coll., 182) were these: 1. It would be safest to fight, should the
Mexicans advance, immediately on their getting across the desert region
that lay between San Luis Potosí and the advanced American position,
rather than let them recuperate and use Saltillo as a base. 2. Had the
Americans fallen back to Monterey, Santa Anna would have invested it,
the Mexicans of that section would have risen, every animal at Monterey
would have starved or been destroyed, the troops--disheartened by
retreating, and beyond succor--would have surrendered or been cut to
pieces, and every American dépôt in the rear would have been abandoned
or captured. 3. Doniphan would have been ruined. But (1), as we have
seen (note 27), Taylor believed on Jan. 26, Feb. 4, 7, and 14 (_i.e._
both before and after taking the advanced position) that he was in no
real danger of being attacked by Santa Anna, and hence had not the
warrant of a supposed emergency for disregarding his instructions. (2)
This advanced position was not, as his explanation assumes, a good
place at which to meet the Mexicans, and he retired from it before the
battle of Buena Vista. (3) Rinconada Pass, on the other hand, could
probably have been made virtually impregnable toward the south, and,
if properly defended, could at least have held out for a considerable
time. (4) It was not reasonable to suppose that Santa Anna, learning
that Scott was about to strike at the vitals of Mexico, would undertake
to carry the Pass and besiege a city like Monterey, prepared in all
ways--as Marcy had instructed Taylor on Oct. 13, 22 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
356, 364) to prepare it--for a stubborn resistance (Howard, Taylor,
238). (5) If, however, Santa Anna were going to do so, as Taylor's
explanation assumes, the policy of Scott and the administration was
certainly the true one, since it would have contributed to a triumph
on the line from Vera Cruz to the capital. (6) Taylor's retirement
to Monterey and vicinity would have entailed no loss of prestige or
confidence on the part of the Americans, since it would have formed one
part of a bold offensive plan; but would only have diminished somewhat
Taylor's personal effulgence. (7) It was not reasonable to believe that
the men with whom Taylor (Bixby coll., 86) was ready to meet Santa
Anna in the field could not hold their own against him in strong works
(Meade, Letters, i, 179), and a success at Monterey would have been not
only more certain but more decisive and less costly than at Buena Vista
(Scott, Mems., ii, 412). Moreover Taylor would have had the Monterey
garrison as well as the troops who actually fought at Buena Vista. (8)
Taylor represented that he could not transport siege guns from Camargo
to Monterey, and how could he have expected Santa Anna to bring them to
Monterey from San Luis Potosí? (9) If Monterey did not contain ample
forage for the animals, the fault was Taylor's; and, if he was to stand
a siege, most of the animals could have been sent to the Rio Grande
(Ripley, War with Mex., i, 435). (10) Reinforcements from the north
were _en route_, and succor from Scott could have reached Monterey more
easily than a position far in advance. (11) Doniphan could have retired
from Chihuahua by the way he had gone there or (like a party of only
forty men: _Hughes, Doniphan's Exped._, 335) _via_ Presidio del Rio
Grande; and before moving toward Saltillo it was his duty to ascertain,
as he actually did, whether he could safely go there.
Another point brought forward by Taylor was that had he remained at
Monterey, the Mexicans could more effectually have annoyed his flanks
and lines of communication (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1110); but (1) evidently,
had he remained at Monterey, his flanks and lines of communication
would have been less extended and more easily protected than when he
was about eighty-five miles farther on (Polk, Diary, Mar. 23, 1847),
and (2) as a matter of fact his flanks were effectually annoyed and his
communications entirely cut off. (For certain points in this discussion
the author is indebted to Ripley's "War with Mexico.") In short,
the only rational explanation of Taylor's course appears to be that
suggested in the text. Oct. 15 Taylor wrote: Every day's march beyond
Saltillo will weaken our position and strengthen the enemy's (Ho. 60;
30, 1, p. 352). Nov. 26 he wrote: "We have advanced as far from our base
in this quarter as we ought to venture" (Bixby coll., 72).
The troops that Taylor now had were: _regulars_--two squadrons of
cavalry, four batteries (16 guns), and at Monterey one company of
artillery; _volunteers_--two regiments of horse, eight regiments of
foot, and two guns at Monterey, Saltillo and beyond Saltillo; and three
regts. of volunteer foot holding the line to Camargo and down the river
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1098).
XIX. SANTA ANNA PREPARES TO STRIKE
19.1. Butler returned to Monterey about the first of February.
19.2. The statements regarding Taylor's negligence are from
Gen. Benham, who was on the ground as an engineer officer. His
"Recollections" was published in 1871, and whether it was based on
documents is not known. But, being an engineer, he was a man of clear
and trained intelligence; he possessed superior ability; and on careful
inquiry the author was told by Major Lukesh, director of the engineer
school, Washington Barracks, that in 1878 his faculties appeared to
be entirely sound. Moreover his account shows internal evidences of
credibility. The alleged negligence of Taylor was in accordance with
his temperament and previous record, and he probably thought it would
reassure the troops.
19.3. Taylor wrote nothing and did nothing indicating an intention
to make his stand at Carnero Pass, and the evidence that he intended
to fight at Agua Nueva seems to be decisive. He might, however, have
endeavored to annoy the enemy at the Pass.
19.4. _Affairs with Taylor up to Feb. 20._ Carleton, Buena Vista,
2-8, 50, 179-80. =190=Ewing, diary. =330=Taylor to brother,
Feb. 8. Raleigh (N. C.) _Star_, Aug. 18, 1847. Taylor, Letters (Bixby),
86, 182. =69=Wool to Taylor, Jan. 20, 29. =69=Warren to Wool,
Feb. 14. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._, recollections.
=61=Am. offs. to S. Anna, Mar. 24. =61=Heady to Marshall,
Aug. 30, 1848. =61=Gaines to Scott, May 3, 1847. =65=Wool,
orders 222. C. M. Clay, Mems., i, 143. _Vedette_, ii, no. 2 (Oury);
no. 8 (Lee). =61=[Wool] to adj. gen., Jan. 17. Article on Taylor
(by J. Davis) in Appleton's Biog. Dict. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 248-9.
=185=Bragg to Duncan, Apr. 4. =299=Posey to friend, Feb.
19. Smith, Chile con Carne, 161. Smith, Remins., 41-5. Upton, Mil.
Policy, 209. _Amer. Flag_, Matamoros, Feb. 17. N. Y. _Tribune_, Mar.
29. =367=Yell to ----, Jan. 19. Ho. Report 413; 30, 1. Encarnacion
Prisoners, 35-8, 92-4. Meade, Letters, i, 169, 182. =300=Prickett,
letters. Bishop, Journal. =8=Anon. diary. =245=Bee to
Lamar, Dec. 5, 1846. Rápida Ojeada, 6, 8. Coleman, Critt., i, 308-10.
Balbontín, Invasión, 70. Benham, Recollections. =253=Harney to
McLean, June 13. =349=Pattridge to Miss W., July 21. _Spirit of
the Times_, May 1 (H. von S.). _Hist. Teacher's Mag._, Apr., 1912.,
p. 75. N. Y. _Eve. Post_, Jan. 4, 1849. =316=Bragg to Sherman,
Mar. 4, 1848. =146=Caswell, diary, Jan. 12. =139=Campbell
to D. C., Nov. 2, 9, 1846. Senex, Myth. N. Y. _Sun_, Jan. 28. (Urrea)
_Delta_, Jan. 16. _Picayune_, Mar. 11; Apr. 14 (Taylor); June 25.
_Niles_, Mar. 20, p. 60; May 8, p. 156. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 441, 1098,
1106-10, 1162 (Taylor); 864, 876 (Scott); 1108 (Wool); 1111-2, 1182
(lists). _Monitor Repub._, Jan. 14. =76=S. Anna, Jan. 26; Feb. 27.
=76=Zambonino, Jan. 23. =76=Auxil. inspector of N. León to
Canales, Jan. 20.
Col. Campbell (First Tenn. regt.): "Old Zack's" manners are such that he
excites no jealousy; "no one feels that he [Taylor] is his superior, but
his equal or inferior, and each thinks he can control and manage such a
mind" (=139=to D. Campbell, Apr. 25, 1847). U. S. Grant: We thought
the battles on the Rio Grande pretty important, but had "only a faint
conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the North
by the Press and the reports came back to us" (Mems., i, 99). It will be
noted that Taylor pursued now the same anti-Cæsarean, anti-Napoleonic
policy of teaching his troops to despise the enemy that had been
followed by him before the battles of May, 1846 (chap. viii, note 9).
The distance by rail from Saltillo to Agua Nueva station is eighteen
miles. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 350) speaks of the buildings at
Buena Vista as "laid out in regular streets"; but, as the text states,
Buena Vista was only a poor farm, not a rich hacienda. A soldier, there
present, called it an "insignificant, dirty little rancho."
19.5. _El Crepusculo_, May 16, 1835, said that Santa Anna triumphed
over Zacatecas "with the tranquillity of the tiger, which, sated with
the flesh of its prey, lies down on what it does not wish to devour."
During December, 1846, very sharp =76=letters were exchanged by
Governor González and Santa Anna.
19.6. This estimate is based upon about thirty statements, none of
them official. About the middle of August Salas ordered to the north the
troops that had been fighting in Jalisco. About 5500 regulars preceded
or accompanied Santa Anna's journey to the north, and later he called
other troops from the capital and the states. Though accounts varied,
Ampudia seems to have brought nearly 6000; the Fourth Brigade, which
had failed to reach Monterey, and the former garrison of Tampico were
substantial additions; Guanajuato state, roused personally by Valencia,
contributed more than 5000; the Jalisco regiment, which arrived at
the end of October, numbered 1345 foot; the state of S. Luis Potosí
did well, and other states did more or less; and an artillery company
was made up from American deserters, mostly Irishmen, under the name
of San Patricio (see chap. xi, note 11); but desertion--due to the
inborn distaste of the masses for war, to bad treatment and to poor
subsistence--was constantly unraveling the work of accumulation.
It seems to have been a mistake to draw Ampudia's army to San Luis at
so early a date. It was in no danger before the end of the armistice;
it could have encouraged the people near Saltillo to act as guerillas;
and it needed time to regain its morale. Besides, this backward movement
had a bad effect on the other troops, and so much was said at San Luis
by Ampudia's men about the prowess of the Americans, that a general
order forbidding such talk had to be issued. Ampudia and a number of
his officers were put on trial; but the trials were suspended, and
most of the accused were exonerated in orders. Several thousand men
(successively under Urrea, Valencia and Vázquez) were kept at Tula,
about 125 miles northeast of San Luis. Santa Anna knew the Americans
could not bring artillery _via_ Tula, and did not fear them without it;
but he looked forward to operating _via_ Victoria against Taylor's line
of communication. Another body was kept at Matehuala. Smaller forces
were echeloned in the same general direction; and Miñón's brigade was
thrown still farther forward as a screen, corps of observation and means
of annoying the enemy. In order to prevent the Americans from learning
about his operations, Santa Anna gave orders to the cavalry at his front
that no one should be permitted to go to Saltillo or Monterey without a
pass signed by himself.
19.7. _Santa Anna's arrival, plans and operations at S. L. P.; his
financial difficulties there._ _Amer. Eagle_, Apr. 8. =52=J.
Parrott, Feb. 6. =52=Black, Nov. 17, 1846. London _Times_, Dec. 18,
1846; Mar. 11; Apr. 20, 1847. Matamoros _Amer. Flag_, Mar. 13. Giménez,
Mems., 96-7, 264. _Journal des Débats_, Feb. 22. _Constitutionnel_,
Dec. 5, 12, 1846; Jan. 17, 31, 1847. =69=Worth to Bliss, Nov. 29,
1846. =69=Shields to Bliss, Jan. 13, 1847. =58=Jobson, Feb.
14. =61=Shields to adj. gen., Jan. 19. =47=Black to Conner,
Sept. 24, 1846. =47=Conner, Oct. 26; Nov. 5; Dec. 1. Memoria de ...
Guerra, Dec., 1846. Doblado, Memoria que contiene. =70=Canalizo to
S. Anna, Jan. 7. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 249, 271. Gamboa, Impug., 26.
Negrete, Invasión, ii, 351; iii, app., 444; iv, app., 177, 417. Ramírez,
México, 9, 10, 12. México á través, iv, 579, 591-2. _Don Simplicio_,
Oct. 10, 1846; Jan. 9, 30; Feb. 17, 1847. _Observador Zacat._, Dec.
27, 1846, suplem. =100=Jefe dept. of V. Cruz to ayunt., Dec. 21,
1846. _Eco de Tampico_, Oct. 8, 14, 1846. Escudero, Mems., 6. Durango
congress, Dec. 11, 1846. _Republicano_, Oct. 15, 1846; Feb. 2, 1847.
=80=Méx. state, decree, Nov. 26, 1846. _Epoca_, Sept. 26; Oct. 13,
1846; Jan. 19, 26, 30; Feb. 16. =77=_Relaciones_, circulars, Sept.
30; Oct. 6, 19, 20, 22, 1846. =75=_a_Hacienda, circular, Oct. 14,
1846. =83=Gov. Querétaro to other govs., Oct. 16, 1846; to Farías,
Oct. 18; to S. Anna, Nov. 21; Dec. 21. Rivera, Gobernantes, ii, 309.
Balbontín, Invasión, 53-4, 58, 61. Apuntes, 69, 70, 73, 75. Defensa de
... Estrada. Donnavan, Adventures, 51, 76. =13=Bankhead, nos. 140,
144, 151, 173, 178, 1846. Muro, Miscelánea, 65, 68, 70. García, Revol.
de Ayutla, 27. Sierra, Evolution, i, 217. _Crepúsculo_, May 16, 1835.
Puga y Acal, Docs., 57. García, Juárez, 65. Bustamante, Apuntes ...
S. Anna, 289. S. Anna, Apelación, 24-5; app., 3, 14, 18-24, 30, 30-9,
66-7. =80=_Id._ to gov. Méx. state, Nov. 26, 1846; Jan. 31, 1847.
_Picayune_, Mar. 10. _Delta_, Jan. 22. _Independiente_, May 22. Wash.
_Union_, Nov. 16, 30, 1846; Mar. 17, 1847. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_,
Jan. 8. =80=Gov. to legislature, Feb. 15, 1847. _Diario_, Oct.
1, 2, 6, 7, 16, 21, 22, 24; Nov. 2, 14, 19, 27; Dec. 4, 6, 8, 16,
20, 24, 25, 28, 1846; Jan. 30; Feb. 15, 17, 1847. _Monitor Repub._,
Oct. 18, 31; Nov. 17, 18, 20, 21; Dec. 21, 1846; Jan. 8, 29; Feb. 11,
16; Apr. 22; Nov. 30, 1847. Mora, Papeles, 64, 66. =162=Conner,
Dec. 1, 1846 =166=Black to Conner. Sept. 24, 1846. _Niles_,
Mar. 27, p. 57. Meade, Letters, i, 160. =52=J. Parrott, June 4,
1846. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 343, 346, 1846. =75=Gov.
Michoacán to Relaciones: circ. no. 252 of Relac. Parrodi, Memoria (S.
Anna, Oct. 18). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 776, no. 4. =366=Letters from
S. Anna to gov. S. L. P., Nov. 1. And from =76= the following.
Carrera, Nov. 10. Plana mayor, Dec. 1. Valencia, addresses, Oct. 6, 30.
Gov. to cong. Durango, Nov. 8. M. Escandón, July 21. Salas, proclams.,
Aug. 28; Nov. 11. Piña to Carrera, Dec. 10. Decrees, Sept. 27; Dec. 2.
Memo, of artill. sent to S. L. P. Circular, Aug. 4. Report on artillery,
Nov. 13. Comte. gen. Chiapas, Oct. 3. Comisario gen. to S. Anna, Nov.
30; Dec. 5. Juan Morales, Nov. 2. Comte. gen. Durango, address, Oct. 16.
Guerra, circulars, Oct. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; Nov. 30; Dec. 2, 1846. S. Anna,
Sept. 29; Oct. 3, 4, 10, 14, 17, 19, 22, 22, res., 25, res., 28, 30,
31; Nov. 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 16, 18, 19, 28, 30; Dec. 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 14,
19, 22, 28, 30, 1846; Jan. 1, 4, 7, 15, 19, 20; Feb. 27, 1847. Mora,
Apr. 22, 1847. Comte. gen. Guanajuato, Oct. 30; Nov. 13; Dec. 28, 1846.
S. L. P. assembly, decree, June 17, 1846. Ampudia to S. Anna, Oct. 18.
Relaciones, Jan. 11. J. G. P. Garay, June 8, 1846. Valencia, proclam.,
Dec., 1844. Yáñez, Oct. 9; Nov. 6, 1846. Ampudia, Oct. 1, 1846.
Valencia, Nov. 8. To S. Anna, Oct. 17. S. Anna to gov. Zacatecas, Dec.
17.
19.8. Copies of the _Herald_ containing this letter arrived at Vera
Cruz, but were seized. Later Santa Anna denied flatly that he had had
any dealings with the United States (Apelación, 16).
19.9. As Santa Anna's movement rested essentially upon non-military
reasons, Scott's forecast of his operations naturally proved incorrect.
The American attack upon Vera Cruz, though known to be planned, was not
yet known certainly to be coming. Santa Anna defended himself later for
not going to Vera Cruz by saying that he was merely commander of the
northern army, but in fact he did not so regard himself. The truth is
that he urged and expected the government to provide for Vera Cruz, that
the government assured him it had been provided for, and that, had it
been tenaciously defended, it could have held out until he could have
arrived in that vicinity (=76=S. Anna, Oct. 14, 20, 1846; Jan. 14,
18, 1847. _Id._, Apelación, 33. =76=To S. Anna, Jan. 30, 1847).
Taylor's moving away from Scott caused the intercepting of Scott's
letter of January 3, which revealed Taylor's weakness, and thus may have
been the cause of the battle of Buena Vista.
19.10. _Why Santa Anna marched north_ (_complaints of his conduct_).
=52=Black, Aug. 27; Oct. 8; Nov. 17, 1846; Jan. 28, 1847. Sierra,
Evolution, 218. _Soldado de la Patria_, no. 13. London _Times_, Jan.
28. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846. _Courrier des Etats Unis_,
June 20; July 9, 1846. =335=Mackenzie to Trist, Nov. 25, 1846.
Gamboa, Impug., 15-19, 21-2. Kenly, Md. Vol., 390. Ramírez, Mexico,
173, 192. _Don Simplicio_, Jan. 9, 20, 27; Feb. 3. =82=MS.
apparently written in Jan., 1847. =77=Relaciones, circular, Nov.
27, 1846. _Republicano_, Jan. 21, 31. =13=Pakenham, no. 127, 1846.
=83=Gov. Querétaro to S. Anna, Nov. 21, 1846. Biog. del Gen. S.
Anna, 1847. =13=Pakenham to Palmerston, Oct. 29, 1846. Negrete,
Invasión, iii, app., 483 (Otero); iv, app., 177. Balbontín, Invasión,
59. Apuntes, 77. Pacheco, Exposición. =13=Bankhead, nos. 121,
140, 141, 157, 169, 1846; 5, 1847. García, Juárez, 65. Tributo á la
Verdad, 27. S. Anna, Manifiesto, Méx., 1847, 6. _Id._, Apelación, 16,
23. _Picayune_, Mar. 9, 10. Acta, Mazatlán, Jan. 18. =80=Olaguíbel
to S. Anna, Jan. --, 1847. Wash. _Union_, Oct. 10, 1846 (from _La
Patria_); Mar. 17, 1847. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 5, 1846. Richmond
_Times_, Sept. 2, 1846. _Diario_, Nov. 24; Dec. 6, 8, 1846; Jan. 30,
1847. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 22; Nov. 20, 29; Dec. 28, 1846; Jan. 4,
6, 8, 14, 19, 22 (calling attention to the scattered state of Taylor's
forces), 26, 29, 1847. Mora, Papeles, 70. _Niles_, Mar. 27, p. 57.
=73=Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 343, res., 410, 1846. Bustamante,
Nuevo Bernal, ii, 90. =76=Relaciones, Jan. 11. =76=S. Anna,
Feb. 27. =76=_Id._, Manifiesto, Jan. 26.
Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 341) doubts whether S. Anna had learned
from Richey's despatches (chap. xviii, note 27) that Taylor's forces had
been depleted, and cites in evidence S. Anna's declaration in defence
of himself for going against Taylor when Scott was about to attack
Vera Cruz (Apelación, 32). But (1) S. Anna was not a person to admit
unnecessarily the strongest point of an accusation against him, and in
fact the other point of his defence, cited by Rives, was not honest; (2)
S. Anna here representing that he feared Scott was coming from Tampico
to S. Luis Potosí shows again the disingenuousness of his defence, for
he must have known that such a movement was impracticable; (3) it is
hardly conceivable that Scott's intercepted letter of Jan. 3 did not,
like Marcy's of Sept. 2, find its way to headquarters.
19.11. The forces taking part in the campaign seem to have been 9500
infantry from San Luis, 4000 (under Mejía) stationed at Matehuala, and
1000 (under Parrodi) from Tula, 6000 cavalry in four brigades (Torrejón
at Las Bocas near S. L. P., Juvera at Venado, Andrade at Cedral, and
Miñón at La Encarnación), and 900 engineers, artillery and sappers--a
total of 21,400 including officers. These numbers are taken from Rápida
Ojeada and from a San Luis letter (the figures of which were stated
positively to have come from a member of Santa Anna's staff) printed in
_El Republicano_ of February 12, which substantially agree. Santa Anna's
figures were smaller but perhaps did not include Miñón's and Parrodi's
troops. Those of the Spanish minister were somewhat larger. There seem
to have been seventeen guns (three 24-pounders and three 16's, all of
which were siege or fortress guns, and for field pieces five 12's, five
8's and a 7-inch howitzer) which, as well as most of the ammunition,
appear to have gone forward January 27. Urrea was at the same time to
pass from Tula into Tamaulipas, strike at Taylor's communications and
threaten Monterey. Probably there were bodies of irregulars at points
not named above.
It occurs to the author at this point to remark that consistency in the
use of the article in geographical names is hardly practicable. Even
Mexican maps have not been consistent; and for us it would (_e.g._) be
an affectation to use the article with such well-known names as Puebla
and Saltillo.
19.12. At certain points in the desert there were large wells; and in
each of these a wide wheel, carrying buckets, was turned by mule power.
19.13. The main part of the army arrived Feb. 17-19 (Apuntes, 96).
Taylor thought he could not move more than about 6000 men some 125
miles (supposed to be about 140) from a well-stocked base, Camargo,
through a region supplied with water, subsistence and forage, and could
not transport 18-pounders (chap. xi, note 5). After Miñón advanced to
Potosí, Andrade occupied La Encarnación (night of Feb. 11). The wheel
pumps were then set in operation, but by Feb. 19 they were worn out. The
only ample supply of water was then seven or eight miles away, but it
had to be used for the animals. The distance from S. L. Potosí to Agua
Nueva by rail is about 223 miles.
19.14. Feb. 19 two brigades of cavalry had not arrived. The figures
may or may not have included these and Miñón's force. Probably they did
include many whose duties kept them from the firing line (_Republicano_,
May 3, 1847). The original reports of the officers regarding numbers and
operations have disappeared from =76=.
19.15. _To and at La Encarnación._ Carleton, Buena Vista, 23, 229.
León, Méx., 474. García, Juárez, 67. London _Times_, May 10. _Journal
Milit. Serv. Instit._, xiv, 443. Giménez, Mems., 98. Sierra, Evolution,
219. Le Clercq, Voyage, 31-49. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. Sen. 32;
31, 1, p. 8, note. Rápida Ojeada, 4, 7-9, etc. Ordóñez, Refutación,
5, 8, etc. =61=Lamar to Bliss, Apr. 21. Rodríguez, Breve Reseña,
1848, 57. _Republicano_, Feb. 12; Mar. 24; May 3. =80=S. Anna to
gov. México state, Jan. 27. _Epoca_, Jan. 19, 26; Feb. 25. Negrete,
Invasión, ii, 389. Balbontín, Invasión, 60-9, 78. Apuntes, 88, 91-7.
S. Anna, Manifiesto, Mar., 1848. _Id._, Apelación, 24-7, 32; app., 67.
Muro, Miscelánea, 73-5. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 153-8. De Peyster, Kearny,
127. _Diario_, June 13. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30. _Journal of U. S.
Artillery_, July, 1892, p. 294. Rápida Ojeada, ii, 4, 6, 7. _Niles_,
Mar. 27, p. 62. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, 1846. Encarnacion
Prisoners, 43. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 125. =76=S. Anna, Jan.
19, 26; Feb. 2, 11, 17, 27. The author has been over the greater part of
the route.
19.16. One cannot be sure enough now regarding the truth of the
various allegations regarding the lateral routes to say what Santa Anna
might have done. If he had reason (as he seems to have had) to believe
that he could surprise Agua Nueva, it would have been unwise to choose a
circuitous route of doubtful practicability. No Mexican came to give him
information about the ground (=76=Mora, April 23, 1847).
19.17. _From La Encarnación to Carnero Pass._ Carleton, Buena Vista,
232. Semmes, Service, 121. Gamboa, Impug., 23. _Epoca_, Feb. 25.
Balbontín, Invasión, 69, 70, 79. Apuntes, 97. S. Anna, Apelación, 25.
Ordóñez, Refutación. _Republicano_, Mar. 24. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 156-8.
_Diario_, June 13 (Ordóñez). Diccionario Universal (_Itinerarios_).
=76=Mora, Feb. 25. =76=S. Anna, Feb. 27.
19.18. McCulloch had made a previous expedition to La Encarnación and
found cavalry there.
19.19. Santa Anna attributed to a deserter named Váldez the failure
of his plan to surprise Taylor (Apelación, 26), but the story of
Váldez in itself probably would not have had much effect on Taylor. At
La Hedionda May sent Lieut. Sturgis on a scouting expedition. Firing
was heard later, and Sturgis, being captured, did not return. This La
Hedionda was often called La Hedionda Grande.
19.20. Chamberlain's =147=diary states in detail, quoting the
remarks made, how Wool, supported by the officers, forced the withdrawal
from Agua Nueva by threatening to lead the troops back himself rather
than see them sacrificed. This is startling, but cannot easily be
rejected. Of all the military men known to the author Chamberlain
was the most sternly soldierlike. He rose from the ranks to a brevet
brigadier-generalship, and he vouched for the correctness of his diary,
which had been kept strictly for himself. When not acting as Wool's
orderly he served as one of May's dragoons, who were commonly used by
Taylor as a sort of bodyguard. The reason given by Taylor for retreating
(Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 132) was that his position could be turned on either
side; but he knew that long before, or should have known it.
As the route _via_ La Hedionda debouched in the rear of Buena Vista,
one asks why the reason which seems mainly to have caused the retreat
did not veto the stand actually taken. Wool must have seen this point;
and one suspects that he used the alarm produced by the reports of
the scouts to bring about a withdrawal to the position he had long
preferred, reckoning also that, should it prove necessary to retire
farther, this could much more easily be done from Buena Vista than from
Agua Nueva. Evidently the sudden retreat fatigued the troops as well as
discouraged them; and not having become acquainted with the peculiar
ground on which they were to fight, they were repeatedly taken by
surprise during the battle that followed. By retreating Taylor gave up
the advantage, on which he had insisted, of forcing S. Anna to fight at
the very edge of a desert (chap. xviii, note 39).
19.21. At night wagons were sent to Agua Nueva for the stores, but
the Gentlemen-Volunteers under Yell refused to load them. Hence the
First Dragoons (regulars), who had slept only some three hours in as
many days, were sent up to do the work (Chamberlain, diary). Marshall's
Kentucky horse reinforced Yell. The haste of the Americans was such
that corn and beans, instead of being loaded into waiting wagons or
destroyed, were thrown into a spring, where the Mexicans found them
(officer's diary in _Republicano_, May 3, 1847). Yell's instructions
were to retire before midnight, taking the Second Kentucky with him from
La Encantada.