=299=Posey to friend, Feb. 19. =69=Wool to Bliss, Feb. 7.
=147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recollections. Madison
_Record_, 1850 (Prickett). =300=Prickett, letters. Semmes, Service,
121-2. Tampico _Sentinel_, Mar. 27. Scribner, Camp., 59. Smith, Remins.,
37, 42. _Picayune_, Apr. 14 (Taylor). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97, 99, 132
(Taylor); 144 (Wool). J. Davis in _Cong. Globe_, 31, 1, app., 1034-41.
=173=_Id._, Address. Benham, Recolls. _Journ. U. S. Artillery_,
July, 1892, p. 294. Davis, J. Davis, i, 336. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1168,
1176 (Taylor). Carleton, Buena Vista, 4, 12-21, 24-6, 45. _Journ. Milit.
Serv. Instit._, xiv, 199 (No one can tell why Taylor did not fortify
Saltillo before the battle), 443. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849.
=76=Mora, Feb. 25.
The reason that led Taylor to neglect preparing Saltillo was no doubt
the same that had led him previously to neglect preparations when the
circumstances called for them.
XX. BUENA VISTA
20.1. Many of the Mexicans marched nearly forty-five miles in less
than twenty-four hours. See Stevens, Camps., 18.
20.2. The statements regarding the time of day differ, but the account
of the text appears to rest upon the most reliable evidence. See
Wallace, Wallace, 40. Taylor's verbal reply to the summons of Santa Anna
is said to have been more forcible than elegant, but a courteous answer
in writing was sent by Bliss.
20.3. Several officers seem to have noted the advantages of this
battlefield, but Wool recommended it near the end of December and is
entitled to the credit of the choice. The author visited the ground
twice, and found that a good route for infantry and cavalry ran from
La Encantada behind the hills west of Buena Vista valley, and entered
this valley north of La Angostura. Apparently it could have been made
practicable for cannon easily, and could have been used effectively by
either general for a feint at least. Engineer Mansfield had a picket
guard it during the afternoon and night of February 22.
20.4. This space was to be closed, if necessary, with two wagons
loaded with stone. The parapet was occupied by two companies of the
First Illinois under Lieut. Col. Weatherford. The main American position
was over-manned. S. Anna could not have carried it against Washington's
guns and infantry flanking fire from the edge of the plateau, and men
were urgently needed for the American left.
20.5. =330=The American forces in action at Buena Vista were as
follows: Dragoons under Bvt. Lieut. Col. May (First, 133; Second, 76),
209; Third Artillery (Co. C under Capt. Bragg, three guns--the fourth
being at Saltillo; Co. E under Capt. Sherman, four guns), 150; Fourth
Artillery, Capt. Washington, eight guns, 117; Arkansas horse, Col. Yell,
479; First Kentucky (two squadrons of cavalry and a battalion of mounted
riflemen), Col. Marshall, 330; Second Kentucky, Col. McKee, 571; First
Mississippi, Col. Davis, 368; Indiana Brigade (Second regt. under Col.
Bowles and Third under Col. Lane), Gen. Lane, 1253, including a rifle
battalion of four companies under Major Gorman; First Illinois, Col.
Hardin, 580; Second Illinois, Col. Bissell, 573; Texas volunteer company
(attached to Second Illinois), Capt. Conner, 61; Major McCulloch's Texan
scouts, 27. The figures include officers and men. The general staff
numbered forty-one. Three hundred and sixty-four of the men were on the
sick list. A company of the First Artillery, a few men of the Third
Artillery, two Mississippi companies and four Illinois companies were at
Saltillo. All except the dragoons and artillery were volunteers. Only
the artillery, dragoons, Mississippi regiment, and Conner's company had
been under fire, and some of these men were raw recruits; but Col. Davis
and all the field officers of the Second Kentucky were West Pointers.
Mostly Wool's men had been well trained. McCulloch's company probably
served under May. All the corps not otherwise described were infantry.
In the volunteer horse certain companies appear to have been regarded as
true cavalry and certain others as only mounted infantry. A similar fact
was noted in connection with the battle of Sacramento (p. 309).
20.6. Miñón issued from the Palomas de Adentro pass.
20.7. No satisfactory explanation of Taylor's trips to Saltillo was
made. The city had been in greater danger of attack from Miñón while
the Americans were eighteen miles away at Agua Nueva than after they
retired. Taylor should have ascertained seasonably that Palomas Pass
was practicable for cavalry, and have done whatever was necessary. Wool
appears to have barricaded the streets of Saltillo before going to Agua
Nueva (N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849), and Butler began a redoubt,
which seems to have been the only external defence. Taylor's escort were
not needed as laborers. Major Warren, the governor of Saltillo, Capt.
Webster of the First Artillery, who had charge of the redoubt, and First
Lieut. Shover, of the Third Artillery, stationed not far away in the
old camp, were competent officers; and the first two made no allusion
in their reports to Taylor's visits, while the third only said that
the General ordered him to watch Miñón, and, if attacked, defend his
post to the last extremity--which were his obvious duties. There seems
to have been no particular reason to anticipate a night attack. Taylor
did not suggest this as a reason for going to the city. Especially is
it surprising that he left his work at Saltillo, whatever it was, so
incomplete on the morning of February 22 that he had to return in the
evening. Santa Anna, after the exhausting march just made, could not
be expected to strike decisively that day, whereas such an attack was
almost certain to be made the next morning, and it was Taylor's duty to
be on the ground at that time.
20.8. _Events of Feb. 22; the battlefield._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp.
97-9 (Taylor); 98 (S. Anna); 144 (Wool); 163 (Marshall); 169 (Fry);
171 (Roane); 174 (Weatherford); 175 (Bissell); 181 (Gen. Lane); 186
(Col. Lane); 189 (Gorman); 197 (May); 203 (Sherman); 205 (Warren);
206 (Webster); 207 (Shover). Carleton, B. Vista, 5-9, 27-49, 177-86.
González, Aguascalientes, 158. French, Two Wars, 77-8. _Journ. Milit.
Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. =190=Ewing, diary. Raleigh _Star_, Aug.
18. =276=Neville diary. _Delta_, Mar. 14, 1848. =69=Wool to
Taylor, Jan. 20. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recolls.
=110=Barbour, diary. _Vedette_, iv, no. 8 (Lee). =8=Anon.
diary. =61=[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17. =300=Prickett, letters.
Rápida Ojeada. _Diario_, Apr. 17. Matamoros _Amer. Flag_, Mar. 20.
_Republicano_, May 3. =80=Ampudia to gov. Méx. state, Oct. 10.
Balbontín, Invasión, 71-3. Apuntes, 98-100. Taylor and his Generals,
166. S. Anna, Apelación, 25-7. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 55.
Scribner, Camp., 62, note. Smith, Chile con Carne, 214-5. Smith,
Remins., 37, 48. _Picayune_, Apr. 14 (Taylor); May 21; Sept. 7; Oct.
19; Dec. 3. _Delta_, July 11. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 413-4.
Benham, Recolls. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Apr. 7. _Spirit of the Times_,
May 1. Napoleon, Maxims, p. 26. Wallace, Wallace, 40. Davis, J. Davis,
i, 340. Profess. Memoirs corps of engineers, no. 31, p. 110. Stevens,
I. I. Stevens, i, 145. Carreño, Jefes, ccxxxii. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1168
(Taylor). Stevens, Camps., 18. Encarnacion Prisoners, 34, 38-9. N. Y.
_Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. _Littell_ no. 155. Romero, Geog. and Stat.
Notes. =76=Reports of S. Anna, Uraga, Memontesdeoca, Zamara, Mig.
Andrade, Guzman, Trejo, Juvera, Mora.
20.9. The data relating to the Mexican batteries, when collated,
cannot be fully harmonized. _E.g._ Carleton puts the 24-pounders on
the American left near the mountain, but from Mexican sources it seems
clear that they remained near the road, and Wallace (Wallace, 50) says
the same. Washington states that he was most of the time under the fire
of heavy guns. Of course the Mexican left had to be protected, and it
would have been very hard to move these clumsy iron pieces on the rough
ground. Gen. Pérez stated after the battle that from lack of forage the
draught animals had been too weak to draw the artillery up the hills.
20.10. Bowles was personally brave, but had been away much of the
time and did not understand his work (=65=orders 281). His men
keenly realized this (Perry, Indiana, 292), and hence went into the
battle shaky. Lane knew how they felt (Scribner, Camp., 62); and
apparently he should not have placed them far in advance and alone to
meet overwhelming numbers. It should be added, however, that (1) he
intended to give his personal attention to the regiment (Scribner,
Camp., 62), and (2) the Mississippi Rifles (to whom a position had
been assigned the previous evening) were expected to join the Second
Indiana at an early hour (Barbour, diary). Had they not been absent
with Taylor, one may fairly say, Bowles would not have given his fatal
order, and the American flank would in all probability not have been
turned; or, had the order been given, the Second Indiana would almost
certainly have rallied upon the Mississippians, and the virtual loss
of Marshall's troops would have been avoided. The gap created by the
absence of the Mississippi regiment should have been filled by recalling
McKee and Bragg from the west side as soon as the formation of Santa
Anna's columns indicated where he intended to strike and by ordering the
reserved artillery to the plateau. The cause of Bowles's order is not
certain; but O'Brien's horses, when attached to the guns for the purpose
of advancing, faced of course to the rear, and it seems probable that
Bowles misunderstood this as a sign of withdrawal. The worst feature of
his order was that he specified no place to stop.
Lieut. Col. Haddon of the Second Indiana stated in 1848 that the
regiment was rallied on the south edge of a ravine, but was ordered by
Taylor himself, who had then arrived, to cross to the other side of
it, and, as a body of Mexicans charged it just then, it broke and ran
(Perry, Indiana, 292). Certainly Taylor exhibited a peculiar resentment
toward the regiment, opposed having the affair investigated (_ibid._,
163, 313) and endeavored to hush it up (_ibid._, 276). Other officers
were doubtless as censurable as Bowles, but he was the most conspicuous
delinquent and became the scapegoat.
20.11. The failure of this attack on Buena Vista was said by a Mexican
officer to have been due to Gen. Andrade, who failed to coöperate,
and prevented a large force of infantry from doing so
(_Republicano_, May 3, 1847). Yell was a gallant but negligent officer.
He did not know how to manoeuvre his men, and only a portion of them
fought here (_Niles_, May 8, 1847, p. 157; _Spirit of the Times_, May
1). He was far in advance of them when he fell (Carleton, B. Vista, 93).
American guns came up and also some dragoons, and helped complete the
repulse of the enemy. The skirmish lasted only a few minutes.
What the Arkansas men lacked was not courage, but the discipline (and
the resulting skill and confidence) against which they had protested
while on the Chihuahua expedition (p. 274). Benham states that Marshall
would not go back to the field though urged by Taylor personally to
do so (Recolls.). All this resulted from a mistake of Wool's. He
understood that the bench was an extremely valuable position, and should
therefore have occupied it in advance, and thrown up a breastwork
there, dismounting the volunteer cavalry, and placing them behind this
and other works (Chamberlain). One part of the lancers ("cuirassiers")
retreated; the other part crossed to the opposite side of the valley,
and returned behind the hills (see note 3) to Santa Anna's position.
On reappearing they were taken for Americans and caused great alarm
(Balbontín, Invasión, 87). This suggests what the effect might have been
had either Santa Anna or Taylor used this route for a feint or attack.
20.12. A bitterly contested question was whether Wool advised retreat
during the battle. The truth appears to be that, as Benham fully
explains, he advised preparing to retire, that Taylor gave an order
accordingly to Washington, and that a zealous subaltern began to move;
but that Taylor, almost instantly reflecting on the moral effect that a
sign of retreat would have on the volunteers, countermanded the order.
Wool would not have advised retreating from what he considered the best
position, except in the case of absolute necessity.
20.13. Bragg now had three guns, for the one that had been under
Lieut. Kilburn had rejoined him. It is worth mention that Bragg gives
his ammunition expenditure, Feb. 23, as about 250 rounds per gun (Sen.
1; 30, 1, p. 202), an unparalleled record for muzzle-loading cannon.
20.14. The Americans looked upon this as a ruse of Santa Anna,
designed to save the men in the recess of the mountain; but the Mexicans
give the view of the text (_e.g._ Apuntes, 102), and a field officer
(probably Col. Bissell), who went with Hardin and McKee to meet the
Mexican officers, stated that they had no white flag (Littell, no. 155,
p. 234). The fact that so much consideration was paid to their absurd
question suggests that Taylor was not averse to a parley. Many of the
Mexicans in the recess endeavored to escape by scaling the mountain
(Carleton, B. Vista, 105).
20.15. As the Mexican artillery could not cross the long ravine, the
Mexicans in the north field were almost predestined to fail, but had
Santa Anna attacked the centre vigorously at this time with all his
remaining forces, the American artillery would have had to stay on
the plateau, and hence in that respect the two sides would have been
equal in the north field. Santa Anna's critics charged that he simply
threw his troops into the battle, and left them without guidance or
support. Not knowing how much he was hampered by misconduct on the part
of subordinates one must be cautious, but the criticism seems mainly
just. He should have concentrated on the American left and centre,
sending merely a small force to amuse Washington, and making feints on
the west side of the road and from behind the western hills. Again,
as we see from the Mexican reports, he gave too much attention to the
details of the operations, and he was unable to adapt his plans to the
quick manoeuvring of the American artillery. He attributed his defeat
to Miñón's failing to attack Taylor's rear (Negrete, Invasión, ii,
378); but Miñón had not force enough to do this effectively, and such
a duty had not been assigned to him (Balbontín, Invasión, 71). Giménez
(Memorias) charged it to the want of subordination, precision and morale
on the part of the officers and the effect of their criticisms of Santa
Anna upon the soldiers.
20.16. Benham (Recollections, 24) states that (as he learned from
Mansfield) Chilton, Taylor's aide, told Mansfield that he carried
this order, and was cautioned by Mansfield not to mention the fact.
Wallace (Wallace, 47) says Chilton carried the order, and gives his
language. Wool states that this final affair occurred under Taylor's
eye and direction (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 149). W. A. Richardson, a captain
in one of these regiments, and also Col. Bissell stated that the order
emanated from Taylor (Charleston _Courier_, Jan. 20, 1854). Weatherford,
who succeeded Hardin, gives the language of the order in his report.
Lombardini, general-in-chief of the Mexican infantry, had been wounded,
and hence Pérez, second in that command, took his place. It has been
said that Santa Anna should have led the charge, but he stated that his
old wound had reopened (=76=Feb. 23).
20.17. The redoubt at Saltillo commanded most of the approaches. It
was held by Capt. Webster with two 24-pound howitzers, a company of the
First Artillery, and an Illinois company. At the train and headquarters
camp on the right of the redoubt Lieut. Shover had one of Bragg's
6-pounders and two Mississippi companies. The three remaining Illinois
companies (two having been detached from each of the regiments) remained
in the city. Miñón found that on account of the broken ground he could
do nothing (Miñón in _Delta_, June 16, 1847), and soon retired. Shover
pursued him for some distance with his gun, the Mississippians and a
yelling crowd of stragglers and teamsters, followed by Lieut. Donaldson
of Webster's company with one of the howitzers. It was believed that
Miñón lost fifty or sixty men. Many Mexican irregulars gathered near
Saltillo but they accomplished nothing.
20.18. Once, it was said, Col. McKee sent his adjutant to inform
the General that he was surrounded, and to ask what should be done.
With convincing energy Taylor replied, "Go and tell your Colonel that
he has got them just where he wants them, and now is the time to give
them Jesse"; upon which the adjutant, whose face had been a picture
of despair, clapped spurs to his horse, rushed back and delivered the
message at the top of his voice with a spirit that every soldier caught
instantly. Whether the story is literally true or not, it doubtless
represents the most important part played by Taylor, and this was
invaluable. If Taylor made the remark, however, he doubtless used a
stronger Biblical word than "Jesse." According to Gen. Chamberlain,
instead of saying, "Give them a little more grape, Mr. Bragg," he
exclaimed, "Double-shot your guns and give 'em hell!" Rev. Theodore
Parker said (Sermon) that the following anecdote appeared to be "very
well authenticated." Seeing McKee's regiment stagger, Taylor cried as
if the men could hear him, "By God, this will not do; this is not the
way for Kentuckians to behave." Then they rallied, and rising in his
stirrups he shouted, "Hurrah for Old Kentuck! That's the way to do it.
Give 'em hell, damn 'em!" There is ample reason to believe that such
Taylor could be on the battlefield.
20.19. _The battle of Feb. 23_. The reports of Taylor and his officers
in Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 97-209. =267=Reports of Miss. captains.
Perry, Indiana, contains numerous letters. Carleton, Buena Vista,
_passim_. Calderón, Rectif. Ceballos, Capítulos, 122-3. González,
Aguascalientes, 159-60. Puga y Acal, Doc., 59. Rápida Ojeada, Segunda
Parte, 9. Zarco, Historia, i, 259. French, Two Wars, 78-83. _Journ.
Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443-4; xvii (Van Deusen). Neville, diary.
Sierra, Evolution, i, 219. _Delta_, Mar. 14. Claiborne, Quitman, i,
291. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 182. =69=Wool to Taylor, Mar. 30.
=147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recolls. =69=Bragg
to [Bliss], Mar. 5. =190=Ewing, diary. Davis, Recolls., 212-3. Dix,
Speeches, i, 210. =330=Taylor to brother, Mar. 27; Apr. 25; Sept.
--. Raleigh _Star_, Apr. 28; July 21; Aug. 18. Charleston _Mercury_,
Apr. 8. Rowland, Register, 407, 410-12. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans.,
1904, pp. 49-50, 53-6; 1905, p. 209. =61=Gorman, report, Mar.
2. =61=O'Brien court of inquiry. =61=Gen. Lane, statement,
May 19, 1849. =65=Gen. Lane court of inquiry. =65=Bowles
court of inquiry. Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 63. =110=Barbour,
diary. Greensborough (N. C.) _Morn. Post_, Apr. 5, 1903 (O. R. Smith).
=8=Anon. diary. =61=[Wool] to Jones, Jan. 17. Madison
_Record_, 1850 (Prickett). =300=Prickett, letters. Sen. 32; 31,
1 (Hughes). Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9. Appleton's Biog. Dict. (_Taylor_ by
J. Davis). Johnson, Thomas, 24. McCormack, Koerner, i, 499, 504-5.
Parker, Sermon. =256=Gen. Lane to Wool, May 20. =256=Wool to
Marcy, June 12. =277=Taylor to Coombs, May 23. Wallace, Wallace,
44-51. Nebel and Kendall, The War Illustrated, 11-16. Semmes, Service,
120-2. Rápida Ojeada, i. =5=Anaya, memoria, [Nov., 1847]. S.
Anna, Mi Historia, 60-5. _Id._, Apelación, 28. Gamboa, Impug., 24-5.
=185=Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4, 1847; Jan. 13, 1848. Kenly, Md. Vol.,
264. Tampico _Sentinel_, Mar. 27. _Diario_, Apr. 16. _Republicano_,
Mar. 24; Apr. 17; May 3; June 20. =80=Ampudia to gov. Méx., Oct.
10. =208=Herran to Acal, Mar. 6. Noticia hist. de todos los
Cuerpos. =212=Hastings, diary. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 33-5.
Balbontín, Invasión, 80-8. Apuntes, 100-4. Taylor and his Generals, 166.
Scribner, Campaign, 21, 59-71. Ordóñez, Refutación, i, ii. Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 349. Grant, Memoirs, i, 138. Muro, Miscelánea, 75. Smith,
Chile con Carne, 215-49. Smith, Reminiscences, 6, 50, 112. N. Orl.
_Picayune_, Mar. 27; Apr. 14, 22; May 21; June 24. _Delta_, Apr. 4;
May 30; June 6, 16; July 11. _Tropic_, Mar. 31. Upton, Milit. Policy,
209-10. _Boletín de la Democracia_, no. 11. Buhoup, Narrative, 120,
123. =210=Bragg to Hammond, May 4; Dec. 20. =349=Pattridge
to Miss W., Aug. 25. Piatt, Thomas, 69. Quisenberry, Taylor, 34-5.
_Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, pp. 413-7. Benham, Recolls. Wash.
_Union_, Apr. 6, 7; June 16; Aug. 25. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Apr. 7,
23; May 7, 21, 1847; Mar. 23, 1848. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_, Apr.
16. _Monitor Repub._, May 6, 16; Nov. 30. _Spirit of the Times_ (H.
von S.), May 1. _Journ. of U. S. Artillery_, July, 1892, p. 296;
Oct., 1892, pp. 415-8. Halleck, Milit. Art, i, p. 415. Dodd, Davis,
87. Charleston _Courier_, Apr. 20, 1847; Jan. 20, 1854. N. Y. _Eve.
Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. Ceremonies. =367=Moore to Moore, Apr. 15.
Davis, J. Davis, i, 341-50. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 145. Carreño,
Jefes, ccxxxiv-v. _Niles_, Apr. 3, p. 80; Apr. 10, pp. 83-4; Apr. 24,
p. 117; May 8, p. 156. =92=Accusación del Gral. S. Anna. Ho. 60;
30, 1, pp. 1115, 1169, 1181. Dix, Dix, i, 210-3. Madigan, cat. no. 2,
1914 (Bragg). =210=Alvord to Hammond, Feb. 24, 1848. Griepenkerl,
Applied Tactics, 187. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans. ix, 50. _South.
Qtrly. Rev._, Jan., 1851, 169-89. _Littell_, no. 155, pp. 233-5.
=251=Lowry, narrative. Albert Pike, poem. =76=S. Anna, Feb.
23. =76=_Id._ to Adame, Feb. 26. =76=Mora, Mar. 31, res.
A German ex-officer under Taylor said the battle was won, in spite of
an unexampled ignorance of all tactical rules on the part of field
officers, by the lion-like courage of the soldiers of certain regiments
assisted by other fortunate circumstances (Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9). W. H.
L. Wallace, adjutant of First Illinois, wrote: "I've no doubt--_inter
nos_--had it been just as convenient for us, as for Santa Anna, to
_vamos_ [_i.e._ retreat] we would have been off for Monterey"; but we
knew Miñón was in our rear, and believed that larger Mexican forces
had been sent toward Monterey, and that the mountains were full of
irregulars (Wallace, Wallace, 51; see also Balbontín, Invasión, 84).
20.20. Killed, 265; wounded, 408 (Ho. 24; 31, 1). Missing, 6. The
Mississippi regiment lost more heavily than any other--one out of 3.75
men (Carleton, B. Vista, 212).
20.21. Aside from pluck and patriotism Taylor had a good reason
for not giving up. Had he been defeated, he would probably have been
punished for disobeying orders in advancing so far (see Polk, Diary,
March 23, 1847). (Querying) =173=J. Davis, Address.
20.22. The greater part of the deserters appear to have gone to Agua
Nueva (Balbontín, Invasión, 83), where they hoped to find provisions
and water. Santa Anna should have had a guard on the road to check and
reorganize these men. His policy of holding out expectations of booty
reacted now, for many men left the ranks to rob the dead and wounded
(Uraga in _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30, 1847).
20.23. Balbontín (Invasión, 89) said that the troops felt confident
of triumphing the next day, and therefore would not have deserted; but
while this may have been true of the artillery (always a superior body)
to which he belonged, it cannot have been true of the army in general.
Thousands had deserted already.