CONSTANTINE ALLEGED TO HAVE SUED FOR PEACE; ATTEMPT TO DESTROY
TURKISH SHIPS IN THE GOLDEN HORN POSTPONED; MADE AND FAILS;
MURDER OF CAPTIVES; REPRISALS; OPERATIONS IN LYCUS VALLEY;
BRIDGE BUILT OVER GOLDEN HORN; SENDING TO SEEK VENETIAN FLEET;
PROPOSAL THAT EMPEROR SHOULD LEAVE CITY; ATTACKS ON BOOM;
JEALOUSY BETWEEN VENETIANS AND GENOESE; NEW ASSAULTS FAIL BOTH
AT WALLS AND BOOM; ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE WALLS; CONSTRUCTION
OF A TURRET; DESTROYED BY BESIEGED; FAILURE OF VESSEL SENT TO
FIND VENETIAN FLEET; UNLUCKY OMENS.
[Sidenote: Constantine alleged to have asked for peace.]
Ducas relates that about this time, when the emperor found that the
walls which had resisted the Arabs and other invaders were not strong
enough to support the attack of Mahomet’s cannon, he sent an offer to
pay any amount of tribute which might be imposed on condition that the
siege should be abandoned.
His narrative would imply that the offer was made immediately after the
transport of the fleet overland.[318]
Mahomet replied to the emperor that it was too late: that he meant to
obtain the city or die in the attempt. He, however, made a counter
proposal. If the emperor would leave it, he would give him the
Morea, would appoint his brother to rule over other provinces, and
thus sultan and emperor might live at peace with each other. If this
counter proposal were rejected, he declared his intention of putting
the emperor and all his nobles to the sword, of allowing his soldiers
to take captive the people and to pillage their houses. He himself
would be content with the deserted city. Ducas adds that of course the
offer of Mahomet was refused, because in what place could the emperor
have appeared without meeting the scorn, not only of all Christians,
but of Jews and even of the Turks themselves? This proposal is not
mentioned by Phrantzes. Gibbon suggests that he is silent regarding it
because he wished to spare his prince even the thought of a surrender.
Ducas, however, is constantly inaccurate, and it may well be that he
was merely relating an unfounded report which was current after the
capture of the city, when he himself was but a boy. It is difficult
to believe that if any proposal of the kind had been made at the time
indicated it would not have been known to Leonard, Barbaro, Pusculus,
Tetaldi, or others who were present at the siege, and if known that it
would not have been mentioned. Phrantzes, writing in defence of the
emperor, says that it is certain that he could have fled from the city
if he had so desired and that he deliberately preferred the fate of the
Good Shepherd who is ready to lay down his life for his sheep.[319]
The same testimony is borne by Critobulus,[320] who says that although
Constantine realised the peril which threatened the city, and although
he could have saved his own life as many counselled him to do, yet he
refused, and preferred to die rather than see the city captured.
[Sidenote: Attempts to destroy Turkish ships in harbour.]
The sudden appearance of the seventy or eighty ships in the inner
harbour of the Golden Horn caused consternation in the city. Every one
could understand that if this fleet were not destroyed, the number
of men available for the defence of the landward walls must be very
greatly lessened. Moreover, the walls now for the first time requiring
defence were low and required constant watching. A bridge or pontoon
was already in course of construction in the upper part of the Horn
beyond the city walls, the use of which was now evident as a means of
attacking the harbour walls.
[Sidenote: Plan decided upon.]
A meeting was hastily called with the consent of the Venetian bailey,
and perhaps by him, at which twelve men who had trust in each other
were present. Among them was John Justiniani, who had already acquired
the confidence not merely of his countrymen and of the emperor but of
the Venetians. They met in the church of St. Mary, probably in the
Venetian quarter near the present Rustem Pasha mosque, to decide upon
the best measures for the destruction of the Turkish ships which had
been so strangely carried over Pera Hill.[321] Various proposals were
made. It was suggested that the Christian ships in the harbour should
make a combined attack upon the Turkish vessels. It was objected that
the consent of the Genoese at Galata would be required, and they were
known to be unwilling to declare open war against Mahomet. In any case,
precious time would be lost in obtaining their consent. The second
proposal was to destroy the Turkish guns which had been placed on the
western side of Galata to protect the ships, and then to attempt to
burn the vessels. This was evidently a dangerous operation, because
Zagan Pasha had a detachment of troops in the neighbourhood and the
Venetians and Greeks were not sufficiently numerous to risk the loss
of a body of men upon such an expedition. The third proposal was the
one which finally commended itself to the meeting. If not made it was
at least strongly supported by James Coco, the captain of a Trebizond
galley, a man whom Phrantzes describes as more capable of action than
of speech.[322] His project was, without delay, without consulting the
Genoese, to make a dash and burn the Turkish ships in Cassim Pasha Bay.
He himself offered to undertake the task.
The meeting had been quietly called, and no time had been lost in
arriving at a decision. It was of the very essence of Coco’s proposal
that it should be executed immediately and that it should be kept
secret. His preparations were forthwith put in hand. He chose two
transports of five hundred tons each and placed bales of cotton and of
wool upon them as armour to prevent damage from cannon-balls. Two large
galleys and two of the lighter and swifter kinds of biremes or fustae
were to accompany them. Each fusta had twenty-four banks or thwarts
and contained seventy-two oarsmen, forty-eight abaft the mast and
twenty-four ahead of it. Accompanying each ship was a large boat.[323]
Coco’s plan was to employ the two large ships as a screen for the
galleys and fustae, so that at the last moment these swift vessels
might pull rapidly forward and cut out or burn the Turkish ships.
[Sidenote: Execution postponed till April 28.]
It was agreed that the vessels should be brought together that same
night of April 24, at an hour after sunset, the Eastern method of
computing the hours making this a fixed and precise time, and the
attack was to be made at midnight. The Genoese heard of the proposed
attack and pressed the Venetians hard to postpone the execution of the
project, in order that they might take part in it. Unluckily, they
consented. The preparations of the Genoese took four days. During that
period the sultan became aware of what was proposed, added two big guns
to those already stationed on the shore at Cassim Pasha to cover his
ships, and waited in confidence for the attack.
Contemporary writers charge the Genoese with having betrayed the
project to the sultan. Even Leonard evidently believed in the
existence of this treachery and hints that he knows more than he
cares to tell. Ducas states bluntly that the Genoese told the sultan.
Critobulus and Pusculus each affirm that Mahomet had information from
Galata.[324] Barbaro adds the further detail that the Podestà, as the
mayor of Galata was called, on learning what was proposed to be done,
immediately sent word to the sultan at St. Romanus Gate, and speaks of
the ‘accursed Genoese’ as ‘enemies of the faith and treacherous dogs’
for so doing.
While it is difficult to reject all these statements, it must be
remembered that the cry of treachery is usually raised in similar cases
when things go wrong, and, as the preparations must have been known to
a great many people, it would have been wonderful indeed if Mahomet had
not learned what so many knew.
In whatever manner the information was acquired, it cannot be doubted
that the Turks had knowledge of the project, and that the Greeks and
Venetians were not aware that it was known to the common enemy.
[Sidenote: Attempt made to destroy Turkish ships.]
By April 28 everything was ready. Two hours before dawn the two ships
with their bales of cotton and wool left the harbour of Galata--that
is, the north-eastern portion of the Golden Horn. They were accompanied
by the galleys, one under Trevisano and the other under Zacharia
Grione. Both captains were experienced and brave men. Trevisano was
the captain who had placed himself at the service of the emperor ‘per
honor de Dio et per honor di tuta la Christianitade.’ Three swift
fustae, each with well-armed and picked men and materials for burning
the Turkish fleet, accompanied them. The leading one was commanded by
Coco, who had chosen the crew from his own galley. A number of small
boats carrying gunpowder and combustibles were to follow. The order was
given, as previously arranged, that the ships should go first and the
galleys and biremes follow under their shelter. When the expedition
started, some at least were surprised to see a bright light flare up
from the top of Galata Tower, which was probably rightly judged to be
a signal to the Turks that the ships were leaving.[325] Everything was
still in profound darkness and no sign or sound came from the Turkish
ships to indicate that they were on the alert. While the Christian
ships were pulled slowly and silently along, Coco, in his swift fusta,
grew impatient at their slow progress. Naturally, says Barbaro, the
ships with only forty rowers could not go so fast as did his fusta,
which had seventy-two; and, greedy of glory, he drew ahead of them in
order that he might have the satisfaction of being first to attack and
of being the destroyer of the Turkish fleet. Then suddenly the silence
was broken and the Turks showed they were prepared. Their cannon opened
fire and Coco’s fusta was struck, but without being much damaged. A
minute or two afterwards, however, a better aimed shot hit his vessel,
going in at one side, and out at the other.
Before you could have said ten paternosters she had sunk.[326] The
survivors of his crew were swimming with their light armour and in the
darkness for their lives. Many perished, and among them Coco himself.
Meantime the guns were directed against the ships. The enemy fired
from a short distance and Barbaro tells us that though they could hear
the mocking laughter of their foes, they were unable, on account of
the darkness and the smoke arising from the cannon and the smouldering
cotton and wool of their own ships, to render any assistance. By the
time, indeed, the other vessels had come up, the Turks had all their
guns in full play and the vessels had enough to do to look after their
own safety. Trevisano’s ship, as probably the largest of the galleys,
was signalled for attack. Two shots struck and went through her. She
half filled with water and had to be deserted, Trevisano and most of
his men taking to the water to save their lives.
[Sidenote: Attempt fails.]
Then the whole Turkish fleet of seventy or eighty vessels put out to
attack the other two ships. The Italians and Greeks fought valiantly,
probably expecting to be supported by the rest of the Christian
fleet, which, however, did not arrive in time to give any aid. The
fight was ‘terrible et forte:’ there was, says Barbaro, ‘a veritable
hell;’ missiles and blows were countless, cannonading continual. The
contest raged furiously for a full hour and a half and neither of the
combatants could overcome the other. Thereupon both retired. The two
ships were not captured, and their crews had once more maintained the
superiority of the Christian ships over a more numerous foe in smaller
vessels.[327]
[Sidenote: Murder of captives.]
[Sidenote: Reprisals.]
But the expedition had nevertheless failed. Eighty or ninety of the
best men, including many Venetians, had been lost. Only one Turkish
vessel had been destroyed. The misfortune caused bitter grief to the
Greeks and Latins. The success of the Christian ships when attacked
by the Turks a few days earlier had led to the belief that on the
water at least they were invincible. The consternation and even panic
caused in the fleet by the failure was such that if the Turks on that
day had joined battle and taken the offensive ‘we should all,’ says
Barbaro, ‘without a doubt have been captured, and even those who were
on shore.’ The depression in the city was increased and turned to rage
by the conduct of Mahomet. Some of the sailors had swum to the northern
shore and were captured by the Turks. Forty of them were ostentatiously
killed so that those who a short while before had been their companions
witnessed their execution. Though one may blame the inhumanity of
reprisals, one cannot, in the event which followed, be surprised at
them. A large number of Turkish prisoners in the city were brought
bound from prison and were hanged on the highest part of the city walls
opposite Cassim Pasha, where the Christian prisoners had suffered.[328]
[Sidenote: Operations in Lycus Valley.]
During these days the city walls on the landward side had been the
scene of constant attacks. The failure of the first attempt, on the
18th, to pass the walls was followed by steady firing day and night to
destroy them. Probably on April 23 the great cannon was removed to a
position opposite the Romanus Military gate, the place where Justiniani
was stationed, ‘because there the walls were the least solid and very
low.’[329] From this time it commenced and never ceased to batter them.
The disadvantages resulting from the transport of the Turkish ships
into the harbour were at once felt. While continual pounding from the
great cannon and other machines was going on at the landward walls and
while feints were being made which kept the defenders always on the
alert, to resist attacks or effect repairs, a portion of their forces
had to be told off to defend the north-western walls facing the Golden
Horn. Many attempts were made from these walls on the Horn, and from
the Christian ships to destroy the Turkish vessels. Nearly every day as
long as the siege lasted, some of the Greek or Venetian ships were told
off to watch or attack them. Sometimes the Turks were chased to the
shore: at other times the pursuers became the pursued.[330]
[Sidenote: Building of bridge over Upper Horn.]
To enable his troops to pass readily across the Golden Horn, Mahomet
commenced and carried through with his usual energy the construction
of a bridge over the upper part of it, near the place where the
landward walls join those on the side of the Horn. This district was
then known as Cynegion, and now as Aivan Serai.[331] The bridge was
formed of upwards of a thousand wine barrels, all securely fastened
together with ropes. Two of the barrels placed lengthways made the
width of the bridge. Upon them beams were fixed, and over the beams
a planking sufficiently wide to enable five soldiers to walk abreast
with ease.[332] The object in placing the bridge so near the walls was,
not merely to facilitate communications between the troops behind Pera
and the army before the walls, but to attach to it pontoons upon which
cannon could be placed for attacking the harbour walls.
The paucity of the number of the defenders greatly alarmed the
emperor and those around him who had gathered in council to meet the
new dangers. They were compelled to recognise that this new point of
attack, in the very place where, and where alone, the city had formerly
been captured, required especial care, and accordingly they decided
to send a strong detachment of Greeks and Italians to the north-west
corner of the walls at Aivan Serai.[333]
From the moment the Turks had gained entrance into the inner harbour
they never ceased to harass the city on every side.
During the next few days the cannonading against the walls was constant
and the efforts to repair the damage equally persistent.
[Sidenote: Provisions running short at commencement of May.]
Barbaro mentions that on May 1 or 2 it was found that provisions were
running short. The organisation for the supply of food to the soldiers
was defective, and many complained that they had to leave the walls
in order to earn bread for their wives and families. This led to the
formation of what we may call a relief committee charged with the
distribution of provisions.
[Sidenote: Skirmishes between ships and besieged.]
On May 3, the besieged placed two of their largest guns on the walls
opposite the Turkish ships in the harbour. The Turks replied by placing
the two large cannons with which Coco’s bireme had been attacked on the
opposite shore to attack the walls. The besieged persisted in their
endeavours to destroy the fleet. For a time they did more damage than
the Turks were able to effect, but the latter brought other cannon
and kept up their firing night and day. For ten days, says Barbaro,
Greeks and Turks fired at each other, but without much result, ‘because
our cannons were inside the walls and theirs were well protected, and
moreover the distance between them was half an Italian mile, and beyond
the range of guns on either side.’
[Sidenote: May 3: sending out of brigantine to find Venetian fleet.]
Now that the siege had run into May the emperor and the leaders
were becoming alarmed at the non-arrival of the Venetian fleet. The
agreement with the Venetian bailey, in conformity with which a fleet
was to be sent at once to the aid of the city, had been concluded
on January 26, and no tidings had yet been heard of it. Its admiral,
Loredano, was known to be a brave man ‘who held strongly to the
Christian cause,’ but the fear was that he had not been informed of
the agreement. Accordingly, on May 3, the emperor called together the
notables of the Venetian colony and his chief officers, and suggested
that one of their swiftest ships should be sent into the Archipelago
and, if need be, as far as Euboea to seek for the fleet and to press
Loredano to hasten to the relief of the city. Every one approved of
the suggestion, and the same day a swift-sailing brigantine, manned
only with twelve men, was made ready to sail. The crew were disguised
to make them look as much as possible like Turks. At midnight the boom
was opened. The ship hoisted the Turkish flag and sailed away, passing
safely through the Marmora and the Dardanelles into the Archipelago.
[Sidenote: Proposal that Constantine should leave the city.]
The author of the Moscovite chronicle, who was probably present at the
siege, declares that Constantine during these days was urged by the
patriarch and the nobles to leave the city, that Justiniani himself
recommended this course and placed his ships at the emperor’s disposal
for such purpose. It was probably urged that he would be more likely
to defeat the Turks from outside than within the city; that, though
the number of men for the defence of the walls was insufficient, the
withdrawal of the emperor and a small retinue would be of little
consequence, but that, once outside, his brother and other subjects
would flock to his banner and he could arrange with Iskender Bey for
the despatch of an Albanian army. In this manner time would be gained
during which the long looked-for ships and soldiers from the West which
the Venetians and the pope had promised, and to which other princes
were ready to contribute, could arrive at Constantinople. Probably the
presence of the emperor, with even a small band, elsewhere threatening
the Turkish position would cause Mahomet to raise the siege.
The emperor, says the same writer, listened quietly, was touched by
the proposal and shed tears; thanked the chiefs for their advice, but
declared that, while he recognised that his departure might be of
advantage to himself, he would never consent to abandon the people,
the clergy, the churches, and his throne in such a moment of danger.
‘What,’ he adds, ‘would the world say of me? Ask me to remain with you.
I am ready to die with you.’ It was probably on this occasion that the
emperor declared, as already mentioned, that he preferred ‘to follow
the example of the Good Shepherd who lays down his life for his sheep.’
[Sidenote: New attack on ships at boom, May 5.]
Determined if possible to destroy the Christian fleet and apparently
caring very little about resistance from Galata, the Turks placed two
of their guns on the slope of Pera Hill and on May 5 commenced once
more to fire over the corner of Galata at the ships lying at the boom.
They took care, however, according to Barbaro, to aim at the Venetian
vessels. Firing went on all day. A ball of two hundred pounds weight
struck a Genoese merchant ship of three hundred tons burden, which was
laden with a valuable cargo of silk and other merchandise, and sank
her. The Turks continued firing all day long, and in consequence ships
left the boom and retired to the shelter of the Galata walls.[334] The
Genoese went to complain to the Turkish vizier of the unfriendly act
of firing on and sinking one of their vessels. They reminded him that
they were neutrals and were most anxious to preserve peace. According
to Ducas, they declared that if they had not been friendly, the Turks
would never have succeeded in transporting their ships overland, as
they, the Genoese, could have burnt them. There are two versions of the
reply given by the Turkish leaders. According to Ducas, they pleaded
that they did not know that the owner of the sunken ship was a Genoese,
and believed it to belong to the enemy. They urged the Genoese to wish
them success in their efforts to capture the city and promised, in such
case, full compensation to the owner of the sunken ship and cargo.
According to Phrantzes, the sultan himself answered that the ships were
not merchant vessels but pirates. They had come to help the enemy and
must be treated as enemies. It is difficult to decide which answer was
given, but that recorded by Ducas appears more in accord with the young
sultan’s crafty policy. Whichever is the correct version, the Genoese
had to profess their satisfaction with it.
The failure to destroy the Turkish ships, the increased labour thrown
on the Venetians within the city, and the doubtful conduct of the
Genoese, led to ill-feeling between the citizens of the two republics
which caused a disturbance amounting to a serious riot within the city
itself.
[Sidenote: Jealousy between Venetians and Genoese.]
The traditional jealousy between Venetians and Genoese was still
formidable. In the present instance each accused the other of not
loyally defending Constantinople and of being ready to send away their
ships whenever they could do so in safety. The Venetians replied to
this accusation by pointing out that they had unshipped the rudders
from many of their vessels and had deposited both them and the sails
within the city. The Genoese retorted that, though they kept their
rudders and sails on board ready for use at any moment, they had their
wives and children in Galata and had not the slightest intention of
abandoning so excellent a situation. If they had advocated peace with
the Turks, it was at the desire of the emperor, with whom they had
a common interest. The reply was difficult to answer, but carried
no conviction to their rivals, because the Venetians believed that,
in spite of it, the Genoese were acting solely to further their own
interests. To the most serious charge--that of giving notice to the
Turks of the attempt to burn their ships--the Genoese answered that
the plan had failed through the bad management of Coco, who, with the
object of gaining for himself alone the credit of having destroyed
the hostile fleet, had neglected necessary precautions. Recrimination
ran high and led to blows. Phrantzes gives us a pathetic picture of
the emperor appearing among the rioters and imploring them to make
friends. War against the enemy was surely bad enough; he begged them
for the sake of God not to make war on each other. His influence was
sufficient to restore order, but while the hostile feeling was so far
temporarily allayed as to make Genoese and Venetians content during the
siege to lay aside their differences, it endured until the end.
[Sidenote: Attempt to capture city by assault on May 7 fails.]
On May 7, an assault was commenced which the besieged believed would
be general by land and sea. On the previous days the monotonous firing
against the walls had been constantly going on, and preparations had
been noted as being made in the fleet for some new movement. Four hours
after sunset thirty thousand Turks with scaling ladders and everything
necessary endeavoured to force an entrance over the walls. The attempt
lasted for three hours, but the besieged resisted bravely and the Turks
had to retreat, having suffered, says Barbaro, much damage and, ‘I
should say, with a great many killed.’ The sailors on their side were
ready: the ships left the protection of the Galata walls and moved once
more to take up their positions in defence of the boom, but the Turks
did not come to the attack, possibly, as Barbaro suggests, because they
were afraid of the Venetian ships.
The Moscovite mentions an encounter during this attack between a
Greek strategos or general named Rangebè and a Turk named Amer Bey,
the standard-bearer of the sultan. The Greek made a sortie, put the
followers of Amer to flight, and then attacked Amer himself, whom he
cut in two. The Turks, furious at the loss, surrounded Rangebè and
killed him.[335]
The next day the Venetian Council of Twelve decided that Trevisano with
his four hundred men should leave the entrance to the harbour and take
up the defence of the newly threatened walls at Aivan Serai. There
appears, however, to have been considerable opposition on the part of
his crews, who preferred to remain afloat. Finally this was overcome,
and on the 13th they went to their positions at the place mentioned,
where the defenders had been occupied in constantly repairing the
breaches made by the guns. Trevisano’s galleys were left in the
imperial harbour of Neorion near the end of the chain. His place was
taken by Diedo, captain of the Tana galleys, who was now appointed to
the chief command of the fleet.
[Sidenote: A new assault on May 12.]
At midnight of the 12th fifty thousand Turks made an attack near
Tekfour Serai, the Palace of the Porphyrogenitus, between Adrianople
Gate and Caligaria, where a battery of guns had been planted from the
commencement of the siege and had greatly damaged the breastwork and
the Outer Wall. The attack was made with such force, and the shouting
of the invaders was so loud, that Barbaro says ‘most of us believed
that they would capture the city.’ Once more the attack failed. On the
14th, Mahomet removed the guns which he had placed on the slope of
Pera Hill and had them taken to Aivan Serai and placed so as to attack
the gate of the imperial palace of Blachern. It was found, however,
that the guns in this position did no great harm, and they were once
more removed, taken to the Lycus valley, and placed near the others to
batter the walls near the Romanus Gate. From this time onward this was
the principal place against which Mahomet concentrated his attack.
The entries in the diaries of the siege, showing that, while other
parts of the wall were often attacked, the bombardment in the Lycus
valley was unceasing day and night, occur during many days with
monotonous regularity. Equally constant were the efforts for the
defence: ‘We, on our side, were working day and night to repair the
walls with logs and earth and other materials.’
[Sidenote: New attempts to force the boom, on May 16 and 17.]
On the 16th, Mahomet, probably because he had learnt of the landing
of Trevisano’s men from the fleet, ordered his ships at the Double
Columns to make another attack upon the boom. One would have expected
that the seventy or eighty ships that were in the Inner Horn would have
co-operated in this attack but they did not move. Neither Turk nor
Genoese cared to risk open war with the other. The Turkish fleet came
down the Bosporus, and the Greek and Venetian ships prepared to receive
them. As the Turkish ships came up to the attack, Diedo brought his
vessels from the shelter of the walls of Galata to the boom. Thereupon
the Turks retired, and using their oars returned to the Columns. A
similar incident occurred on the 17th, but the Turks, again finding
that the ships at the boom were prepared for a fight, went back.
[Sidenote: Renewed attempt on May 21.]
Mahomet, however unwilling to break with the Genoese, was not
content to have communication between the two divisions of his fleet
interrupted. Accordingly, once more he renewed his attempt to destroy
the boom. Barbaro appears to have been on one of the ships defending
it. On May 21 at two hours before daylight, the whole fleet moved out
from the Double Columns and with great noise of drums and trumpets came
down the Bosporus. All on board the Christian vessels were greatly
alarmed, but dispositions for the defence were taken, and, as it was
feared that contemporaneously a general attack upon the city was about
to be made, the alarm bells rang out and every one took his allotted
station either on shore or on the ships. Once more the Turks decided
that it was hopeless to attempt the destruction of the boom, and
therefore returned to their moorings. It is impossible to say whether
the Turks really believed that they might destroy it or whether the
three attempts just mentioned were merely feints to tire out the
besieged and alarm them by a display of overwhelming force. It is
certain, however, that the Venetian and Greek sailors were always ready
to resist, and that, after this attempt on May 21, Mahomet’s fleet made
no further attempt to force its way into the harbour.
[Sidenote: Attempts to undermine the walls.]
Already, on May 16, the besieged had discovered that the Turks were
attempting to undermine the walls and thus enter into the city. Zagan
Pasha, the renegade Albanian, in command of Mahomet’s army in Pera and
opposite the walls from Caligaria to the Horn, had under him a number
of miners, who had been brought from Novo Brodo in Serbia and who
possibly were Saxons brought to that country to work in the silver
mines. These men took in hand the task of undermining. They commenced
their work at a distance sufficiently far removed not to be observed
by the besieged. Probably the first place attacked was between the
Adrianople Gate and Tekfour Serai. They endeavoured to undermine the
foss and the Outer Wall.[336] When this failed a second attempt was
made against the walls of the quarter called Caligaria, and this, says
Barbaro, because in that place there were no enclosures or, as he calls
them, ‘barbicans,’ the wall being single and unprotected even by a
ditch. This description enables us to identify the place as the wall
running at right angles to the northern end of the foss. An Austrian
named John Grant, who acted under the Grand Duke, took charge of the
counterminers and succeeded in finding and entering the Turkish mine,
where he and his men burnt the props. The works fell in and suffocated
a number of Turkish workmen. The incident greatly alarmed the citizens,
who feared that on future occasions Grant might not be fortunate enough
to discover the mine before the Turks had entered by it or had blown
up a part of the walls. Fortunately, the rocky character of the ground
prevented the miners from meeting with any notable success. Phrantzes
states that the only damage done by the Turks in mining was to destroy
part of an old tower, which was soon repaired by the defenders.[337]
[Sidenote: Construction of a turret, May 18.]
At daylight on May 18, the citizens were astonished to see a wooden
turret or ‘bastion,’ which had been built during the night.[338] The
turret had been constructed with the same secrecy and celerity that
Mahomet invariably adopted in the execution of his plans. Barbaro
declares that all the Christians in the city could not have made it
under a month. It was a huge structure. It was only in the morning,
when they saw it complete in a place where no preparations had been
observed on the previous evening, that they realised what had been
done. This ancient form of the ‘Taker of Cities’ was stationed near
the Romanus Gate. It consisted of a strong framework of long beams
so high as to overlook the Outer Wall.[339] It had been partly
filled with earth, faced with a threefold covering of camels’ or
bullocks’ hides, and was built on wheels or rollers. Steps led to
its upper platform. These and the road which led to the camp, which
was sufficiently distant to be out of range, were also covered for
protection. Scaling-ladders could be raised and thrown from the summit
of the turret to that of the wall. If the huge machine was, as Barbaro
states, within ten paces of the wall, it must have been built in the
foss itself. It dominated the outer barbican or enclosure and would
have allowed the enemy under cover of its protection to fill the ditch
from three openings which were in the side presented to the walls and
to undermine them in safety. The latter probably was the principal
object for which it was intended. It would also have enabled the Turks
to prevent the besieged from repairing the damages to the Outer Wall
caused by the cannon. For this reason we can understand the statement
of Barbaro, that while it gave increased hope to the Turks, it filled
the besieged with alarm. It was built, according to Tetaldi, opposite
the place defended by Justinian.[340] Its dangerous character was soon
shown. The cannon having destroyed one of the towers near the Romanus
Gate, the turret was moved and stood overhanging the ditch. A fierce
fight took place between the Turks inside it and the Greeks and
Italians under Justiniani. The Turks flung earth, wood, and all kinds
of material available into the foss, employing mainly the stone from
the ruined tower, so as to form a level pathway across. The besieged
fought hard from daylight till after sunset to prevent the Turks from
making use of the turret, and the emperor and Justiniani assisted all
the night at the repair of the tower.
It was probably the fact that the ditch had been largely filled with
brushwood which brought about the destruction of the machine. The
besieged managed to place barrels of powder in the ditch, set fire
to the brushwood, and blew up the whole structure. Several of its
occupants perished in the explosion. At daylight the sultan found that
his huge turret was reduced to ashes, that the foss had been cleared
out, and that the ruined tower had been in great part repaired. He
swore that the thirty-seven thousand prophets could not have persuaded
him that the besieged could have compassed its destruction in so short
a time.[341]
A similar turret was erected opposite the Pegè Gate, or, what is more
probable, opposite the Third Military Gate, and possibly there were
others near the Golden Gate and elsewhere.[342]
[Sidenote: Further attempts to undermine.]
Undeterred by the discovery and failure of the attempt to undermine
the walls at Caligaria, the Turks made other trials in the same
neighbourhood. But Grant was always ready, countermined and destroyed
the enemies’ work before they could use it. On three successive days
mines were found in this place, ‘where there were no barbicans,’ but
they also were destroyed, and a number of Turks, who could not escape
in time, either lost their lives or were captured.
On the 24th, a mine was found which had apparently been more carefully
concealed. A wooden turret had been built near the walls, which
was intended to serve the double purpose of deceiving the besieged
into supposing that its object was to facilitate the actual scaling
of the walls, while at the same time it rested on a bridge of logs
beneath which excavation was being made. It contained the earth and
stones which were taken out. The ruse was, however, suspected, and the
counterminers found and destroyed the mine.
The last mine dug by the Turks was found on May 25. This, says Barbaro,
was the most dangerous of all, because the miners got under the wall,
and if powder had been employed, it would have brought down a portion,
and have made an opening into the city.[343]
Altogether, says Tetaldi, the Turks had made fourteen attempts to
undermine the walls, but the Christians had listened, had heard and
detected them, and had either smoked out the Turks, destroyed them
with stink pots, let in water on them, or had fought them hand to hand
underground.[344] In all cases they had succeeded in preventing any
dangerous explosion. The attempt to gain an entrance by mining had
failed. In the words of Critobulus, Mahomet was now convinced that
mining was vain and useless labour and expense, and that it was the
cannon which would do everything.[345]
On the 23rd bad news reached the city. The small brigantine which had
been sent out on May 3 returned. Once more, flying the Turkish flag,
she ran the blockade of the Dardanelles and the entry of the Bosporus,
her crew disguised as Turkish sailors. The Turks, however, near the
city recognised and tried to catch her, but before they could bring
their vessels to the boom, it was opened, and the brave little ship was
once more safely in the Golden Horn.
[Sidenote: Return of brigantine. Failure to find Venetian fleet.]
Unfortunately, her crew had to report their failure to find the
Venetian fleet. They had, nevertheless, done their work gallantly. Like
the men, forty years later, under Columbus, the sailors appear to have
had a voice in determining what their ship should do. Having completed
their task and decided that it was useless to search any longer for
Loredano, a proposal was made to return to Constantinople. To this some
of the crew objected. They professed to believe, perhaps did believe,
that the city, if not already captured, would be taken to a certainty
before they could reach it. They had done their best; why should they
run the gauntlet again and return to the doomed city, since they could
do no good? The greater number, however, were true to their engagement,
and their answer has the best quality of seaman-like loyalty about it:
‘Whether the city be taken or not; whether it is to life or to death,
our duty is to return,’ and in consequence the brigantine made sail
once more for the Golden Horn.[346]
[Sidenote: Supernatural omens.]
During these days--that is, somewhere between May 22 and 26--certain
events occurred of which mention is made by several writers.
Though we may regard the narrative of these events mainly as evidence
of the superstition of the age, they have to be taken into account,
inasmuch as they affected the spirit both of besiegers and besieged.
The narratives are vague and not altogether reconcilable, but
Critobulus, a man writing with exemplary carefulness long after the
siege, probably gives the most accurate summary of what happened,
though his account, like all others, is tinctured by the superstition
of the time. He states that three or four days before the general
assault, when all available citizens, men and women, were going in
solemn procession through the city carrying with them a statue of the
Virgin, the image fell from the hands of the bearers. It fell as if it
had been lead. It was nearly impossible to raise it, and the task was
only accomplished by the aid of the fervent prayers of priests and of
all present. The fall itself created fear, and was taken to be an omen
of the fall of the city. But this impression was deepened when, as
the procession continued on its way, there happened a violent storm
of thunder and lightning, followed by torrential rain. The priests
could not make headway against the flood. The incident was manifestly
supernatural. On the following day the impression was still further
accentuated by the very unusual occurrence in Constantinople at the
end of May of a thick fog, which lasted till evening. The cloud of fog
gave complete confirmation of the impression that God had abandoned the
city, because, as Critobulus remarks, the Divinity hides His presence
in the clouds when He descends upon the earth.[347]
But the phenomenon of a light which appeared to settle over Hagia
Sophia alarmed both sides. The sultan himself appears to have
considered it an unfavourable omen, until the braver or more sceptical
of his followers, without denying the evident fact that it was a
heaven-sent omen, turned the difficulty by declaring that it was
unfavourable to the Greeks. Within the city the besieged were even more
alarmed than the Turks.
It is difficult to say what the phenomenon was. Men in that age
expected omens and signs in the heavens and expressed their
disappointment if none were vouchsafed to them. Writing, as all the
narrators did, after the siege, they would look back to recall what
were the signs of the divine displeasure, and they did not fail to
find them. Around the story of some atmospheric phenomenon there grew
a large myth, until we find The Moscovite recording that the light of
heaven illuminated all the city; that the inhabitants, believing it to
be the reflection of a fire caused by the Turks, ran towards Hagia
Sophia and found flames bursting out of its upper windows. These flames
englobed the dome and met in a single blaze which rose towards heaven
and there disappeared. The patriarch and the chief dignitaries of the
Church and members of the senate were so impressed with the tidings
of these wonderful signs that they went next day in a body to the
emperor to advise him to leave with the empress. The patriarch reminded
Constantine of well-known and ancient predictions regarding the fall of
the empire, and named witnesses of the miracle. This new and terrible
augury meant that the grace and goodness of God had abandoned the city,
and that it was decreed to be delivered to the enemy. When the emperor
learned the terrible news he fell to the ground in a faint. He was
revived with aromatic water, and when he was pressed to leave the city
gave the answer, ‘If it is the will of God, whither can we fly before
His anger?’ He would die with his people.
The growth of the myth is evident. An imaginary empress[348] is
brought in and a light is introduced, which, if it had been visible
as described, would have been recorded by every contemporary writer.
The unfortunate part of the story is that it is difficult to say which
parts are mythical and which are true.[349]
Up to May 24, the city had been besieged for upwards of six weeks.
The failure of the brigantine to find the Venetian fleet was a
terrible disappointment to all within the walls. If aid were coming
from Western Europe, it must be speedy. The besieged could do nothing
but fight on. During the whole six weeks the guns had been pounding
against the walls day and night with ceaseless monotony, and Greeks
and Italians alike, while worn out by frequent attacks and alarms,
were continually occupied in the repair of the damaged walls. Men and
women, girls, old men and priests, all, says Barbaro, were engaged in
this wearisome work. The breaching of the walls was steadily going on
at three places, but the damages were greatest in the Lycus valley.
There, indeed, all the force of the enemy seemed now to have been
concentrated. There, especially, was the big bombard, throwing its ball
of twelve hundred pounds weight which, when it struck the wall, shook
it and sent a tremor through the whole city, so that even on the ships
in the harbour it could be felt.[350]