLOGY.
As in the world there are two principles, the passive and the active, so
in the understanding there are two elements: a passive
element--_sensation_, and an active element--_reason_.
All knowledge commences with the phenomena of sensation (aisthêsis).
This produces in the soul an image (phantasia), which corresponds to the
exterior object, and which Chrysippus regarded as a modification of the
mind (alloiôsis).[840]
Associate with sensibility is thought--the faculty of general ideas--the
orthos logos, or right reason, as the supreme power and the guiding
light of humanity. This active principle is of divine origin, "a part or
shred of the Divinity."
[Footnote 840: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.
ch. xxxiv.]
This "right reason," or "common reason," is the source and criterion of
all truth; "for our individual natures are all parts of the universal
nature," and, therefore, all the dictates of "common reason" are
"identical with that right reason which pervades every thing, being the
same with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of all
things."
The fundamental canon of the logic of the Stoics, therefore, was that
"what appears to all, that is to be believed, for it is apprehended by
the reason, which is common and Divine."
It is needless to remark that the Stoics were compelled by their
physiological theory to deny the proper immortality of the soul. Some of
them seem to have supposed that it might, for a season, survive the
death of the body, but its ultimate destination was absorption into the
Divine essence. It must return to its original source.
ETHICS.
If reason be the great organizing and controlling law of the universe,
then, to live conformable to reason is the great practical law of life.
Accordingly, the fundamental ethical maxim of the Stoics is, "Live
conformably with nature--that is, with reason, or the will of the
universal governor and manager of all things."[841] Thus the chief good
(eudaimonia) is the conformity of man's actions to reason--that is, to
the will of God, "for nothing is well done without a reference to
God."[842]
[Footnote 841: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.
ch. liii.]
[Footnote 842: Marcus Aurelius, bk. iii. § II.]
It is obvious that this doctrine must lead to a social morality and a
jurisprudence the very opposite of the Epicurean. If we must do that
which is good--that is, that which is reasonable, regardless of all
consequences, then it is not for the pleasurable or useful results which
flow from it that justice should be practised, but because of its
intrinsic excellence. Justice is constituted good, not by the law of
man, but by the law of God. The highest pleasure is to do right; "this
very thing is the virtue of the happy man, and the perfect happiness of
life, when every thing is done according to a harmony of the genius of
each individual to the will of the Universal Governor and Manager of all
things."[843] Every thing which interferes with a purely rational
existence is to be eschewed; the pleasures and pains of the body are to
be despised. To triumph over emotion, over suffering, over passion; to
give the fullest ascendency to reason; to attain courage, moral energy,
magnanimity, constancy, was to realize true manhood, nay, "to be
godlike; for they have something in them which is, as it were, a
god"[844]
The sublime heroism of the Stoic school is well expressed in the manly
precept, "Anechou"--_sustine_--endure. "Endure the sorrows engendered by
the bitter struggle between the passions support all the evils which
fortune shall send thee--calumny, betrayal, poverty, exile, irons, death
itself." In Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius this spirit seems to rise
almost to the grandeur of Christian resignation. "Dare to lift up thine
eyes to God and say, 'Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleasest. I
agree, and am of the same mind with thee, indifferent to all things.
Lead me whither thou pleasest. Let me act what part thou wilt, either of
a public or a private person, of a rich man or a beggar.'"[845] "Show
those qualities," says Marcus Aurelius, "which God hath put in thy
power--sincerity, gravity, endurance of labor, aversion to pleasure,
contentment with thy portion and with few things, benevolence,
frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling,
magnanimity."[846]
[Footnote 843: Diogenes Laertius, "Lives of the Philosophers," bk. vii.
ch. liii.]
[Footnote 844: Id., ib., bk. vii. ch. xliv.]
[Footnote 845: Arrian, "Diss. Epict.," bk. ii. ch. xviii.]
[Footnote 846: "I read to-day part of the 'Meditations of Marcus
Antonius' [Aurelius]. What a strange emperor! And what a strange
heathen! Giving thanks to God for all the good things he enjoyed! In
particular for his good inspirations, and for twice revealing to him, in
dreams, things wherby he was cured of (otherwise) incurable distempers.
I make no doubt but this is one of the 'many' who shall come from the
east and the west, and sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,' while
the 'children of the kingdom'--nominal Christians--are 'shut
out.'"--Wesley's "Journal," vol. i, p. 353.]
Amid the fearful moral degeneracy of imperial Rome, Stoicism became the
refuge of all noble spirits. But, in spite of its severity, and its
apparent triumph over the feelings, it brought no real freedom and
peace. "Stoical morality, strictly speaking, is, at bottom, only a
slavish morality, excellent in Epictetus; admirable still, but useless
to the world, in Marcus Aurelius." Pride takes the place of real
disinterestedness. It stands alone in haughty grandeur and solitary
isolation, tainted with an incurable egoism. Disheartened by its
metaphysical impotence, which robs God of all personality, and man of
all hope of immortality; defeated in its struggle to obtain purity of
soul, it sinks into despair, and often terminates, as in the case of its
two first leaders, Zeno and Cleanthes, and the two Romans, Cato and
Seneca, in self-murder. "Thus philosophy is only an apprenticeship of
death, and not of life; it tends to death by its image, _apathy_ and
_ataraxy._"[847]
[Footnote 847: Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i.
p. 439.]