about the same time as the treaty of limits, had been pursuing a
checkered career, though a similar agreement between Mexico and England
went rapidly through. At one stage of the proceedings the Mexican
plenipotentiaries kept our minister entirely in the dark about an
important concession made to Great Britain, falsely assuring him that
equally favorable terms were offered to this country. Indeed, Victoria
showed a strong disposition to block the business altogether. July 10,
1826, however, the negotiators reached an agreement, but it did not
prove satisfactory to the American Senate. A second treaty signed in
February, 1828, did not please the Congress of Mexico, and was properly
rejected. At a later date negotiations were again resumed; but in 1831
that body held the matter in abeyance for more than nine months. At
last, one day before the session was to close, our minister gave notice
that unless the treaty were concluded, he would leave the country. The
government at Washington also exerted some pressure by insisting that
the two matters should fare alike, and postponing the re-ratification of
the treaty of limits; and consequently both treaties became law at the
same time, April 5, 1832. Yet for nearly a year the commercial treaty
was not promulgated by Mexico; and hence, though her citizens residing
in the United States could have the benefit of it, Americans in Mexico
could not, for the local authorities with whom it was necessary to deal
declared they had no knowledge of such an agreement.[3.8]
Toward the close of 1829 Guerrero, as a desperate throw for popularity,
asked for the recall of Poinsett, merely saying that public opinion
demanded it; and then for about six years the United States had as its
representative a friend of Jackson's named Anthony Butler, whose only
qualifications for the post were an acquaintance with Texas and a strong
desire to see the United States obtain it. In brief, he was a national
disgrace. Besides having been through bankruptcy more than once, if we
may believe the Mexican minister at Washington, and having a financial
interest in the acquisition of this Mexican territory, he was personally
a bully and swashbuckler, ignorant at first of the Spanish language
and even the forms of diplomacy, shamefully careless about legation
affairs, wholly unprincipled as to methods, and, by the testimony of two
American consuls, openly scandalous in his conduct. One virtue, to be
sure, according to his own account he possessed: he never drank spirits;
but one learns of this with regret, for an overdose of alcohol would
sometimes be a welcome excuse for him.[3.9]
His particular business was to obtain as much of Texas as possible, an
enterprise that lay close to Jackson's heart; and he began by visiting
the province--about whose loyalty and relations with the United States
much concern was already felt at Mexico--when on the way to his post.
This promise of indiscretion in office was admirably fulfilled.
Maintaining a hold on our President by positive assurances of success,
he loafed, schemed, made overtures, threatened, was ignored, rebuffed,
snubbed and cajoled, fancied he could outplay or buy the astute and
hostile Alamán, tried to do "underworking" with Pedraza, plotted bribery
with one Hernández, the confessor of Santa Anna's sister, grossly
violated his conciliatory instructions by engaging in a truculent
personal affair with Tornel, and was finally, after ceasing to represent
us, ordered out of the country. In short he succeeded only in proving
that we had for minister a cantankerous, incompetent rascal, in making
it appear that our government was eager to obtain Mexican territory,
and in suggesting--though explicitly and repeatedly ordered to eschew
all equivocal methods--that we felt no scruples as to means. On the
ground of Butler's connection with disaffected Texas, Mexico politely
asked for his recall near the close of 1835, and in December Powhatan
Ellis, born a Virginian but now a federal judge in Mississippi, was
appointed chargé d'affaires.[3.10]
[THE TEXAN REVOLUTION]
A few months later Texas broke away from the mother-country, and her
former lords felt sure that from beginning to end, in the colonization,
rebellion and successful defence of that region, the hand of the
American government could plainly enough be seen. Their state of feeling
seemed to Butler "a perfect tempest of passion," and Ellis believed
that the Cabinet of Mexico discussed seriously the question of an open
rupture with the United States. The Mexican view, however, although
supported by a section of the American public, was radically incorrect.
Essentially the migration of our citizens across the Sabine formed a
part of the great movement that peopled the Mississippi valley. The
causes of the Texan rebellion were provided by Mexico herself. That
step actually crossed the wish and aims of our administration, which
desired to buy the province--not see it become an independent country.
From the very first, our national authorities proclaimed and endeavored
to enforce neutrality; and they gave the Texans no assistance in their
struggle for independence. The British minister at Mexico expressed the
opinion to Santa Anna that our government had done all that could be
expected, and all that lay in its power; and Santa Anna did not venture
to deny this. Individual Americans and sometimes Americans in groups
did, it is true, contribute materially to aid the cause of Texas; but
in most cases their action was entirely lawful, while in the others it
could not be prevented. Moreover, these few trespasses against the law
of neutrality were in substance only just retribution for the tyranny,
misgovernment and atrocities of Mexico. In reality, therefore, our
skirts were as clear as reasonably could have been expected.[3.11]
One phase of the case, however, which excited special indignation
at Mexico, requires notice. Two streams from the north send their
waters into Sabine Lake, and it was held by some that either of these
could be regarded as the Sabine River and, therefore, as marking the
boundary. In October, 1833, Butler urged that we insist upon the western
stream, commonly called the Neches, and occupy in force the valuable
intermediate region, which included Nacogdoches; and for a time Jackson
felt inclined to do so. Near the close of 1835 Mexico was officially
warned against encroaching upon our territory while fighting the
Texans, and suspected that Secretary of State Forsyth took this action
with a view to the Nacogdoches district. She therefore became alarmed,
and early in 1836 a special minister hastily set out for Washington
to investigate the matter. This minister was Manuel E. de Gorostiza,
a witty, agreeable man of the world, Mexican by birth, Spanish by
education, the author of some clever dramas, but not professionally a
topographer, a lawyer or even a diplomat.[3.12]
[BOUNDARY DIFFICULTIES]
Then a delicate matter became suddenly menacing. On both sides of the
Sabine there were Indians, who loved war, whisky and plunder as much
as they hated work and the whites. A paper boundary, particularly one
in dispute, meant nothing to them. Once roused, they were practically
sure, as Gorostiza admitted, to rob and murder wherever they could;
and not only the fighting in Texas but at least one Mexican emissary
enkindled their passions. United States Indians crossed the line and
perpetrated outrages. Homes were abandoned. People fled panic-stricken
from the vicinity of Nacogdoches; citizens of the town implored American
protection against our own Indians; and evidence of an incipient
conflagration was placed in the hands of General E. P. Gaines, who
commanded our troops on the border.[3.12] Now the treaty of amity
required each country to prevent its Indians from ravaging the other;
but, as Mexico did not wish us at this time to keep our savages
from harassing the Texans, and did not request us to act for her in
fulfilling her pledge, which she could not fulfil herself, possibly
the treaty, though often cited by the United States, had technically
no direct bearing. But the American government argued rightly that
substance was more important than form; that the intent of the treaty
was to require both countries to prevent "by all the means in their
power" an Indian war on the frontier; that it was the paramount duty
of the Executive to protect our people, who, as Gorostiza virtually
admitted, were liable to be endangered by the threatened conflagration;
that as it was known to be physically impossible for Mexico to comply
with the treaty, she could not complain of us for doing what she had
agreed ought to be done, and had undertaken to do; that, should it be
necessary to cross what had been commonly assumed to be the boundary
in order to perform our duty--particularly in order to prevent our own
Indians from perpetrating outrages on the other side--common sense and
the spirit of the treaty warranted our doing it; and that, on account
of the distance to the Sabine, it was necessary to give the general
commanding there a certain credence and a certain discretion. Our
government could have reasoned also, and very likely it did, that the
strong desire of the Texans, _de facto_ successors to the Mexicans in
that region, that we should fulfil the obligation which the treaty
created, was an additional ground for so doing.[3.12]
Accordingly Gaines, while ordered with strong emphasis to maintain a
rigid neutrality, was authorized to advance as far as Nacogdoches--an
excellent point from which to defend the American frontier and prevent
our Indians from operating beyond it--should such a step seem positively
necessary; and then, as measures of precaution, Forsyth not only
explained our views and intentions personally to Gorostiza, but made
in writing what that minister himself described as a "frank and noble"
statement, saying that the occupation of the intermediate region, should
it occur, would be temporary and for the sole purpose indicated, and
would have no significance in regard to the boundary question.[3.12]
Apparently satisfied by the directness and candor of this policy,
Gorostiza at first admitted the right of the United States to enter
Texas in order to punish actual or prevent intended outrages, and
thus conceded that the frontier could be crossed without offence. But
apparently, when he had taken leave of the secretary of state, his
distrust returned, and his Mexican subtlety imagined all sorts of ugly
possibilities. It disturbed him that Forsyth did not formally commit
himself, in advance of a survey, against the Neches claim. It alarmed
him to find that the state department could not give him early and exact
information as to Gaines's movements in a remote, unsettled region.
He felt angry that Lewis Cass, who was secretary of war but of course
had no control over our foreign relations, looked upon Nacogdoches
as American territory. Various other things also appeared to him
suspicious, when really his lack of judgment was the chief or only
reason. Most important of all, no doubt, he thought of public opinion
in Mexico, which was entirely unacquainted with American directness
as exemplified by Forsyth, intensely suspicious of us, and intensely
hostile.[3.12]
[DIPLOMATIC CLASHES]
He retracted, therefore, as much as possible of his concurrence, opened
a war of notes upon our state department, and near the end of the year
1836, on learning from the secretary that in spite of his objections
American troops had gone to Nacogdoches, demanded his passports, and
left our shores in wrath. His conduct in so doing was officially
endorsed by his government, and anti-American feeling in that country
became deeper and hotter than before. Nothing could be seen there except
that "sacred" soil claimed and long occupied by Mexico, though now out
of her control, had been profaned by Gaines's troops, and thus, as all
Mexicans argued, the way opened for limitless aggressions. To make the
case even worse, it was erroneously believed that Houston's victory at
San Jacinto had really been gained by troops then in the service of the
United States, and it was said that we were preparing to attack Mexico
very soon by sea and by land.[3.12]
Our recognition of Texas, which occurred early in 1837, was entirely in
line with our previous action in similar cases, was less prompt than our
recognition of Mexico herself had been, and seemed not only warranted
but required by the circumstances. That republic had a government in
operation which appeared to be competent, and was thought likely to
endure. Santa Anna, the President of Mexico, admitted that she could not
hope to gain control of the revolted province, even should its troops
be vanquished in the field, and expressed a desire that we should open
the way to a settlement of the controversy by granting recognition.
After 1836, as the Mexican minister of war stated eight years later,
there was no serious talk of attempting to subdue Texas. At the date of
recognition, since war between us and Mexico seemed almost inevitable,
there appeared to be no great need of considering her susceptibilities;
and it was feared that England entertained certain designs, unfavorable
to us, regarding Texas, which could be defeated or at least hindered by
taking this action. As Mexico was totally unable to protect American
vessels in the port of Galveston, we had to establish relations with the
power that could do so, or else conduct an important part of our trade
under hazardous conditions; and no commercial nation willingly accepts
the second alternative in such a case. Finally, the leading powers of
Europe endorsed our course by doing the same thing before any material
change in the situation occurred.[3.13]
Mexico, however, would see none of these facts. Our earliest moves
toward recognition were looked upon by her, said the British minister,
"as the consummation of a design long since entertained" to rob her
of that valuable territory, and excited, as he remarked, a "bitter
animosity" that no explanation could even mitigate; and our formal
action became one more standing ground of complaint and wrath against
the government and people of the United States.[3.13]
In 1842 Mexican feeling was intensified. At this time Santa Anna
thought it advisable to rekindle the Texan war, now virtually dormant
for six years. Very likely he did not wish to let the case go by
default; naturally his recollections of Texan hospitality moved him to
reciprocate; and in all probability he believed that any prospect of
fighting Texas or the United States in the name of national honor would
help to make his autocratic military rule more acceptable. Accordingly,
several annoying though ineffective raids beyond the Rio Grande
occurred, and a serious invasion was threatened. Upon this, many Texan
sympathizers in the Unites States and many who thought they saw England
supporting the Mexican operations, held meetings, contributed funds, and
even migrated to Texas with guns on their shoulders, all of which they
could legally do.[3.14]
In pursuance of Santa Anna's policy--probably also to gratify the strong
and universal sentiment of his fellow-citizens, aid the anti-Texas and
anti-administration party in the United States, neutralize perhaps the
good understanding between the United States and England resulting
from the settlement of our northeastern boundary, and possibly gain
the sympathy not only of Great Britain, but of her friend Louis
Philippe--Bocanegra, the minister of relations, now declared war
upon us in the field of diplomacy. May 12, 1842, he addressed Daniel
Webster, then secretary of state, directly, protesting against the
aid given Texas by our citizens, and asking whether the United States
could injure Mexico any more, if openly at war against her. "Certainly
not," he said, in reply to his own question. Then he issued a circular
to the diplomatic corps at Mexico, in which he charged our government
with tolerating aggressions made upon Mexican territory by "subaltern
and local authorities," and announced that while his country did not
wish to fight the United States, she would certainly do all that was
"imperatively required for her honor and dignity." Still not satisfied,
he wrote again to Webster, though an answer to the first letter was
not yet due, accusing the American Cabinet itself of "conduct openly
at variance with the most sacred principles of the law of nations and
the solemn compacts of amity existing between the two countries," and
threatening that a continuance of this policy would be regarded as "a
positive act of hostility."[3.14]
In reply to Bocanegra's first despatch, Webster said that the American
government utterly denied and repelled the charges made against it, and
then with characteristic power he discussed and refuted them. We shall
still maintain neutrality, he concluded, "but the continuance of amity
with Mexico cannot be purchased at any higher rate." To Bocanegra's
second letter his reply was no less positive but a great deal briefer.
The President, he wrote, considers the language and tone of that
communication "highly offensive," and orders "that no other answer be
given to it than the declaration that the conduct of the Government of
the United States, in regard to the war between Mexico and Texas, having
been always hitherto governed by a strict and impartial regard to its
neutral obligations, will not be changed or altered in any respect or in
any degree."[3.14]
This compelled Mexico, as the British minister observed, to accept the
rebuke invited by her imprudent language or begin hostilities. The
former course was chosen; and Bocanegra humbly replied that, relying
upon Webster's "frank declaration" of neutrality, he would not dwell
further upon the subject. Even before Webster was heard from, our
minister described the state of feeling at Mexico as "most bitter";
and such a correspondence, disagreeable enough to Mexican pride, tended
naturally to bring the two countries nearer to the tented field.
Richtofen, the Prussian envoy at Mexico, said that Bocanegra's note led
to a distinctly hostile state of things. At one time the President of
the United States did not see how war could be avoided; and the Mexican
press did about all it could to create a fighting temper.[3.14]
An opera bouffe sequel followed. Commodore T. A. C. Jones, lying at
Callao with our Pacific squadron, received some of Bocanegra's effusions
from the American consul at Mazatlán, who added that war seemed "highly
probable." Jones could not believe that a responsible minister would
write so fiercely unless prepared for a conflict, and he felt sure the
United States would not flinch. Anxious to provide a port of refuge for
American vessels, alarmed lest England should now obtain California
under some arrangement with Mexico, as she was thought ready to do, and
satisfied that hostilities would actually break out before he could
reach that coast, he sailed promptly and arrived at Monterey on October
19. Being a rather self-sufficient and hasty person, he investigated
the matter there in but a superficial manner, and the next day politely
occupied the town. He now found that war had not begun; and upon this,
after hauling down his flag and saluting that of Mexico, he sailed
away, while General Micheltorena, the governor, thundered grandiloquent
language at him from a safe distance. Naturally the authorities at
Mexico flared up at this episode; but they soon found that no charge
could be made against our government, and, realizing presently with our
minister's aid that the longest finger pointed toward Bocanegra and the
loudest laugh was at Micheltorena, they willingly allowed the matter to
fade away. It therefore sharpened Mexican hostility far less than might
have been expected, yet no doubt considerably.[3.15]
Meanwhile fresh trouble arose. The continuance of nominal war between
Mexico and Texas and the constant danger of raids interfered seriously
with our commercial interests. Near the end of June, 1842, therefore,
the American secretary of state, hoping to influence the government of
Mexico, observed to our minister that the war was "not only useless,
but hopeless, without attainable object, injurious to both parties
and likely to be, in its continuance, annoying and vexatious to other
commercial nations"; and this line of policy was followed up in January,
1843. Indeed, Webster gave notice that a formal protest would very
likely be made, unless the state of war should be ended or respectable
forces take the field.[3.14]
Naturally these remonstrances, however proper, gave much offence;
and the translation of John Quincy Adams's brilliant speech at
Braintree, Massachusetts, which made an eloquent but mistaken attack
upon the American administration, gave the newspapers of Mexico a
fresh opportunity and fresh reason to ventilate their suspicions of
us. A merciless warfare upon Texas was now announced; and Santa Anna
decreed in June, 1843, that all foreigners taken in arms on Texan soil
should be executed. In reply to this, our secretary of state declared
that American citizens could not be prevented from serving abroad,
as Frenchmen and Germans had served in our own revolutionary armies;
and that, if captured in Texas, they must be treated as prisoners of
war. "On this point," he insisted, "there can be no concession or
compromise."[3.14]
[AMERICAN GRIEVANCES]
Here our point of view must be shifted. So far we have mainly been
concerned with complaints on the part of Mexico, and it will be admitted
that in those affairs the United States did not materially injure her
in any unlawful way, and exhibited no malicious intentions. We must now
take up certain American grievances; and first in order may be mentioned
the summary execution of twenty-two of our citizens in 1835. Under the
revolutionist Mejía they had left the United States for Texas, but they
were conducted to Tampico and there were captured. The minister of
relations asserted that they were duly tried, and simply experienced the
rigor of the law; but our minister ascertained that no trial took place.
In spite of international law and treaty stipulations the government
ordered them shot, and shot they were--officially murdered. At the edge
of the grave eighteen of them signed a denial, their "dying words," that
any intention to invade Mexico had existed in their minds.[3.16]
Next may come the systematic endeavor of Mexico, even after signing the
treaty of amity and commerce, to hinder our people from crossing the
boundary, and in particular to keep them out of Texas. Article III of
the treaty said: "The citizens of the two countries shall have liberty
to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any part of said
territories, respectively." All Mexicans were offered the full benefit
of this agreement in the United States; but a Mexican law, revived by
decree on April 4, 1837, with evident reference to our people, read
thus: "Foreigners are prohibited from settling in those States and
territories of the Confederacy which border on the territories of their
own nations." This was done on the ground that political mischief was
liable to result from their presence. Now some allowance is to be made
for this view. But in reality all international relations involve
danger, and the country that fears it should use precautions. American
sailors make trouble in French ports, but France does not refuse them
admission--she appoints policemen. The danger from Americans in Texas
was doubtless greater, but so were the advantages to be derived from
their coming. Had Mexico governed that region well, their presence
would have benefited her immensely; and to make a treaty sanctioning
foreign intercourse, and then endeavor to keep the main avenue of that
intercourse barred, in order to avoid the legitimate results of her own
misgovernment, was an international system decidedly more novel than
friendly, more ingenious than straightforward.[3.17]