and was then created Plenipotentiary for the Treaty of _Pisa_, after he
had in vain been sent to _Lyons_, to make an agreement; for there the
business was crossed with a thousand difficulties, amongst which the
precedency was one.
The _Pope_ was brought into such a Labyrinth, that he did almost lose his
wits in seeking how to come out of it; for on one side the affection of
his Family did continually solicite him to yield to the great pretensions
of the French King; on the other, the _Decorum_ and honour of his
Pontificate, which would be blurr’d with the infamy of having given away
so much of the Dignity and Profits of the Church, did make him resolve to
be constant, and bate nothing of that respect and Majesty which the
_Popes_ do use to expect from Princes: and the rather, because he had
alwayes shewed himself a singular defender of the Pontifical Dignity, and
could not endure to be forced to submit to a Crown for which he had never
had any great inclination.
For all this, at last, the interest of his Kindred carried it before
those of the Church; and after he had worn out all the slights and arts
that the Court of _Rome_ could furnish him withal, he was forced at last
to come to an agreement, as infamous for the See of _Rome_, as it was
honourable for _France_.
Whereupon some of the most zealous Cardinals having vented their
complaints in the Consistory it self, blaming _Monsignor Rasponi_ for
signing the Treaty, He was obliged to excuse himself to every one of them
in a particular Visit, by saying _That he had an express Order from his
Holiness for what he had done_; _who had declared his resolution of
yielding to any conditions_, _rather than of leaving his Family engaged
against so powerful an Enemy as France_. To which purpose he related to
some of his particular friends, the very words which the _Pope_ spoke to
him when he went to take his leave of him to go to _Pisa_, to treat with
the Duke of _Crequy_, which were these, _Be discreet and yield up
something of the Popedom_, _to save our Family_; _and not leave them and
the Church in an obligation of maintaining a dangerous War in_ Italy.
Thus it appears that it is not so much that universal care of a Father,
that makes the _Popes_ maintain a good correspondence with Christian
Princes; as the fear of leaving Enemies to their Families, and bringing
ruine upon their Relations.
We all know that every _Pope_ either out of envy or some other motive is
well pleased to lessen, if not utterly to destroy the Family of his
Predecessor; and of this we have had many experiences since two ages.
Therefore also the _Popes_, to prevent this misfortune, do ordinarily
endeavour to get, while they are alive, the protection of some eminent
Christian Prince, for their Family; under whose wings they may shelter
themselves in a time of calamity.
And if this be, we may conclude, that all the affection, the care, and
the desire which the _Popes_ have of advancing their Kindred, does at
last turn to a general benefit and profit for Christendom; and if you
except one inconvenience, which is, that they impoverish the Church, and
carry away all its treasure, it were and is better for all other
considerations, that the _Popes_ do govern conjoyntly with their
_Nipotismo_, than without it: which is proved by a third reason; which
is, that without a _Nipotismo_ the Negotiations and business of the Court
could never be carried with secresie enough.
I am in doubt whether it be harder to keep a thing secret in the Court of
a Prince, than in the Council of a Commonwealth; for in the Commonwealth
the great number of Counsellors make the keeping of a Secret a very
difficult thing: and in the Court of Princes, the envy of those
Courtiers, who are excluded from the management of Affairs, is so
sharp-sighted, and does so pry and penetrate into the most hidden
Mysteries of the Court, to the end they may either hurt the Prince
through his Counsellors, or the Counsellors through the Prince, that it
is almost impossible to keep any thing hidden from them.
I am of opinion, that for one reason the Secrets of a Commonwealth are
better concealed, which is; because that those that are conscious to
them, are themselves the Princes and Masters of the State: but in a
Monarchy, the Prince being forced to trust some of his Subjects, it is
much more dangerous for him and for his business; for he becomes slave
and dependent of those who should be his. Divers Histories will furnish
us with examples to prove what we say; and if that be true, and that yet
nevertheless it is very hard to keep counsel in a Commonwealth, it is
easily inferr’d, how difficult a thing it is to do it in a Monarchy.
But what shall we say then of the state of the Church, of which no body
can tell whether it be Commonwealth, or Monarchy, the _Popes_ appearing
sometimes absolute like Princes, and other while dependent like Dukes of
Commonwealths; and without doubt the _Popes_ could never be able to
conceal so many private and publick interests without that trust and
relyance, which they have in their _Nipotismo_: and this particularly for
two reasons. The first is thus.
The Court of _Rome_ taken in all its latitude, is without doubt the
greatest of _Europe_, and the most magnificent of Christendom; for it
yields to no other in the great number of Ambassadours, and publick
Ministers which reside in it.
For the _Popes_, that they may the better conserve the title of Universal
Father, which they affect, do by all means procure to have as many
Ambassadors of Christian Princes near them as they can. But that very
thing by which this Court seems to be most honoured, does also carry with
it an evident danger; for these Ambassadours and Residents being
unwilling to stay in _Rome_, without procuring some considerable
advantage to the Princes that send them, are perpetually watching for
occasions to discover the _Popes_ most secret designs: so that they are
in effect so many spyes, who the more they are in number, the more do
they encrease the difficulty of preserving and concealing the Secrets of
the Court.
Before I speak of the second Reason, which makes the Court of _Rome_ so
suspicious a place for Secrets, I must say something about the Cardinals,
and their Office, and Employment.
The Cardinals are the _Pope’s_ Counsellors, who by the Dignity of their
place, and the Majesty of their Habit, do much augment the pomp and
splendor of the Court. The _Popes_ do every day give them new
Priviledges and Prerogatives, by the means of which they are respected
like so many Kings.
This makes Forreign Princes endeavour to get their friendship by all
means, giving them both secret and publick allowances and Pensions, in
consideration of these Prerogatives, and of the power which they have to
chuse the _Pope_; who must necessarily be one of their number.
But if Princes shew a promptitude and readiness to win the Cardinals
affections, they are themselves reciprocally courted by the Cardinals for
divers reasons; As first, for the Emolument of their Pensions; Next, that
they may not obstruct their way to the Popedom by an open Exclusion in
the Conclave; And last of all, that they may live in greater reputation
and esteem in _Rome_, Where those Cardinals are most valued that
entertain an exact correspondence with Princes: particularly if it be
with any of the two Crowns of _Europe_, that is, _France_, or _Spain_;
upon whose Brigues and Interests does ordinarily depend the election of
the _Pope_.
Now it is to be believed, that these Princes do not prodigally spend
their Treasure without receiving a continual Interest for it; which
Interest is an exact information of all that is done, treated, and
managed in the Court of _Rome_: And of this the Cardinals acquit
themselves with great industry and diligence.
So we see, how intricate and troublesome the Government of _Rome_ would
become to the _Popes_; if they had not Confidents, that is, Nephews, on
whom they might relie; and to whom they might trust their secrets without
fear.
For indeed, a _Pope_ without Kindred must renounce Monarchy, and resolve
to be only as the Head of a Commonwealth; which would be just to give
himself up into the hands of the Cardinals, and be at their discretion:
Which if it were, every body may easily infer how dangerous it would
prove to the _Pope’s_ Authority, and how unbeseeming the greatness and
_decorum_ of his place and dignity. Besides that, probably things would
fall into confusion and disorder, while every Cardinal would be more
intent to satisfie his own ends; and, as they say, draw the water to his
Mill, than to mind the necessities of the State and Church.
If the _Pope_ could do nothing without the counsel and assent of the
Cardinals, How would he be able to treat any Leagues, make Wars, or
Peace? Which are things so incident to the nature of a great State, such
as the _Pope’s_ is, that it can seldom be without them. There would be
framed a thousand difficulties in the very beginnings of Negotiations;
and the Enemy would know all before you had resolved any thing. Every
Cardinal would support his Prince and Country, and at last they would all
be so embarassed and confounded, that they would either be in danger of
losing themselves for the Church, or of exposing the Church to mischief
to save themselves.
How would it be fit, that the _Pope_ should advise with the Senate of
Cardinals, if they themselves are his and the Churches greatest enemies,
If they have not only promised, but sworn fidelity to the Party of those
Princes that give them Pensions and Revenues? How then can they follow
the _Pope’s_ directions, or consent to his designs? Certainly they must
either cheat the Prince, that they may be true to the Church; or be false
to the Church, that they may not be ungrateful to those Princes, whose
money they have taken.
There are some Cardinals that would not care, if all were lost, so they
did but save their Family, which is under the protection of some Prince;
and avoid themselves the reproach of ingratitude from their Benefactors.
The greatest part of the Cardinals are either of the _French_ or
_Spanish_ Faction, and each of them makes it his greatest glory to defend
the Pretensions of the Crown he protects, whether just or unjust; so that
often between them they neglect and ruine the Interests of the Church and
_Pope_. How were it possible then for the _Pope_ either to preserve
himself or the Church in its Prerogatives, if he would take and follow
the counsel of those whose interest makes them the Enemies to both;
though they pretend, that what they do is only out of a tender
consideration of the publick good.
To this purpose I remember that a certain _Italian_ Cardinal, being weary
of holding for many years on the _Spaniards_ side, gave himself to the
_French_ by the mediation of a better Pension which they promised him.
And indeed the Cardinals, whatsoever they pretend, have no other
inclination to either party than what their Interest leads them to; For
he that gives highest Pensions, and the best Benefices, is sure to have
them.
This Cardinal, having thus renounced the _Spaniard_, did go about to take
away the imputation of inconstancy and self-interest; and would say in
all companies, _That he had no other end in doing so_, _but a desire to
be able to serve the Church and_ Pope _the better_.
But another Cardinal, of great experience and prudence, hearing him one
day discourse after this rate, could not forbear saying these words to
him, _I wish to __God that your Eminence_, _that have never been able to
do the Church any service while you were a true_ Spaniard, _may do her
some now you are a counterfeit_ Frenchman. And this he said in the
presence of divers Cardinals and Embassadours.
Let us then conclude, that the State and Church can never be well
governed, as to the point in hand, if the _Popes_ be without Nephews to
relye on, and in whose secrecy they may confide.
_Innocentius_ the tenth was so convinced of this truth, that finding
himself deprived of those helps which he could not receive from his
lawful Kindred by reason of their inabilities; and withal seeing that he
was exposed to the unsatiable avarice of a woman, his Sister-in-Law, he
was fain to take the young _Astalli_ and declare him Cardinal Nephew, and
_Padrone_, giving him the name of _Pamphilio_; and in a word, made him in
_Rome_, as _Pharaoh_ was in _Ægypt_, the Governour of all things.
But what hapned? This young Cardinal not being able to comply with the
_Pope’s_ humours, and having no tye of Consanguinity upon him, was rather
a Traytor to him than a Nephew; for he did reveal to the _Spaniards_,
from whom he did secretly receive good Pension, all that passed through
his hands, or that could come to his knowledge: caring not how he
hazarded and engaged the _Pope’s_ Honour and Reputation.
Particularly, at that time that the _Pope_ and the _Barberins_ together,
did consult how they should fall upon the Kingdom of _Naples_ and divide
it among themselves, _Astalli_ all day long did set spies, and endeavour
himself to discover their Counsels; and then secretly in the night did
give the _Spaniards_ notice of all; who, being thus well instructed, did
easily prevent their Enemies designs, by taking away all those means
which the Pretendants relied upon for the execution of their Enterprize.
Upon this the _Pope_ enraged against _Astalli_, banished him from _Rome_,
took away from him all that he had so liberally given him, except the
quality of Cardinal; of which he could not be deprived but for great
crimes, and that by a fair trial too.
Now if the _Pope Innocent_ could not trust one whom he had raised from
nothing; and if the secrets of his Court were revealed and published by a
Cardinal so much obliged to him, How can other _Popes_ trust Cardinals
that are as it were their enemies by being too much other Princes
friends?
These are the reasons that force the _Popes_ to call their Kindred about
them, and shew them all demonstrations of kindness; and I think they are
such as prove that the _Pope_ cannot govern according to the rules of
good Policy, if their Kindred be not with them, and have not a share in
their fortune.
And if it be so, Why do we murmur so much against the _Popes_ for
spending the Treasure of the Church in maintaining the greatness of their
Nephews? since it is certain that their Pomp and State is the Churches.
And to what shall its Treasure be useful, except it serve to make the
Majesty of the Popedom appear to the eyes of the world? For there is no
doubt, that if the _Pope’s_ Spiritual Authority were not held up and
maintained by his Temporal Power, it would soon be ruined and despised.
For now adaies the reputation of riches and strength is that, which
breeds respect for the Popedom; as in the Primitive Ages of the Church it
was upheld by holiness of life, and good example.
Poor Church-men are indeed respected still by some devout Women, and the
Vulgar: But they are despised in the Courts of Princes; where the Rich
are welcome, and honourably received. A poor Church-man must wear a
Hair-cloth, Fast, do Penitence, and work Miracles to be known and
respected: But a rich one, without more ado, shall immediately be saluted
and welcomed even where he is unknown.
Why are the Jesuites so in vogue in the World, and desired in Courts, as
if Princes could not be without them. The Vulgar adore them, Noblemen
respect them, and Magistrates grant them protection and priviledges. Is
it that they serve the Church better than other Church-men? No
certainly: For the Orders of Saint _Francis_ and Saint _Dominick_ have
spent more bloud in the profession of the Christian Faith in a Day, than
the Jesuites in an Age; neither do they live a more exemplary or a
stricter life than others. How comes it to pass then, that they are so
powerful? I will tell you; Money is the Key which opens all doors to
these good Fathers, by which they purchase Credit, Power, and Authority,
even amongst Church-men, and in the Court of _Rome_.
The _Popes_ by this, seeing how important a thing Riches are in the hands
of Church-men, do very wisely strive to furnish their _Nipotismo_ with
them; that as they are to treat and manage the greatest affairs of
Christendom: so they may do it with the Pompe and State, that so Eminent
an Employment does require.
The SECOND BOOK.
The Contents.
_IN which is discoursed_, _of all the good and ill that the_ Pope’s
_Nephews have done the Church ever since_ Sixtus _the Fourth_. _Of the
Church of Christ_, _compared to a Field_. _Of those that first bestowed
Riches upon the Church_. _Of the insatiability of the_ Nipotismo _in
general_. _Of the Princes that murmur against the mischiefs caused by
the_ Pope’s _Nephews in_ Christendom. _Of the honour that Princes
receive in bestowing Revenues upon the Church_. _How the Scandal was
first introduced in the Church_. _Of the Complaints made against the_
Popes. _Of the_ Primum movens, _that gives Motion to the Sphere of the_
Nipotismo. _Of a Comparison betwixt the Gospel and the Churchmen_. _Of
a Dispute between __a_ Papist _Preacher_, _and a_ Protestant. _Of the
Spirit of the_ Nipotismo, _inclined to gather Riches_. _Of the
impossibility of serving God and the World_. _Of the Excommunication of
the_ Lucheses _by_ Urban _the Eighth_. _Why men are so easily
corrupted_. _Of an Accident that befel St_. Francis _of_ Assiza. _Of
another that befel St_. Francis _of_ Paola. _Of a false Opinion_,
_maintained by some Divines_. _Of a Discourse held by_ Ferdinand, _Great
Duke of_ Toscany, _to a Pilgrim that was going to_ Rome. _Of the great
number of Decrees that have been made to reform the Church-men_. _Of the
People that complain of the_ Nipotismo. _How all_ Christendom _is
scandalized by it_. _How the Monks exclaim against it_, _because it
starves them_. _How often Princes withdraw from_ Rome _discontented_.
_Of the_ Popes _that cannot reform the Abuses of the Church_, _except
they begin with their Nephews_. _Of_ Alexander _the Seventh_, _and his
austere Life_. _How the good Example he gave in the beginning of his_
Pontificate, _was of great profit to the Church_. _Of some_ Protestants
_that went to_ Rome _on purpose_, _upon the noise of his exemplary Life_.
_How he left off hating_, _and fell to loving his Kindred_. _Of_ Don
Mario, _the Head of this_ Nipotismo. _Of the Disorder that was in_ Rome,
_about the Accident that befel the Duke of_ Crequy. _Of the damage done
to the Church by it_. _Of_ Don Agostino, _and his high Carriage_. _Of
the Cardinal_ Padrone _his inclination to sensual Pleasure_. _Of the
Taxes and Oppression of the_ Pope’s _Subjects_. _Of a particular Opinion
about the Peoples Vices_. _Of the pitiful condition of the Church in_
Innocentius _the Tenth’s time_. _Of the Renunciation of the Cardinals
Cap_, _made by the __Prince_ Pamphilio. _How_ Donna Olympia _did carry
her self towards the_ Nipotismo. _Of the Princes_ Ludovisio _and_
Giustiniani. _Of the_ Nipotismo _of_ Urban _the Eighth_. _Of the
Praises given to this_ Nipotismo, _by those who have writ the Life of_
Urban. _Of the Policy of the Nephews of the_ Popes. _Of the most
remarkable Passages of the Life of_ Urban. _How the Writers did
dissemble all the ill done by him_. _Of the_ Barberins _Proceedings
towards the Emperour and King of_ Poland. _Of the scandal which the_
Protestants _themselves did receive from their Dealings_. _Of the
Designs of_ Gregory _the Fifteenth_, _to destroy the_ Protestants. _How
Cardinal_ Ludovisio _his Nephew was of another Opinion_. _Of the pains
that_ Gregory _took to get into his hands_ Marc Anthony de Dominis, _who
was fled to_ London. _How the Prince Elector’s Library was given to the_
Pope. _Of the Zeal of_ Paul _the Fifth towards the defence of the
Ecclesiastick Jurisdiction_. _Of the hatred he bore to the State of_
Venice. _How dangerous the Excommunication of the_ Venetians _was to
all_ Italy. _Of the great constance of the_ Venetian _Senate_. _Of the
Troubles of the Church in the_ Pontificate _of_ Clement _the Eighth_.
_How he opposed himself to_ Henry _the Fourth King of_ France. _Of that
King’s Resolution_. _Of the Proceedings of_ Sixtus _the Fifth towards
his Kindred_. _How he banished one of his Relations_. _Of his_
Nipotismo, _that did the Church neither good nor harm_. _Of the
Resolution of_ Sixtus, _to Excommunicate_ Henry _the Third of_ France.
_How the Cardinals opposed it_. _Of that King’s Death_. _How_ Sixtus
_did not much care to assist the League in_ France. _Of some
Particularities of the_ Nipotismo _of_ Gregory _the Fifteenth_. _Of the
great disorder that was in_ Rome _in the time of_ Paul _the Fourth_. _Of
the Cardinal_ Caraffa _that died last_: _And of some other
Particularities about other_ Popes.
THAT which we have said in the precedent Book, is rather a Panegyrick for
the _Popes_ and their Nephews, than a true dis-interessed Relation,
becoming a History: Therefore lest our _Nipotismo_ should lose its Soul,
and that which will make it live, we must fall into our wonted
indifference; and by saying all the ill, and all the good that can be
said of the _Nipotismo_, perswade our Reader, as it is true, That we have
no other Design, than to relate freely and without interest its concerns.
Thus doing, the _Popes_ will have no reason to complain; since the ill
that is said, will be recompensed by the good; and the _Romans_, or my
other Readers, will not tax the Author of partiality or flattery, since
he so freely writes all that comes to his knowledge for the instruction
of the Publick.
Therefore we will treat in this Book, of all the good and all the
mischief, that the Nephews of the _Popes_ have done to the Church, ever
since _Sixtus_ the Fourth. Their good actions shall be set out, that the
Memory of the dead may be revived, and due Honour given to the living
that deserve it. And their ill deeds shall not be forgotten, that they
may be hated by all Mankind; and that the Nephews of the _Popes_ to come,
hearing the blame they undergo, may learn to esteem good actions, and
avoid ill ones.
But the greatest difficulty that I find in the execution of this my
design, will be, how to separate the good Corn from the Tares: for all
that the _Nipotismo_ does, is thought good and just by them, though never
so wicked; and the _Romans_, on the contrary, will scarce allow of any of
their actions, though never so virtuous.
Christ has often compared in his Gospel the Church to a Field; and indeed
it was a very fit Metaphor: for, like a Field, it has always been either
sowed, or mowed; and it is a hard matter to know, whether the number of
the Sowers does exceed that of the Mowers, though their Employment be
very different.
But certainly we may say, That the _Popes_ Nephews have always been the
Mowers, and the rest of Christian Princes the Sowers. And as Princes
have made no difficulty of taxing themselves and their Subjects, and
parting with the dearest fruits of their labours, to give to the Church;
so the _Pope’s_ Nephews have made no scruple of dissipating and spending
in their Pastimes and Pleasures, that which Princes had spared out of
their own Treasure for them.
What would _Constantine_, _Pepin_, _Charlemagne_, the Countess
_Mathilda_, and so many other Princes say, if they should come into the
World again, to see those Lands and Revenues, which they so charitably
gave to the Church, divided, and cast lots for, as his Vestments? Truly
I think, that they would now think it as a pious Work, to take from the
Church-men by force, that which they had before given so willingly: and
this because they would deliver so many People from the intolerable
oppression of these _Nipotismo’s_. And indeed their insatiability is
such, that the Church and the State, ruined and spoiled as it is by so
many hungry _Nipotismo’s_, would scarce suffice for their maintenance, if
Forreign Princes did not take a pride in enriching the Church by great
Revenues, which are all devoured by the hungry _Nipotismo’s_; who are
very justly compared to the _Hydra’s_ Heads, whereof one was no sooner
cut off, but there sprung seven worse and more envenomed in the place.