Many warnings, both official and private, went from California, and
the province maintained commissioners at the capital, who presented
information regarding the wholly unsatisfactory conditions existing
there. That part of the country has been "forgotten for more than twenty
years," wrote one of these commissioners to the war department in 1844;
and the following year he said that it had been "injured by every one of
our administrations." Alarms were sounded publicly in such newspapers
as the London _Times_ and London _Chronicle_. Notices regarding
the danger of American encroachment--particularly by the method of
emigration, a declaration of independence and early annexation--were
received over and over again from the Mexican minister at Washington,
the Mexican consul at New Orleans, Pakenham, the British minister,
and Bankhead, who succeeded him. This peril was notorious, declared
General Mora y Villamil near the close of 1845; and the government
itself recognized the gravity of the situation. In March of that year
the minister of war and the minister of relations admitted publicly
that California had been grossly misgoverned and was liable to slip
away.[16.6] Yet the government did nothing, and confessed that nothing
could be done.[16.9]
Virtually, we say again, it was abdication. Both morally and physically
Mexico had thrown away and forever lost her control of the province.
She had nothing left except the bare thread of legal proprietorship;
and in certain cases legality is, according to enlightened modern
ideas, nothing. It is our conviction that human welfare is the supreme
test; and the welfare, not merely of California but of all the world,
certainly required that so rich a portion of the earth should be
developed and occupied. In our opinion a child, neglected and abused by
drunken parents who are always fighting each other, has good grounds for
leaving home, though not legally independent. We believe in the right of
revolution, which means that when a country misgoverns persistently a
considerable part of the population, it forfeits all claims to domineer
over them; and California, though her weakness led officials to practice
a lip service that deceived nobody, had more than once rebelled, had
made good her cause, and entertained no thought of accepting Mexican
rule again.[16.9]
She was, therefore, being in every way unable to establish herself
as an independent nation and gain the recognition of the world as
such, quite adrift. The province is now "at the mercy of whoever may
choose to take possession of it," wrote the nearest British consul in
1845. Californians, Mexicans, Britons, French and Americans, who were
qualified to judge, agreed on that. She was the homeless child, whom any
kind, intelligent and well-to-do person may, and some kind, intelligent
and well-to-do person should, provide for. Any one of the nations then
leading the march of civilization, if disposed to perform a parent's
duty toward California, could rightfully have taken charge of her, and
some one of them was under obligation to do so.[16.7] Of those nations
the United States was more favorably situated than any other to fulfil
the trust,[16.8] and she felt ready to accept it.[16.9]
[THE AMERICANS INTERESTED IN CALIFORNIA]
Indeed our people were profoundly interested in the matter. As early as
1839 a Congressional report on Oregon said enough about the territory
farther south to excite attention; and Forbes's history of California,
published the same year, did much to fix it and create the fear that
European powers might encroach there. The seizure of American residents
in 1840, the appearance of Dana's "Two Years Before the Mast," and the
incidents connected with Jones's landing at Monterey deepened these
impressions. By 1842 glowing letters from American settlers began to
appear in our newspapers, and the suspected purposes of England received
ample notice. Gold existed there, it was reported; the country was
attractive, salubrious and rich; the port of San Francisco had a value
that words could not represent, and the British already held a mortgage
on the country. Our Pacific whaling fleet was said by the New Bedford
member of Congress to include before the end of 1844 six hundred and
fifty vessels, which had cost twenty millions and employed 17,000 men;
and not only was this harbor most important, since the bar at the
Columbia River hampered navigation, but American control was needed
there, for the uncertain and vexatious Mexican regulations caused great
annoyance. Besides, it was pointed out, we required a fortified port on
that coast, else in case of war with England our whalers would be unable
to avoid capture.[16.10]
All these ideas took root, and in the spring of 1845 the press from
New York to St. Louis and New Orleans broke into quite a furore about
California. Its value became a popular subject; the known fact that
English holders of Mexican bonds had their eyes upon it was recalled;
the designs of the British government seemed to be clear; and annexation
was not only urged, but represented as near at hand. So keen became the
fear that England would forestall us, that in January, 1846, the ease
with which she could acquire California was dwelt upon in our national
Senate, while in the House the enormous advantages of our holding the
territory attracted attention.[16.10]
Our government was even in advance of the people. In 1835 an attempt
was made to purchase the Bay of San Francisco. The next year Ellis,
who represented the United States at Mexico, expressed the opinion
that northern California would be of "immense importance" to us. Four
years later a personal letter to President Van Buren pointed out that
England, as a great creditor of Mexico, was likely to appropriate the
territory, and steps were taken to obtain information regarding it for
the use of Congress and the Cabinet. Daniel Webster felt strongly by
this time that we should acquire it. In 1842, while he was secretary of
state, our minister at Mexico not only expatiated on the value of the
territory, but reported that England had taken steps to anticipate us;
and the minister was instructed to ascertain whether an offer from this
country would be acceptable. Our strained relations with Mexico and
especially Jones's occupation of Monterey made it unwise to follow up
the matter that year; but after an interval, Tyler and Webster planned
an arrangement which--had it been carried through--would have given us
the port of San Francisco.[16.11]
The expansive course of Great Britain, remarks dropped by English
writers, repeated warnings from our diplomatic and consular agents at
Mexico, and the consensus of opinion in California, Mexico, France and
the United States were quite enough to warrant suspicions of England,
and the circumstances connected with the visit of Duflot de Mofras,
attaché of the French legation at Mexico, to California, and the
publication of his book by order of the king, hinted of danger from
another quarter; but neither country took any positive action, and our
government--doubtless noting that a tide of emigration to the far west
had begun--refrained from every move that could excite the jealousy of
Mexico or Europe. Early in 1843 Larkin, who was deficient in education
but not in shrewdness, activity or patriotism, was appointed consul at
Monterey; but the value of American commerce fully justified the step.
During 1845 he did not receive one letter from the state department,
and for a long time no American war vessel could be seen on the
coast.[16.11]
[OUR GOVERNMENT INTERESTED]
Early in 1845, owing to the annexation of Texas, a breach with Mexico
had seemed probable, and the danger that she would somehow dispose of
California in order to place it beyond our reach had been deemed acute.
But our government did not intend to have war, the tide of emigration to
that quarter was rising, and Polk warned off European interference by
re-asserting the "Monroe Doctrine." On July 10, 1845, however, Larkin
wrote that England was maintaining there a vice consul without consular
business, and that, according to the universal belief in his vicinity,
she was promoting a new Mexican expedition to California; and at about
the same time as this letter, news of an extensive British plan to
colonize in that province arrived from London.[16.11]
The question was then maturely considered at Washington. Apparently the
American emigrants, unless checked, were sure to bring California into
the Union. That was natural and logical; such a peaceful invasion had
given us Texas; and in the opinion of the best qualified observers it
seemed likely to be efficacious again. Larkin, the Californians, the
British vice consul, the Mexican consul at New Orleans, the Mexican
minister at Washington, and Mexican, British, French and American
journals agreed on this. Larkin believed the matter would be settled
in that way by 1848. "Without striking a blow and without incurring
any expense," wrote Vice Consul Forbes, the United States will obtain
a secure foothold in the coveted region. The Americans do not need to
fight for California, said _Le Constitutionnel_ of Paris. "No more
convenient mode of conquest was ever devised," remarked the Baltimore
_American_. To suppose that Polk and the Cabinet failed to see what was
not only obvious but often pointed out, would be absurd. The condition
and political feeling of California, which were quite well known through
Larkin and others, fully warranted a procedure so amicable and so
beneficial; and it only remained to guard against European interference,
which our government now considered a real danger.[16.11]
On October 17, 1845, therefore, confidential instructions, based upon
the fact that British and French consuls having no commercial business
were maintained in California, were issued to Larkin, who was now
to be confidential agent as well as consul. "The interests of our
commerce and our whale fisheries in the Pacific Ocean demand," he was
informed, "that you should exert the greatest vigilance in discovering
and defeating any attempt, which may be made by foreign governments to
acquire a control over that country," Against such an attempt the United
States would "vigourously interpose"; but "should California assert and
maintain her independence, we shall render her all the kind offices in
our power"; and "whilst the President will make no effort and use no
influence to induce California to become one of the free and independent
states of this Union, yet if the people should desire to unite their
destiny with ours, they would be received as brethren, whenever this can
be done without affording Mexico just cause of complaint. Their true
policy for the present in regard to this question, is to let events
take their course, unless an attempt should be made to transfer them
without their consent either to Great Britain or France." On the same
day instructions to ascertain the designs of those powers were issued
to Commodore Sloat, commanding the Pacific squadron, and Lieutenant
Gillespie of the Marine Corps was ordered to California as a co-agent
with Larkin.[16.11]
All this has been called an intrigue; but, if that word is in fairness
applicable, the "intrigue" was only designed, so far as it concerned
Mexico and California, to rescue with a gentle hand the neglected,
abused and lost; so far as it concerned England and France, to ward off
an interposition which, if attempted, would probably have led to war;
and, so far as it concerned the United States, to safeguard and advance
most important national interests while promoting the general good of
the world. Such "intrigues" are among the most legitimate achievements
of true statecraft.[16.11]
This leads us to the more serious charge, that Polk brought upon two
nations the curse of war and endangered the peace of the world, for
the purpose of tearing California from the parent stem; and we find
ourselves here at the best point of view from which to consider it. Not
only, then, have we no sound evidence in support of the charge; not only
was he personally unfitted to play the rôle of conqueror; not only did
he exert himself to restore friendly relations with Mexico; not only
did he virtually forbid Slidell to work for the sale of California, if
so doing would militate against this endeavor; not only did his taking
certain other important steps and refraining from still others imply the
same intentions; but it appears that he looked forward to obtaining the
territory without war, should he be unable to purchase it, by a method
peculiarly suited to his characteristics and to those of Buchanan. We
therefore do not need to consider one of our Presidents a wretch unhung,
as many Americans have seemed eager to do, and should finally dismiss
the charge.[16.12]
[A CHANGE OF RULE IMMINENT]
While the instructions to Larkin were on their way, the year 1846
came in, and to California it brought fresh perplexities. The desire
to escape from what a citizen described as "a positive state of
anarchy" was more pronounced than ever. One plan contemplated a
French protectorate; but the men of that nationality were few, their
government did nothing, and their consul exerted himself only to acquire
unpopularity. A much greater number favored American control. Probably
all of the foreigners thought such a régime preferable to the existing
state of things. Even the British vice consul admitted that his personal
judgment pointed in that direction. Some of the Californians also leaned
our way. They recognized the merits of our institutions and the growth
of our power. The good order maintained by Commodore Jones's forces
had left a favorable impression, and so had the conduct of our naval
officers who went ashore from time to time.[16.16]
But the participation of Americans in the California revolts had
excited suspicion and fear. Our acquisition of Texas, as described by
Mexicans writers, had been resented, and probably it was known that
Mexicans residing there had fared none too well. American hunters--or
men believed to be such--had sometimes helped themselves to property.
In consequence very likely of misdeeds committed by our sailors the
Americans were generally disliked at Monterey. The constantly increasing
immigration despite Mexican laws appeared intrusive and menacing. All
the faults of our people, who were better known than other foreigners,
came to be understood. Their brusque, overbearing, strenuous ways
impressed the polite, indolent Californians as almost ferocious.
Indeed a natural antipathy--social, religious and racial--made harmony
well-nigh impossible. Finally, doubts were felt whether we should
be able to offer immediate and effective protection against Mexico
and the Indians, and whether our flag would not go down after a time,
as when Jones had raised it, leaving our friends to settle with the
mother-country as best they could.[16.16]
The British, on the other hand, while in every way as free and as
responsible as the Americans, were comparatively exempt from such
objections; their government had a strong fleet in the Pacific; and
hence, as was natural, most of the substantial citizens--especially in
the south--desired the shelter of her flag. But Forbes could not meet
their views. Warned not to meddle, save to hinder any other nation
from establishing a protectorate, he could make no promises and give
no encouragement. He conveyed to the government of California the
declaration of England that she would feel greatly displeased to have
the province pass under the control of any other power, but his only
advice was to elude American rule by declaring unqualified independence;
and this plan, as all thoughtful men understood, could not be carried
out.[16.16]
Governor Pico, a fat, swarthy, good-natured farmer of tolerably good
sense but little ability, and educated only about enough to write his
name, was the chief of the British party, and wanted no Americans in the
country. Vallejo--who was now inactive but had great influence--favored
the Americans, for he believed that we held the winning cards, and
foresaw, like many other landowners, that American rule would enhance
the value of real estate. Castro, a man of quick but not profound
intelligence and more ambitious for power and fame than for wealth,
probably desired independence with himself as the autocrat; but he knew
the time had not arrived, and felt that his grip on the customhouse
must not be loosened. For the present, therefore, while he showed
much amiability toward the Americans and occasionally masked his real
views behind cordiality toward France, he posed at Mexico as an ardent
patriot. In order to save his responsibility, whatever might happen,
and perhaps fortify his position, he urged the need of preparing for
war against the United States, and called for plenty of money and a
few soldiers--not more than he could be sure of handling. At the same
time, holding that Pico was only an acting governor, he recommended
that during the crisis, at least, the civil authority should be united
with the military. In March he invited a number of leading citizens to
discuss the situation with him,[16.13] but no agreement on a line of
action could be reached.[16.16]
Forbes congratulated himself that no American of commanding influence,
familiar with the language, customs and prejudices of the people,
resided in California; but Larkin seems to have been on good terms
with all the officials at least. His firm chin, ample brow and correct
side-whiskers inspired respect, while his notable energy, hospitality
and public spirit gained him esteem; and when Gillespie, after crossing
Mexico to Mazatlán in the guise of a mercantile agent and then sailing
perforce to the Hawaiian Islands,[16.14] arrived at Monterey on
April 17, and repeated to him from memory Buchanan's instructions of
precisely six months before, which it had not been thought safe to
bring in writing, he promptly bestirred himself. The main points of his
instructions were transmitted in confidence to friends at other towns;
here and there an official had an opportunity to see a good argument,
written out in Spanish, for American rule; and Castro was assured
that he and his friends might derive personal advantages from such a
change.[16.16]
[A CRASH AT HAND]
As if all these currents and cross-currents did not produce commotion
enough, civil war now loomed up. Both Los Angeles and Monterey desired
to be the capital and possess the customhouse. Herrera had assigned
two thirds of the revenue to Pico and one third to Castro; but Paredes
reversed this arrangement, and Castro improved still further upon it
by taking the whole. In April the comandante general and his officers
repudiated Herrera, on whom Pico's authority depended, came out for
Paredes, and resolved to propose, on the ground of Mexico's threatening
relations with the United States, that the governor should place himself
in Castro's power by coming to Monterey--the latter, in case of a
refusal, to act according to his discretion.[16.16]
Pico, who doubtless knew as well as others, that Castro was aiming to
upset him, appealed to the people and summoned a general convention,
which was to meet at Santa Barbara on June 15, and avert the "external
and internal disasters" that were threatening California. The promoters
of the scheme intended to audit Castro's use of the public funds,
declare for independence, and invite foreign protection--preferably
that of England. Castro denounced it as treasonable, defeated it by
preventing the northern delegates from going to Santa Barbara,[16.15]
and proclaimed martial law; and about the middle of June Pico advanced
against him with all the forces he could raise. It seemed as if a crash
would have to come; and a crash did come.[16.16]
XVII
THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA
1846-1847
In December, 1845, Brevet Captain John C. Frémont of the United
States army, who was engaged with a party of about fifty or sixty
men--necessarily armed but not soldiers--in looking for a satisfactory
road to the Pacific, reached New Helvetia, and at the end of January
he presented himself at Monterey to obtain funds and supplies, and
ask for permission to recruit his followers and horses in California.
Castro gave this permission; but unfortunately one of the two men
either misunderstood or violated the terms of the agreement, and when
the surveying party was discovered early in March near Monterey, Castro
denounced Frémont as having invaded Mexican territory and aiming to
excite a revolt.[17.1]
It was an admirable opportunity to figure at home and at Mexico as a
dauntless patriot, and the comandante general made the most of it. His
narrow but high forehead, framed with curling black hair, seemed to
expand, and his brilliant black eyes darted fire, as he galloped about
the countryside rallying militia. Frémont placed himself in a strong
position, built some fortifications, raised the American flag and
announced that he would perish fighting; but after cannon were seen in
the distance he retired under cover of darkness, and slowly proceeded
toward Oregon. Castro then put out a bombastic proclamation, of course,
declaring that he had driven the American intruder away.[17.1]
[THE "BEAR" MOVEMENT]
Far to the north Frémont was overtaken early in May by Gillespie, and
went back to the Sacramento.[17.2] On June 6 he decided to act. At
his instance Americans captured a drove of horses that Castro had sent
for. Some days later a sizable company took Sonoma, a military post
north of San Francisco Bay, seized the cannon, arms and munitions,
appropriated horses, cattle and miscellaneous property, carried away
Vallejo and other leading citizens as prisoners, and raised a home-made
flag decorated with a particularly home-made semblance of a bear. Some
hostilities then occurred; some blood was shed; and early in July the
tragi-comedy reached its climax in a declaration of independence, which
probably not one Californian acclaimed.[17.6]
What could have precipitated such an astounding performance? Clearly
no directions from our government.[17.3] A policy calculated, not
to outrage and affright, but on the other hand to conciliate and win
the people, had been enjoined upon Sloat, Larkin and Gillespie; and
under Buchanan's order Gillespie had acquainted Frémont with Larkin's
instructions. But Frémont, like the others, was to counteract foreign
designs, and knowing--for Larkin was aware of the fact on April 17 and
hence Gillespie knew it--that Slidell had been rejected, he said and
presumably believed, that war had by this time begun; and he doubtless
feared that England, supposably in collusion with Mexico, would try to
occupy California before the United States could act there. Forbes, on
behalf of the British, could see that a declaration of independence
would keep the Americans out. Hence possibly Frémont argued that such a
step would help to do as much for the British; and evidently a flag put
up by himself could be lowered any day.[17.6]
Besides, as we learn from the President, Gillespie had secret
instructions; and these, while not contradicting the others, very
possibly stated that Polk was determined to have a complete settlement
with Mexico, and in case of war to acquire California, for such was soon
his policy; and presumably they ordered that Frémont should hover about,
and be ready to coöperate at the proper time. These circumstances,
taken together, presented to his roving imagination a brilliant vista
of achievements and glory; and, as he said, he "resolved to move
forward on the opportunity."[17.4] Moreover many of the Americans
in the Sacramento valley, believing that Castro intended to expel
them shortly from the country, appealed to Frémont for aid;[17.5]
and, finally, that officer probably burned to vindicate himself as a
soldier from the imputation of having run away in March. Hence the
determination to overthrow the government. Cannon, munitions and horses
were logical necessities; and it seemed likely that Vallejo and his
friends could be used to influence the public or possibly at the worst
as hostages.[17.6]