September, 1841, resisted with dignity though with no chance of
survival; but at length, in a fit of desperation, he cut the ground
of legality from under his own feet by pronouncing for Federalism, and
on October 7, Santa Anna, driving rapidly through Mexico behind four
white horses belonging to a stockbroker, with a retinue of splendid
coaches and an immense escort of cavalry, took up his quarters at the
palace in Tacubaya, a few miles beyond. Yet not a single viva greeted
his magnificent entry or his address to Congress. Memory paralyzed
admiration. In despair, not love, Mexico consented to be his.[2.8]
[SANTA ANNA VIRTUALLY DICTATOR]
By the new arrangement, called the Bases of Tacubaya, a new Congress was
to draw a new constitution. Meantime some one, the choice of a junta
appointed by the successful chief, was to have the powers "necessary for
the organization of all branches of the public service," and naturally
Santa Anna himself received the votes of his junta. This arrangement
was regarded by the nation as a mere parenthesis, but the General
held a different idea. On October 10, the gloomy old cathedral was as
bright as gold, silver, gems and hundreds of candles could make it.
Troops entered the sacred precincts, and formed to the music of drums
and cornets. The archbishop proceeded to the main entrance in cope and
mitre, holding in his hands a crucifix equally beautiful and precious,
and there he waited for about three quarters of an hour, when a military
officer, who had not even deigned to put on full dress, marched in and
seated himself on a splendid throne. A large suite of generals followed,
but none of them ventured to sit, though the _Te Deum_ lasted an hour;
and finally the man on the throne rose and took this oath: I swear to
God--to do as I please; for such was the meaning of the Bases. Hardened
by seeing his superior astuteness, audacity and energy balked so many
times by circumstances and a lack of confidence in his honor, Santa Anna
proposed, now that he once more had the power, to grip it with a hand of
steel.[2.9]
As dictator he indulged himself by running through the entire diapason
from childishness to omnipotence, announcing impossibilities and
attempting absurdities. The freedom of the press and the freedom of
speech were violated. The tariff was juggled with for selfish pecuniary
reasons. He ordered the university to give one of his friends a degree
and a chair--that is to say, learning and a profession. He closed a
bank without allowing it the time to liquidate. He put up a cheap
building of rubble work that was merely an eyesore--though Tornel
compared it to the Simplon road of Napoleon--and the city government
had to fall down and worship it. His amputated foot was dug up and
reinterred with extraordinary pomp. On the top of a monument was erected
a gilded statue of him pointing toward Texas, though some said it was
pointing at the mint. The Church, now governed by the soft Archbishop
Posada, drowsy with satisfaction and carelessly fattening on sweetmeats
presented to him by adoring nuns, was forced to make "loans"; and
payments on public debts, for which revenues had been solemnly pledged,
were suspended.[2.9]
Nothing, one might almost say, was too great or too small for Santa
Anna, if it looked auriferous. No coach wheel could turn without first
paying a tax. Anybody with a promising scheme to get national funds
could find a partner at the palace. Brokers and contractors took the
places of politicians; wealthy merchants, able to loan great sums at
great percentages, took the places of statesmen. Corruption was rampant
everywhere, of course. "An arbitrary system, indeed, must always be a
corrupt one," as Burke said; "there never was a man who thought he had
no law but his own will, who did not soon find that he had no end but
his own profit." These words describe Santa Anna's course. And when his
chest was full enough and his army big enough, putting a substitute in
his place and shaking off the cares of state, he went down to enjoy his
gambling and cockfighting and plan his next political move at Manga
de Clavo, secure from observation and protected by troops. Hints of a
formal dictatorship began to be heard.[2.9]
To keep up appearances, however, he summoned the proposed Congress. A
majority of the members were Federalists, but he promptly informed it
that Federalism would not do, and when they insisted on their notion,
Tornel, the minister of war, who was glad to be his lackey and wear
the livery of the house, barred Congress out of its hall. Presently,
without a sign of protest from any one, it was dissolved by decree;
and then eighty persons, chosen by the administration, drew up a new
constitution called the Organic Bases. Valencia was president of this
junta; and both he and Paredes began to plot against the dictator.
Santa Anna forced them to swallow their ambitions for the time being,
however, and by dint of military interference--though his enemies were
bestirring themselves and he was now increasingly unpopular--he became
President in January, 1844, under the new constitution. This appeared
like a concession to legality, but no doubt it was intended as a recoil
for another spring. His dream of empire still went on, it was fully
believed.[2.9]
Although the minister of justice described this period as "an epoch of
glory" and an "era of absolute felicity," the new Congress manifested
a disposition to antagonize the President; but an almost supernatural
dread of him paralyzed even his enemies, and he readily bowled them
over. Then he was given a special sum of four millions for war with
Texas; and after that sum was promptly absorbed, he demanded not only
ten millions more but "extraordinary powers" to lay taxes. This meant
that he wanted to have every man's property at his disposal, and it
was generally believed that with a foreign war as excuse he would soon
try to make himself autocrat. Congress resisted, and before long was
suspended.[2.9]
[DOWNFALL OF SANTA ANNA]
But now the people took fire. They had trusted Santa Anna completely,
and their confidence had been as completely abused. It was felt that
he had shown a deliberate intention to ignore the public interest and
feed upon the nation--disregarding all personal rights, threatening
all fortunes and contradicting all principles. Paredes, who had never
forgiven Santa Anna for running him off the track in 1841, pronounced.
In November, 1844, war began. The President attempted both to cajole
and to terrorize his enemies, and moved against the insurgents with a
powerful army; but on December 6 the troops at the capital revolted, and
the nation concurred. In the departments he was particularly hated, for
he had impoverished them with taxes and spent the money elsewhere; but
Mexico itself blazed. "Death to the lame man!" shouted the populace,
dragging his foot round the streets. Dazed and overwhelmed, Santa Anna,
after moving about irresolutely with his dwindling army, left it with
a small escort early in January, 1845, and then took to his heels with
only four servants. Before long some peasants captured him, and later in
the year he was banished.[2.9]
At first sight this collapse amazes us. It seems impossible that
Santa Anna, whose particular talent lay in discovering the direction
of political currents, should have lost so suddenly his tremendous
power. But the explanation is readily found. Without a doubt he was
the foremost Mexican of his time. Seen at the head of a ragged,
undisciplined mob called a regiment, inspiring them with eye, gesture
and words, and leading them on with almost electrical energy; seen at
a banquet, where he could show himself--despite the six colonels erect
and stiff behind his chair--merely a prince of good fellows, dignified
but cordial, courtly but unrestrained, brilliant yet apparently simple;
seen at the council board, seizing upon a shrewd idea expressed by one
of his associates and developing, illustrating and applying it in a way
that made its real author marvel at his chief's wisdom; seen in one of
his outbursts of Jacksonian rage, as when he threatened at a diplomatic
reception to run the boundary line between Mexico and the United
States at the cannon's mouth; seen at the opera house, in a crimson
and gold box with a retinue of crimson and gold officers, dressed in
the plainest of costumes himself, and wearing on his countenance an
interesting expression of gentle melancholy and resignation, as if he
were sacrificing himself for the nation and shrank from the gaze of an
adoring public--seen in these and other phases he appeared remarkable,
and even, as combining them, extraordinary.[2.9]
But in reality he was a charlatan. Though head of an army, he knew
nothing of military science; though head of a nation, he knew nothing
of statesmanship. By right of superiority and by right of conquest
Mexico seemed to be his; and, with what Burke described as "the generous
rapacity of the princely eagle," he proposed to take the chief share of
wealth, power, honor and pleasure, leaving to others the remnants of
these as a compensation for doing the work. It was a cardinal principle
with him that the masses could be ignored; and in 1844, having reduced
the Church to subservience and formed a combination with the military
and the financial men, based on a community of interest in exploiting
the national revenues, he deemed himself invulnerable, the more so
because the coterie of base flatterers that he loved to have about
him reflected this conviction. Of a true national uprising he had no
conception; and when this came, finding himself in the presence of a
power that amazed and overawed him, seeing his axioms disproved and his
pillars going down, he lost heart, and plunged from the zenith to the
nadir of his essentially emotional nature.[2.9]
[HERRERA BECOMES PRESIDENT]
Santa Anna's legal successor was General J. J. Herrera, president of
the council of state, a fair, pacific, reasonable and honest man; and
the new ministry commanded respect. For a time the halcyon days of
1825 returned. This was the first great popular movement since Mexico
had become independent. All had united in it, and therefore all were
in harmony; every one had assisted, and therefore every one felt an
agreeable expectation of reward. Factions laid down their arms. For
a few weeks all remembered they were Mexicans. But the situation was
extremely difficult. Santa Anna's constitution, which commanded no
respect because neither authorized by the people nor endorsed by good
results, was still in force. All who believed in his system, including
twenty thousand half-pay--or rather no-pay--officers, dissipated, hungry
and reckless, began at once to plot for his return or for some one of
the same kind to succeed him. Herrera's aim to introduce reforms, both
civil and military, gave great offence. Paredes, representing the Church
and the aristocracy, stood at the head of the main army, and soon showed
a disposition to hold aloof. Indeed every prominent man had a busily
scheming clique.[2.10]
The correct course for the new President would have been to declare
for the constitution of 1824, and throw himself upon the Federalists;
but, fearing that such a step would excite a revolution, he adopted
the timid and hopeless policy of trying to balance one party against
another. Owing to fear of the army, though he knew he could not rely
upon it, he dared not organize militia; and before long a body of troops
were allowed to revolt with impunity. Soon, therefore, the government
had no prestige and no substantial backing. Every sort of a complaint
was made against it. The financial troubles became acute. Confusion and
uncertainty reigned, and the President was physically incapable of a
hard day's work.[2.10]
In March a conspiracy that indicated an ominous combination of
Federalists and Santannistas came to light. In May, under strenuous
pressure from England and France, the government shrinkingly agreed
to recognize Texas if she would bind herself not to join the United
States; and this wise though tardy move brought an avalanche of abuse
upon it. In June the Federalists rose, but the affair was badly managed
and failed. Tornel, the arch-plotter, a general who never had a command,
was sent to the northern army; and other turbulent men were imprisoned.
But still the government merely drifted--blind, irresolute, vacillating,
moribund; and the general public looked on with complete indifference.
Going to sleep red and waking up green--for revolutions usually began at
night--was no longer a novelty.[2.10]
In August the ministers resigned; "the chief offices of state were
begging in the streets," wrote the correspondent of the London _Times;_
and the men who finally took them, while personally well enough, had
little strength and less prestige. By September the government stood
in hourly fear of a revolution; but so little booty could be seen,
that although the plots thickened, they were lazily developed, and
amounted to nothing. Paredes, the Santannistas and the Federalists
became constantly more threatening, however, and the administration
more and more afraid to take any step whatever, good or bad. Nobody
could guess what it would do to-day from what it did yesterday. The
anarchy of weakness constituted the government. A triumvirate of
Paredes, Tornel and Valencia was much talked of. Many prayed for some
respectable despot, many for a foreign prince; and some of the more
thoughtful suggested cautiously an American protectorate. "Sterile,
deplorably sterile" has been the movement against Santa Anna, exclaimed
the friendly _Siglo XIX_ in October, describing it as "a moment of
happy illusion." By this time the administration was powerless even at
the capital; and on November 30 _El Amigo del Pueblo_, an opposition
sheet, announced, "There is no government in Mexico." This, however, was
premature. Before the dénouement of this tragi-farce the United States
was to enter upon the scene; and as this new phase of the drama requires
to be prepared for, we must here leave Herrera, for a brief space, in
the midst of his difficulties.[2.10]
[DEPLORABLE STATE OF MEXICO]
Sterile indeed and most deplorable was the whole series of events that
we have now followed. One is glad to pass on; but let it be noted first
that while circumstances promoted, they did not produce it. The Mexicans
knew better, far better, than they acted. In 1824 the Constituent
Congress pointed out distinctly in a solemn address to the nation, that
without virtue liberal institutions would fail, revolution would follow
revolution, anarchy would ensue; and as time went on editors and orators
frequently traced the causes of Mexico's downfall in vivid and truthful
sentences. The trouble was that a great majority of those who might
have advanced her welfare preferred ease to effort, guile to wisdom,
self-indulgence to self-control, private advantage to the public weal,
partisan victory to national success; and naturally, in such a state
of things, the few honorable, public-spirited citizens could seldom
command a sufficient following to accomplish anything. Our leading
public men, said a contemporary, having been for one reason or another
contemptible, have learned to despise and distrust one another, and the
public, sick to death of their manoeuvres, have learned to despise and
distrust them all; yet such persons--demagogues and soldiers--were still
permitted to lead. Paper constitutions and paper laws, naturally of
little validity in the eyes of such a wilful, passionate race, had been
rendered by experience contemptible.
For the consequences, if there be such a principle as national
responsibility, the people as a body were responsible; and so they
were for the results of this deplorable schooling as it affected the
relations between their country and ours. The inheritance from Spain had
been unfortunate, but there had been time enough to recover from it; and
instead of improving, the Mexicans had even degenerated.[2.11]
III
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
1825-1843
In turning from the domestic to the foreign affairs of Mexico we must
beware of carrying prejudice with us. Our minds must be open to all
the facts, and see them exactly as they were. But it is right and even
necessary, for our guidance in interpreting these facts, to presume that
aliens, traditionally disliked by the Mexicans,[3.1] were treated
no more kindly, fairly and honestly than fellow-citizens; and the
evidence is conclusive that even the highest authorities were generally
unbusinesslike, often unjust or tricky, and on too many occasions
positively dishonorable in their dealings with foreigners.[3.2]
Our first minister to Mexico, received there on June 1, 1825, was Joel
R. Poinsett. Apparently a better man for the office could not have been
chosen or even created; and the warm interest of the United States in
the cause of Spanish-American independence, our prompt recognition of
Mexico, and the fact that her political institutions had been modeled
upon ours, were additional auguries for the success of his mission.
But duty required him to stand for a Protestant power in a country
intensely Roman Catholic, to represent democracy where the dominant
element consisted of aristocrats hoping more or less generally for a
Bourbon king, to support Monroe's doctrine of America for the Americans
against the strength of Europe and the European affiliations of Mexico,
to vindicate the equal position of the United States where Great Britain
had established a virtual protectorate, to insist upon full commercial
privileges when the Spanish-American states favored mutual concessions,
and to antagonize other influences possessing no little strength.[3.3]
[FRICTION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES]
His only feasible course was to affiliate with men of the popular,
democratic, Federalist party. Largely through his advice they abandoned
their plan of rebelling, placed their confidence in organization and the
ballot, and so gained the ascendency. They soon fell into excesses of
their own, however, which they were glad to charge against a Protestant
and foreigner; all the other elements antagonized by him joined in the
accusations; envy of the recognized prosperity of the United States
assisted; and in the end he came to be almost universally denounced
by the Mexicans as the diabolical agent of a jealous, hypocritical,
designing government.[3.3]
Of course, the Poinsett affair planted a root of bitterness in the
United States. Our national authorities could but protest against the
attacks upon our minister that were made by state legislatures in
contempt of all diplomatic usage, against the neglect of the Mexican
Executive to shield him, and against the general attitude of distrust
and ill-will exhibited by that country. Indeed, our government fully
believed that baseless popular clamor had been permitted to exert "a
sinister influence" against the Americans in its councils, and pointedly
informed Guerrero that unless "a marked change" in the temper of his
administration should "speedily" occur, a collision might result; and
of course the people of the United States could not fail to notice the
abusive and even ferocious treatment accorded to our representative,
against whom no charges were made by the Mexican government, and to
resent still more keenly the insults that were lavished upon the
character and purposes of the American nation. The fact that Poinsett
continued to be an important factor in our public life, even becoming
a member of the Cabinet at a later day, tended to emphasize these
feelings, both official and popular.[3.4]
Besides all this, official work of his added to the irritation in both
countries. As one of his principal duties, he was instructed to make
a treaty reaffirming the boundary agreed upon with Spain in 1819, or,
if he could, buy a portion at least of Texas. The proposal that our
neighbor should sell us territory has been called by partisan writers
in the United States, insulting, but as we have made purchases from
Spain, France, Russia and Mexico herself, this accusation is evidently
unwarranted. On the other hand the suggestion was reasonable. We for
our part desired the land, aside from its intrinsic value, as a needed
protection to New Orleans and the Mississippi; and Mexico not only
appeared to misprize it, but could have strengthened herself somewhat by
letting it go. Later it became a fashion with her public men to declaim
about its preciousness and beauty; but as late as 1836, according to
Santa Anna himself, many officials did not know where Texas was or what
nation claimed it. Mexico had ten times the area she could people, and
what she needed in that quarter was the means of shielding her northern
settlements from the Indians. Moreover, under contracts already made,
Texas was filling up with men who, as President Victoria saw in 1825,
were not at all likely to assimilate with the Mexicans; and since it was
recognized that a mistake had been made in admitting such colonists,
it might well have seemed the part of wisdom to cut off the infected
section before it should set an example of dissatisfaction, and perhaps
cause trouble also with the United States.[3.5]
Poinsett, accordingly, taking the matter up in July, 1825, stated
frankly that the treaty of 1819 was recognized by his country as
binding, but expressed a desire to lay it aside, and fix upon a more
satisfactory line. This pleased Victoria and Alamán, for they imagined
they could push the boundary eastward almost to the Mississippi, but
in spite of Poinsett's urgency and his dropping the plan to extend our
territory, a long delay followed. At last, however, on January 12,
1828, a treaty of limits reaffirming the agreement with Spain was duly
signed. In the course of April it reached Washington and was ratified.
On the last day of the month our secretary of state notified the Mexican
representative that he was ready to exchange ratifications, and reminded
him that under the terms of the instrument this would have to be done
by May 12; but Obregón was not prepared to act, and for that reason the
treaty failed.[3.6]
Yet the Mexicans not only held that the United States caused the
miscarriage in order to prosecute designs upon Texas, but charged
officially as well as on the street, with neither evidence nor
plausibility in favor of the accusation, that our minister stole the
paper--entrusted to him on May 10 for transmission--which would have
authorized Obregón to exchange the ratifications. So we had in 1830 this
extraordinary picture: on the one hand, the United States earnestly
desiring the prosperity and friendship of Mexico, and pursuing a just
and sympathetic policy towards her; and, on the other, Mexico accusing
us of hostile intentions and the basest arts. From that day on,
everything we did was viewed with a jaundiced eye.[3.6]
The treaty of limits was, however, revived by fresh negotiations, and
in April, 1832, went into effect. By its terms a joint commission to
run the line had to be appointed within a year from this date, and
presently Mexico received notice, both at her own capital and at ours,
that an American commissioner had been named; but she paid no attention
to the matter, and the year expired. Our minister was then directed
to negotiate a new agreement, labored for more than twelve months,
and finally, by addressing strong language personally to the acting
President, carried the point. Yet the United States was officially
denounced for endeavoring--and by wretched artifices--to delay the
fixing of the boundary.[3.7]