THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (_continued_).
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (_continued_).
ARISTOTLE.
Aristotle was born at Stagira, a Greek colony of Thrace, B.C. 384. His
father, Nicomachus, was a physician in the Court of Amyntas II., King of
Macedonia, and is reported to have written several works on Medicine and
Natural History. From his father, Aristotle seems to have inherited a
love for the natural sciences, which was fostered by the circumstances
which surrounded him in early life, and which exerted a determining
influence upon the studies of his riper years.
Impelled by an insatiate desire for knowledge, he, at seventeen years of
age, repaired to Athens, the city of Plato and the university of the
world. Plato was then absent in Sicily; on his return Aristotle entered
his school, became an ardent student of philosophy, and remained until
the death of Plato, B.C. 348. He therefore listened to the instructions
of Plato for twenty years.
The mental characteristics of the pupil and the teacher were strikingly
dissimilar. Plato was poetic, ideal, and in some degree mystical.
Aristotle was prosaic, systematic, and practical. Plato was intuitive
and synthetical. Aristotle was logical and analytical. It was therefore
but natural that, to the mind of Aristotle, there should appear
something confused, irregular, and incomplete in the discourses of his
master. There was a strange commingling of questions concerning the
grounds of morality, and statements concerning the nature of science; of
inquiries concerning "real being," and speculations on the ordering of a
model Republic, in the same discourse. Ethics, politics, ontology, and
theology, are all comprised in his Dialectic, which is, in fact, the one
grand "science of the idea of the good." Now to the mind of Aristotle it
seemed better, and much more systematic, that these questions should be
separated, and referred to particular heads; and, above all, that they
should be thoroughly discussed in an exact and settled terminology. To
arrange and classify all the objects of knowledge, to discuss them
systematically and, as far as possible, exhaustively, was evidently the
ambition, perhaps also the special function, of Aristotle. He would
survey the entire field of human knowledge; he would study nature as
well as humanity, matter as well as mind, language as well as thought;
he would define the proper limits of each department of study, and
present a regular statement of the facts and principles of each science.
And, in fact, he was the first who really separated the different
sciences and erected them into distinct systems, each resting upon its
own proper principles. He distributed philosophy into three
branches:--(i.) _Theoretic_; (ii.) _Efficient_; (iii.) _Practical_. The
Theoretic he divided into--1. _Physics_; _2. Mathematics_; 3.
_Theology_, or the Prime Philosophy--the science known in modern times
as Metaphysics. The Efficient embraces what we now term the arts,--1.
_Logic; 2. Rhetoric_; 3. _Poetics_. The Practical comprises--_1.
Ethics_; 2. _Politics_. On all these subjects he wrote separate
treatises. Thus, whilst Plato is the genius of abstraction, Aristotle is
eminently the genius of classification.
Such being the mental characteristics of the two men--their type of mind
so opposite--we are prepared to expect that, in pursuing his inquiries,
Aristotle would develop a different _Organon_ from that of Plato, and
that the teachings of Aristotle will give a new direction to philosophic
thought.
ARISTOTELIAN ORGANON.
Plato made use of psychological and logical analysis in order to draw
from the depth of consciousness certain fundamental ideas which are
inherent in the mind--born with it, and not derived from sense or
experience. These ideas he designates "the intelligible species" (ta
nooumena genê) as opposed to "the visible species"--the objects of
sense. Such ideas or principles being found, he uses them as
"starting-points" from which he may pass beyond the sensible world and
ascend to "the absolute," that is, to God.[674] Having thus, by
immediate abstraction, attained to universal and necessary ideas, he
descends to the outer world, and attempts by these ideas to construct an
intellectual theory of the universe.[675]
Aristotle will reverse this process. He will commence with _sensation_,
and proceed, by induction, from the known to the unknown.
The repetition of sensations produces _recollection_, recollection
_experience_, and experience produces _science_.[676] "Science and art
result unto men by means of experience...." "Art comes into being when,
from a number of experiences, one universal opinion is evolved, which
will embrace all similar cases. For example, if you know that a certain
remedy has cured Callias of a certain disease, and that the same remedy
has produced the same effect on Socrates and on several other persons,
that is _Experience_; but to know that a certain remedy will cure all
persons attacked with that disease, is _Art_. Experience is a knowledge
of individual things (tôn kathekasta); art is that of universals (tôn
katholou)."[677]
[Footnote 674: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xx.]
[Footnote 675: "Timæus," ch. ix.]
[Footnote 676: "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. i.]
[Footnote 677: Ibid.]
Disregarding the Platonic notion of the unity of all Being in the
absolute idea, he fixed his immediate attention on the manifoldness of
the phenomenal, and by a classification of all the objects of experience
he sought to attain to "general notions." Concentrating all his
attention on the individual, the contingent, the particular, he ascends,
by induction, from the particular to the _general_; and then, by a
strange paralogism, "the _universal_" is confounded with "the _general_"
or, by a species of logical sleight-of-hand, the general is transmuted
into the universal. Thus "induction is the pathway from particulars to
universals."[678] But how universal and necessary principles can be
obtained by a generalization of limited experiences is not explained by
Aristotle. The experiences of a lifetime, the experiences of the whole
race, are finite and limited, and a generalization of these can only
give the finite, the limited, and at most, the general, but not the
universal.
[Footnote 679: "Topics," bk. i. ch. xii.; "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. iii.]
Aristotle admits, however, that there are ideas or principles in the
mind which can not be explained by experience, and we are therefore
entitled to an answer to the question--how are these obtained? "Sensible
experience gives us what is _here_, _there_, _now_, in such and such a
manner, but it is impossible for it to give what is _everywhere_ and _at
all times_."[680] He tells us further, that "science is a conception of
the mind engaged in universals, and in those things which exist of
necessity, and since there are _principles of things demonstrable and of
every science_ (for science is joined with reason), it will be neither
science, nor art, nor prudence, which discovers the principles of
science;... it must therefore be (nous) pure intellect," or the
intuitive reason.[681] He also characterizes these principles as
_self-evident_. "First truths are those which obtain belief, not through
others, but through themselves, as there is no necessity to investigate
the '_why_' in scientific principles, but each principle ought to be
credible by itself."[682] They are also _necessary_ and _eternal_.
"Demonstrative science is from necessary principles, and those which are
_per se_ inherent, are necessarily so in things."[683] "We have all a
conception of that which can not subsist otherwise than it does.... The
object of science has a necessary existence, therefore it is _eternal_.
For those things which exist in themselves, by necessity, are all
eternal."[684] But whilst Aristotle admits that there are "immutable and
first principles,"[685] which are not derived from sense and
experience--"principles which are the foundation of all science and
demonstration, but which are themselves indemonstrable,"[686] because
self-evident, necessary, and eternal; yet he furnishes no proper account
of their genesis and development in the human mind, neither does he
attempt their enumeration. At one time he makes the intellect itself
their source, at another he derives them from sense, experience, and
induction. This is the defect, if not the inconsistency, of his
method.[687]
[Footnote 680: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. xxxi.]
[Footnote 681: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. vi.]
[Footnote 682: "Topics," bk. i. ch. i.]
[Footnote 683: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. vi.]
[Footnote 684: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. iii.]
[Footnote 685: Ibid., bk. vi. ch. xi.]
[Footnote 686: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. iii.]
[Footnote 687: Hamilton attempts the following mode of reconciling the
contradictory positions of Aristotle:
"On the supposition of the mind virtually containing, antecedent to all
experience, certain universal principles of knowledge, in the form of
certain necessities of thinking; still it is only by repeated and
comparative experiments that we compass the certainty; on the one hand,
that such and such cognitions can not but be thought as necessary,
native generalities; and, on the other, that such and such cognitions
may or may not be thought, and are, therefore, as contingent, factitious
generalizations. To this process of experiment, analysis, and
classification, through which we attain to a scientific knowledge of
principles, it might be shown that Aristotle, not improperly, applies
the term _Induction_."--"Philosophy," p. 88.]
The human mind, he tells us, has two kinds of intelligence--the
_passive_ intelligence (nous pathêtikos), which is the receptacle of
forms (dectikon tou eidous); and the _active_ intelligence (nous
poiêtikos), which impresses the seal of thought upon the data furnished
by experience, and combines them into the unity of a single judgment,
thus attaining "general notions."[688] The passive intelligence (the
"external perception" of modern psychology) perceives the individual
forms which appear in the external world, and the active intelligence
(the intellect proper) classifies and generalizes according to fixed
laws or principles inherent in itself; but of these fixed laws--prôta
noêmata--first thoughts, or _à priori_ ideas, he offers no proper
account; they are, at most, purely subjective. This, it would seem, was,
in effect, a return to the doctrine of Protagoras and his school, "that
man--the individual--is the measure of all things." The aspects under
which objects present themselves in consciousness, constitute our only
ground of knowledge; we have no direct, intuitive knowledge of Being _in
se_. The noetic faculty is simply a _regulative_ faculty; it furnishes
the laws under which we compare and judge, but it does not supply any
original elements of knowledge. Individual things are the only real
entities,[689] and "universals" have no separate existence apart from
individuals in which they inhere as attributes or properties. They are
consequently pure mental conceptions, which are fixed and recalled by
general names. He thus substitutes a species of conceptual-nominalism in
place of the realism of Plato. It is true that "real being" (to on) is
with Aristotle a subject of metaphysical inquiry, but the proper, if not
the only subsistence, or ouaia, is the form or abstract nature of
things. "The essence or very nature of a thing is inherent in the _form_
and _energy_"[690] The science of Metaphysics is strictly conversant
about these abstract intellectual forms just as Natural Philosophy is
conversant about external objects, of which the senses give us
information. Our knowledge of these intellectual forms is, however,
founded upon "beliefs" rather than upon immediate intuition, and the
objective certainty of science, upon the subjective necessity of
believing, and not upon direct apperception.
[Footnote 688: "On the Soul," ch. vi.; "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. i.]
[Footnote 689: "Metaphysics," bk. vi. ch. xiii.]
[Footnote 690: Ibid., bk. vii. ch. iii.]
The points of contrast between the two methods may now be presented in a
few sentences. Plato held that all our cognitions are reducible to two
elements--one derived from _sense_, the other from _pure reason_; one
element particular, contingent, and relative, the other universal,
necessary, and absolute. By an act of _immediate abstraction_ Plato will
eliminate the particular, contingent, and relative phenomena, and
disengage the universal, necessary, and absolute _ideas_ which underlie
and determine all phenomena. These ideas are the thoughts of the Divine
Mind, according to which all particular and individual existences are
generated, and, as divine thoughts, they are real and permanent
existences. Thus by a process of immediate abstraction, he will rise
from particular and contingent phenomena to universal and necessary
principles, and from these to the First Principle of all principles, the
First Cause of all causes--that is, to _God_.
Aristotle, on the contrary, held that all of our knowledge begins with
"the singular," that is, with the particular and the relative, and is
derived from sensation and experience. The "sensible object," taken as
it is without any sifting and probing, is the basis of science, and
reason is simply the architect constructing science according to certain
"forms" or laws inherent in mind. The object, then, of metaphysical
science is to investigate those "universal notions" under which the mind
conceives of and represents to itself external objects, and speculates
concerning them. Aristotle, therefore, agrees with Plato in teaching
"that science can only be a science of universals,"[691] and "that
sensation alone can not furnish us with scientific knowledge."[692] How,
then, does he propose to attain the knowledge of universal principles?
How will he perform that feat which he calls "passing from the known to
the unknown?" The answer is, by _comparative abstraction_. The universal
being constituted by a relation of the object to the thinking subject,
that is, by a property recognized by the intelligence alone, in virtue
of which it can be retained as an object of thought, and compared with
other objects, he proposes to _compare, analyze, define,_ and _classify_
the primary cognitions, and thus evoke into energy, and clearly present
those principles or forms of the intelligence which he denominate
"universals." As yet, however, he has only attained to "general
notions," which are purely subjective, that is, to logical definitions,
and these logical definitions are subsequently elevated to the dignity
of "universal principles and causes" by a species of philosophic
legerdemain. Philosophy is thus stripped of its metaphysical character,
and assumes a strictly _logical_ aspect. The key of the Aristotelian
method is therefore the
ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC.
Pure Logic is the science of the formal laws of thought. Its office is
to ascertain the rules or conditions under which the mind, by its own
constitution, reasons and discourses. The office of Applied Logic--of
logic as an art--is "to form and judge of conclusions, and, through
conclusions, to establish proof. The conclusions, however, arise from
propositions, and the propositions from conceptions." It is chiefly
under the latter aspect that logic is treated by Aristotle. According to
this natural point of view he has divided the contents of the logical
and dialectic teaching in the different treatises of the _Organon_.
[Footnote 691: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. vi.]
[Footnote 692: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. xxxi.]
The first treatise is the "_Categories_" or "Predicaments"--a work which
treats of the universal determinations of Being. It is a classification
of all our mental conceptions. As a matter of fact, the mind forms
notions or conceptions about those natures and essences of things which
present an outward image to the senses, or those, equally real, which
utter themselves to the mind. These may be defined and classified; there
may be general conceptions to which all particular conceptions are
referable. This classification has been attempted by Aristotle, and as
the result we have the ten "Categories" of _Substance, Quantity,
Quality, Relation, Time, Place, Position, Possession, Action, Passion_.
He does not pretend that this classification is complete, but he held
these "Predicaments" to be the most universal expressions for the
various relations of things, under some one of which every thing might
be reduced.
The second treatise, "_On Interpretation_," investigates language as the
expression of thought; and inasmuch as a true or false thought must be
expressed by the union or separation of a subject and a predicate, he
deems it necessary to discuss the parts of speech--the general term and
the verb--and the modes of affirmation and denial. In this treatise he
develops the nature and limitations of propositions, the meaning of
contraries and contradictions, and the force of affirmations and denials
in _possible, contingent_, and _necessary_ matter.
The third are the "_Analytics_," which show how conclusions are to be
referred back to their principles, and arranged in the order of their
precedence.
The First or Prior Analytic presents the universal doctrine of the
Syllogism, its principles and forms, and teaches how must reason, if we
would not violate the laws of our own mind. The theory of reasoning,
generally, with a view to accurate demonstration, depends upon the
construction of a perfect syllogism, which is defined as "a discourse in
which, certain things being laid down, something else different from the
premises necessarily results, in consequence of their existence."[693]
Conclusions are, according to their own contents and end, either
_Apodeictic_, which deal with necessary and demonstrable matter, or
_Dialectic_, which deal with probable matter, or _Sophistical_, which
are imperfect in matter or form, and announced, deceptively, as correct
conclusions, when they are not. The doctrine of Apodeictic conclusions
is given in the "_Posterior Analytic_," that of Dialectic conclusions in
the "_Topics_," and that of the Sophistical in the "_Sophistical
Elenchi_."
Now, if Logic is of any value as an instrument for the discovery of
truth, the attainment of certitude, it must teach us not only how to
deduce conclusions from premises, but it must certify to us the validity
of the principles from whence we reason and this is attempted by
Aristotle in the Posterior Analytic. This treatise opens with the
following statement: All doctrine, and all intellectual discipline,
arises from a prior or pre-existent knowledge. This is evident, if we
survey them all; for both mathematical sciences, and also each of the
arts, are obtained in this manner. The same holds true in the case of
reasonings, whether through [deductive] _Syllogism_ or through
_Induction_, for both accomplish the instruction they afford from
information previously known--the former (syllogistic reasoning)
receiving it, as it were, from the traditions of the intelligent, the
latter (inductive reasoning) manifesting the universal through the light
of the singular.[694] Induction and Syllogism are thus the grand
instruments of logic.[695]
[Footnote 693: "Prior Analytic," bk. i. ch. i.; "Topics," bk. i. ch. i.]
[Footnote 694: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. i.]
[Footnote 695: "We believe all things through syllogism, or from
induction."--"Prior Analytic," bk. ii. ch. xxiii.]
Both these processes are based upon an _anterior_ knowledge.
Demonstrative science must be from things true, first, immediate, more
known than, prior to, and the causes of, the conclusion, for thus there
will be the appropriate first principles of whatever is
demonstrated.[696] The first principles of demonstration, the material
of thought, must, consequently, be supplied by some power or faculty of
the mind other than that which is engaged in generalization and
deductive reasoning. Whence, then, is this "anterior knowledge" derived,
and what tests or criteria have we of its validity?
1. In regard to deductive or syllogistic reasoning, the views of
Aristotle are very distinctly expressed.
Syllogistic reasoning "proceeds from generals to particulars."[697] The
general must therefore be supplied as the foundation of the deductive
reasoning. Whence, then, is this knowledge of "the general" derived? The
answer of Aristotle is that the universal major proposition, out of
which the conclusion of the syllogism is drawn, _is itself necessarily
the conclusion of a previous induction, and mediately or immediately an
inference_--a collection from individual objects of sensation or of
self-consciousness. "Now," says he, "demonstration is from universals,
but induction from particulars. It is impossible, however, to
investigate universals except through induction, since things which are
said to be from abstraction will be known only by induction."[698] It is
thus clear that Aristotle makes _deduction necessarily dependent upon
induction_. He maintains that the highest or most universal principles
which constitute the primary and immediate propositions of the former
are furnished by the latter.
[Footnote 696: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. ii.]
[Footnote 697: Ibid., bk. i. ch. xviii.; "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. iii.]
[Footnote 698: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. xviii.]
2. General principles being thus furnished by induction, we may now
inquire whence, according to Aristotle, are the materials for induction
derived? What is the character of that "anterior knowledge" which is the
basis of the inductive process?
Induction, says Aristotle, is "the progression from singulars to
universals."[699] It is an illation of the universal from the singular
as legitimated by the laws of thought. All knowledge, therefore, begins
with singulars--that is, with individual objects. And inasmuch as all
knowledge begins with "individual objects," and as the individual is
constantly regarded by Aristotle as the "object of sense," it is claimed
that his doctrine is that all knowledge is derived from _sensation_, and
that science and art result to man (_solely_) by means of _experience._
He is thus placed at the head of the empirical school of philosophy, as
Plato is placed at the head of the ideal school.
[Footnote 699: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. xviii.]
This classification, however, is based upon a very superficial
acquaintance with the philosophy of Aristotle as a whole. The practice,
so commonly resorted to, of determining the character of the
Aristotelian philosophy by the light of one or two passages quoted from
his "Metaphysics," is unjust both to Aristotle and to the history of
philosophic thought. We can not expect to attain a correct understanding
of the views of Aristotle concerning the sources and grounds of all
knowledge without some attention to his psychology. A careful study of
his writings will show that the terms "sensation" (aisthêsis) and
"experience" (empeira) are employed in a much more comprehensive sense
than is usual in modern philosophic writings.
"Sensation," in its lowest form, is defined by Aristotle as "an
excitation of the soul through the body,"[700] and, in its higher form,
as the excitation of the soul by any object of knowledge. In this latter
form it is used by him as synonymous with "intuition," and embraces all
immediate intuitive perceptions, whether of sense, consciousness, or
reason. "The universe is derived from particulars, therefore we ought to
have a sensible perception (aisthêsis) of these; and this is intellect
(nous)."[701] Intelligence proper, the faculty of first principles, is,
in certain respects, a sense, because it is the source of a class of
truths which, like the perceptions of the senses, are immediately
revealed as facts to be received upon their own evidence. It thus
answers to the "sensus communis" of Cicero, and the "Common Sense" of
the Scottish school. Under this aspect, "Sense is equal to or has the
force of Science."[702] The term "Experience" is also used to denote,
not merely the perception and remembrance of the impressions which
external objects make upon the mind, but as co-extensive with the whole
contents of consciousness--all that the mind _does_ of its own native
energy, as well as all that it _suffers_ from without. It is evidently
used in the Posterior Analytic (bk. ii. ch. xix.) to describe the whole
process by which the knowledge of universals is obtained. "From
experience, or from every universal remaining in the soul, the
principles of art and science arise." The office of experience is "to
furnish the principles of every science"[703]--that is, to evoke them
into energy in the mind. 'Experience thus seems to be a thing almost
similar to science and art.[704] In the most general sense, "sensation"
would thus appear to be the immediate perception or intuition of facts
and principles, and "experience" the operation of the mind upon these
facts and principles, elaborating them into scientific form according to
its own inherent laws. The "experience" of Aristotle is analogous to the
"reflection" of Locke.
[Footnote 700: "De Somn.," bk. i.]
[Footnote 701: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. xi.; see also ch. vi.]
[Footnote 702: "De Cen. Anim."]
[Footnote 703: "Prior Analytic," bk. i. ch. xix.]
[Footnote 704: "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. i.]
So much being premised, we proceed to remark that there is a distinction
perpetually recurring in the writings of Aristotle between the elements
or first principles of knowledge which are "clearest in their own
nature" and those which "are clearest to our perception."[705] The
causes or principles of knowledge "are _prior_ and _more known_ to us in
two ways, for what is prior in nature is not the same as that which is
prior to us, nor that which is more known (simply in itself) the same as
that which is more known to us. Now I call things prior and more known
to us, those which are _nearer to sense_; and things prior and more
known simply in themselves, those which are _remote from sense_; and
those things are most remote which are especially _universal_, and those
nearest which are _singular_; and these are mutually opposed."[706] Here
we have a distribution of the first or prior elements of knowledge into
two fundamentally opposite classes.
(i.) _The immediate or intuitive perceptions of sense,_
(ii.) _The immediate or intuitive apperceptions of pure reason,_
[Footnote 705: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. iv.; "Metaphysics," bk. ii. ch. i.;
"Rhetoric," bk. i. ch. ii.; "Prior Analytic," bk. ii. ch. xxiii.]
[Footnote 706: "Post. Analytic," bk. i. ch. ii.]
The objects of sense-perception are external, individual, "nearest to
sense," and occasionally or contingently present to sense. The objects
of the intellect are inward, universal, and the essential property of
the soul. They are "remote from sense," "prior by nature;" they are
"forms" essentially inherent in the soul previous to experience; and it
is the office of experience to bring them forward into the light of
consciousness, or, in the language of Aristotle, "to evoke them from
potentiality into actuality." And further, from the "prior" and
immediate intuitions of sense and intellect, all our secondary, our
scientific and practical knowledge is drawn by logical processes.
The Aristotelian distribution of the intellectual faculties corresponds
fully to this division of the objects of knowledge. The human intellect
is divided by Aristotle into,
1. The Passive or Receptive Intellect (nous paphêtikos).--Its office is
the reception of sensible impressions or images (Phantasmata) and their
retention in the mind (myêmê). These sensible forms or images are
essentially immaterial. "Each sensoriurn (aisthêtêrôn) is receptive of
the sensible quality _without the matter_, and hence when the sensibles
themselves are absent, sensations and phantasikos remain."[707]
[Footnote 707: "De Anima," bk. iii. ch. ii.]
2. The Active or Creative Intellect (nous pointikos).--This is the power
or faculty which, by its own inherent power, impresses "form" upon the
material of thought supplied by sense-perception, exactly as the First
Cause combines it, in the universe, with the recipient matter.
"It is necessary," says Aristotle, "that these two modes should be
opposed to each other, as matter is opposed to form, and to all that
gives form. The receptive reason, which is as matter, becomes all things
by receiving their forms. The creative reason gives existence to all
things, as light calls color into being. The creative reason transcends
the body, being capable of separation from it, and from all things; it
is an everlasting existence, incapable of being mingled with matter, or
affected by it; prior, and subsequent to the individual mind. The
receptive reason is necessary to individual thought, but it is
perishable, and by its decay all memory, and therefore individuality, is
lost to the higher and immortal reason."[708]
This "Active or Creative Intellect" is again further subdivided, by
Aristotle--
1. The _Scientific_ (epistêmonikon) part--the "virtue," faculty, or
"habit of principles." He also designates it as the "place of
principles," and further defines it as the power "which apprehends those
existences whose principles can not be otherwise than they are"--that
is, self-evident, immutable, and necessary truths[709]--the _intuitive
reason_.
2. The _Reasoning_ (logistikon) part--the power by which we draw
conclusions from premises, and "contemplate contingent matter"[710]--the
_discursive reason_.
The correlatives _noetic_ and _dianoetic_, says Hamilton, would afford
the best philosophic designation of these two faculties; the knowledge
attained by the former is an "intuitive principle"--a truth at first
hand; that obtained by the latter is a "demonstrative proposition"--a
truth at second hand.
The preceding notices of the psychology of Aristotle will aid us
materially in interpreting his remarks "_Upon the Method and Habits
necessary to the ascertainment of Principles_."[711]
[Footnote 708: "De Anima," bk. iii. ch. v.]
[Footnote 709: "Ethics," bk. vi. ch. i.]
[Footnote 710: Ibid.]
[Footnote 711: "Post. Analytic," bk. ii, ch. xix., the concluding
chapter of the Organon.]
"That it is impossible to have scientific knowledge through
demonstration without a knowledge of first immediate principles, has
been elucidated before." This being established, he proceeds to explain
how that "knowledge of first, immediate principles" is developed in the
mind.
1. The knowledge of first principles is attained by the _intuition of
sense_--the immediate perception of external objects, as the _exciting_
or _occasional cause_ of their development in the mind.
"Now there appears inherent in all animals an innate power called
_sensible perception_ (aisthêsis); but sense being inherent, in some
animals a permanency of the sensible object is engendered, but in others
it is not engendered. Those, therefore, wherein the sensible object does
not remain have no knowledge without sensible perception, but others,
when they perceive, retain one certain thing in the soul,... with some,
_reason_ is produced from the permanency (of the sensible impression),
[as in man], but in others it is not [as in the brute]. From sense,
therefore, as we say, memory is produced, and from the repeated
remembrance of the same thing we get experience.... From experience, or
_from every universal remaining in the soul_--the one besides the many
which in all of them is _one_ and the _same_--the principles of art and
science arise. If experience is conversant with generation, the
principles of art; if with being, the principles of science.... Let us
again explain: When one thing without difference abides, there is then
the first universal (notion) [developed] in the soul; for the singular
indeed is perceived by sense, _but sense is [also] of the
universal_"--that is, the universal is immanent in the sensible object
as a property giving it "form." "It is manifest, then, that primary
things become necessarily known by induction, for thus sensible
perception produces [develops or evokes] the _universal_." 2. The
knowledge of first principles is attained by the _intuition of pure
intellect_ (nous)--that is, "_intellect itself is the principle of
science_" or, in other words, intellect is the _efficient, essential
cause_ of the knowledge of first principles.
"Of those habits which are about intellect by which we ascertain truth,
_some[712] are always true_, but others[713] admit the false, as opinion
and reasoning. But science and (pure) intellect are always true, and no
other kind of knowledge, except intellect [intellectual intuition], is
more accurate than science. And since the principles of demonstration
are more known, and all science is connected with reason, there could
not be a science of principles. But since nothing can be more true than
science, except intellect, intellect will belong to principles. From
these [considerations] it is evident that, as demonstration is not the
principle of demonstration, so neither is science the principle of
science. If, then, we have no other true genus (of habit) besides
science, _intellect will be the principle of science_; it will also be
the principle (or cause of the knowledge) of the principle."
[Footnote 712: The "noetic."]
[Footnote 713: The "dianætic."]
The doctrine of Aristotle regarding "first principles" may perhaps be
summed up as follows: All demonstrative science is based upon
_universals_ "prior in nature"--that is, upon _à priori_, self-evident,
necessary, and immutable principles. Our knowledge of these "first and
immediate principles" is dependent primarily on _intellect_ (nous) or
intuitive reason, and secondarily on sense, experience, and induction.
Prior to experience, the intellect contains these principles in itself
potentially, as "forms," "laws," "habitudes," or "predicaments" of
thought; but they can not be "evoked into energy," can not be revealed
in consciousness, except on condition of experience, and they can only
be scientifically developed by logical abstraction and definition. The
ultimate ground of all truth and certainty is thus a mode of our own
mind, a subjective necessity of thinking, and truth is not in things,
but in our own minds.[714] "Ultimate knowledge, as well as primary
knowledge, the most perfect knowledge which the philosopher can attain,
as well as the point from which he starts, is still a proposition. All
knowledge seems to be included under two forms--knowledge _that_ it is
so; knowledge _why_ it is so. Neither of these can, of course, include
the knowledge at which Plato is aiming--knowledge which is correlated
with Being--a knowledge, not _about_ things or persons, but _of_
them."[715]
[Footnote 714: "Metaphysics," bk. v. ch. iv.]
[Footnote 715: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 190.]
ARISTOTELIAN THEOLOGY
Theoretical philosophy, "the science which has truth for its end," is
divided by Aristotle into Physics, Mathematics, and Theology, or the
First Philosophy, now commonly known as "Metaphysics," because it is
beyond or above physics, and is concerned with the primitive ground and
cause of all things.[716]
In the former two we have now no immediate interest, but with Theology,
as "the science of the Divine,"[717] the _First Moving Cause_, which is
the source of all other causes, and the original ground of all other
things, we are specially concerned, inasmuch as our object is to
determine, if possible, whether Greek philosophy exerted any influence
upon Christian thought, and has bequeathed any valuable results to the
Theology of modern times.
"The Metaphysics" of Aristotle opens by an enumeration of "the
principles or causes"[718] into which all existences can be resolved by
philosophical analysis. This enumeration is at present to be regarded as
provisional, and in part hypothetical--a verbal generalization of the
different principles which seem to be demanded to explain the existence
of a thing, or constitute it what it is. These he sets down as--
[Footnote 716: "Physics are concerned with things which have a principle
of motion in themselves; mathematics speculate on permanent, but not
transcendental and self-existent things; and there is another science
separate from these two, which treats of that which is immutable and
transcendental, if indeed there exists such a substance, as we shall
endeavor to show that there does. This transcendental and permanent
substance, if it exist at all, must surely be the sphere of the
_divine_--it must be the first and highest principle. Hence it follows
that there are three kinds of speculative science--Physics, Mathematics,
and Theology."--"Metaphysics," bk. x. ch. vii.]
[Footnote 717: "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. ii.]
[Footnote 718: Aition--cause--is here used by Aristotle in the sense of
"account of" or "reason why."]
1. The Material Cause (tên ylên kai to ypokeimenon)--the matter and
subject--that _out of_ which a given thing has been originated. "From
the analogy which this principle has to wood or stone, or any actual
matter out of which a work of nature or of art is produced, the name
'material' is assigned to this class." It does not always necessarily
mean "matter" in the now common use of the term, but "antecedents--that
is, principles whose inherence and priority is implied in any existing
thing, as, for example, the premises of a syllogism, which are the
material cause of the conclusion."[719] With Aristotle there is,
therefore, "matter as an object of sense," and "matter as an object of
thought."
2. The Formal Cause (Tên ausian kai to ti einai)--the being or abstract
essence of a thing--that primary nature on which all its properties
depend. To this Aristotle gave the name of eidos--the form or exemplar
_according to_ which a thing is produced.
3. The Moving or Efficient Cause (othen ê archê tês kinêseôs)--the
origin and principle of motion--that _by which_ a thing is produced.
4. The Final Cause (to ou eneken kai to agathon)--the good end answered
by the existence of any thing--that for the sake of which_ any thing is
produced--the eneka tou, or reason for it.[720] Thus, for instance, in a
house, the wood out of which it is produced is the _matter (ylê), the
idea or conception according to which it is produced is _the form_
(eidos morphê), the builder who erects the house is the _efficient_
cause, and the reason for its production, or the end of its existence is
the _final_ cause.
[Footnote 719: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Aristotle;" "Post.
Analytic," bk. ii. ch. xi.]
[Footnote 720: "Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. iii.]
Causes are, therefore, the elements into which the mind resolves its
first rough conception of an object. That object is what it is, by
reason of the matter out of which it sprang, the moving cause which gave
it birth, the idea or form which it realizes, and the end or object
which it attains. The knowledge of a thing implies knowing it from these
four points of view--that is, knowing its four causes or principles.
These four determinations of being are, on a further and closer
analysis, resolved into the fundamental antithesis of MATTER and FORM.
"All things that are produced," says Aristotle,[721] "are produced from
something (that is, from _matter_), by something (that is, _form_), and
become something (the totality--to synolon);" as, for example, a statue,
a plant, a man. To every subject there belongs, therefore, first,
_matter_ (ylê); secondly, _form_ (morphê). The synthesis of these two
produces and constitutes _substance_, or ousia. Matter and form are thus
the two grand causes or principles whence proceed all things. The
formative cause is, at the same time, the moving cause and the final
cause; for it is evidently the element of determination which impresses
movement upon matter whilst determining it; and it is also the end of
being, since being only really exists when it has passed from an
indeterminate to a determinate state.
[Footnote 721: "Metaphysics," bk. vi. ch. vii.]
In proof that the eidos or form is an _efficient_ principle operating in
every object, which makes it, to our conception, what it is, Aristotle
brings forward the subject of generation or production.[722] There are
three modes of production--natural, artificial, and automatic. In
natural production we discern at once a matter; indeed Nature, in the
largest sense, may be defined as "that out of which things are
produced." Now the result formed out of this matter or nature is a given
substance--a vegetable, a beast, or a man. But what is the _producing_
cause in each case? Clearly something akin to the result. A man
generates a man, a plant produces another plant like to itself. There
is, therefore, implied in the resulting thing a _productive force_
distinct from matter, upon which it works. And this is the eidos, or
form. Let us now consider artificial production. Here again the form is
the producing power. And this is in the soul. The art of the physician
is the eidos, which produces actual health; the plan of the architect is
the conception, which produces an actual house. Here, however, a
distinction arises. In these artificial productions there is supposed a
noêsis and a poiêsis. The noêsis is the previous conception which the
architect forms in his own mind; the poiêsis is the actual creation of
the house out of the given matter. In this case the conception is the
moving cause of the production. The form of the statue in the mind of
the artist is the motive or cause of the movement by which the statue is
produced; and health must be in the thought of the physician before it
can become the moving cause of the healing art. Moreover, that which is
true of artificial production or change is also true of spontaneous
production. For example, a cure may take place by the application of
warmth, and this result is accomplished by means of friction. This
warmth in the body is either itself a portion of health, or something is
consequent upon it which is like itself, which is a portion of health.
Evidently this implies the previous presence either of nature or of an
artificer. It is also clearly evident that this kind of generating
influence (the automatic) should combine with another. There must be a
productive power, and there must be something out of which it is
produced. In this case, then, there will be a ylê and an eidos.[723]
[Footnote 722: Ibid.]
[Footnote 723: Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," pp. 205, 206.]
From the above it appears that the _efficient_ cause is regarded by
Aristotle as identical with the _formal_ cause. So also the _final_
cause--the end for the sake of which any thing exists--can hardly be
separated from the perfection of that thing, that is, from its
conception or form. The desire for the end gives the first impulse of
motion; thus the final cause of any thing becomes identical with the
good of that thing. "The moving cause of the house is the builder, but
the moving cause of the builder is the end to be attained--that is, the
house." From such examples as these it would seem that the
determinations of form and end are considered by Aristotle as one, in so
far as both are merged in the conception of _actuality_; for he regarded
the end of every thing to be its completed being--the perfect
realization of its idea or form. The only fundamental determinations,
therefore, which can not be wholly resolved into each other are _matter
and form_.[724]
[Footnote 724: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy," pp. 120, 123.]
The opposition of matter and form, with Aristotle, corresponds to the
opposition between the element of _generality_ and the element of
_particularity_. Matter is indeterminate; form is determinate. Matter,
abstracted from form, in thought, is entirely without predicate and
distinction; form is that which enters into the definition of every
subject, and without which it could not be defined. Matter is capable of
the widest diversity of forms, but is itself without form. Pure form is,
in fact, that which is without matter, or, in other words, it is the
pure conception of being. Matter is the necessary condition of the
existence of a thing; form is the essence of each thing, that in virtue
of which substance is possible, and without which it is inconceivable.
On the one side is passivity, possibility of existence, capacity of
action; on the other side is activity, actuality, thought. The unity of
these two in the realm of determined being constitutes every individual
substance. The relation of matter and form, logically apprehended, is
thus the relation of POTENTIALITY and ACTUALITY.
This is a further and indeed a most important step in the Aristotelian
theology. Matter, as we have seen, after all, amounts to merely capacity
for action, and if we can not discover some productive power to develop
potentiality into actuality, we look in vain for some explanation of the
phenomena around us. The discovery, however, of energy (energeia), as a
principle of this description, is precisely what we wanted, and a
momentary glance at the actual phenomena will show its perfect identity
with the eidos, or form.[725] "For instance, what is a calm? It is
evenness in the surface of the sea. Here the sea is the subject, that
is, the matter in _capacity_, but the evenness is the _energy_ or
actuality;... energy is thus as form."[726] The form (or idea) is thus
an energy or actuality (energeia); the matter is a capacity or
potentiality (dynamis), requiring the co-operation of the energy to
produce a result.
These terms, which are first employed by Aristotle in their
philosophical signification, are characteristic of his whole system. It
is, therefore, important we should grasp their precise philosophical
import; and this can only be done by considering them in the strictest
relation to each other. It is in this relation they are defined by
Aristotle. "Now energeia is the existence of a thing not in the sense of
its potentially existing. The term _potentially_ we use, for instance,
of the statue in the block, and of the half in the whole (since it may
be subtracted), and of a person knowing a thing, even when he is not
thinking of it, but might be so; whereas energeia is the opposite. By
applying the various instances our meaning will be plain, and one must
not seek a definition in each case, but rather grasp the conception of
the analogy as a whole,--that it is as that which builds to that which
has a capacity for building; as the waking to the sleeping; as that
which sees to that which has sight, but whose eyes are closed; as the
definite form to the shapeless matter; as the complete to the
unaccomplished. In this contrast, let the energeia be set off as forming
the one side, and on the other let the potential stand. Things are said
to be in energeia not always in like manner (except so far as there is
an analogy, that as this thing is in this, and related to this, so is
that in that, or related to that); for sometimes it implies _motion_ as
opposed to the _capacity of motion_, and sometimes _complete existence_
opposed to _undeveloped matter_".[727] As the term dynamis has the
double meaning of "_possibility of existence_" as well as "_capacity of
action_" so there is the double contrast of "_action_" as opposed to the
capacity of action; and "_actual existence_" opposed to possible
existence or potentiality. To express accurately this latter antithesis,
Aristotle introduced the term entelecheia[728]--entelechy, of which the
most natural account is that it is a compound of en telei echein--"being
in a state of perfection."[729] This term, however, rarely occurs in the
"Metaphysics," whilst energeia is everywhere employed, not only to
express activity as opposed to passivity, but complete existence as
opposed to undeveloped matter.
[Footnote 725: "That which Aristotle calls 'form' is not to be
confounded with what we may perhaps call shape [or figure]; a hand
severed from the arm, for instance, has still the outward shape of a
hand, but, according to Aristotelian apprehension, it is only a hand now
as to matter, and not as to form; an actual hand, a hand as to form, is
only that which can do the proper work of a hand."--Schwegler's "History
of Philosophy," p. 122.]
[Footnote 726: "Metaphysics," bk. vii. ch. ii.]
[Footnote 727: "Metaphysics," bk. viii. ch. vi.]
[Footnote 728: "Entelechy indicates the perfected act, the completely
actual."--Schw.]
[Footnote 729: Grant's Aristotle's "Ethics," vol. i. p. 184.]
"In Physics dynamis answers to the necessary conditions for the
existence of any thing before that thing exists. It thus corresponds to
ylê, both to the protê ylê--the first matter, or matter devoid of all
qualities, which is capable of becoming any definite substance, as, for
example, marble; and also to the eschatê ylê--or matter capable of
receiving form, as marble the form of the statue." Marble then exists
potentially in the simple elements before it is marble. The statue
exists potentially in the marble before it is carved. All objects of
thought exist, either purely in potentiality, or purely in actuality, or
both in potentiality and in actuality. This division makes an entire
chain of all existence. At the one end is matter, the protê ylê which
has a merely potential existence, which is necessary as a condition, but
which having no form and no qualities, is totally incapable of being
realized by the mind. At the other end of the chain is pure form, which
is not at all matter, the absolute and the unconditioned, the eternal
substance and energy without matter (ousia aldios kai energeia aneu
dynameôs), who can not be thought as non-existing--the self-existent
God. Between these two extremes is the whole row of creatures, which out
of potentiality evermore spring into actual being.[730]
[Footnote 730: Id., ib., vol. i. p. 185.]
The relation of actuality to potentiality is the subject of an extended
and elaborate discussion in book viii., the general results of which may
be summed up in the following propositions:
1. _The relation of Actuality to Potentiality is as the Perfect to the
Imperfect_.--The progress from potentiality to actuality is motion or
production (kinêsis or genesis). But this motion is transitional, and in
itself imperfect--it tends towards an end, but does not include the end
in itself. But actuality, if it implies motion, has an end in itself and
for itself; it is a motion desirable for its own sake.[731] The relation
of the potential to the actual Aristotle exhibits by the relation of the
unfinished to the finished work, of the unemployed builder to the one at
work upon his building, of the seed-corn to the tree, of the man who has
the capacity to think, to the man actually engaged in thought.[732]
Potentially the seed-corn is the tree, but the grown-up tree is the
actuality; the potential philosopher is he who is not at this moment in
a philosophic condition; indeed, every thing is potential which
possesses a principle of development, or of change. Actuality or
entelechy, on the other hand, indicates the _perfect act_, the end
gained, the completed actual; that activity in which the act and the
completeness of the act fall together--as, for example, to see, to
think, where the acting and the completed act are one and the same.
2. _The Relation of Actuality to Potentiality is a causal Relation_.--A
thing which is endued with a simple capacity of being may nevertheless
not actually exist, and a thing may have a capacity of being and really
exist. Since this is the case, there must ensue between non-being and
real being some such principle as _energy_, in order to account for the
transition or change.[733] Energy has here some analogy to motion,
though it must not be confounded with motion. Now you can not predicate
either motion or energy of things which are not. The moment energy is
added to them they are. This transition from potentiality to actuality
must be through the medium of such principles as propension or _free
will_, because propension or free will possess in themselves the power
of originating motion in other things.[734]
[Footnote 731: "Metaphysics," bk. viii. ch. vi.]
[Footnote 732: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. vi.]
[Footnote 733: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. iii.]
[Footnote 734: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. v.]
3. _The Relation of Actuality and Potentiality is a Relation of
Priority_.--Actuality, says Aristotle, is prior to potentiality in the
order of reason, in the order of substance, and also (though not
invariably) in the order of time. The first of all capacities is a
capacity of energizing or assuming a state of activity; for example, a
man who has the capacity of building is one who is skilled in building,
and thus able to use his energy in the art of building.[735] The primary
energizing power must precede that which receives the impression of it,
Form being older than Matter. But if you take the case of any particular
person or thing, we say that its capacity of being that particular
person or thing precedes its being so actually. Yet, though this is the
case in each particular thing, there is always a foregone energy
presumed in some other thing (as a prior seed, plant, man) to which it
owes its existence. One pregnant thought presents itself in the course
of the discussion which has a direct bearing upon our subject. [Dynamis]
has been previously defined as "a principle of motion or change in
another thing in so far forth as it is another thing"[736]--that is, it
is fitted by nature to have motion imparted to it, and to communicate
motion to something else. But this motion wants a resting-place. There
can be no infinite regression of causes. There is some primary [dynamis]
presupposed in all others, which is the beginning of change. This is
[Greek: physis], or nature. But the first and original cause of all
motion and change still precedes and surpasses nature. The final cause
of all potentiality is energy or _actuality_. The one proposed is prior
to the means through which the end is accomplished. A process of
actualization, a tendency towards completeness or perfection ([Greek:
telos]) presupposes an absolute actuality which is at once its beginning
and end. "One energy is invariably antecedent to another in time, up to
that which is primarily and eternally the Moving Cause."[737]
[Footnote 735: "Metaphysics," bk. viii. ch. viii.]
[Footnote 736: Ibid., bk. iv. ch. xii.]
[Footnote 737: Ibid., bk. viii. ch. viii.]
And now having laid down these fundamental principles of metaphysical
science, as preparatory to Theology, Aristotle proceeds to establish the
conception of the Absolute or Divine Spirit _as the eternal, immutable
Substance, the immaterial Energy, the unchangeable Form of Forms, the
first moving Cause_.
I. _The Ontological Form of Proof_.--It is necessary to conceive an
eternal and immutable substance--an actuality which is absolute and
prior, both logically and chronologically, to all potentiality; for that
which is potential is simply contingent, it may just as easily not be as
be; that which exists only in capacity is temporal and corruptible, and
may cease to be. Matter we know subsists merely in capacity and
passivity, and without the operation of Energy,(energeia), or the
formative cause, would be to us as non-entity. The phenomena of the
world exhibits to us the presence of Energy, and energy presupposes the
existence of an eternal substance. Furthermore, matter and potentiality
are convertible terms, therefore the primal Energy or Actuality must be
_immaterial_.[738]
2. _The Cosmological Form of Proof_.--It is impossible that there should
be _motion_, genesis, or a chain of causes, except on the assumption of
a first Moving Cause, since that which exists only in capacity can not,
of itself energize, and consequently without a principle of motion which
is essentially active, we have only a principle of immobility. The
principle "ex nihilo nihil" forbids us to assume that motion can arise
out of immobility, being out of non-being. "How can matter be put in
motion if nothing that subsists in energy exist, and is its cause?" All
becoming, therefore, necessarily supposes that which has not become,
that which is eternally self-active as the principle and cause of all
motion. There is no refuge from the notion that all things are "born of
night and nothingness" except in this belief.[739]
[Footnote 738: "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. vi.]
[Footnote 739: Ibid., bk. xi. ch. vii., viii.]
The existence of an eternal principle subsisting in energy is also
demanded to explain the _order_ of the world. "For how, let me ask, will
there prevail _order_ on the supposition that there is no subsistence of
that which is eternal, and which involves a separable existence, and is
permanent."[740] "All things in nature are constituted in the best
possible manner."[741] All things strive after "the good." "The
appearance of ends and means in nature is a proof of design."[742] Now
an end or final cause presupposes intelligence,--implies a _mind_ to see
and desire it. That which is "fair," "beautiful," "good," an "object of
desire," can only be perceived by Mind. The "final cause" must therefore
subsist in that which is prior and immovable and eternal; and _Mind_ is
"that substance which subsists absolutely, and according to
energy."[743] "The First Mover of all things, moves all things without
being moved, being an eternal substance and energy; and he moves all
things as the object of reason and of desire, or love."[744]
[Footnote 740: Ibid., bk. x. ch. ii.]
[Footnote 741: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. ix.]
[Footnote 742: "Nat. Ausc.," bk. ii. ch. viii.]
[Footnote 743: "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. vii.]
[Footnote 744: Ibid.]
3. _The Moral Form of Proof_.--So far as the relation of potentiality
and actuality is identical with the relation of matter and form, the
argument for the existence of God may be thus presented: The conception
of an absolute matter without form, involves the supposition of an
absolute form without matter. And since the conception of form resolves
itself into _motion_, _conception_, _purpose_ or _end_, so the Eternal
One is the absolute principle of motion (the prôton kinoun), the
absolute conception or pure intelligence (the pure ti ên einai), and the
absolute ground, reason, or end of all being. All the other predicates
of the First Cause follow from the above principles with logical
necessity.
(i.) _He is, of course, pure intellect_, because he is absolutely
immaterial and free from nature. He is active intelligence, because his
essence is pure actuality. He is self-contemplating and self-conscious
intelligence, because the divine thought can not attain its actuality in
any thing extrinsic; it would depend on something else than self--some
potential existence for its actualization. Hence the famous definition
of the absolute as "the thought of thought" (noêsis noêseôs).[745] "And
therefore the first and actual perception by mind of Mind itself, doth
subsist in this way throughout all eternity."[746]
[Footnote 745: Schwegler's "History of Philosophy," p. 125.]
[Footnote 746: "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. ix.]
(ii.) _He is also essential life_. "The principle of life is inherent in
the Deity, for the energy or active exercise of mind constitutes life,
and God constitutes this energy; and essential energy belongs to God as
his best and everlasting life. Now our statement is this--that the Deity
is a living being that is everlasting and most excellent in nature, so
that with the Deity life and duration are uninterrupted and eternal; for
this constitutes the essence of God."[747]
(iii.) _Unity belongs to him_, since multiplicity implies matter; and
the highest idea or form of the world must be absolutely
immaterial.[748] The Divine nature is "devoid of parts and indivisible,
for magnitude can not in any way involve this Divine nature; for God
imparts motion through infinite duration, and nothing finite--as
magnitude is--can be possessed of an infinite capacity."[749]
(iv.) _He is immovable and ever abideth the same_; since otherwise he
could not be the absolute mover, and the cause of all becoming, if he
were subject to change.[750] God is impassive and unalterable ([Greek:
apathês kai analloiôton]); for all such notions as are involved in
passion or alteration are outside the sphere of the Divine
existence.[751]
[Footnote 747: "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. vii.]
[Footnote 748: Ibid.]
[Footnote 749: Ibid.]
[Footnote 750: Ibid., bk. xi. ch. viii.]
[Footnote 751: Ibid., bk. xi. ch. vii.]
(v.) _He is the ever-blessed God_.--"The life of God is of a kind with
those highest moods which, with us, last a brief space, it being
impossible they should be permanent; whereas, with Him they are
permanent, since His ever-present consciousness is pleasure itself. And
it is because they are vivid states of consciousness, that waking, and
perception, and thought, are the sweetest of all things. Now essential
perception is the perception of that which is most excellent,... and the
mind perceives itself by participating of its own object of perception;
but it is a sort of coalescence of both that, in the Divine Mind,
creates a regular identity between the two, so that with God both (the
thinker and the thought, the subject and object) are the same. In
possession of this prerogative, He subsists in the exercise of energy;
and the contemplation of his own perfections is what, to God, must be
most agreeable and excellent. This condition of existence, after so
excellent a manner, is what is "so astonishing to us when we examine
God's nature, and the more we do so the more wonderful that nature
appears to us. The mood of the Divine existence is essential energy,
and, as such, it is a life that is most excellent, blessed, and
everlasting.[752]
[Footnote 752: "Metaphysics," bk. xi. ch. vii.]
The theology of Aristotle may be summed up in the following sentences
selected from book xi. of his "Metaphysics:"
"This motionless cause of motion is a necessary being; and, by virtue of
such necessity, is the all-perfect being. This all-pervading principle
penetrates heaven and all nature. It eternally possesses perfect
happiness; and its happiness is in action. This primal mover is
immaterial; for its essence is in energy. It is pure thought--thought
thinking itself--the thought of thought. The activity of pure
intelligence--such is the perfect, eternal life of God. This primal
cause of change, this absolute perfection, moves the world by the
universal desire for the absolute good, by the attraction exercised upon
it by the Eternal Mind--the serene energy of Divine Intelligence."
It can not be denied that, so far as it goes, this conception of the
Deity is admirable, worthy, and just. Viewed from a Christian
stand-point, we at once concede that it is essentially defective. There
is no clear and distinct recognition of God as Creator and Governor of
the universe; he is chiefly regarded as the Life of the universe--the
Intellect, the Energy--that which gives excellence, and perfection, and
gladness to the whole system of things. The Theology of Aristotle is, in
fact, metaphysical rather than practical. He does not contemplate the
Deity as a moral Governor. Whilst Plato speaks of "being made like God
through becoming just and holy," Aristotle asserts that "all moral
virtues are totally unworthy of being ascribed to God."[753] He is not
the God of providence. He dwells alone, supremely indifferent to human
cares, and interests, and sorrows. He takes no cognizance of individual
men, and holds no intercourse with man. The God of Aristotle is not a
being that meets and satisfies the wants of the human heart, however
well it may meet the demands of the reason.
[Footnote 753: "Ethics," bk. x. ch. viii.]
Morality has no basis in the Divine nature, no eternal type in the
perfections and government of God, and no supports and aids from above.
The theology of Aristotle foreshadows the character of the
ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS.
We do not find in Aristotle any distinct recognition of an eternal and
immutable morality, an absolute right, which has its foundation in the
nature of God. Plato had taught that there was "an absolute Good, above
and beyond all existence in dignity and power;" which is, in fact, "the
cause of all existence and all knowledge," and which is God; that all
other things are good in proportion as they "partake of this absolute
Good;" and that all men are so far good as they "resemble God." But with
this position Aristotle joins issue. After stating the doctrine of Plato
in the following words--"Some have thought that, besides all these
manifold goods upon earth, there is some _absolute good_, which is the
cause to all these of their being good"--he proceeds to criticise that
idea, and concludes his argument by saying--"we must dismiss the idea at
present, for if there is any one good, universal and generic, or
transcendental and absolute, it obviously can never be realized nor
possessed by man; whereas something of this latter kind is what we are
inquiring after." He follows up these remarks by saying that "Perhaps
the knowledge of the idea may be regarded by some as useful, as a
pattern (paradeigma) by which to judge of relative good." Against this
he argues that "There is no trace of the arts making use of any such
conception; the cobbler, the carpenter, the physician, and the general,
all pursue their vocations without respect to the _absolute good_, nor
is it easy to see how they would be benefited by apprehending it."[754]
The good after which Aristotle would inquire is, therefore, a _relative
good_, since the knowledge of the absolute good can not possibly be
realized.
[Footnote 754: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. vi.]
Instead, therefore, of seeking to attain to "a transcendental and
absolute good "--a fundamental idea of right, which may be useful as a
paradigm by which we may judge of relative good, he addresses himself
solely to the question, "what is good for man"--what is the good
attainable in action? And having identified the Chief Good with the
final and perfect end of all action, the great question of the _Ethics_
is, "_What is the end of human action?_" (ti esti to tôn praktôn
teloa).[755]
[Footnote 755: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. xiii.]
Now an end or final cause implies an intelligence--implies a mind to
perceive and desire it. This is distinctly recognized by Aristotle. The
question, therefore, naturally arises--is that end fixed for man by a
higher intelligence, and does it exist for man both as an idea and as an
ideal? Can man, first, intellectually apprehend the idea, and then
consciously strive after its realization? Is it the duty of man to aim
at fulfilling the purposes of his Creator? To this it may be answered
that Aristotle is not at all explicit as to God's moral government of
the world. "Moral government," in the now common acceptation of the
term, has no place in the system of Aristotle, and the idea of "duty" is
scarcely recognized. He considers "the good" chiefly in relation to the
constitution and natural condition of man. "_It is_" says he, "_the end
towards which nature tends_." As physical things strive unconsciously
after the end of their existence, so man strives after the good
attainable in life. Socrates had identified virtue and knowledge, he had
taught that "virtue is a Science." Aristotle contended that virtue is an
art, like music and architecture, which must be attained by exercise. It
is not purely intellectual, it is the bloom of the physical, which has
become ethical. As the flower of the field, obeying the laws of its
organization, springs up, blooms, and attains its own peculiar
perfection, so there is an instinctive desire (orexis) in the soul which
at first unconsciously yearns after the good, and subsequently the good
is sought with full moral intent and insight. Aristotle assumes that the
desires or instincts of man are so framed as to imply the existence of
this end (telos).[756] And he asserts that man can only realize it in
the sphere of his own proper functions, and in accordance with the laws
of his own proper nature and its harmonious development.[757] It is not,
then, through instruction, or through the perfection of knowledge, that
man is to attain the good, but through exercise and habit (ephos). By
practice of moral acts we become virtuous, just as by practice of
building and of music, we become architects and musicians; for the
habit, which is the ground of moral character, is only a fruit of
oft-repeated moral acts. Hence it is by these three things--nature,
habit, reason--that men become good.
[Footnote 756: Ibid, bk. i. ch. ii.]
[Footnote 757: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. vii.]
Aristotle's question, therefore, is, _What is the chief good for man as
man_? not what is his chief good as a spiritual and an immortal being?
or what is his chief good as a being related to and dependent upon God?
And the conclusion at which he arrives is, that it is _the absolute
satisfaction of our whole nature_--that which men are agreed in calling
_happiness_. This happiness, however, is not mere sensual pleasure. The
brute shares this in common with man, therefore it can not constitute
the happiness of man. Human happiness must express the completeness of
rational existence. And inasmuch as intelligence is essential activity,
as the soul is the _entelechy_ of the body, therefore the happiness of
man can not consist in a mere passive condition. It must, therefore,
consist in _perfect activity_ in well-doing, and especially in
contemplative thought,[758] or as Aristotle defines it--"_It is a
perfect practical activity in a perfect life_."[759] His conception of
the chief good has thus two sides, one internal, that which exists in
and for the consciousness--a "complete and perfect life," the other
external and practical. The latter, however, is a means to the former.
That complete and perfect life is the complete satisfaction and
perfection of our rational nature. It is a state of peace which is the
crown of exertion. It is the realization of the divine in man, and
constitutes the absolute and all-sufficient happiness.[760] A good
action is thus an End-in-itself (teleion telos) inasmuch as it secures
the _perfection_ of our nature; it is that for the sake of which our
moral faculties before existed, hence bringing an inward pleasure and
satisfaction with it; something in which the mind can rest and fully
acquiesce; something which can be pronounced beautiful, fitting,
honorable, and perfect.
[Footnote 758: "If it be true to say that happiness consists in doing
well, a life of action must be best both for the state and the
individual. But we need not, as some do, suppose that a life of action
implies relation to others, or that those only are active thoughts which
are concerned with the results of action; but far rather we must
consider those speculations and thoughts to be so which have their _end
in themselves_, and which are for their own sake."--"Politics," bk. vii.
ch. iii.]
[Footnote 759: "Ethics," bk. i. ch. x.]
[Footnote 760: "Ethics," bk. x. ch. viii.]
From what has been already stated, it will be seen that the Aristotelian
conception of _Virtue_ is not conformity to an absolute and immutable
standard of right. It is defined by him as _the observation of the right
mean (mesotês) in action_--that is, the right mean relatively to
ourselves. "Virtue is a habit deliberately choosing, existing as a mean
(meson) which refers to us, and is defined by reason, and as a prudent
man would define it; and it is a mean between two evils, the one
consisting in excess, the other in defect; and further, it is a mean, in
that one of these falls short of, and the other exceeds, what is right
both in passions and actions; and that virtue both finds and chooses the
mean."[761] The perfection of an action thus consists in its containing
the right degree--the true mean between too much, and too little. The
law of the mesotês is illustrated by the following examples: Man has a
fixed relation to pleasure and pain. In relation to pain, the true mean
is found in neither fearing it nor courting it, and this is _fortitude_.
In relation to pleasure, the true mean stands between greediness and
indifference; this is _temperance_. The true mean between prodigality
and narrowness is _liberality_; between simplicity and cunning is
_prudence_; between suffering wrong and doing wrong is _justice_.
Extending this law to certain qualifications of temper, speech, and
manners, you have the portrait of a graceful Grecian gentleman. Virtue
is thus _proportion, grace, harmony, beauty in action_.
[Footnote 761: Ibid, bk. ii. ch. vi.]
It will at once be seen that this classification has no stable
foundation. It furnishes no ultimate standard of right. The _mean_ is a
wavering line. It differs under different circumstances and relations,
and in different times and places. That mean which is sufficient for one
individual is insufficient for another. The virtue of a man, of a slave,
and of a child, is respectively different. There are as many virtues as
there are circumstances in life; and as men are ever entering into new
relations, in which it is difficult to determine the correct method of
action, the separate virtues can not be limited to any definite number.
Imperfect as the ethical system of Aristotle may appear to us who live
in Christian times, it must be admitted that his writings abound with
just and pure sentiments. His science of Ethics is a _discipline of
human character in order to human happiness_. And whilst it must be
admitted that it is directed solely to the improvement of man in the
present life, he aims to build that improvement on pure and noble
principles, and seeks to elevate man to the highest perfection of which
he could conceive. "And no greater praise can be given to a work of
heathen morality than to say, as may be said of the ethical writings of
Aristotle, that they contain nothing which a Christian may dispense
with, no precept of life which is not an element of Christian character;
and that they only fail in elevating the heart and the mind to objects
which it needed Divine Wisdom to reveal."[762]
[Footnote 762: Encyclopædia Britannica, article "Aristotle."]