at Agua Nueva. Temporary supplies of food were available,[20.25]
and the troops were at once reorganized by combining companies from
different corps. Before the day was out Major Bliss arrived to propose
an exchange of prisoners and suggest an end of hostilities.[20.26] To
the former proposition Santa Anna acceded, but he rejected the latter;
and, ordering the eyes of the American commissioner to be unbound,
he exhibited to him an army prepared for battle. In general orders
he stated that his purpose in retiring had been to draw Taylor upon
ground where Mexican cavalry could operate; but, as the prospect of
resuming the offensive was extremely slight, provisions were scanty, the
dysentery had already broken out, and the presence of so many wounded
men--more than 700 poor fellows in the most wretched condition--seemed
liable to produce other diseases, a council of war decided the next
day upon retreat, and February 26 in the afternoon the troops moved
south.[20.27]
Now came their real defeat. Like Napoleon returning from Russia,
Santa Anna hurried on in advance, and owing to complications there was
actually no general-in-chief. Divisions and corps marched and lived
as they could. Officers obeyed or disobeyed as they chose. Dysentery,
typhus and all sorts of minor distresses prevailed. The condition of
the troops was enough to make nature shudder, wrote an officer; and
the march was "worse than three retreats from Matamoros put together."
Probably not less than 3000 men were lost in one way or another on the
road; and when the miserable survivors--less than half the number that
had left San Luis full of enthusiasm--began to arrive in that city,
the sensation among the people was described by a witness as "most
profound." Santa Anna, however, had already been accorded triumphal
honors there. By this time a wave of jubilation, soon to break in
plaudits on the far-distant shores of Tabasco River, was in motion;
and he took pains to ensure proper testimony by having a cross of
honor decreed to every officer distinguished in the battle, and by
distributing twenty-seven promotions in the three highest grades.[20.27]
For Taylor also the battle of Buena Vista had a sequel. Impressed, very
likely, by the report of Bliss, he allowed his army to rest where it
was for three days; but late on the twenty-seventh, having ascertained
Santa Anna's retreat through a reconnaissance, he reoccupied Agua Nueva,
where he found a number of Mexican wounded, and on March 1--though his
troops were not yet fresh enough to pursue the enemy or he did not think
it safe to do so--he pushed a detachment on to La Encarnación with a
like result. Provisions and surgical assistance were freely given to the
disabled foemen, but their comrades were evidently beyond reach.[20.29]
Taylor's rear, however, caused him rather serious trouble. The long
shadow cast by Santa Anna's army had spread alarm and confusion all over
northeastern Mexico, and the approach of troops from Tula deepened it.
Even the people of Monclova and Parras, despite their promises to be
neutral, took up arms. The Americans were now to be driven across the
Rio Grande and perhaps the Sabine, it was threatened. Preparations for
defence were made at all our chief posts, and for this reason they were
hardly molested; but the lines of communication could not be maintained,
detachments en route were menaced or assailed, and on the day following
the battle Urrea, a polished ruffian of the distinctive Spanish-American
type, broke up a large wagon train with signal atrocity.[20.28] The
rancheros coöperated eagerly in this profitable work, and the result of
the battle had little effect upon them, for they had seen the Mexican
army come and go at will, and doubtless thought it might appear again.
Taylor therefore proceeded to Monterey about the eighth of March, and
endeavored to restore order. On the twenty-eighth he reported that quiet
had returned; but three weeks later, though he believed that Urrea and
his regulars had withdrawn beyond the Sierra Madre, he admitted that
bands of robbers were still very numerous.[20.29]
Nor was the panic limited to this region. Almost equal alarm prevailed
in the United States. "The sympathy of every human being is elicited,"
wrote Brooke at New Orleans; and the government itself, hurrying off
recruits and authorizing Brooke to accept new volunteers, awaited in
"painful suspense" the result of Santa Anna's advance. The tidings
of his failure, exaggerated of course into news of a brilliant and
overwhelming triumph won by a general robbed of his troops, caused a
tremendous rebound. Polk, holding that only Taylor's blundering and
violation of orders had created the peril, and that his brave men had
rescued him from it, would not permit a general salute in the army; but
the nation saluted, and the General's nomination for the Presidency
became inevitable.[20.29]
NOTES
KEY TO THE REFERENCES
In most cases it will not be difficult to determine where the MS.
sources are preserved. Despatches to or from a military or naval
officer, a diplomatic or a consular agent may be understood, if there is
no indication to the contrary, to be in the corresponding archives of
the government addressed. (The connection of the author of a despatch
may be ascertained by looking up his name in the index.) This direction
may seem vague, but the officials at the archives will be found able
to supply the needful details. The principal foreign agents in Mexico
were (U. S.) Poinsett, Butler, Ellis, Thompson, Shannon, Slidell, and
(consuls) Jones, Black, and Dimond; (England) Morier, Ward, Pakenham,
Ashburnham, Bankhead, Doyle, Thornton, and (consul) Giffard; (France)
Cochelet, Martin, Deffaudis, and Cyprey; and (Spain) Bermúdez de Castro
and Lozano. Mexican documents cited in the form "To S. Anna, Apr. 20"
or "S. Anna, Mar. 4," are in the archives of the War Dept. of Mexico,
National Palace. Many unofficial letters can readily be traced by means
of the list of MS. sources. When it has seemed desirable, however,
particularly at the beginning of a chapter, heavy figures referring to
that list have been prefixed to the citation, and also to many citations
of official documents. The MS. sources are given in the appendix of each
volume; the printed sources in the appendix of the second volume.
A formula like "Ho. 60; 30, 1" means House Executive Document no. 60,
of the Thirtieth Congress, first session; and "_Cong. Globe_, 30, 2"
refers to the _Congressional Globe_, Thirtieth Congress, second session.
In some cases it has been found best to cite a document broadly by
mentioning the first page of it; and the same remark applies to passages
in other publications. The year in the date of a cited document is
omitted when it is the same as that of the events referred to in the
corresponding paragraph of the text. _E.g._ a document dated Oct. 15,
1847, attached to a paragraph dealing with Scott's landing at Vera
Cruz (March, 1847) or capturing Mexico City (Sept., 1847) is cited
as of "Oct. 15," not "Oct. 15, 1847." This is done to save space.
The abbreviations are plain. "Gov." means _governor_; "comte. gen.,"
_comandante general_; "comte. mil." _comandante militar_. "Gov. Puebla,"
etc., means _governor of Puebla_, etc. "_Diario_" means the official
newspaper. For fuller titles of books the list of sources may be
consulted.
The want of definiteness and the lack of statistics in numerous cases
(particularly Mexican affairs) may be charged to a dearth of trustworthy
data.
NOTES
PREFACE
P.1. Another reason for the neglect of the Mexican War has been its
unpopularity. But for that, it would no doubt have been thoroughly
studied sooner.
P.2. A second reason for preparing this history was that a number of
important topics--such as the conditions existing in the two countries
just before the war, the war in American politics, our conduct and
methods in occupied territory, the finances of the war, its foreign
relations, etc.--had been treated most superficially or not at all.
In the third place it was hoped to handle more carefully the material
previously used. The bound volumes entitled "Archivo de Guerra" in the
Archivo General y Público at Mexico occupy some 200 feet of shelf room,
and the papers examined in the Archivo de Guerra y Marina, which had to
be examined one by one, would probably, if placed one on another, make a
pile sixty feet high.
As will be seen from the detailed account of the MS. sources (appendix),
the author did not visit the archives of all the Mexican states and
cities. This was because nothing further of local value could be hoped
for, and because the practice of communicating from state to state
copies of important documents made it seem unnecessary to continue in
those directions. The results in Peru and Colombia were negative, but
this fact had a positive significance, for there were reasons to look
for an active sympathy and correspondence with Mexico in those quarters.
The author planned to examine the Prussian archives, but the outbreak
of the great war prevented him from doing so. From other trustworthy
sources, mostly unpublished, he fully understood the attitude of that
government, however (chap. xxxv). The reports of the Prussian
representative at Mexico cannot have been reliable, both because of
his personal characteristics and because for several reasons he did
not stand within the inner circle, and probably, since his government
felt scarcely any interest in the war, they were not full. Hence it
is not believed that anything of material value has been lost through
the impossibility of examining them. Of some of the newspaper files
only scattered portions were found. Many newspapers, as well as many
books and pamphlets, were read to ascertain the general temper, social
state, and political conditions of the two countries, and it appeared
unnecessary to set down references--which would have been almost
innumerable--to such literature. The author contemplated at one time a
critical discussion of the sources, but he soon found that this would
require too much space. It would in fact make a volume. For additional
information regarding the sources one may consult an article of the
author's that appeared in _The Military Historian and Economist_, vol.
i, no. 1.
P.3. The printed versions of diplomatic and military documents, when
substantially correct, are usually cited in the notes, because they
are easily accessible; but so far as possible they have been collated
with the originals. On the value of official military reports the
author presented some remarks in the _American Historical Review_, vol.
xxi, p. 96. Gen. Worth said privately that Scott's report on the
battle of Cerro Gordo was "a lie from beginning to end," and in a
sense different from what this language would at first sight appear
to mean, it was fairly correct (chap. xxiii, note 33). Subordinate
officers not infrequently brought all possible influence, both personal
and political, to bear upon the general whose report they knew would
be printed. A general naturally favored in his report the regiment and
the officers with whom he had been formerly associated. An undue regard
for rank was often felt. Taylor asked a promotion for Brig Gen. Twiggs
after the capture of Monterey though Twiggs had been ostensibly ill at
the time and had taken no material part in the fight. Captain (later
General) Bragg wrote: "The feelings succeeding a great victory caused
many things to be forgotten and forgiven which would sound badly in
history, and which will never be known except in private correspondence"
(=210=to Gov. Hammond, May 4, 1848). An important document issued
by our government was privately described by the adj. gen. as "full of
inaccuracies" (=117=R.Jones to B. Mayer, Oct. 10, 1848).
A special reason for leaving no stone unturned has been the
consideration that the omission of a significant fact is even worse than
a positive error, since it is equally misleading and less likely to
be discovered. In many instances an apparently insignificant document
proved to be the keystone of an arch or at least to fill a serious gap,
and the cumulative effect of a number of such documents frequently
established a capital fact. Documents not actually used often prove
helpful by preventing the writer from drawing inferences that look
reasonable but are in fact incorrect (see the last paragraph of the
article in the _Military Historian_ cited above). Even minutiæ enable
one to give life and, so to speak, rotundity to events, and to do this
is to increase the fidelity of the narrative. The more information the
historian possesses, the better he can criticise particular documents.
In consequence of a want of this full acquaintance with the facts,
documents relating to the subject have previously been misunderstood.
Still another valuable fruit of a wide investigation is a higher degree
of confidence on the part of both author and reader that no later
discoveries will upset present conclusions. For Scott's statement see
=65=gen. orders 249, Aug. 6, 1847.
Naturally the author had little occasion to use previous histories of
the war, and indeed he took care not to consult them while writing
this work. No thorough attempt has been made to point out their errors
and no wish is felt to criticize them in general; but it needs to be
explained that while Ripley, Wilcox, Furber and Roa Bárcena present
statements of minor importance, not found elsewhere, which the author
wished to use, he has seldom felt at liberty to do so. As is well known
those authors were not critical historians. They were also too near the
events. It is frequently impossible to be sure whether their statements
rested upon hearsay, upon trustworthy second-hand information, or upon
personal knowledge. Roa Bárcena spoke as a Mexican. Wilcox aimed to
glorify our officers and men; and Ripley intended to exalt the unworthy
Pillow at the expense of Scott (chap. xxiii, note 29; and, for an
interesting though not wholly correct review of Ripley, _So. Qtrly.
Rev._, Jan., 1851, 149-60). Pillow =185=wrote in reference to Ripley's
book, He has torn Scott "the _man_ and the _officer_ all _to pieces_."
The recent work by Rives contains much that is sound as well as
dignified; but his investigations came far short of the requirements.
The present author has frequently taken pains to write in such a way as
to correct errors without mentioning them, and the reader may feel sure
that he has carefully considered all statements not in agreement with
his own.
P.4. Particular reasons why a civilian could venture to prepare
the history of this war were that (1) owing largely to the smallness
of the numbers engaged, the operations were simple; (2) the reports
were written for non-military readers; and (3) a large amount of
good criticism was written at the time or soon afterwards--mostly in
a private way--by competent officers who were personally familiar
with the circumstances. As a matter of fact military men's technical
knowledge does not necessarily enable them to reach correct historical
conclusions. This is proved by their radical differences of opinion
(_e.g._ compare the articles on Wilcox's History of the Mexican War,
_Journal of U.S. Artillery_, July and Oct., 1892) and their manifest
errors of judgment. Gen. U. S. Grant pronounced Scott's strategy on Aug.
20, 1847, faultless as a result of the perfect work of his engineer
officers (Pers. Mems., i, 145); but the engineer from whose report
Scott's essential orders regarding the battle of Churubusco resulted
admitted privately that he blundered (<xxvi, notes, remarks on
Churubusco). The dicta of military authorities are not often quoted by
the author, because war cannot be made by rule and it would be necessary
to consider in each case whether the dictum was applicable.
A very difficult matter was to decide how many military details to
introduce. There is hardly any limit to the names of officers and
commands and the minutiæ of movements that might have been presented.
The principle adopted was to draw the line between historical value and
antiquarian value, to include what was needed to show how the important
results were brought about and allow the curious reader to ascertain the
rest of the details by looking up the references.
The reader who has given no study to the subject may perhaps welcome
a few informal and obviously incomplete remarks on the principles
of war. One proper aim is the occupation of territory, and this may
possibly be accomplished without fighting; but essentially combat is
presupposed, and the purpose is then to destroy or in some other way
eliminate the enemy's military strength, so that he will feel compelled
to accept our terms. Therefore the general should (1) make all possible
preparations; (2) take the initiative and lose no time; (3) secure
unity in plan and in action; (4) obtain as much information as possible
regarding the enemy and beware of despising him; (5) embarrass him and
break down his morale, while building up your own, through rapidity of
movement, surprises, feints, threats against his communications, etc.;
(6) select for objective a point combining, as far as may be, weakness
and decisiveness--qualities often incompatible, of course; (7) running
no avoidable risk of inadequacy, concentrate near and move upon this
an overpowering force, while diverting the enemy's forces from it;
(8) strike with energy and decision; and (9) if successful, pursue to
the limit of endurance and safety. In a general way it may be said
that an "indirect" or "oblique" (_i.e._ flank) attack is preferable,
but obviously the actual conditions must decide whether to adopt that
method. In view of these principles, strategy determines when, where,
and with what forces a battle shall be fought, and tactics directs the
battle itself. It follows that on the defensive one should protect
one's communications, force the enemy to send out detachments and rout
or annoy these; and, if such methods have no saving effect, retire to
a position strong by nature, art, or both, and, while defending it,
watch for opportunities to strike. One may consult on these points
and on the text to which this note refers Clausewitz, On War, book i,
chap. 7; Jomini, Précis, i, 470-2; Murray, Reality of War, 21, 77;
Donat, Strategical Science, 275-6; Henderson, Science of War, 19-20;
Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 116; Goltz, Conduct of War, 10-12; _Jour.
Milit. Serv. Instit._, 1908, p. 31; _Am. Hist. Rev._, xi, 388.
P.5. As the author was compelled to depart in many cases from the
familiar method of referring to the sources, he feels bound to explain
how these were handled. All the material, condensed as much as it safely
could be, was marked in the margin with Roman figures, indicating to
what chapter each sentence or larger section would belong. Then the
sections were copied into packets, each of which contained all the
material of a chapter. Next the material of each packet was analyzed
into topical items, and the items were numbered with Arabic figures.
In writing a chapter the author placed after each sentence (or, if the
case demanded, after each clause, phrase or word) the Arabic figures
numbering the items upon which it rested. These figures were retained
through the successive revisions until the MS. was ready to print, and
were used in the re-examination of the work. By this routine every
document was considered at least five times. Of course care was taken
at all stages to ensure correct copying; yet in the final revision the
author went back, unless there was a good reason for not doing so,
to originals or to trustworthy copies from the originals--doing this
not merely to verify the references but also to see, in the light of
the completed investigation of the subject, whether he had omitted or
misunderstood anything of importance in making notes and condensations.
The text and remarks as written looked thus:
"Gen. Patterson once asserted that Volunteers were no worse
than regulars 578, but the evidence of other officers 83-4 340
385 564 568 1266 and of the Mexicans 84 87 340 489 582 1236 was
overwhelmingly against him. Regulars committed offences, but these
appear to have been commonly mere pilfering 181 562, and to have
been chargeable mostly to fresh recruits 83 1103. It is probable,
however, that the Volunteer troops often bore the blame 109 for
acts done by soldiers dishonorably discharged 659 981, deserters
582 601 659 689 945, teamsters and other civilian employees 358
1315 and the many "black legs" 377 and "human vultures" 1292 who
followed the army 365 568 639. The great difficulty was to identify
the culprits 1315. Mexicans were often afraid to testify against
our soldiers 1266."
The saving of space and labor that resulted from the grouping of
citations can easily be illustrated. Take the case of ten statements
resting upon ten documents, which may be represented by the first ten
letters of the alphabet. Were the usual method followed the references
might be: _acj_, _dfghi_, _be_, _adeghj_, _fij_, _bcf_, _adeg_, _cfh_,
_i_, _bdgh_j; whereas by the group method the references would be
_abcdefghij_--in the former case 35, in the latter 10. The higher
cost of the former method might have enforced the omission of all
references from the printed volumes, if indeed the increased labor of
writing, copying, and proof-reading the references had not deterred
the author--as it might well have done--from completing his task. As it
stands, the book probably represents (including the work of clerical
assistants) nearly twenty years of labor. After all, the chief value
of citations is perhaps their effect upon the author. Few look them
up; but, no matter how conscientious he may be, the fact of constantly
giving such pledges of fidelity keeps him wide-awake to the necessity of
accuracy, and indeed compels him to refer to his sources more than he
might otherwise feel obliged to do.
I. MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS
(To the sources mentioned below may be added a residence of more than
a year in Mexico, during which the author met people of numerous
categories and made every possible effort to understand the national
traits.)
1.1. _Physical Mexico._ U. S. War Dept., Monograph. Bureau of Amer.
Republics, Mexico. Encyclopædia Britannica, "Mexico." Numerous books of
travel mentioned in note 8.
1.2. _Population._ The census which served as a basis for the
elections of 1841 and some later years gave the population as 7,016,000
(Dublán, Legislación, v, 152, gives the figures by states). The American
governor of Jalapa, Col. Hughes, =257=wrote, Jan. 28, 1848, that
according to "authentic Mexican official documents" the population
was about 7,500,000, of whom 2,500,000 were under seventeen years of
age, 500,000 were over sixty, and 300,000 were idlers, beggars, etc.,
incapable of work. The population of the United States in 1840 was
17,069,453. _Observador Judicial_, 1842. Consideraciones, 5. _Journal
des Débats_, Sept. 9, 1847. =261=Mémoire. Macgregor, Progress, i,
317. Ward, Mexico, i, 28. Mora, Obras, i, 54. México á través, iii, 19;
iv, p. vii. Relaciones, circular, Aug. 9, 1847. =82=Decree, Dec.
16, 1847. _Diario_, May 4, 1847, claimed 8,000,000.
1.3. _Racial divisions and characteristics._ México á través, iii,
18-21. Humboldt, Essai Polit., i, 367, 381, 411-6; ii, 1-4, 9, 45,
48-52. =52=Poinsett, no. 166, March 10, 1829. Mayer, War, 13,
16. _Commerc. Review_, ii, 165-76. Consideraciones, 5-7. García,
Conquista, 4, 370-2, 397. Thompson, Recolls., 7. Poinsett, Notes, 161.
=13=Hervey, Description of Mexico. =261=Mémoire. Löwenstern,
Le Mexique, 166, 174-89. Mora, Obras, i, 54-6. Cuevas, Porvenir,
12-14. =178=Davis, diary. =162=Conner to wife, Mar. 4, 1846.
Diccionario Universal (_Mexicanos_). =13=Morier, no. 10, Feb. 10,
1825. _Eco del Comercio_, Mar. 22, 1848.
Technically the child of a Spaniard and an Indian was a "mestizo," the
child of a Spaniard and a mestizo was a "castizo," and the child of a
Spaniard and a castizo was a "criollo" (creole); but "criollo" came to
include all these classes and also pure whites born in Mexico. As very
few Spanish women went to Mexico, the mixture of blood was practically
inevitable. As is well known the Spanish blood itself is a singular
mixture. Hence the Mexican was naturally peculiar.
1.4. _The class divisions._ Otero, Cuestión, 37, 47-51.
=13=Morier, no. 12, Feb. 10, 1825. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, i,
232. =26l=Mémoire. Humboldt, Essai Polit., i, 391-5, 400-1, 429-31;
ii, 40. Poinsett, Notes, 162. Constituent Cong. of Mex., Address.
Consideraciones, 18, 19. Mora, Obras, i, 54-6. Paredes, Papers, 136.
=52=Poinsett, no. 166. México á través, iii, 18. Löwenstern, Le
Mexique, 188-9.