being out of hopes to keep it any time falls to plundering and destroying
it, carrying away all that’s good; and leaving to the poor Citizens
nothing but the liberty of venting their complaints: Just so do the
Church-men who are in authority in one _Pope’s_ life; for foreseeing that
their power is like to expire with him, and be resigned up to his
Successor, they make Hay while the Sun shines, and use all manner of
Extortions and Violences in their respective places for fear else of
departing with their hands empty. And the people are so far from
obtaining redress from those that succeed them, that they had rather be
under the Government of their old Masters; for the new ones come with
intention to do as much, if not worse, than the others.
In the time of _Francesco Maria della Rovere_, last Duke of _Urbin_, his
Creatures seeing him past hopes of having any Heirs; and that after his
death the Estate was like to fall to the Church, as being a Feife of it,
they applyed themselves to make their advantage by all means; that is,
they plunder’d and ruin’d it, that they might leave it bare to the
Church-men their Successors. Particularly, when they saw the Duke
languishing in a decrepit Age, they then bestirr’d themselves, and flew
about like so many Bees to suck the rest of the Honey: But he hapning to
live longer than they expected they were at a loss, and had drained all
the State so dry; that they themselves were fain to sit and look upon the
desolate condition of that Dukedom without being able to make it worse.
It came thus lean and impoverished into the Church-mens hands, who, for
all they have such good Stomachs, were fain to forbear eating for the
first seven years, till it had gathered a little flesh again; and then
they fell to devouring of it afresh, and have since continued to do so:
no sooner perceiving it to be a little recruited, but they extenuate it
with Taxes, Impositions, and Extortions.
That which hapned once to the Dutchy of _Urbin_, happens often to the
whole state of the Church; for as soon as the Governours, and other
subordinate Officers, see the _Pope_ drawing to his end, and by
consequence that their time of getting is also ready to expire, every new
_Pope_ advancing new Creatures, there is no sort of Violence, Theft,
Robbery, or Extortion that they do not commit in their respective
charges: which they no sooner resign to new Officers, but that they who
come in poor, and must maintain the _Decorum_ of their places, invent
some new way of vexing the poor people, and enriching themselves; giving
afterwards a little respite to the people to breath in, and by that time
the _Pope_ is a dying, and then they fall on a fresh.
So that it appears that the Popedom being Elective and not Hereditary,
causes all these misfortunes to the State and people; for this makes
every body think of the present, and none of the future, there being no
future amongst Church-men.
But if this inconveniency be great, it would without doubt prove much
more intolerable, if the _Pope_ had no Kindred to help them in the
Government of the State and Church; For though it seem that a _Nipotismo_
is directly bent upon its own profit and advantage: yet for divers
reasons and respects they do preserve many places from ruine, and many
Subjects from oppression. Whereas if the _Pope_ were without them, he
would be forced to trust to a great number of Governours, who would every
one be as greedy, and as absolute as a Nephew; and Lord it as high with
the title of _Dominus Dominantium_.
The Nephews, who are few in number, take upon them to be both Shepherds,
and Shearers; Treasurers, and Extorters: so that they suffer no body to
grow rich but for them, nor to rise but by their means and to their
profit, nor to take from others except it be to present them. For woe be
to those Ministers of State, or subordinate Officers, that dare
contradict a Nephew’s Will; or do any thing without their Order.
Now this being so, it is evident that it is more easie to satisfie one
mans avidity than a hundreds. If the Nephews were not, every Prelate,
every Bishop, every Abbot, every Cardinal, would treat the Church as the
Jews did our Saviour’s Garments; that is, divide it amongst them: and it
may be, would leave nothing for their Successors; for their Maximes are
indeed to live well themselves, but not to provide that others may do so
too.
The _Nipotismo_ looks upon the Popedom as their own, and so they have
some consideration for a thing in which they pretend a propriety. When
once their Purse is full they let it breath, and recover its forces.
’Tis true that that seldom falls out; for we have seen the _Barbarins_,
enjoy the state of the Church for three and twenty years: and yet shew as
much avidity when they were upon the point to leave it, as when they
first entred upon it.
Besides this, if _Rome_ were without a _Nipotismo_, the Government of the
City would be every day in new hands; every Church-man’s ambition being
to climbe up to the top of the Wheel, and supplant him that stands next
to the Soveraign Power. So that the Church would be in one Pontificate,
tossed like a ball from one to the other; and that most commonly by very
unskilful persons: the mystery of Church-Government being a thing not to
be mastered but by those who stay long in it, and acquire great
experience in the management of affairs.
Moreover, if the State were governed by different Persons under the Reign
of one _Pope_, it would be a very hard matter to find out the Author of
the Peoples miseries, every one having his Predecessors actions for an
excuse; so that men would also lose that poor consolation of being able
to show their Tormenters: But it is not so when a _Nipotismo_ governs,
for then as they have the Honour, and Riches; so must they endure the
Reproaches, and Complaints made against their Government, which the
_Romans_ do without mercy, making the air sound and repeat their murmurs
with a thousand Echoes.
These reasons do sometimes prevail upon the _Pope’s_ Kindred to make them
abstain from doing all the mischief they would do; or at least they
suffer not others to commit crimes and faults which they know will be
laid to their charge: and of the imputation of which they shall be sure
to be heirs as well as of their Uncle’s riches.
And indeed, how would it be possible for the State of the Church, which
is a Monarchy, to be governed well if it were governed as a Republick.
For in Commonwealths the Governours are the Citizens and Natives
themselves, who being sure that the State they govern, is their own, do
administer with Justice and Equity; first, as reaping a benefit by their
moderation; And secondly, as being sure to expect a punishment when they
are out of their charges: But the _Pope_ having the disposing of all
places and charges, does often advance Strangers; who have no design but
of making their own Fortune, and who, when once removed from their
dignities, may either leave the State, or else procure impunity by a part
of those riches which they have extorted from the poor people. It is
much better therefore that there should be a _Nipotismo_, into whose
hands the _Popes_ may trust their Government and Person; and who by the
purchase which they make of great Estates do, as it were, settle
themselves within the State: and may fear the being called to an account
for their violences, if they exceed measure.
There are three other reasons which seem to conclude very strongly in
favour of a _Nipotismo_, which are these:
That the _Pope_ may more easily discover the interests of Foreign
Princes; That he may be able to govern with more care and affection; And
that he may be able to carry on the Negotiations of his Court with more
secrecy.
And indeed, it would not only be difficult, but almost impossible for the
_Pope_ to dive into the hidden interests and designs of Foreign Princes
without a _Nipotismo_; For how could he trust Strangers with his secrets,
if he could not be assured that they would reciprocally reveal to him all
theirs. The Ministers of State would be easily corrupted to betray the
_Pope_ their Master, and incline much more to oblige Princes, upon whom,
because of their hereditary and settled condition, they might relie, than
to be faithful to one who might fail every moment; and with him all their
hopes and expectations.
Besides, the Princes themselves would hardly condescend to reveal their
secrets, and treat of important matters in the Court of _Rome_, when they
should know and see that they must confide in strangers, whom another
Prince might bribe and corrupt to their disadvantage; For just so far do
Soveraigns trust the _Pope_ as they see about him people, in whom he may
trust himself.
_Urban_ the eighth deserves no small praises for his Policy, all along
his Reign: but particularly, for his method and way of treating with the
Soveraigns of _Europe_; whose secrets were all revealed to him, whereas
none of his were revealed to them again. For the same means, which he
used to discover others designs, help him to conceal his own.
For having created his two Nephews Cardinals, and gave them instructions
worthy such a politick head as his was, he made one of them declare for
_Spain_, and the other for _France_; each of them making demonstration of
an extraordinary kindness for the Crown they protected. Which thing
proved most fortunate to the _Pope_, and successful in the design he had,
to be Master of the secrets of both Kings.
Now that this was a design of the Uncle, and no particular inclination of
the Nephews, appears easily; because that Cardinal _Antonio_, who sided
with the French, had never had any communication with this Nation before
his being made Cardinal: neither had he received from them any kindness
that could endear him to their Party: Nay, indeed he had rather reason to
encline to the Spaniards, from whom he had received many courtesies worth
acknowledging; but he followed in this his Uncle’s suggestions.
The Cardinal _Francesco_ on the other side who had never any great
inclination for _Spain_, and who in the services he did do them, did not
appear with that violence that Cardinal _Antonio_ did; for the _French_
would nevertheless in obedience to his Uncle often declare for them: and
in some occasions show a great deal of affection and desire to oblige a
Crown, which did seek after his protection.
_Urban_ having thus assigned the care of the interest of these two Potent
Princes to his Nephews, could not chuse but be perfectly informed of
their designs, and secret intrigues of their Courts; whose Ministers and
Ambassadours in order to a further discovery of the _Pope’s_
inclinations, were forced to communicate before hand a great part of
their secrets to the Cardinal, Protector of their Kingdom, in hopes by
his means of diving further into that which was yet hidden to them: but
most commonly they got little light and intelligence by it, for the
Nephews following exactly their Uncle’s Instructions, did endeavour to
pump every body else, and keep themselves close. Their Uncle in the mean
time well informed on both hands, was sure to take just measures; and by
an even carriage so to entertain the affections of both Kings, as to make
them both his Friends: and really one who could govern a Popedom so well,
and easily, betwixt so opposed and different Interests, did deserve to
govern as long as _Urban_ did.
_Innocentius_ might have been named for one of the greatest Politicians
in the world, if his Sister-in-law had not lead him astray; or rather if
he had been guilty of an unparalell’d inconstancy in changing so often
his _Nipotismo_.
For they that were disgraced did immediately reveal to Princes all the
secrets of his Court, and they who came in their room could never
penetrate into the hidden designs of Forreign Courts; for the Princes of
those Kingdoms and States durst not trust them with any thing, as being
alwayes afraid, lest they should be turned off as the first.
And in effect, as soon as the news of the adoption of Cardinal _Astalli_
was spread abroad, there were many that laid great wagers, that he would
not conserve himself in his post long; and the grounds they went upon,
was the unconstant humour of the Pope, which no body could trust to.
Cardinal _Mazarine_ himself being weary of so many extravagant changes in
the _Nipotismo_ of _Innocentius_, and seeing _Astalli_ fallen out of his
favour, and the _Barberins_ in his place, said to one of his Confidents,
in the presence of a French Protestant, these words, _I have never relyed
much upon the Cardinal_ Astalli; _and I shall now scarce rely upon the
Pope himself_. Many Princes both of _Italy_ and _Germany_ were of
Cardinal _Mazarine’s_ minde in this, and became very cautious in all
their negotiations; avoiding all occasions of treating with his Holiness,
as knowing that nothing could be well managed in such divisions, and
changes.
Thus we see, that not only the _Popes_ must have near them those that
have the title of Nephews; but they must be really such, as by
consanguinity may be obliged to the same interest with the _Pope_, if he
means that others should trust them. This is the only way to make the
_Popes_ appear Sovereigns, as really they desire to be; and any other way
they will seem rather to be the Heads of a Commonwealth than absolute
Princes.
It is fit therefore, that they should be allowed a _Nipotismo_ for their
own and others safety; but it is not just that they should so indulge
this _Nipotismo_, as to set it above themselves, and become its slaves.
Let them treat with Princes, but let them not become so themselves, and
usurp the _Pope’s_ Authority, so far as to use it without his knowledge,
and often contrary to the Interests of the Church and State.
Let them not do as _Gregory_ the 15th. who had given to the Cardinal
_Ludovisio_ his Nephew, so great an Authority of doing and saying what he
pleased, without so much as consulting his Uncle, that he was really
become _Pope_, and the _Pope_ as if he had been the Nephew; and if ever
he come and give him part of any secret negotiation, it was because the
thing was so intricate, that he either could not, or durst not undertake
to come to execution, without being first fortified with his Uncle’s
advice and approbation.
But the best was, that the _Pope_ himself did not dare to ask him any
questions about business, or inform himself otherwise; but sometimes
would be whole weeks together without so much as seeing the face of an
Ambassadour, or publick Minister: his Nephew in the mean time giving
Audience, and concluding all business with them.
And the _Pope_ was so customed to this usage, that it never came into his
minde to be offended at it; but would very contentedly make amends for
those faults which his Nephew did often commit in his administration: and
whensoever he did see his Nephew come into his presence, he would say,
_Nephew_, _I am sure ’tis some very hard and intricate business that
brings you hither_, _for else we should scarce be repaired to for
counsel_. And he had a great deal of reason to say so, for his Nephew
did never communicate to him any negotiation, except he had first spoiled
it, and brought himself to a _non-plus_; and then the _Pope_ would oblige
the Congregations of the Cardinals to take the business into their care,
and set right again that which had been spoiled by his inability.
The second reason for the _Nipotismo_ is, that the _Popes_ may be able to
govern with more care and affection. There is nothing that forces more a
Prince to answer the ends of Government, and to oblige his people, than
when he considers that the Government is to descend to his Heirs; for a
Prince without a Successor does often dissipate and spoil that which he
would preserve, if he had any body to leave it to.
The State of _Venice_ which never established any Law without having
first deliberated upon it, and sifted it in their Council of _Pregadi_,
does think fit to oblige the kindred of the dead Duke to answer for their
Kinsman’s misdemeanours and miscarriages; fining them in great summes of
money for a reparation of his faults: so that often they are fain to
endure for the dead Duke those punishments, which his Dignity when he was
alive, and his death, have preserved him from.
The effect of this is, that the Dukes of _Venice_ do comport themselves
with all moderation and equity, following exactly those rules of
Government which they receive from the State; And the fear they are in of
leaving their Relations engaged in a painful satisfaction for their
faults, does oblige them to study night and day how they may serve the
publick: in doing which, they do at the same time oblige their Countrey,
themselves, and their Kindred; whereas else they might be subject to
follow their own private interests, to the prejudice and detriment of all
the Commonwealth.
The _Popes_ have almost the same fear upon them, and by consequent the
like obligation; for the only consideration of leaving their Relations
engaged with too powerful enemies, has often made them desist from
enterprizes, which would have proved fatal to their State, and all
Christendom.
_Urban_ the 8th. did often protest, that if it had not been out of a
kindeness to his Nephews, he would either have hazarded the Popedom, or
have brought Princes to his will.
The _Popes_ know very well by experience, that there is no way to
preserve their _Nipotismo_ from the persecution which ordinarily they are
to expect from their Successours; whensoever their Successors are such as
come with pre-occupation against them, and finde in the Government of the
Church and State so many abuses, which do quicken their indignation
against the precedent _Nipotismo_.
This is a very great tye upon them in their administration, which appears
if once they come to cast it off.
_Paul_ the 4th. who had much of a barbarous and inhumane humour in him,
more becoming a Souldier than a Pope; as soon as he had banished his
Nephew from _Rome_, did do things with a great deal more resolution and
insolence than before: insomuch that it seemed, as if he had a minde to
reduce all the world under his Laws, and force Christendom to follow the
dictates of his _Capriccio_.
The Ministers of Princes who had to do with him, did extremely complain
of this his proceeding; for he did no less than threaten them all upon
every occasion: and one day particularly as the Spanish Ambassador was
complaining to him of some occasion of disgust which his Holiness had
given the Crown of _Spain_, he answered him in a fume, _That he had now
no Nephews to care for_; _and that suppos’d_, _That his actions did
deserve to be blamed_, _he little cared_: _for with his death all
resentments would vanish_: meaning he was no longer concerned for his
Relations, for whose sake he had all this while contained himself within
the limits of the Papal Dignity.
Some say that _Julius_ the second did bear a great affection to his
Kindred, but did forbear any demonstrations of kindeness to them out of a
more solid Principle of Love; which was, That they might not receive any
reproaches or injuries after his death, for those faults which he might
have committed in his life time: for having resolved to do nothing but
make War, and lead a Souldiers life, as indeed he did, he would
infallibly have drawn the revenge of all his Enemies upon his kindred, to
whom therefore he shewed himself averse.
And indeed it was wisely done of him, and kindely; for it was impossible
but so warlike a humour as his was, must needs offend many Princes, who
all would have been revenged upon his _Nipotismo_, as Authors, and
Partakers of their Uncle’s Designs.
If _Urban_ had done the same thing, the persecution of the _Barberins_
had not been at all, or at least had not been so violent; but the great
Authority with which they appeared under him, did make Princes believe
that all the _Pope’s_ actions were of their plotting and managing.
So, when the Duke of _Parma_, and the Princes his allyes made War against
the Church, they declared to all the world that they had no design to
offend the _Pope_; but only to be revenged of the _Barberins_, whose
ambition they accused as the Motive of the War.
Quite contrary, All the errors and miscarriages of _Innocent_ the 10th.
were never imputed to his Nephew the Prince _Pamphilio_; for every body
knew well, that he had no share in the administration of the Government,
and yet he is in possession of all those riches and vast summes of money
which _Donna Olympia_ his Mother had got together: and no doubt if she
were now alive, she would certainly be in very great danger, if it were
only, because of that opinion which Princes had conceived of the
Authority with which she rul’d, and was thought to have a hand in all the
transactions of her Brother’s Pontificate.
And on the other side, that tender affection which the Pope did bear to
his Sister-in-law, was very useful towards the abating something of the
violence of the _Pope’s_ temper, diverting him from all thoughts of War,
and keeping him from entring into Leagues and Confederacies with Princes,
with whom he desired to live in peace.
When the revolution of _Naples_ happened, which was the greatest occasion
that ever any _Pope_ had to possess himself of that Kingdom, he was so
far from attempting it, that he would never so much as say a word, or
enter into deliberation about it; not that he wanted courage or desire:
but only because he would not leave _Donna Olympia_, and his Kindred,
involved in an irreconcilable War with _Spain_, and in danger of ruining
themselves for ever.
Our _Alexander_ has alwayes used the same precautions, for when _Don
Agostino_ in the heighth of his insolence and pride disobliged so openly
the Family of _Colonna_, by making his Uncle the Cavalier _De la Ciaia_
take up that place in the Theatre, which the High Constable _Colonna_ had
hired for himself.
The _Pope_ was infinitely offended at so rash an action, not out of any
consideration for the merit of the Family of the _Colonna_; but because
he knew that such an accident could not choose but be followed by an open
enmity betwixt the two Families of _Chiggi_ and _Colonna_: therefore
without any delay the _Pope_ gave order, that all the means of
reconciliation should be sought out. And finding that _Don Agostino_
stood too much upon his terms, and would not be brought to make any
satisfaction to the Constable, the _Pope_ grew passionate; and sending
for him, forced him to a present complyance, using some reproaches: and
amongst others, these words, _You commit extravagant follies_, _and I
__must be put to the trouble of making amends for them_, _to free you
from the danger of their consequences_. And a little after, _You do
nothing but procure mischief to your self and me_, _while I make it my
business to do you good_.
I will not say any thing of the business of the Duke of _Crequy_, for it
is most certain, that without the consideration of his Kindred, the
_Pope_ had never condescended to an agreement so advantageous for
_France_.
Witness the _Pope’s_ own expressions to those Ambassadours and Cardinals,
who for the quiet of _Italy_ did endeavour to take up the business. The
Venetian Ambassadour above all did concern himself very much in the
business, following the Orders of his Senate; which does wisely fore-see
and endeavour to take away all causes of a War in _Italy_: and as he was
pressing the _Pope_ upon the business, his Holiness answered him, _That
it was a great affliction to him that he had introduced his Kindred into_
Rome; _for else he would either have broke himself_, _or have made_
France _bend_.
But the Ambassadour who was very ready in all occasions, but particularly
prepared upon this, answered him, _If your Holiness had never brought
your Kindred into_ Rome, _this accident had not happened_.
To which the _Pope_ replyed suddenly, _Well then_, _we must make all well
again_, _to the Churches prejudice_, _and our Kindreds advantage_.