CHAPTER VII

EDUCATION AFTER TWENTY-ONE

Be assured that happiness has its source, not in extensive

possessions, but in a right disposition of the soul. Even in the

case of the body, no one would call it fortunate for being arrayed

in splendid garments; but one would do so, if it had health, and

were nobly developed, even without such appendages. In the same

manner, we ought to ascribe happiness to the soul only when it is

cultivated, and to call a man happy only if he possesses such a

soul, not if he is splendidly attired outwardly, but has no worth of

his own.... For those whose souls are ill-conditioned, neither

wealth, nor power, nor beauty is a blessing; on the contrary, the

more excessive these conditions are, the more widely and deeply do

they injure their possessors, being unaccompanied with

right-mindedness.--Aristotle.

Zeno used to tell a story about Crates, to this effect: One day

Crates was sitting in a shoemaker's shop, reading aloud Aristotle's

_Exhortation_ (to Philosophy), addressed to Themison, king of the

Cyprians, in which the king is reminded that he possesses, in an

exceptional degree, all the conditions of philosophy, superabundant

wealth, and high position. As he was reading, the shoemaker, without

interrupting his sewing, listened to him, until at last Crates said:

"Philiscus, I think I will write an _Exhortation_ for you; for I see

you have more of the conditions of philosophy than Aristotle has

enumerated."--Teles.

At the age of twenty-one, those young men who have successfully

completed the State system of training become citizens or politicians,

and begin to exercise the functions of such. These are of two kinds, (1)

active, practical, or executive, and (2) deliberative, theoretical, or

legislative. As action must, on the one hand, be vigorous, and, on the

other, guided by deliberation, which requires large experience, the

functions of the State must be so arranged that the active duties fall

to the young and robust, the deliberative to the elderly and mature. The

distinguishing virtue of the former is fortitude, with endurance or

patience; that of the latter philosophy. Both equally have self-control

and justice. In this way does Aristotle distribute Plato's four cardinal

virtues.

When young men first become citizens, they are assigned to posts of

active service, civil and military, and thus study practical

philosophy--Ethics and Politics--in a practical way. As they grow older,

they gradually rise to posts demanding less practice and more thought,

until at last they are admitted to the deliberative body, or council,

when their active duties cease, and they are able to devote themselves

to Speculative Philosophy or Theoretics. These men have now reached the

end of life, as far as this world is concerned. They spend their days in

cultured leisure, and the contemplation of divine things (θεωρία). The

very oldest of them, those who are most conversant with divine things,

are chosen as priests, so that they may, as it were, live with the gods,

and these be worthily served. Thus gradually, almost insensibly, they

pass from the world of time to that of eternity; from the imperfect

activity of practice, whose end is beyond itself, to the perfect energy

of contemplation, which is self-sufficient and the life of God. In this

way Aristotle settles the vexed question with regard to the

compatibility and relative value of the practical and the contemplative

life. They are necessary complements of each other. Practice is the

realization of what contemplation discovers in the pure energy of God,

revealing itself in the world. Thus the practical life of man glides

gradually into the contemplative life of God.

Such is the highest view of man's destiny, and the way thither, that the

Greeks ever reached, and it is in many ways a most attractive and

inspiring one. Its defects are the defects of all that is Greek. They

are two: (1) its ideal is intellectual and æsthetic,--a coördinated,

harmonious whole, whereof the individual is but a part: not moral or

religious--a self-surrender of the individual to the supreme will;

consequently, (2) it does not provide for every human being, as such,

but only for a small, select number, the fruit of the whole. Its ethics

are institutional not personal, and, indeed, the Greek never arrived at

a distant conception of personality, that being possible only through

the moral consciousness, which is its core. It seeks to find happiness

in a correlation and balancing of individual selves, not in the

independent conformity of each self to a supreme self. Hence it was

that, with all its marvellous grasp and manly prudence, the ideal of

Aristotle proved powerless to restore the moral unity of man, until it

was absorbed in a higher.

BOOK IV

THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD

(B.C. 338-A.D. 313)

CHAPTER I

FROM ETHNIC TO COSMOPOLITAN LIFE

'Tis Greece, but living Greece no more.--Byron.

Most glorious of all the Undying, many-named, girt round with awe!

Jove, author of Nature, applying to all things the rudder of law--

Hail! Hail! for it justly rejoices the races whose life is a span

To lift unto Thee their voices--the Author and Framer of Man.

For we are Thy sons; Thou didst give us the symbols of speech at our

birth,

Alone of the things that live, and mortal move upon earth.

Wherefore Thou shalt find me extolling and ever singing Thy praise;

Since Thee the great Universe, rolling on its path round the world,

obeys:--

Obeys Thee, wherever Thou guidest, and gladly is bound in Thy bands,

So great is the power Thou confidest, with strong, invincible hands,

To Thy mighty, ministering servant, the bolt of the thunder, that

flies,

Two-edged, like a sword and fervent, that is living and never dies.

All nature, in fear and dismay, doth quake in the path of its stroke,

What time Thou preparest the way for the one Word Thy lips have spoke,

Which blends with lights smaller and greater, which pervadeth and

thrilleth all things,

So great is Thy power and Thy nature--in the Universe Highest of Kings!

On earth, of all deeds that are done, O God! there is none without

Thee.

In the holy æther not one, nor one on the face of the sea;

Save the deeds that evil men, driven by their own blind folly, have

planned;

But things that have grown uneven are made even again by Thy hand;

And things unseemly grow seemly, the unfriendly are friendly to Thee;

For so good and evil supremely Thou hast blended in one by decree.

For all Thy decree is one ever--a Word that endureth for aye,

Which mortals, rebellious, endeavor to flee from and shun to obey--

Ill-fated, that, worn with proneness for the lordship of goodly things,

Neither hear nor behold, in its Oneness, the law that divinity brings;

Which men with reason obeying, might attain unto glorious life,

No longer aimlessly straying in the paths of ignoble strife.

There are men with a zeal unblest, that are wearied with following of

fame,

And men, with a baser quest, that are turned to lucre and shame.

There are men, too, that pamper and pleasure the flesh with delicate

stings:

All these desire beyond measure to be other than all these things.

Great Jove, all-giver, dark-clouded, great Lord of the thunderbolt's

breath!

Deliver the men that are shrouded in ignorance, dismal as death.

O Father! dispel from their souls the darkness, and grant them the

light

Of Reason, Thy stay, when the whole wide world Thou rulest with might,

That we, being honored, may honor Thy name with the music of hymns,

Extolling the deeds of the Donor, unceasing, as rightly beseems

Mankind; for no worthier trust is awarded to God or to man

Than forever to glory with justice in the law that endures and is

One.--Cleanthes.

The distinguishing characteristics of Hellenic education were unity,

comprehensiveness, proportion, and aimfulness. It extended to the whole

human being, striving to bring the various elements of his nature into

complete harmony in view of an end. This end was the State, in which the

individual citizen was expected to find a field for all his activities.

We have seen how, while conservative Sparta clung to this ideal to the

last, and rigorously excluded those influences which tended to undermine

it, Athens, by freely admitting these, gradually broke down the fair

proportion between bodily and mental education, in an excessive devotion

to the latter, and so came to make a distinction between the man and the

citizen. The result was an epidemic of individualism which threatened

the existence of all that was Hellenic. Against this destructive power

the noblest men in the nation, an Æschylus, an Aristophanes, a Pericles,

a Socrates, a Xenophon, a Plato, an Aristotle, fought with all the might

of worth and intellect. Some of them sought once more to remerge the man

in the citizen by means of a despotism and the suppression of all

intellectual pursuits; others, seeing clearly the impossibility of this,

tried so to define the sphere of the individual that it should not

encroach upon that of the citizen, but stand in harmonious relation to

it. They did this by placing the sphere of the individual above that of

the State, and, inasmuch as the former was a purely intellectual sphere,

they found themselves driven to conclude, and to lay down, that the

contemplative life is the end and consummation of the practical, that

the citizen and the State exist only for the sake of the individual.

They were very far indeed from seeing all the implications of this

conclusion: these showed themselves only in the sequel; but the fact is,

that the principle of the separation between the man and the citizen,

and the assignment of the place of honor to the former, proved at once

the destroying angel of Hellenism and the animating spirit of the

civilization which took its place. If we look closely at the schemes of

Plato and Aristotle, we shall see that they try to render innocuous the

spirit of individualism by exhausting its activities in intellectual

relations to the divine, offering it heaven, if it will only consent to

relinquish to the political spirit its earthly claims. They practically

said: Man, in all his relations to his fellow-men here below, is a

citizen; only in relation to God is he an individual. The history of the

last two thousand years is but a commentary on this text. From the day

when the master-mind of the Greek world credited man's nature with a

divine element having a supreme activity of its own, European thought

and life have been agitated by three questions, and largely shaped by

the answers given to them: (1) What is the nature of the divine element

in man? (2) In what form or institution shall that element find

expression and realization? (3) How shall that institution relate itself

to the State? And they have not yet been definitely answered.

Principles that are to move the world are never the result of mere

abstract thought, but always of a crisis or epoch in human affairs. And

so it was in the present case. The separation between the man and the

citizen was accomplished in fact, before it was formulated in theory. On

the other hand, the theory received emphasis from the events which

accompanied and followed its promulgation. The battle of Chæronea, which

took place sixteen years before Aristotle's death, by putting an end

forever to the free civic life of Greece, removed the very conditions

under which the old ideal could realize itself, and forced men to seek

a sphere of activity, and to form associations, outside of the State.

The State, indeed, still maintained a semblance of life, and the old

education, with its literature, gymnastics, and music still continued;

but the spirit of both was gone. The State was gradually replaced by the

philosophic schools, while intellectual training tended more and more to

concentrate itself upon rhetoric, that art which enables the individual

to shine before his fellows, and to gain wealth or public preferment.

From this time on, the spiritual life of Greece found expression in the

pretentious, empty individualism of the rhetorician, the lineal

descendant of the sophists, and in the philosophical sects, which

embodied the spirit of Socrates, their opponent.

The founder of the rhetorical schools may be said to have been

Isocrates, who, after being a pupil of Socrates', turned against the

philosophic tendency, and championed elegant philistinism. The aim of

these schools was to turn out clever men of the world, thoroughly

acquainted with popular opinions and motives, and capable of expressing

themselves glibly, sententiously, and persuasively on any and every

subject. They usually made no profession of imparting profound learning

or eliciting philosophic thought: indeed, they despised both; but they

did seek to impart such an amount of ordinary knowledge as to place

their pupils in the chief current of the popular thought of their time.

They thus became the bearers of practical education among a people who,

having lost their political life without finding any higher, sought to

obtain satisfaction in social intercourse. For hundreds of years they

exerted an enormous influence, and, indeed, at certain times and places

were formidable rivals of the philosophic schools.

The first man of Greek race who attempted to found a sect or school

outside the State was Pythagoras, and there can be no doubt that all

subsequent schools were in some degree modelled upon his. It is true

that the Pythagorean school had been broken up and dispersed long before

the days of Plato and Aristotle (see p. 54); nevertheless, his

followers, scattered over Greece, had carried with them the ideas and

principles of their master, and now that Athens had fallen into the

condition against which the Pythagorean discipline had been a protest,

these ideas found a ready response in the hearts of those men whom the

social life of the time could not satisfy. Hence the schools of Plato

and Aristotle, which had originally been mere educational institutions,

turned, even during the lifetime of the latter, into sects (αἱρέσεις,

heresies, as they were called later on), with definite sets of

non-political principles, in accordance with which their members tried

to shape their lives. It cannot be said that these two schools were in

any high degree successful, and the reasons were that they were too

purely intellectual, that they made no striking revolt against political

life, and that they called for a type of man not easy to find. But,

shortly after the death of Aristotle, there arose, almost

contemporaneously, two other schools, which exerted an influence, deep

and wide, for over six hundred years. These were the Epicurean and the

Stoic. Widely as these differed in respect to means, they sought the

same end, namely, personal independence, and they sought it by

conformity to laws imposed by no human legislator, but by nature. The

former took the law of the senses, the latter the law of the spirit, for

its guide; and, by a strange contradiction, while the former championed

free will, the latter professed fatalism. These four schools were the

only ones that ever met with extensive patronage in Athens, and with the

exception of the Academic, they never diverged far from the principles

of their founders. In the time of Marcus Aurelius, after Athens had been

for ages a mere Roman university, they were placed under State

patronage, and supported by public funds, and there is no record to show

that this was discontinued until they were finally closed by the Emperor

Justinian in A.D. 529.

Not long after the death of Aristotle, Athens was supplanted by

Alexandria, as the centre of Greek influence. Here the rhetorical and

philosophic schools established themselves, and could soon boast a

numerous discipleship. This, however, was no longer exclusively, or even

mainly, Greek, but was recruited from all the nations of the known

world, more especially those of the East. Phœnicians, Syrians, Jews,

Persians, etc., not to speak of Egyptians, now became students of Greek

philosophy, and members of philosophic sects, whose members not only

studied together, but often, to a large extent, lived together in

communities. About the year B.C. 300 were founded the famous Museum and

Library of Alexandria--the first university and the first public library

in the world. Round these the various sects gathered, to study, to

discuss, and to exchange opinions. Nor was it Greek thought alone that

engaged their attention. The opinions and beliefs of Egypt and the East

came in for a share, and, in the end, for the largest share. Nor is this

wonderful, when we consider the direction that thought and life were

then taking.

We have already seen that, as Greek civic life lost the conditions of

its existence, the thoughtful portion of the people came more and more

to seek for life-principles in the supersensible world of intellect. The

nature of this world Plato and Aristotle had done their best to reveal.

But the event proved that neither an ordered host of ideas commanded by

the Good, nor a Supreme Intelligence served by a host of lower

intelligences, could yield the principles which the life of the time

demanded; and thus we find the philosophers of Alexandria striving to

people their intelligible world with forms drawn from all the religions

of the East, including Judaism. Thus there grew up the various forms of

Alexandrine philosophy, compounds of Greek thought and Oriental

religion. On the basis of these again were organized, at the same time,

various forms of social life, all tending more or less to religious

communism. Hence came the Essenes (see p. 59), the Therapeuts, the

Neopythagoreans, and the Neoplatonists, all of whom, notwithstanding

certain shortcomings, did much to purify life, and to pave the way for a

higher civilization.

In B.C. 146, Greece, and, in B.C. 30, Egypt, fell into the hands of the

Romans and thenceforth formed provinces of their empire. Athens and

Alexandria were now Roman university-towns, while Rome became more and

more the diffusing centre of Greek and Oriental influence. It would be

impossible, in a work like the present, to give even a sketch of the

forms which education assumed in these three great centres, or in the

world that revolved round them, in the six hundred and more years that

passed between the loss of Greek autonomy and the triumph of

Christianity. We shall merely endeavor to give a general notion of its

two chief tendencies, which, as we saw, were towards rhetoric and

philosophy; and we shall do this in connection with the names of two

men, who may be regarded as respectively typical of the two tendencies,

Quintilian the rhetorician, and Plotinus the philosopher. By doing so we

shall pave the way for the consideration of the Rise of the Christian

Schools.

CHAPTER II

QUINTILIAN AND RHETORICAL EDUCATION

Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both have for their

subjects those things which, in a certain way, are matters of common

knowledge, and belong to no definite science. Hence everybody, in

some degree, is gifted with them; for everybody, to some extent,

tries to examine and sustain an argument, to defend himself, and to

accuse others.--Aristotle.

There is a certain political theory which is made up of many great

things. A large and important part of it is artificial eloquence,

which they call rhetoric.--Cicero.

Every duty which tends to preserve human relations and human society

must be assigned a higher place than any that stops short with

knowledge and science.--_Id._

Zeno, having pressed his fingers together and closed his fist, said

that was like Dialectic; having spread them out and opened his hand,

he said Eloquence was like his palm there.--_Id._

To act considerately is of more moment than to think wisely.--_Id._

I pass to the pleasure of oratorical eloquence, the delight of which

one enjoys not at any one moment, but almost every day and every

hour.--Tacitus.

Grammar is an experimental knowledge of the usages of language as

generally current among poets and prose writers. It is divided into

six parts, (1) trained reading with due regard to prosody [_i.e._

aspiration, accentuation, quantity, emphasis, metre, etc.], (2)

exposition according to poetic figures [literary criticism], (3)

ready statement of dialectical peculiarities and allusions

[philology, geography, history, mythology], (4) discovery of

etymologies, (5) accurate account of analogies [accidence and

syntax], (6) criticism of poetical productions, which is the noblest

part of the grammatic art [ethics, politics, strategy,

etc.].--Dionysius Thrax.

Reading is the rendering of poetic or prose productions without

stumbling or hesitancy. It must be done with due regard to

expression, prosody, and pauses. From the expression we learn the

merit of the piece, from the prosody the art of the reader, and from

the pauses the meaning intended to be conveyed. In this way we read

tragedy heroically, comedy conversationally, elegiacs thrillingly,

epics sustainedly, lyrics musically, and dirges softly and

plaintively. Any reading done without due observance of these rules

degrades the merits of the poets and makes the habits of readers

ridiculous.--_Id._

Some arts are common, others liberal.... The liberal arts, which

some call the logical arts, are astronomy, geometry, music,

philosophy, medicine, grammar, rhetoric.--_Scholia to Dionysius

Thrax._

It is obvious that man excels the other animals in worth and speech:

Why may we not hold that his worth consists as much in eloquence as

in reason?--Quintilian.

The civil man, and he who is truly wise, who does not devote himself

to idle disputes, but to the administration of the commonwealth

(from which those folks who are called philosophers have farthest

withdrawn themselves), will be glad to employ every available

oratorical means to reach his ends, having previously settled in his

own mind what ends are honorable.--_Id._

If we count over all the epochs of life, we shall find its pains far

more numerous than its pleasures.... The first, that of babyhood, is

trying. The baby is hungry; the nurse sends it to sleep: it is

thirsty; she washes it: it wants to go to sleep; she takes a rattle

and makes a noise. When the child has escaped from the nurse, it is

taken hold of by the pedagogue, the physical trainer, the

grammar-master, the music-master, the drawing-master. In process of

time, there are added the arithmetic-master, the geometer, the

horse-breaker; he rises early; he has no chance for leisure. He

becomes a cadet; again he has to fear the drill-master, the physical

trainer, the fencing-master, the gymnasiarch. By all these he is

whipt, watched, throttled. He graduates from the cadets at twenty;

again he dreads and watches captain and general, etc.--Teles the

Stoic (B.C. 260).

The palmy period in the history of Rome is the period when she had

no literature. It was only when the Roman nationality began to

break up, and cosmopolitan Greek tendencies to lay hold upon the

people, that a literature began to appear. For this reason, Roman

literature from its very inception is, from absolute necessity,

filled with the Greek spirit, and stands in the most direct

opposition to the national spirit of the people.--Mommsen.

Quintiliane, vagæ moderator summe juventæ,

Gloria Romanæ, Quintiliane, togæ.--Martial.

Up to the time when Rome began to decline, the school education of her

youth was meagre in the extreme, consisting of reading, writing, and a

little law. All later education that was more than this was borrowed

from the Greeks. It was about the year 200 B.C., at the close of the

Second Punic War, that their influence began clearly to show itself. The

severe Cato, who so cordially despised rhetoricians and philosophers,

learnt Greek in his old age and wrote, for the use of his son, a series

of manuals on ethics, rhetoric, medicine, military science, farming, and

law. At the same time Scipio Africanus spent his leisure hours in

practising gymnastics. From this time on, and just in proportion as Rome

lost her national character and became cosmopolitan, she more and more

adopted Greek manners, Greek religion (or irreligion), and Greek

education. When, finally, in B.C. 146, Greece became a Roman dependency,

it was strictly true that "Captive Greece took captive her rude

conqueror." Thousands of Greek schoolmasters, rhetoricians,

philosophers, etc., flocked to Rome, and, though attempts were made to

expel or suppress them, they held their place, for the simple reason

that the education they offered was a necessity of the time. Rome, the

mistress of the world, had either to become cosmopolitan or perish, and

she preferred the former alternative. She now, for the first time, began

to have a literature and to cultivate her own language. The studies

which she specially affected were (1) grammar, that is, literature, (2)

rhetoric, (3) philosophy, which corresponded to school, college, and

university education. The last, like music and geometry, was, for the

most part, an elegant accomplishment, rather than a serious study. The

physical sciences found little favor.

So long as Roman education was in the hands of Greeks, it was conducted

in the Greek language, and the authors read and discussed were Greek.

But the Romans, though willing enough to borrow Greek culture, were

unwilling to remain permanently in intellectual dependence upon a

conquered people, which in many respects they despised. Strong efforts,

therefore, were made to develop a national literature and a national

education. About the year B.C. 100, Lucius Ælius Præconinus Stilo, a

worthy and conservative Roman knight, opened a private class in Latin

grammar and rhetoric for young men of the upper classes, and from this

time on the direct influence of the Greeks, except in philosophy,

declined. Greek, indeed, continued to be spoken by all persons making

any pretensions to culture; but Latin became the language of Roman

literature. Among the pupils of Stilo were Varro and Cicero, who, along

with Julius Cæsar, may be called the parents of the classical Latin

language, literature, and eloquence. Both Varro and Cæsar wrote works on

grammar. A certain Cornificius (generally known as _Auctor ad

Herennium_) about this time wrote the first Latin treatise on Rhetoric;

but the great authority on the subject, in practice as well as theory,

was Cicero, who wrote no fewer than seven works on it. With Cicero's

death, and the transformation of the republic into an empire, eloquence

lost its noblest use, the defence of liberty. Rhetoric, nevertheless,

continued to be cultivated as a fine art and for forensic use, and,

indeed, was made to cover the whole of the higher education of youth. Of

this art the most celebrated teacher was Quintilian, "the supreme

director of giddy youth, the glory of the Roman toga" (_i.e._ civil

manhood).

Quintilian was born about A.D. 35 in the Spanish city of Calagurris

(Calahorra), where, later, St. Dominic first saw the light. He was

educated in Rome, but afterwards returned to his native place and

established himself as a teacher of rhetoric. About A.D. 68, he was

invited by the Emperor Galba to settle in Rome, which he did, giving

instruction in rhetoric with unparalleled success for twenty years, and

drawing a salary from the government. At the end of that time, he

retired, rich and honored, into private life. It was after this that he

wrote the work which carried his fame down to posterity, his _Institutio

Oratorica_, or Education of the Orator. In the first book of this he

draws out a scheme of preparatory education for the family and the

school; the succeeding ten are devoted to rhetoric, and the last to the

character of the orator, whom he regards as identical with the

cultivated gentleman. It is only the first book that concerns the modern

student of education, and of this I shall now give a brief summary.

The first care of the parent, after the birth of a child, should be to

procure for it a nurse of good moral character and of cultivated speech.

A child that early learns bad habits in acting and speaking, rarely, if

ever, gets cured of them afterwards. Great care ought to be taken with

regard to the child's youthful companions, and to his pedagogue, who

ought to be of good character and well-informed. Its first language

ought to be Greek; but Latin ought to be begun early, and both to be

carefully cultivated. There is no need to follow the ordinary custom of

not allowing the child to learn to read or write before the close of its

seventh year. Much can very profitably be done by play long before that.

It is a mistake to teach children to repeat the alphabet before they

know the forms of the letters. These they may learn from tablets or

blocks. As soon as the letters are recognized, they ought to be written.

Following with a pen the forms of letters engraved on ivory tablets is a

good thing. After letters, syllables must be learnt--all the possible

syllables in both languages. After syllables come words, and after

words, sentences. In all this process, it is of the utmost importance to

secure thoroughness by avoiding haste. The child must not attempt words

till he can read and write all the syllables, nor sentences till he is

perfectly familiar with words. In reading sentences, he must learn to

run ahead, so that, while he is pronouncing one word with his lips, he

is recognizing others with his eye. The writing lesson should be

utilized in order to make the child acquainted with rare words and good

poetry. At this stage, his memory ought to be well exercised, and made

to lay up large stores of good literature for future use. At the same

time, his organs of speech should be well trained, by being made to

pronounce rapidly verses containing difficult combinations of sound.[5]

As soon as he is able, the child should go to school. Home education is

objectionable on many accounts, especially for boys intended for

orators. These, above all others, must learn sociability, tact, and

_esprit de corps_, and form school-friendships. Many moral lessons can

be learnt, and many motives employed, in the school, that are not

possible in the family. Among the latter is ambition, which "though

itself a vice, is the parent of many virtues," and therefore ought to be

freely used. Hardly any motive is so powerful.

When a boy is sent to school, his teacher's first business is to

investigate his character and capacity. The chief marks of ability are

memory and power of imitation. Imitation is not mimicry, which is always

a sign of low nature. Slowness, though objectionable, is better than

precocity, which should be discouraged in every way. Different treatment

is required for different boys: some need the bit, some the spur. The

best boy is the one "whom praise excites, whom glory pleases, who cries

when he is beaten. Such a one may be nourished with emulation; reproach

will sting him; honor will rouse him." Boys ought to have seasons of

rest and play, neither too short to afford recreation, nor too long to

encourage idleness. Games of question and answer are good for

sharpening the wits. In play an excellent opportunity is offered to the

teacher for learning the character of his pupils. Corporal punishment is

altogether to be deprecated, and, indeed, is unneeded when the teacher

does his duty.

What boys learn in school is grammar; but this must be supplemented by

music and astronomy. Without the former it will be impossible to scan

verse; without the latter, to understand certain allusions and modes of

fixing dates in the poets. A little philosophy is necessary for the sake

of understanding such poets as Empedocles and Lucretius; geometry, in

order to give practice in apodictic reasoning, as well as for practical

uses. Thus the curriculum of school education will consist of Grammar,

Music, Astronomy, Philosophy, and Geometry.

Grammar consists of two parts, (1) _Methodics_, or the art of correct

speaking, (2) _Historics_ (German _Realien_), the interpretation of

poets, historians, philosophers, etc. _Methodics_--grammar in the modern

sense--should aim at enabling a boy to speak and write with correctness,

clearness, and elegance. All barbarisms (_i.e._ foreign words and

idioms), solecisms, affectations, and careless pronunciations are to be

avoided. In the use of language, four things are to be taken into

account, (1) reason, (2) antiquity, (3) authority, (4) custom. In

reading, the boy must be taught "where to draw his breath, where to

divide a verse, where the sense is complete, where it begins, where the

voice is to be raised, where lowered, what inflections to use, what is

to be uttered slowly, what rapidly, what forcibly, what gently." "That

he may be able to do all this, he must _understand_. Reading must above

all be manly and grave, with a certain sweetness." Poetry must not be

read either as prose, nor yet in a sing-song way. All theatrical

personification, and all gesticulation smacking of the comedian, are to

be avoided.

For _Histories_ the teacher must be very careful in his selection of

texts. Homer and Virgil are best to begin with. Though their full import

cannot be understood by youth, they awake enthusiasm for what is noble

and spirited, and will often be read in later life. "Tragedies are

useful. There is nourishment in the lyric poets"; but they must be used

with caution and in selections, from which everything relating to love

must be excluded. Even Horace must be expurgated. Satire and comedy,

though of the utmost value for the orator, must be deferred till the

moral character is sufficiently established not to be injured by them.

Passages from the poets ought to be committed to memory. In all reading,

the utmost care ought to be taken to promote purity and manliness

(_sanctitas et virilitas_).

After reading a piece of poetry, boys must be made to analyze and scan

it, to point out peculiarities of language and rhythm, to enumerate the

different meanings of words, to name and explain the various figures of

speech. But far more important than all this it is, that the teacher

should impress on their minds the importance of systematic arrangement

and propriety of description, "showing what is suitable for each rôle,

what is commendable in thought, what in expression, where diffuseness

is proper, and where brevity." In giving collateral information, whether

in history, mythology, or geography, he should keep within bounds,

giving only what is necessary and rests on respectable authority. "It is

one of the virtues of a schoolmaster to be ignorant of some things."

As regards lessons in composition, the teacher should begin by making

his pupils write out from memory the _Fables_ of Æsop, in pure, simple,

direct, and unadorned language. He should then call upon them to turn

poetry into prose, and to paraphrase it, either briefly or diffusely. He

should then make them write out proverbs, apophthegms, aphorisms, short,

brilliant anecdotes, etc. Famous stories related by the poets may be

used as subjects for composition, but chiefly for the sake of

information. Beyond this the schoolmaster should not go in the matter of

composition. The rest should be left to the rhetorician.

It is of great importance in youthful education that several subjects

should be studied at the same time. Boys like and need variety, and,

when they get it, it is truly astonishing how much they can accomplish.

"There is not the slightest reason for fearing that boys will shrink

from the labor of study. No age is less easily fatigued." ... "Boys are

naturally more inclined to hard work than young men."

Such, in brief, is Quintilian's school-programme. It has no place for

physical science (except Astronomy), for manual training, or for

physical exercise. Play is, indeed, permitted as a necessary recreation,

and gymnastics and physical training (παιδοτρίβεια) are recommended in

so far as they are necessary to enable the budding orator to move and

to gesticulate gracefully; but that is all. "Nothing can please that is

not becoming."

As soon as he is ready, the young aspirant for oratorical fame passes

into the hands of the rhetorician, under whom he learns all the arts,

and acquires all that knowledge, necessary to fit him for his

profession. No kind of knowledge, and no moral excellence ought to be

foreign to the orator. Quintilian is very severe upon the philosophers

for claiming, in their title, to be, in an exceptional way, lovers of

wisdom, and maintains that the true orator is the truly wise and good

man. He is surely superior to the philosopher, who turns his back upon

the world and manifests no interest in human affairs. Moreover,

"philosophy may be simulated; eloquence cannot."

The closing chapter of the last book of Quintilian's work treats of the

orator after his retirement from public life. He is to devote himself to

writing and to the study of art, science, and philosophy. The picture is

charming; but it ends with death, and there is nothing beyond. God may

be defined for oratorical purposes; but his existence is a matter of

conjecture.

In Quintilian we have the highest type of the civic man living under a

cosmopolitan despotism. His defects--his pedantry, his servility, his

externality, his worldliness--are only such as are natural to a good man

placed in this position, without any outlook upon a higher existence.

CHAPTER III

PLOTINUS AND PHILOSOPHIC EDUCATION

The material body, which is subject to motion, change, dissolution,

and division, requires an immaterial principle to hold and bind it

together in unity. This principle of unity is the soul. If it were

material, it would require another principle of unity, and so on _ad

infinitum_, till an immaterial first were reached, which would then

be the true soul.--Ammonius Saccas.

Intelligible things, when they are united with other things, are not

changed, as corporeal things are when they are united with each

other, but remain as they are, and what they are. Soul and body are

intimately united, but not mixed. The soul can separate and withdraw

itself from the body, not only in sleep, but also in thought. As the

sun illuminates and yet remains itself a separate light, so is the

soul in its relation to the body. It is not in the body as in place;

rather the body is in it and of it.--_Id._

One's duty is to become first man, then God.--Hierocles.

Neither Schelling nor Baader nor Hegel has refuted Plotinus: in many

ways he soars above them.--Arthur Richter.

What is loved by us here is mortal and hurtful. Our love is love for

an image, that often turns into its opposite, because what we loved

was not truly worthy of love, nor the good which we sought. God

alone is the true object of our love.--Plotinus.

The practical and the contemplative lives, which Plato and Aristotle had

labored so hard to combine and correlate, in order to save human worth

and Greek civilization, fell asunder, despite all their

efforts--greatly, of course, to the detriment of both. In the terrible

picture which Quintilian draws of Roman life in the first century of

our era, we see one side of the result of this divorce: in the cruel

satires of Lucian, written less than a century later, we may find

depicted the other. But, just as, in the midst of the moral corruption

and brutality, there arose from time to time worthy men like Quintilian

and Tacitus, so amid the philosophical charlatanry and pretence, there

still survived a few earnest thinkers, who aspired with all the power

that was in them to divine truth, and strove to find in the eternal

world that reality which was so miserably wanting in this. By far the

greater number of these men were neither Greeks nor Romans, but

Orientals, men whose thinking combined Greek philosophy with some

earnest form of Eastern mysticism. To such men this life was merely an

opportunity of preparing for a higher, in which lay all beauty, all

good, and all blessedness. It is not difficult to see what sort of

education would follow from this view of life. It may best be

characterized by the one word "ascetic." It no longer seeks to train

harmoniously all the faculties of body and mind with a view to a worthy

social life, but to enable the soul to die to the body and to social

life, and so rise to union and consubstantiality with God. In no sect

was this tendency more marked than in the Neoplatonic, or, as it might

equally well be called, the Neoaristotelian or Neopythagorean, the

greatest name in which is Plotinus.

Plotinus was born in Egypt about A.D. 205. His nationality is unknown.

He received his education in Alexandria--grammar, rhetoric, and

philosophy,--and adopted the teaching of the last as a profession. He

sought in vain, however, for a system that could satisfy him, till he

met with Ammonius "the Sack-bearer," whom he at once recognized as his

master. This Ammonius had been reared as a Christian, but had

apostatized on becoming acquainted with philosophy. His Christian

education, however, had not been altogether lost on him; for he had

carried over into philosophy a religious spirit, and not a few of the

esoteric ideas then current in certain Christian sects. It was this,

apparently, that enabled him to give a new direction to philosophy, and

to found a new school, whose influence upon subsequent, even Christian,

thought, it would be difficult to overestimate. His school was the

Neoplatonic, which, more than any other, united profound thought with

mystic theosophy (θεωρία).

Plotinus listened to Ammonius for eleven years, and, on the death of the

latter, paid a visit to Persia, with the view of studying the religion

of that country. He shortly returned, however, and, after a brief

sojourn at Antioch, betook himself, in his fortieth year (A.D. 244), to

Rome, where he spent the remainder of his life as a teacher of

philosophy. His saintly character and his deep, religious thought drew

round him a considerable number of earnest men and women, including even

members of the imperial family. He made some attempt to found in

Campania a Platonopolis, so that his principles might be realized in a

social life, in a theosophic community; but this was never carried out.

He died in A.D. 270. Plotinus was the only truly great, original ancient

thinker after Aristotle.

While Plato and Aristotle had sought to rise to the intelligible world

from, and by means of, the sensible, Plotinus, believing that he has

attained a direct, intuitional knowledge of the former, sets out from it

and thence tries to reach the other. At the summit of being he finds the

supreme Platonic principle, the One or the Good, absolutely transcendent

and self-sufficient; next below this, the supreme Aristotelian

principle, Intelligence or Absolute Knowing, the _locus_ of all ideas;

and third, the supreme principle of the Stoics, Soul, Life, or Zeus, the

animating principle of the world. Good, Intelligence, Life--these are

Plotinus' divine trinity, evolved by a process of abstraction from the

_Nous_ of Aristotle (see p. 161). The members of this trinity are

neither personal, conscious, nor equal. Each lower is caused by, but

does not emanate from, the next above it; and this causation is due, not

to any act of free will, but to an inner necessity. Thus the trinity of

Plotinus is a mere energy, acting according to necessary laws. The third

member of it turns toward matter, which is mere poverty and hunger for

being, and, in so doing, produces a world of gods, dæmons, and mundane

beings, the highest of which last is man. All that has matter has

multiplicity.

It is easy enough to see what kind of ethics and education will spring

from such a system as this. Inasmuch as the good means self-sufficiency,

freedom from multiplicity and matter, evil means dependence,

multiplicity, materiality. Whatever evil there is in man is due to his

connection with matter, for which he is in no sense responsible. His

sole business, if he desires blessedness, is to free himself from

matter and multiplicity, and return to the unity of the Supreme Good.

The steps by which this may be accomplished are, (1) Music or Art, (2)

Love, (3) Philosophy or Dialectic: through all these he rises above

multiplicity into unity. In all this there is, obviously, neither moral

evil nor moral good, and, indeed, the world of Plotinus contains no

moral element, for the simple reason that it contains nothing personal,

either in God or man. Evil is the product of necessity, and

consciousness, implying as it does, multiplicity, is part of it. The

unethical character of Plotinus' teaching comes out very clearly in his

reversal of the positions of instruction and purgation in the scheme of

education. According to the old view, purgation was a mere medical

process, preparatory to ethical training (see p. 7). According to the

Neoplatonic view, ethical training and the "political virtues" are a

mere preparation for purgation and the intellectual virtues. And this is

perfectly logical; for evil, being physical, must be cured by physical

means. And the means which Plotinus recommends are magical, rather than

moral; rites and prayers, rather than heroic deeds; the suppression of

the will, rather than its exercise.

Plotinus is too much of a Greek to accept, or even see, all the

consequences of his own theory, which makes moral life consist in an

attempt to escape from the world and to quench consciousness and

personality. Accordingly, though he has a poor opinion of civic life (a

thing excusable enough in those days), he believes that the civic

virtues ought to be cultivated, as a means toward the higher, and has

apparently nothing to say against the ordinary grammatical, rhetorical,

and musical education of his time. He has a good deal to say in favor of

Mathematics, as a preparation for what to him is the supreme branch of

education, Dialectics. But the tendency of his teaching is only too

obvious, and the conclusions which he did not draw, time and succeeding

generations drew for him. The effect of Neoplatonism was, in the long

run, to make the super-civic part of man the whole man, to discredit

political life and political effort, and to pave the way for the mystic,

the ascetic, and the hermit. Nor were the tendencies of the other

philosophical schools in any marked degree different. Thus philosophy,

instead of contributing to harmonize man and society, and to restore

moral life, came to be one of the strongest agencies in bringing about

confusion and dissolution, by ignoring moral life altogether, embracing

superstition, and turning man into a mere plaything of blind necessity

and magical forces. And thus ancient civilization fell to pieces,

because man himself had fallen to pieces, and each piece tried to set

itself up for the whole. The civic fragment finds its highest expression

in Quintilian, the super-civic in Plotinus. Ere the fragments can be

united into a truly moral being, a member of a truly moral society, a

new combining force, unknown to either rhetorician or philosopher, must

arise.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Truly it was an old world, and even Cæsar's patriotic genius was not

enough to make it young again. The dawn does not return till the

night has fully set in.--Mommsen.

My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways,

saith the Lord.--Isaiah.

Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all

thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the great and first

commandment. And a second like unto it is this, Thou shalt love thy

neighbor as thyself.--Jesus.

Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things

that are God's.--_Id._

Are not five sparrows sold for two farthings? and not one of them is

forgotten in the sight of God. But the very hairs of your head are

all numbered.--_Id._

We love because he first loved us. If a man say, I love God, and

hateth his brother, he is a liar.--John.

By one intelligible form, which is the divine Essence, and one

conscious intention, which is the divine Word, things may be known

in their multiplicity by God.--Thomas Aquinas.

If God acts in all things, and such action in no way derogates from

his dignity, but even belongs to his universal and supreme power, he

cannot consider it below him, nor does it stain his dignity, if he

extend his providence to the individual things of this world.--_Id._

Une immense espérance a passé sur la terre.--Alfred de Musset.

We have seen that the Greek ideal of life rested upon the complete

identification of the man with the citizen. We have seen also how this

ideal was paralyzed by the growth of individualism; how the wisest men

thought to render this innocuous and even beneficent, by providing for

it a sphere of contemplation, superior to that of practice, but

organically related to it, and, finally how, with the failure of this

attempt, the two sides of human nature, divorced from each other,

degenerated, the one into selfish worldliness, the other into equally

selfish other-worldliness, both conditions equally destitute of moral

significance.

This sad result was mainly due to three causes, (1) that the remedies

proposed for individualism were not sufficient, (2) that the best remedy

was set aside, (3) that the conditions for which the remedies were

offered soon ceased to exist. Both Plato and Aristotle wrote for the

small Greek polities, which lost their autonomy through the Macedonian

conquest. If it may be doubted whether even the proposals of the latter

would have redeemed these polities, had they continued free, it is

certain that they would have been ineffective under the changed

circumstances. At all events, they were never adopted, and even for the

super-civic man the teaching of Plato was preferred to his.

As the new cosmopolitanism deepened the gulf between the citizen and the

individual, and immeasurably widened the sphere of the latter, in the

same proportion did the teaching of Plato fail to bridge over that gulf,

and provide activity for that sphere. To tell the super-civic man now

that his function was to contemplate divine things and oracularly

deliver laws for the guidance of the world, would have argued an absence

of humor not common in those days. Besides, those persons who claimed

to have contemplated divine things showed no such fitness for

legislation as to induce practical men to accept their guidance. The

sober fact was, that the contemplation of divine things, which more and

more absorbed the energy of Greek thought, was, except for Aristotle, a

mere vague asperation without moral value, and became ever more a sort

of mystic ecstasy, in which the individual, instead of acquiring insight

and power to live worthily and beneficently in the world, was thrown

back upon himself, with his will paralyzed. Nor could this be otherwise,

seeing the nature of the divine things, the contemplation of which was

reckoned so important. Instead of being personal attributes, or a person

imposing a moral law seen to be binding, they were mere abstractions,

increasing in emptiness the higher they were in the series, the highest

being absolute vacancy. In vain had Aristotle protested that all reality

is individual: the Platonic theory, that all knowledge is of ideas or

universals, prevailed, with the result that the highest knowledge was

held to be knowledge of that which is absolutely universal, viz.

indeterminate being or, as Plotinus held, something lacking even the

determination of being--the Supreme Good. That the super-civic man

should find satisfaction in gazing into vacancy, or be any more valuable

in the world after he had done so, no matter how spotless his life and

ecstatic his look, is inconceivable.

But while, in the Greek world, the sphere of activity of the super-civic

man was vanishing into nothingness, among a small and obscure band of

restored exiles of Semitic race, that sphere had come to claim the

entire man and all his relations, practical and spiritual. Isaiah's

little band of faithful followers (see p. 133) had grown into a nation,

living by no law save that of Jehovah, a very real, very awful, and very

holy personality, whom the heaven of heavens could not contain, but who

yet watched the rising up and the sitting down of every son of man. Long

before Quintilian wrote his elegant treatise on rhetoric, or Plotinus

his pantheistic Enneads, there had sprung from the bosom of this people

a man who, bursting, at the expense of his life, the narrow bounds of

his nationally, elevated the theocracy of his people into a Kingdom of

Heaven, which he had bade proclaim to all the world. It was proclaimed,

and then (though to some it seemed a stumbling-block, and to others

foolishness) the super-civic man, who for hundreds of years had been

wandering in darkness, in search of his fatherland, suddenly became

aware that he had found it in the Church of Christ. He now no longer

tries to escape from the visible world into the emptiness of an abstract

first principle; but, in the service of a First Principle who is the

most concrete of realities, and who numbers the very hairs of his head,

he goes down into the most loathsome depths of the material world to

elevate and redeem the meanest of the sons of men. There is no question

of bond or free, ruler or ruled, now. In the Kingdom of Heaven there are

no such relations. The only greatness recognized there is greatness in

service; the only law, the Law of Love. Love! yes, the whole secret is

in that one word. By adding love to the conception of the God of his

people, by exemplifying it in his own life, and demanding it of his

followers, Jesus accomplished what had baffled all the wisdom of the

Greek sages. He restored the moral unity of man, abolished the old

world, and made a new heaven and a new earth. In vain have the advocates

of an indeterminate, self-evolving first principle, whether calling

themselves Neoplatonists, mystics, materialists, evolutionists,

Hegelians, or Theosophists, striven to bring back the old world with its

class distinctions and institutional ethics; in vain have they sought to

sink the individual God and man of reality in the universal ideas of

thought. The Law of Love, which is the ground of individuality, as well

as of true society, has bidden, and will bid them, defiance.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

THE SEVEN LIBERAL ARTS

The Greeks originally recognized two branches of liberal education[6]

(1) Gymnastics, for the body, and (2) Music, for the soul. Out of music

grew, in process of time, not only the so-called Liberal Arts, that is,

the arts that go to constitute the education of every freeman, but also

what was regarded as a superfluous luxury (περιττή), Philosophy. It is

the purpose of this appendix to trace, as far as possible, this gradual

development.

In doing so, one must bear in mind that originally the term "Music"

covered, not only what we call music, but also poetry, and that poetry

was the vehicle of all the science that then was. The Homeric _aoidos_

knows the "works of gods and men." Strictly speaking, therefore, it was

out of music and poetry that all the arts and sciences grew. The first

step in this direction was taken when Letters were introduced, that is,

about the first Olympiad.[7] But it was long before Letters were

regarded as a separate branch of education; they were simply a means of

recording poetry. Even as late as the time of Plato, Letters are still

usually included under Music. In Aristotle, they are recognized as a

separate branch. It follows from this that, when we find Greek writers

confining soul-education to Music, or Music and Letters, we must not

conclude that these signify only playing and singing, reading and

writing. Socrates was saying nothing new or paradoxical, when he

affirmed that Philosophy was the "highest music." The Pythagoreans had

said the same thing before him, and there can be no doubt that

Pythagoras himself included under Music (1) Letters, (2) Arithmetic, (3)

Geometry, (4) Astronomy, (5) Music, in our sense, and (6) Philosophy (a

term invented by him). Plato did the same thing. He speaks of "the true

Muse that is accompanied with truth (λόγων) and philosophy." But in his

time "Music" was used in two senses, a broad one, in which it included

the whole of intellectual education, and a narrow one, in which it is

confined to music in the modern sense. It is in this latter sense that

it is used by Aristotle, when he makes the intellectual branches of

school education (1) Letters, (2) Music, and (3) Drawing. Philosophy he

places in a higher grade. Having distinguished Letters from Music, it is

natural enough that he should assign to the former the branches which

Pythagoras had included under the latter. His literary scheme appears to

be (1) Grammar, (2) Rhetoric, (3) Dialectic, (4) Arithmetic, (5)

Geometry, (6) Astronomy. Add Music, and we have exactly the Seven

Liberal Arts; but, as Drawing must also be added, it is clear that there

was, as yet, no thought of fixing definitely the number seven. That

Drawing was for a long time part of the school curriculum, is rendered

clear by a passage in a work of Teles (B.C. 260) quoted by Stobæus

(xcviii, 72), in which it is said that boys study (1) Letters, (2)

Music, (3) Drawing; young men, (4) Arithmetic, and (5) Geometry. The

last two branches are here already distinguished from Letters; but we

cannot be sure that the list is intended to be exhaustive. What is

especially noticeable in the list of Teles is, that it draws a clear

distinction between the lower and higher studies, a distinction which

foreshadows the _Trivium_ and _Quadrivium_ of later times.[8]

Philosophy, or the highest education, Aristotle divided into (1) Theory

and (2) Practice. Theory he subdivided into (a) Theology, First

Philosophy, or Wisdom, called later Metaphysics, the science of the

Unchangeable, and (b) Physics, the science of the Changeable; Practice

into (a) Ethics, including Politics and Œconomics, and (b) Poetics or

Æsthetics.

After Teles we hear little of the Greek school-curriculum until about

the Christian era. Meanwhile, the Romans, having acquired a smattering

of Greek learning, began to draw up a scheme of studies suitable for

themselves. It is noticeable that in this scheme there is no such

distinction as the Greeks drew between liberal (ἐλευθέριαι, ἐγκύκλιοι,

λογικαί) and illiberal (βάναυσοι) arts.[9] As early as the first half of

the second century B.C., Cato the Censor wrote a series of manuals for

his son on (1) Ethics, (2) Rhetoric, (3) Medicine, (4) Military Science,

(5) Farming, (6) Law. It is very significant that the only Greek

school-study which appears here is Rhetoric; this the Romans, and

notably Cato himself, always studied with great care for practical

purposes. It seems that Cato, in order to resist the inroads of Greek

education and manners, which he felt to be demoralizing, tried to draw

up a characteristically Roman curriculum. Greece, however, in great

measure, prevailed, and half a century later we find Varro writing upon

most of the subjects in the Greek curriculum: Grammar, Rhetoric,

Dialectic, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy, Music, Philosophy, besides

many others. He wrote a treatise in nine books, called _Disciplinarum

Libri_. Ritschl, in his _Quæstiones Varronianæ_,[10] tried to show that

these "Disciplinæ" were the Seven Liberal Arts, _plus_ Architecture and

Medicine, and Mommsen, in his _Roman History_, has followed him; but

Ritschl himself later changed his opinion. There seems no doubt that (1)

Grammar, (2) Rhetoric, (3) Dialectic, (4) Music, (5) Geometry, and (6)

Architecture were treated in the work: what the rest were we can only

guess.[11] There is no ground for the assertion that the Seven Liberal

Arts were obtained by dropping Architecture and Medicine from Varro's

list. It must have been about the time of Varro, if not earlier, that

Roman education came to be divided into three grades, called

respectively (1) Grammar, (2) Rhetoric, and (3) Philosophy, the last

falling to the lot of but few persons. Of course "Grammar" now came to

have a very extensive meaning, as we can see from the definition of it

given by Dionysius Thrax, in his grammar, prepared apparently for Roman

use (B.C. 90). In the Scholia to that work (I am unable to fix their

date), we find the Liberal Arts enumerated as (1) Astronomy, (2)

Geometry, (3) Music, (4) Philosophy, (5) Medicine, (6) Grammar, (7)

Rhetoric.[12]

But to return to the Greeks. In the works of Philo Judæus, a

contemporary of Jesus, we find the Encyclic Arts frequently referred to,

and distinguished from Philosophy. The former, he says, are represented

by the Egyptian slave Hagar, the latter by Sarah, the lawful wife. One

must associate with the Arts before he can find Philosophy fruitful. In

no one passage does Philo give a list of the Encyclic Arts. In one place

we find enumerated (1) Grammar, (2) Geometry, (3) Music, (4) Rhetoric

(_De Cherub._, § 30); in another (1) Grammar, (2) Geometry, (3) "the

entire music of encyclic instruction" (_De Agricult._, § 4); in another

(1) Grammar, (2) Music, (3) Geometry, (4) Rhetoric, (5) Dialectic (_De

Congressu Quær. Erud. Grat._, § 5); in another, (1) Grammar, (2)

Arithmetic, (3) Geometry, (4) Music, (5) Rhetoric (_De Somniis_, § 35),

etc.

It would seem that the Encyclic Arts, according to Philo, were (1)

Grammar, (2) Rhetoric, (3) Dialectic, (4) Arithmetic, (5) Geometry, (6)

Music. Astronomy appears in none of the lists. Philosophy is divided

into (1) Physics, (2) Logic, (3) Ethics (_De Mutat. Nom._, § 10), a

division that was long current.

From what has been adduced, I think we may fairly conclude that at the

Christian era no definite number had been fixed for the liberal arts

either at Athens, Alexandria, or Rome. The list apparently differed in

different places. Clearly the Roman programme was quite different from

the Greek. Shortly after this era, we find Seneca (who died A.D. 65)

giving the liberal arts, _liberalia studia_, as (1) Grammar, (2) Music,

(3) Geometry, (4) Arithmetic, (5) Astronomy (_Epist._, 88). He divides

Philosophy into (1) Moral, (2) Natural, (3) Rational, and the last he

subdivides into (a) Dialectic and (b) Rhetoric. Above all he places

Wisdom, "_Sapientia perfectum bonum est mentis humanæ_" (_Epist._, 89).

Here we see that two of the Seven Liberal Arts are classed under

Philosophy. A little later, Quintilian divides all education into (1)

Grammar, and (2) Rhetoric, but condescends to allow his young orator to

study a little Music, Geometry, and Astronomy.

Turning to the Greeks, we find Sextus Empiricus, who seems to have

flourished in Athens and Alexandria toward the end of the second

century, writing a great work against the dogmatists or

"mathematicians," of whom he finds nine classes, corresponding to six

arts, and three sciences of philosophy. The arts are (1) Grammar, (2)

Rhetoric, (3) Geometry, (4) Arithmetic, (5) Astronomy, (6) Music: the

sciences, (1) Logic, (2) Physics, (3) Ethics. We are now not far from

the Seven Liberal Arts; still we have not reached them.

There is not, I think, any noteworthy list of the liberal arts to be

found in any ancient author after Sextus, till we come to St. Augustine.

In his _Retractiones_, written about 425, he tells us (I, 6) that in his

youth he undertook to write _Disciplinarum Libri_ (the exact title of

Varro's work!), that he finished the book on (1) Grammar, wrote six

volumes on (2) Music, and made a beginning with _other five_

disciplines, (3) Dialectic, (4) Rhetoric, (5) Geometry, (6) Arithmetic,

(7) Philosophy. It has frequently been assumed that we have here, for

the first time, the Seven Liberal Arts definitely fixed; but there is

nothing whatever in the passage to justify this assumption. The author

does not say "_the_ other five disciplines," but merely "other five."

Among these five, moreover, is named Philosophy, which, though certainly

a "discipline," was never, so far as I can discover, called an art,

liberal or otherwise. There is not the smallest reason for tracing back

the Seven Liberal Arts to St. Augustine, who surely was incapable of any

such playing with numbers. He does not, indeed, recognize the "Seven."

It is in the fantastic and superficial work of Martianus Capella, a

heathen contemporary of Augustine's, that they first make their

appearance, and even there no stress is laid upon their number. They are

(1) Grammar, (2) Dialectic, (3) Rhetoric, (4) Geometry, (5) Arithmetic,

(6) Astronomy, (7) Music. These, no doubt, were the branches taught in

the better schools of the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth

centuries, when, on the whole, the Greek liberal curriculum had

supplanted the Roman rhetorical one. There is not the slightest ground

for supposing that Capella had anything to do with fixing the curriculum

which he celebrates. His work is a wretched production, sufficiently

characterized by its title, _The Wedding of Mercury and Philology_. He

wrote about seven arts because he found seven to write about. Attention

was first called to the _number_ of the arts, and a mystical meaning

attached to it, by the Christian senator, Cassiodorus (480-575) in his

_De Artibus et Disciplinis Liberalium Litterarum_. He finds it written

in Prov. ix, 1, that "Wisdom hath builded her house. She hath hewn out

her seven pillars." He concludes that the Seven Liberal Arts are the

seven pillars of the house of Wisdom. They correspond also to the days

of the week, which are also seven. It is to be observed that he

distinguishes the "Arts" from the "Disciplines," or, as they said later,

the _Trivium_ from the _Quadrivium_. The pious notion of Cassiodorus was

worked out by Isidore of Seville (died 636) in his _Etymologiæ_, and by

Alcuin (died 804) in his _Grammatica_. Of course, as soon as the number

of the arts came to be regarded as fixed by Scripture authority, it

became as familiar a fact as the number of the planets or of the days of

the week, or indeed, as the number of the elements. About A.D. 820

Hrabanus Maurus (776-856), a pupil of Alcuin's, wrote a work, _De

Clericorum Institutione_, in which the phrase _Septem Liberales Artes_

is said to occur for the first time. About the same date Theodulfus

wrote his allegorical poem _De Septem Liberalibus in quadam Pictura

Descriptis_.[13]

The Liberal Studies after St. Augustine did not include Philosophy,

which rested upon the Seven Arts, as upon "seven pillars," and was

usually divided into (1) Physical, (2) Logical, (3) Ethical.[14] After a

time Philosophy came to be an all-embracing term. In a commentary on the

_Timæus_ of Plato, assigned by Cousin to the twelfth century, we find

the following scheme:--

{ Ethics.

{ Practical { Economics.

{ { Politics.

{

{ { Theology.

PHILOSOPHY { { { Arithmetic }

{ { Mathematics. { Music }

{ Theoretical { { Geometry } = Quadrivium.

{ { { Astronomy }

{ { Physics.

The author expressly says that "Mathematica quadrivium continet"; but he

plainly does not include the _Trivium_ under Philosophy. This, however,

was done the following century. In the _Itinerarium Mentis in Deum_ of

St. Bonaventura (1221-74) we find the following arrangements:--

{ { Metaphysics--essence: leads to First

{ { Principle = Father.

{ Natural { Mathematics--numbers, figures: leads

{ { to Image = Son.

{ { Physics--natures, powers, diffusions:

{ { leads to Gift of Holy Spirit.

{

PHILOSOPHY { { Grammar--power of expression = Father.

{ Rational { Logic--perspicuity in argument = Son.

{ { Rhetoric--skill in persuading = Holy

{ { Spirit.

{

{ { Monastics--innascibility of Father.

{ Moral { Œconomics--familiarity of Son.

{ { Politics--liberality of Holy Spirit.

Here we have the _Trivium_, under the division "Rational," while the

_Quadrivium_ must still be included under "Mathematics." In both cases

we get nine sciences or disciplines, and the number was apparently

chosen, because it is the square of three, the number of the Holy

Trinity. In the latter case this was certainly true. Speaking of the

primary divisions of Philosophy, the Saint says: "The first treats of

the cause of being, and therefore leads to the Power of the Father; the

second of the ground of understanding, and therefore leads to the Wisdom

of the Word; the third of the order of living, and therefore leads to

the goodness of the Holy Spirit."

Dante, in his _Convivio_ (II, 14, 15), gives the following scheme, based

upon the "ten heavens," nine of which are moved by angels or

intelligences, while the last rests in God.

{ { Grammar Moon Angels.

{ Trivium { Dialectic Mercury Archangels.

{ { Rhetoric Venus Thrones.

LIBERAL ARTS {

{ { Arithmetic Sun Dominions.

{ Quadrivium { Music Mars Virtues.

{ { Geometry Jupiter Principalities.

{ { Astrology Saturn Powers.

{ Physics and } Starry Heaven Cherubim.

{ Metaphysics }

{

{ Moral Science { Crystalline } Seraphim.[15]

PHILOSOPHY { { Heaven }

{

{ Theology Empyrean God.

In Dante are summed up the ancient and mediæval systems of education.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

It is not intended here to give a complete Bibliography of Greek

Education, but merely to point the readers of this book, who may desire

to pursue the subject further, to the chief sources of information.

1. ANCIENT WORKS

For the first part of the Hellenic Period, that of the "Old Education,"

our authorities are fragmentary, and often vague. They are the _Iliad_

and _Odyssey_ of Homer, the _Works and Days_ of Hesiod, the fragments of

the pre-Socratic philosophers (collected by Mullach, in his _Fragmenta

Philosophorum Græcorum_, Paris, Didot, 1860-81, 3 vols. 4to), and the

comedies of Aristophanes, especially the _Clouds_. For the second part

of the same period, that of the "New Education," the chief authorities

are the tragedies of Euripides, the _Clouds_ of Aristophanes, the

dialogues of Plato, especially the _Protagoras_, _Lysis_, _Republic_,

and _Laws_, and the _Cyropædia_, _Œconomics_, and _Constitution of

Lacedæmon_ of Xenophon.

For Aristotle's educational doctrines, we are confined for information

to his own works, and, among these, to the _Ethics_ and _Politics_. Of

the latter, the closing chapters of the seventh, and the whole of the

eighth, book deal professedly with education. Some information may also

be gleaned from the recently discovered _Constitution of Athens_.

For the Hellenistic Period, our information is derived chiefly from

inscriptions, from the writings of Philo Judæus, Sextus Empiricus,

Plutarch (_On the Nurture of Children_), Ælian (_Miscellanies_), Lucian

(_Anacharsis_ chiefly), Stobæus, Plotinus, Varro, Cicero, Seneca,

Quintilian (_Education of the Orator_), Martianus Capella (_Nuptials of

Mercury and Philology_), and Cassiodorus, and from stray notices in

other poets, historians, and philosophers.

Of the works referred to, these deserve special mention:--

1. Aristophanes, _Clouds_. Translations by John Hookham Frere,

Thomas Mitchell, and W.J. Hickie (in Bohn's Library).

2. Xenophon, _Cyropædia_. Translation, in _Whole Works translated by

Ashley Cooper and Others_, Philadelphia, 1842, and by J.S. Watson

and H. Dale (in Bohn's Library).

3. Plato, _Republic_. Translations by J. Ll. Davies and D.J.

Vaughan, by B. Jowett, and by Henry Davis (in Bohn's Library).

4. Plato, _Laws_. Translations by B. Jowett, and by G. Burges (in

Bohn's Library).

5. Aristotle, _Politics_ (Books VII, VIII). Translations by B.

Jowett, J.E.C. Weldon, and E. Walford (in Bohn's Library).

6. Plutarch, _On the Nurture of Children_. Translation in _Morals_,

translated from the Greek by several hands, corrected and revised by

W.W. Goodwin, Boston, 1878.

7. Quintilian, _Education of an Orator_. Translation by J.S. Watson

(in Bohn's Library).

2. MODERN WORKS

These are very numerous; but the most comprehensive is Lorenz

Grasberger's _Erziehung und Unterricht im klassischen Alterthum, mit

besonderer Rücksicht auf die Bedürfnisse der Gegenwart_, Würzburg,

1864-81, 3 vols. The first volume deals with the physical training of

boys, the second with their intellectual training, and the third with

the education imparted by the State to young men (ἔφηβοι). A volume of

plates is promised. The work is badly constructed, but is a mine of

information and of references.

Along with this may be named O.H. Jäger, _Die Gymnastik der Hellenen, in

ihrem Einfluss auf's gesammte Alterthum und ihrer Bedeutung für die

deutsche Gegenwart_, Esslingen, 1850; Fournier, _Sur l'Education et

l'Instruction Publiques chez les Grecs_, Berlin, 1833; Becq de

Fouquière, _Les Jeux des Anciens_, Paris, 1869; De Pauw, _Recherches

Philosophiques sur les Grecs_; Fr. Jacobs, _Ueber die Erziehung der

Hellenen zur Sittlichkeit_, Vermischte Schr. Pt. III.; Albert Dumont,

_Essai sur l'Ephébie Attique_, Paris, 1876-6; Dittenberger, _De Ephebis

Atticis_; Chr. Petersen, _Das Gymnasium der Griechen nach seiner

baulichen Einrichtung beschrieben_, Hamburg, 1858; Alexander Kapp,

_Platon's Erziehungslehre_, Minden, 1833, and _Aristotle's

Staatspædagogik_, Hamm, 1837; J.H. Krause, _Geschichte der Erziehung des

Unterrichts und der Bildung bei den Griechen, Etruskern und Römern_,

Halle, 1851.

Chapters on Greek Education may be found in W.A. Becker's _Charicles_

and _Gallus_; in Guhl and Koner's _Life of the Greeks and Romans_--all

three translated into English. In _Hellenica_ is an essay, by R.S.

Nettleship, on the _Theory of Education in the Republic of Plato_,

Rivington, 1880, and in Edwin Hatch's _Influence of Greek Ideas upon the

Christian Church_ (Hibbert Lectures) is a chapter on Greek Education

(Lecture II).

FOOTNOTES:

[1] It is worth while to note that it was a passage from Philolaus that

suggested to Copernicus the revolution of the earth round a centre.

[2] This is represented in the charming Apoxyomenos of the Vatican.

[3] So says Aristotle, who tells us further that in his time on this

occasion they were presented with spear and shield _by the people_ (see

p. 97).

[4] I am here using the terms "objective" and "subjective" in their

modern acceptation, which almost exactly inverts the ancient usage. See

Martineau, _Study of Religion_, vol. i, p. 385, n. 2.

[5] Like "Peter Piper," etc., and the German "Messwechsel Wachsmaske."

[6] It must be borne in mind that the Greek τέχνη, art, corresponds

almost exactly to what we mean by "science." It is defined by Aristotle,

_Metaph._, A. 1; 981 a 5 sqq. Schwegler, in his translation of the

_Metaphysics_, renders it by _Wissenschaft_. Ἐπιστήμη is our

"philosophy."

[7] See Jebb, _Homer_, pp. 110 sqq.

[8] It is a pity that we cannot fix the date of the so-called _Picture_

of Cebes (Κέβητος Πίναξ). In this we find enumerated the votaries of

False Learning, (1) Poets, (2) Rhetoricians, (3) Dialecticians, (4)

Musicians, (5) Arithmeticians, (6) Geometricians, (7) Astrologers (if we

count Poets = Grammarians, we have exactly the Seven Liberal Arts), (8)

Hedonists, (9) Peripatetics, (10) Critics, "and such others as are like

to these." The "Hedonists" (ἡδονικοί) are the Cyrenaics; the "Critics"

(κριτικοί) can hardly be the grammarians, though that is usually the

meaning of the term in later times. Should we not read κυνικοί?

[9] "Liberal" means fit, "illiberal" unfit, for freemen. The sum of the

liberal arts was called Ἐγκυκλιοπαιδεία, which we have corrupted into

_Encyclopædia_.

[10] Bonn, 1845.

[11] See Boissier, _Étude sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de M.T. Varron_,

pp. 332, sqq.

[12] See Bekker's _Anecdota Græca_, ii., 655.

[13] I am indebted for a number of these facts to an article by

Professor A.F. West, in the _Princeton College Bulletin_, November,

1890.

[14] These terms, which we still find in Isidore and Hrabanus Maurus,

are afterwards, in the thirteenth century, replaced by their Latin

equivalents: Natural, Rational, and Moral. In the case of the second,

this caused considerable confusion, inasmuch as when it ceased to be

used as "rational," it took the place of "dialectic."

[15] In the XXVIIIth Canto of the Paradise, these angelic powers are

arranged somewhat differently, in deference to Dionysius Areopagita and

St. Bernard.

INDEX

A

Academics, 112, 210.

Academy, 86, 112.

Achilles, 6.

Æolian Education, 38 _sqq._

Æolians, 35.

Æschylus, 104 _sqq._

Æsop's _Fables_, 146, 223.

Ἀΐτας, 47.

Alexander the Great, 40, 156 _sq._, 178.

Alexandria, 211.

Ammonius Saccas, 225, 227.

Amphidromia, 65.

Amyntas, 156.

Anaxagoras, 24, 99 _sq._

Antisthenes, 112.

Apoxyomenos, the, 82 _n._

Archytas, 55, 193.

Aristocracy in Athens, 98.

Aristophanes, 105.

Aristotle, Life, 29, 153 _sqq._

" Death, 159.

" Philosophy, 161.

" Theology, 165.

" Theory of the State, 166 _sqq._

" Pedagogical State, 172 _sqq._

" Scheme of Secondary Education, 199.

Arithmetic, how Taught, 77.

Artemis Orthia, 50.

Arts, Origin of, in Greece, 20.

Athenian Education, 60.

Athenian Ideal of the State, 63.

Athletes, 78, 184.

Athletics, 190.

B

Barbarians _vs._ Greeks, 12.

Bodily Training, 77.

Branches of Greek Education, 6.

C

Cæsar, 217.

Cato Major, 216.

Chæronea, Battle of, 157.

Character of the Greeks (Zeller), 18.

Children, Defective, 185.

Children, Treatment of, 185.

Christianity, 233 _sqq._

Cicero, 217.

Citharist, his Functions, 77.

Citizen, Meaning of, 175.

Clisthenes, 98.

College Education, 85.

Commerce, Effect of, 21, 99 _sq._

Competition in Education, 71.

Conditions of Education, 9.

Contemplation, 201.

Copernicus, 39.

Cornificius (_Auctor ad Herennium_), 217.

Cretan Education, 42.

Culture-State, 90, 175.

Cynosarges (Gymnasium), 86, 112.

Cyrus, his Education, 115 _sqq._

D

Dancing, 82 _sqq._

Democracy in Athens, 92, 99.

Diagogē (διαγωγή), 33, 178.

Dionysiac Chorus, 85.

Dipœnis and Scyllis, 21.

Discus-throwing, 80.

Dorian Education, 41 _sqq._

Doric Harmonies, 197.

Draco, 98.

Drawing, 189.

E

Education, "Old," 27, 33, 61 _sqq._

" "New" 27, 93 _sqq._

" Higher, 108.

Εἰσπνήλας (Inspirer), 47.

Epaminondas, 40, 55.

Epheboi (Cadets), 49, 89, 90, 116, 118.

Epheboi, Oath of, 61, 89.

Epicureans, 210.

Epochs in Education, 26.

Essenism, 59, 212.

Ethnic and Cosmopolitan Life, 205.

Examinations, 64, 90.

F

Family Education in Athens, 64.

Freedom, Greek Tendency to, 19.

Freeman's Square, 116, 177.

Friendship, Aristotle on, 170.

G

Games, 66.

_Golden Words_, 57 _sqq._, 146.

Grading in Schools, 85.

Grammar, 214, 221.

Greeks a Mixed Race, 20.

Greeks _vs._ Barbarians, 12.

Guardians of Public Instruction, 185 _sqq._

Gymnasia at Athens, 86, 105.

Gymnastics, 7, 77, 189.

H

Harmony, 55, 56, 76.

" Doric, Lydian, etc. 192.

" in Music, Unknown to Greeks, 73.

Hellenic Period of Education, 26, 32 _sqq._

Hellenistic Period of Education, 27, 203 _sqq._

Helots, 44 _sq._

Hermæa, 79, 85.

Hermias, 155.

Hesiod, 22.

Hetæræ, 132.

Holidays, 85.

Homeric Education, 6, 17.

" Society and Kings, 16.

" Poems collected, 35.

Homeridæ, 21.

I

Ideal of Greek Education, 3, 206.

Individualism and Philosophy, 93 _sqq._, 207.

Induction, Method of, 162.

Ionian Education, 60 _sqq._

Isaiah, 53, 133, 234.

Ischomachus, 124 _sqq._

Isocrates, 209.

J

Javelin-casting, 81.

Jumping, 80.

Justinian, 211.

K

Kalokagathia, 8, 12, 15, 86.

Katharsis (purgation), 7, 76, 229.

Kindergarten, 66, 145.

Kingdom of Heaven, 234.

"Know Thyself," 108.

L

Larceny, Instruction in, 48.

Leaping, 80.

Learning, how viewed in Greece, 72.

Leisure, Education for, 33, 179.

Letters, 22, 188.

Letters, Introduction and Uses of, 21.

Liberal Arts, 180 _sqq._, 198.

Library of Alexandria, 211.

Life the Original School, 6.

Literary Education, 72.

Love, as a Power in Life, 234.

Lyceum, 105, 171.

Lycurgus, 42, 43.

Lysis, 39.

M

Macedonian Period in Education, 13.

Marriage, 10, 127.

Melleirenes, 49.

Milo, the Wrestler, 55.

Money-making Classes, 13.

Music, 22, 34, 72 _sqq._, 188, 191.

Music, Greek Feeling for, 76, 146.

Museum at Alexandria, 211.

N

Nymphæum at Stagira, 156.

Neoplatonism, 212, 227.

O

Œconomy, 13.

Olympic Games, 78.

P

Παιδονόμοι, 46, 185, 187.

Palæstra, 69 _sq._, 78 _sq._

Pantheism, 136.

Parmenides, 24.

Parthenon, 24, 106.

Pedagogical State, 172 _sqq._

Pedagogue, 68.

Peleus, 7.

Pentathlon, 88.

Pericles, 105 _sqq._

Perioikoi, 44.

Periods of Greek Education, 26 _sqq._

Persian Education, 115 _sqq._

Personality, 202.

Pherecydes, 53.

Phiditia, 44.

Philolaus, 39.

Philosophy, Rise of, 22.

Philosophy and Individualism, 93 _sqq._

Physical Culture, 189.

Physicians in Homer, 17.

Pindar, 39.

Pisistratus, 35, 98, 178.

Plato, 29, 112, 133 _sqq._, 134, 136, 137, 142.

Play, 66, 181 _sqq._

Plotinus, 29, 225 _sqq._, 228 _sqq._

Poetesses, 21.

Poetry, Value of, for Education, 73 _sqq._

"Professional," Meaning of, 195.

_Prometheia_, 24.

Proxenus of Atarneus, 155.

Purgation, 7, 76.

Pythagoras, 29, 52 _sqq._, 149.

Pythias, 156.

Q

Quadrivium, 144, 198.

Quintilian, 29, 214 _sqq._

R

Reading, 75.

Rhapsodes, 23.

Rhetorical Schools, 209, 217.

Roman Education, 216 _sqq._

Roman Period, 27.

Ruling and Ruled, 176.

Running, 79.

S

School Education in Athens, 67.

" Buildings " " 69.

" Rooms " " 77.

Scipio Africanus, 216.

Singing, 75.

Slaves, 12.

Social Life in Greece, 18.

Socrates, 24, 107 _sqq._

Socratic Method, 109.

Solon, and his Laws, 68, 98.

Soothsayers in Homer, 17.

Sophists, 23, 100 _sq._

Spartan Education, 41, 43 _sqq._

Spartan Girls, 49.

" Government, 44.

" Ideal, 42.

" Mercilessness, 45, 50.

" Women, 44.

Stagira, 155 _sq._

State, Meaning of Term, 174.

State as a School, 91.

Stilo, Lucius Ælius Præconinus, 217.

Stoics, 210.

Supercivic Man, 136, 234.

T

Theban Education, 28.

Themistes, 17.

Theories of Education, 28.

Therapeuts, 212.

Thomas Aquinas, 165.

Thucydides' Daughter, 37.

Tragedy, 84.

Trivium, 144, 198.

U

University Education, 90.

" of Alexandria, 212.

" of Athens, 211.

W

_Wilhelm Meister_, 173.

Wingless Victory, 63.

Wisdom, the Ideal of Athens, 63.

Women, Education of, 49, 124.

Worth, 16, 48.

Worth, Aristotle's Pæan to, 4.

Wrestling, 81 _sqq._

Writing, 75.

X

Xenophon, 29, 113, 114 _sqq._

" _Memoirs of Socrates_, 123.

" _Œconomics_, 124.

" on Female Education, 124 _sqq._

Typography by J.S. Cushing & Co., Boston, U.S.A.

Presswork by Berwick & Smith, Boston, U.S.A.

* * * * *

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES

Corrections from the errata list on p. 2 have been incorporated into the

text.

Words in italics are indicated by underscores, _like this_.

The variant spellings "freeborn" and "free-born", "Staatspædagogik" and

"Staatspaedagogik", "subdivided" and "sub-divided" are used in this text.

The abbreviations B.C. and A.D. sometimes precede their date, sometimes

follow it.

Amendments to the text have been made as follows:

p. 21: "Spata" amended to "Sparta".

p. 63: "civilizaton" amended to "civilization".

p. 74: "partiotism" amended to "patriotism".

p. 78: "neans" amended to "means".

p. 78: "humane" amended to "human".

p. 85: "pantomine" amended to "pantomime".

p. 186: "sufficent" amended to "sufficient".

p. 188: quotation mark deleted after "not being universal."

p. 218: B.C. amended to A.D.

p. 227: "fourtieth" amended to "fortieth".

p. 243: "Grammer" amended to "Grammar".

p. 246: full stop added after "Mathematics".

p. 246: extra "the" deleted from "the following century".

Greek:

On p. 22 αἴτια has not been changed to αἰτία (as in LSJ) as it may be an

acceptable alternative form.

Similarly on p. 223 παιδοτρίβεια has not been changed to παιδοτριβία (as

in LSJ).