THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICAL TELEOLOGY.
§ 42. Let us now proceed to examine the effect of the formal considerations
which have been adduced in the last chapter on the scientific
considerations which were dealt with in the previous chapters. In these
previous chapters the proposition was clearly established that, just as
certainly as the fundamental data of science are true, so certainly is it
true that the theory of Theism in any shape is, scientifically considered,
superfluous; for these chapters have clearly shown that, if there is a God,
his existence, considered as a cause of things, is as certainly unnecessary
as it is certainly true that force is persistent and that matter is
indestructible. But after this proposition had been carefully justified, it
remained to show that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge compelled
us to carry our discussion into a region of yet higher abstraction. For
although we observed that the essential qualities of matter and of force
are the most ultimate data of human knowledge, and although, by showing how
far the question of Theism depended on these data, we carried the
discussion of that question to the utmost possible limits of scientific
thought, it still devolved on us to contemplate the fact that even these
the most ultimate data of science are only known to be of relative
significance. And the bearing of this fact to the question of Theism was
seen to be most important. For, without waiting to recapitulate the
substance of a chapter so recently concluded, it will be remembered that
its effect was to establish this position beyond all controversy--viz.,
that when ideas which have been formed by our experience within the region
of phenomenal actuality are projected into the region of ontological
possibility, they become utterly worthless; seeing that we can never have
any means whereby to test the actual value of whatever transcendental
probabilities they may appear to establish. Therefore it is that even the
most ultimate of relative truths with which, as we have seen, the question
of Theism is so vitally associated, is almost without meaning when
contemplated in an absolute sense. What, then, is the effect of these
metaphysical considerations on the position of Theism as we have seen it to
be left by the highest generalisations of physical science? Let us
contemplate this question with the care which it deserves.
In the first place, it is evident that the effect of these purely formal
considerations is to render all reasonings on the subject of Theism equally
illegitimate, unless it is constantly borne in mind that such reasonings
can only be of relative signification. Thus, as a matter of pure logic,
these considerations are destructive of all assignable validity of any such
reasoning whatsoever. Still, even a strictly relative probability is, in
some undefinable degree, of more value than no probability at all, as we
have seen these same formal considerations to show (see § 40); and,
moreover, even were this not so, the human mind will never rest until it
attains to the furthest probability which to its powers is accessible.
Therefore, if we do not forget the merely relative nature of the
considerations which are about to be adduced, by adducing them we may at
the same time satisfy our own minds and abstain from violating the
conditions of sound logic.
The shape, then, to which the subject has now been reduced is simply
this:--Seeing that the theory of Evolution in its largest sense has shown
the theory of Theism to be superfluous in a scientific sense, does it not
follow that the theory of Theism is thus shown to be superfluous in any
sense? For it would seem from the discussion, so far as it has hitherto
gone, that the only rational basis on which the theory of Theism can rest
is a basis of teleology; and if, as has been clearly shown, the theory of
evolution, by deducing the genesis of natural law from the primary data of
science, irrevocably destroys this basis, does it not follow that the
theory of evolution has likewise destroyed the theory which rested on that
basis? Now I conclude, as stated at the close of Chapter IV., that the
question here put must certainly be answered in the affirmative, so far as
its scientific aspect is concerned. But when we consider the question in
its purely logical aspect, as we have done in Chapter V., the case is
otherwise. For although, so far as the utmost reach of scientific vision
enables us to see, we can discern no evidence of Deity, it does not
therefore follow that beyond the range of such vision Deity does not exist.
Science indeed has proved that if there is a Divine Mind in nature, and if
by the hypothesis such a Mind exerts any causative influence on the
phenomena of nature, such influence is exerted beyond the sphere of
experience. And this achievement of science, be it never forgotten, is an
achievement of prodigious importance, effectually destroying, as it does,
all vestiges of a scientific teleology. But be it now carefully observed,
although all vestiges of a _scientific_ teleology are thus completely and
permanently ruined, the formal considerations adduced in the last chapter
supply the conditions for constructing what may be termed a _metaphysical_
teleology. I use these terms advisedly, because I think they will serve to
bring out with great clearness the condition to which our analysis of the
teleological argument has now been reduced.
§ 43. In the first place, let it be understood that I employ the terms
"scientific" and "metaphysical" in the convenient sense in which they are
employed by Mr. Lewes, viz., as respectively designating a theory that is
verifiable and a theory that is not. Consequently, by the term "scientific
teleology" I mean to denote a form of teleology which admits either of
being proved or disproved, while by the term "metaphysical teleology" I
mean to denote a form of teleology which does not admit either of being
proved or of being disproved. Now, with these significations clearly
understood, it will be seen that the forms of teleology which we have
hitherto considered belong entirely to the scientific class. That the
Paleyerian form of the argument did so is manifest, first because this
argument itself treats the problem of Theism as a problem that is
susceptible of scientific demonstration, and next because we have seen that
the advance of science has proved this argument susceptible of scientific
refutation. In other words, from the supposed axiom, "There cannot be
apparent design without a designer," adaptations in nature become logically
available as purely scientific evidence of an intelligent cause; and that
Paley himself regarded them exclusively in this light is manifest, both
from his own "statement of the argument," and from the character of the
evidence by which he seeks to establish the argument when stated--witness
the typical passage before quoted (§ 26). On the other hand, we have
clearly seen that this Paleyerian system of natural theology has been
effectually demolished by the scientific theory of natural selection--the
fundamental axiom of the former having been shown by the latter to be
scientifically untrue. Hence the term "scientific teleology" is without
question applicable to the Paleyerian system.
Nor is the case essentially different with the more refined form of the
teleological argument which we have had to consider--the argument, namely,
from General Laws. For here, likewise, we have clearly seen that the
inference from the ubiquitous operation of General Laws to the existence of
an omniscient Law-maker is quite as illegitimate as is the inference from
apparent Design to the existence of a Supreme Designer. In other words,
science, by establishing the doctrine of the persistence of force and the
indestructibility of matter, has effectually disproved the hypothesis that
the presence of Law in nature is of itself sufficient to prove the
existence of an intelligent Law-giver.
Thus it is that scientific teleology in any form is now and for ever
obsolete. But not so with what I have termed metaphysical teleology. For as
we have seen that the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge precludes us
from asserting, or even from inferring, that beyond the region of the
Knowable Mind does not exist, it remains logically possible to institute a
metaphysical hypothesis that beyond this region of the Knowable Mind does
exist. There being a necessary absence of any positive information whereby
to refute this metaphysical hypothesis, any one who chooses to adopt it is
fully justified in doing so, provided only he remembers that the purely
metaphysical quality whereby the hypothesis is ensured against disproof,
likewise, and in the same degree, precludes it from the possibility of
proof. He must remember that it is no longer open to him to point to any
particular set of general laws and to assert, these proclaim Intelligence
as their cause; for we have repeatedly seen that the known states of matter
and force themselves afford sufficient explanation of the facts to which he
points. And he must remember that the only reason why his hypothesis does
not conflict with any of the truths known to science, is because he has
been careful to rest that hypothesis upon a basis of purely formal
considerations, which lie beyond even the most fundamental truths of which
science is cognisant.
Thus, for example, he may present his metaphysical theory of Theism in some
such terms as these:--'Fully conceding what reason shows must be conceded,
and there still remains this possible supposition--viz., that there is a
presiding Mind in nature, which exerts its causative influence beyond the
sphere of experience, thus rendering it impossible for us to obtain
scientific evidence of its action. For such a Mind, exerting such an
influence beyond experience, may direct affairs within experience by
methods conceivable or inconceivable to us--producing, possibly,
innumerable and highly varied results, which in turn may produce their
effects within experience, their introduction being then, of course, in the
ordinary way of natural law. For instance, there can be no question that by
the intelligent creation or dissipation of energy, all the phenomena of
cosmic evolution might have been directed, and, for aught that science can
show to the contrary, thus only rendered possible. Hence there is at least
one nameable way in which, even in accordance with observed facts, a
Supreme Mind could be competent to direct the phenomena of observable
nature. But we are not necessarily restricted to the limits of the nameable
in this matter, so that it is of no argumentative importance whether or not
this suggested method is the method which the supposed Mind actually
adopts, seeing that there may still be other possible methods, which,
nevertheless, we are unable to suggest.'
Doubtless the hypothesis of Theism, as thus presented, will be deemed by
many persons but of very slender probability. I am not, however, concerned
with whatever character of probability it may be supposed to exhibit. I am
merely engaged in carefully presenting the only hypothesis which can be
presented, if the theory as to an Intelligent Author of nature is any
longer to be maintained on grounds of a rational teleology. No doubt,
scientifically considered, the hypothesis in question is purely gratuitous;
for, so far as the light of science can penetrate, there is no need of any
such hypothesis at all. Thus it may well seem, at first sight, that no
hypothesis could well have less to recommend it; and, so far as the
presentation has yet gone, it is therefore fully legitimate for an atheist
to reply:--'All that this so-called metaphysical theory amounts to is a
wholly gratuitous assumption. No doubt it is always difficult, and usually
impossible, logically or unequivocally to prove a negative. If my adversary
chose to imagine that nature is presided over by a demon with horns and
hoofs, or by a dragon with claws and tail, I should be as unable to
disprove this his supposed theory as I am now unable to disprove his actual
theory. But in all cases reasonable men ought to be guided in their beliefs
by such positive evidence as is available; and if, as in the present case,
the alternative belief is wholly gratuitous--adopted not only without any
evidence, but against all that great body of evidence which the sum-total
of science supplies--surely we ought not to hesitate for one moment in the
choice of our creed?'
Now all this is quite sound in principle, provided only that the
metaphysical theory of Theism _is_ wholly gratuitous, in the sense of being
utterly destitute of evidential support. That it is destitute of all
_scientific_ support, we have already and repeatedly seen; but the question
remains as to whether it is similarly destitute of _metaphysical_ support.
§ 44. To this question, then, let us next address ourselves. From the
theistic pleading which we have just heard, it is abundantly manifest that
the formal conditions of a metaphysical teleology are present: the question
now before us is as to whether or not any actual evidence exists in favour
of such a theory. In order to discuss this question, let us begin by
allowing the theist to continue his pleading. 'You have shown me,' he may
say, 'that a scientific or demonstrable system of teleology is no longer
possible, and, therefore, as I have already conceded, I must take my stand
on a metaphysical or non-demonstrable system. But I reflect that the latter
term is a loose one, seeing that it embraces all possible degrees of
evidence short of actual proof. The question, therefore, I conceive to be,
What amount of evidence is there in favour of this metaphysical system of
teleology? And this question I answer by the following considerations:--As
general laws separately have all been shown to be the necessary outcome of
the primary data of science, it certainly follows that general laws
collectively must be the same--_i.e._, that the whole system of general
laws must be, so far as the lights of our science can penetrate, the
necessary outcome of the persistence of force and the indestructibility of
matter. But you have also dearly shown me that these lights are of the
feeblest conceivable character when they are brought to illuminate the
final mystery of things. I therefore feel at liberty to assert, that if
there is any one principle to be observed in the collective operation of
general laws which cannot conceivably be explained by any cause other than
that of intelligent guidance, I am still free to fall back on such a
principle and to maintain--Although the collective operation of general
laws follows as a necessary consequence from the primary data of science,
this one principle which pervades their united action, and which cannot be
conceivably explained by any hypothesis other than that of intelligent
guidance, is a principle which still remains to be accounted for; and as it
cannot conceivably be accounted for on grounds of physical science, I may
legitimately account for it on grounds of metaphysical teleology. Now I
cannot open my eyes without perceiving such a principle everywhere
characterising the collective operation of general laws. Universally I
behold in nature, order, beauty, harmony,--that is, a perfect _correlation_
among general laws. But this ubiquitous correlation among general laws,
considered as the cause of cosmic harmony, itself requires some explanatory
cause such as the persistence of force and the indestructibility of matter
cannot conceivably be made to supply. For unless we postulate some one
integrating cause, the greater the number of general laws in nature, the
less likelihood is there of such laws being so correlated as to produce
harmony by their combined action. And forasmuch as the only cause that I am
able to imagine as competent to produce such effects is that of intelligent
guidance, I accept the metaphysical hypothesis that beyond the sphere of
the Knowable there exists an Unknown God.[25]
'If it is retorted that the above argument involves an absurd
contradiction, in that while it sets out with an explicit avowal of the
fact that the collective operation of general laws follows as a necessary
consequence from the primary data of physical science, it nevertheless
afterwards proceeds to explain an effect of such collective operation by a
metaphysical hypothesis; I answer that it was expressly for the purpose of
eliciting this retort that I threw my argument into the above form. For the
position which I wish to establish is this, that fully accepting the
logical cogency of the reasoning whereby the action of every law is deduced
from the primary data of science, I wish to show that when this train of
reasoning is followed to its ultimate term, it leads us into the presence
of a fact for which it is inadequate to account. If, then, my contention be
granted--viz., that to human faculties it is not conceivable how, in the
absence of a directing intelligence, general laws could be so correlated as
to produce universal harmony--then I have brought the matter to this
issue:--Notwithstanding the scientific train of argument being complete in
itself, it still leaves us in the presence of a fact which it cannot
conceivably explain; and it is this unexplained residuum--this total
product of the operation of general laws--that I appeal to as the logical
justification for a system of metaphysical teleology--a system which offers
the only conceivable explanation of this stupendous fact.
'And here I may further observe, that the scientific train of reasoning is
of the kind which embodies what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls "symbolic
conceptions of the illegitimate order."[26] That is to say, we can see how
such simple laws as that action and reaction are equal and opposite may
have been self-evolved, and from this fact we go on generalising and
generalising, until we land ourselves in wholly symbolic and--a paradox is
here legitimate--inconceivable conceptions. Now the farther we travel into
this region of unrealisable ideas, the less trustworthy is the report that
we are able to bring back. The method is in a sense scientific; but when
even scientific method is projected into a region of really
super-scientific possibility, it ceases to have that character of undoubted
certainty which it enjoys when dealing with verifiable subjects of inquiry.
The demonstrations are formal, but they are not real.
'Therefore, looking to this necessarily suspicious character of the
scientific train of reasoning, and then observing that, even if accepted,
it leaves the fact of cosmic harmony unexplained, I maintain, that whatever
probability the phenomena of nature may in former times have been thought
to establish in favour of the theory as to an intelligent Author of nature,
that probability has been in no wise annihilated--nor apparently can it
ever be annihilated--by the advance of science. And not only so, but I
question whether this probability has been even seriously impaired by such
advance, seeing that although this advance has revealed a speculative
_raison d'être_ of the mechanical precision of nature, it has at the same
time shown the baffling complexity of nature; and therefore, in view of
what has just been said, leaves the balance of probability concerning the
existence of a God very much where it always was. For stay awhile to
contemplate this astounding complexity of harmonious nature! Think of how
much we already know of its innumerable laws and processes, and then think
that this knowledge only serves to reveal, in a glimmering way, the huge
immensity of the unknown. Try to picture the meshwork of contending rhythms
which must have been before organic nature was built up, and then let us
ask, Is it conceivable, is it credible, that all this can have been the
work of blind fate? Must we not feel that had there not been intelligent
agency at work somewhere, other and less terrifically intricate results
would have ensued? And if we further try to symbolise in thought the
unimaginable complexity of the material and dynamical changes in virtue of
which that thought itself exists,--if we then extend our symbols to
represent all the history of all the orderly changes which must have taken
place to evolve human intelligence into what it is,--and if we still
further extend our symbols to try if it be possible, even in the language
of symbols, to express the number and the subtlety of those natural laws
which now preside over the human will;--in the face of so vast an
assumption as that all this has been self-evolved, I am content still to
rest in the faith of my forefathers.'
§ 45. Now I think it must be admitted that we have here a valid argument.
That is to say, the considerations which we have just adduced must, I
think, in fairness be allowed to have established this position:--That the
system of metaphysical teleology for which we have supposed a candid theist
to plead, is something more than a purely gratuitous system--that it does
not belong to the same category of baseless imaginings as that to which the
atheist at first sight, and in view of the scientific deductions alone,
might be inclined to assign it. For we have seen that our supposed theist,
while fully admitting the formal cogency of the scientific train of
reasoning, is nevertheless able to point to a fact which, in his opinion,
lies without that train of reasoning. For he declares that it is beyond his
powers of conception to regard the complex harmony of nature otherwise than
as a product of some one integrating cause; and that the only cause of
which he is able to conceive as adequate to produce such an effect is that
of a conscious Intelligence. Pointing, therefore, to this complex harmony
of nature as to a fact which cannot to his mind be conceivably explained by
any deductions from physical science, he feels that he is justified in
explaining this fact by the aid of a metaphysical hypothesis. And in so
doing he is in my opinion perfectly justified, at any rate to this
extent--that his antagonist cannot fairly dispose of this metaphysical
hypothesis as a purely gratuitous hypothesis. How far it is a probable
hypothesis is another question, and to this question we shall now address
ourselves.
§ 46. If it is true that the deductions from physical science cannot be
conceived to explain some among the observed facts of nature, and if it is
true that these particular facts admit of being conceivably explained by
the metaphysical hypothesis in question, then, beyond all controversy, this
metaphysical hypothesis must be provisionally accepted. Let us then
carefully examine the premises which are thus adduced to justify acceptance
of this hypothesis as their conclusion.
In the first place, it is not--cannot--be denied, even by a theist, that
the deductions from physical science _do_ embrace the fact of cosmic
harmony in their explanation, seeing that, as they explain the operation of
general laws collectively, they must be regarded as also explaining every
effect of such operation. And this, as we have seen, is a consideration to
which our imaginary theist was not blind. How then did he meet it? He met
it by the considerations--1st. That the scientific train of reasoning
evolved this conclusion only by employing, in a wholly unrestricted manner,
"symbolic conceptions of the illegitimate order;" and, 2d. That when the
conclusion thus illegitimately evolved was directly confronted with the
fact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, he found it to be
beyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to
such a cause. Now, as already observed, I consider these strictures on the
scientific train of reasoning to be thoroughly valid. There can be no
question that the highly symbolic character of the conceptions which that
train of reasoning is compelled to adopt, is a source of serious weakness
to the conclusions which it ultimately evolves; while there can, I think,
be equally little doubt that there does not live a human being who would
venture honestly to affirm, that he can really conceive the fact of cosmic
harmony as exclusively due to the causes which the scientific train of
reasoning assigns. But freely conceding this much, and an atheist may
reply, that although the objections of his antagonist against this symbolic
method of reasoning are undoubtedly valid, yet, from the nature of the
case, this is the only method of scientific reasoning which is available.
If, therefore, he expresses his obligations to his antagonist for pointing
out a source of weakness in this method of reasoning--a source of weakness,
be it observed, which renders it impossible for him to estimate the actual,
as distinguished from the apparent, probability of the conclusion
attained--this is all that he can be expected to do: he cannot be expected
to abandon the only scientific method of reasoning available, in favour of
a metaphysical method which only escapes the charge of symbolism by leaping
with a single bound from a known cause (human intelligence) to the
inference of an unknowable cause (Divine Intelligence). For the atheist may
well point out that, however objectionable his scientific method of
reasoning may be on account of the symbolism which it involves, it must at
any rate be preferable to the metaphysical method, in that its symbols
throughout refer to known causes.[27] With regard, then, to this stricture
on the scientific method of reasoning, I conclude that although the caveat
which it contains should never be lost sight of by atheists, it is not of
sufficient cogency to justify theists in abandoning a scientific in favour
of a metaphysical mode of reasoning.
How then does it fare with the other stricture, or the consideration that,
"when the conclusion thus illegitimately[28] evolved is confronted with the
fact of cosmic harmony which it professes to explain, we find it to be
beyond the powers of human thought to conceive of such an effect as due to
such a cause"? The atheist may answer, in the first place, that a great
deal here turns on the precise meaning which we assign to the word
"conceive." For we have just seen that, by employing "symbolic
conceptions," we _are_ able to frame what we may term a _formal_ conception
of universal harmony as due to the persistence of force and the primary
qualities of matter. That is to say, we have seen that such universal
harmony as nature presents must be regarded as an effect of the collective
operation of general laws; and we have previously arrived at a formal
conception of general laws as singly and collectively the product of
self-evolution. Consequently, the word "conceive," as used in the theistic
argument, must be taken to mean our ability to frame what we may term a
_material_ conception, or a representation in thought of the whole history
of cosmic evolution, which representation shall be in some satisfactory
degree intellectually realisable. Observing, then, this important
difference between an inconceivability which arises from an impossibility
of establishing relations in thought between certain _abstract_ or
_symbolic_ conceptions, and an inconceivability which arises from a mere
failure to realise in imagination the results which must follow among
external relations if the symbolically conceivable combinations among them
ever took place, an atheist may here argue as follows; and it does not
appear that there is any legitimate escape from his reasonings.
'I first consider the undoubted fact that the existence of a Supreme Mind
in nature is, scientifically considered, unnecessary; and, therefore, that
the only reason we require to entertain the supposition of any such
existence at all is, that the complexity of nature being so great, we are
unable adequately to conceive of its self-evolution--notwithstanding our
reason tells us plainly that, given a self-existing universe of force and
matter, and such self-evolution becomes abstractedly possible. I then
reflect that this is a negative and not a positive ground of belief. If the
hypothesis of self-evolution is true, we should _à priori_ expect that by
the time evolution had advanced sufficiently far to admit of the production
of a reasoning intelligence, the complexity of nature must be so great that
the nascent reasoning powers would be completely baffled in their attempts
to comprehend the various processes going on around them. This seems to be
about the state of things which we now experience. Still, as reason
advances more and more, we may expect, both from general _à priori_
principles and from particular historical analogies, that more and more of
the processes of nature will admit of being interpreted by reason, and that
in proportion as our ability to _understand_ the frame and the constitution
of things progresses, so our ability to _conceive_ of them as all naturally
and necessarily evolved will likewise and concurrently progress. Thus, for
example, how vast a number of the most intricate and delicate correlations
in nature have been rendered at once intelligible and conceivably due to
non-intelligent causes, by the discovery of a single principle in
nature--the principle of natural selection.
'In the adverse argument, conceivability is again made the unconditional
test of truth, just as it was in the argument against the possibility of
matter thinking. We reject the hypothesis of self-evolution, not because it
is the more remote one, but simply because we experience a subjective
incapacity adequately to frame the requisite generalisations in thought, or
to frame them with as much clearness as we could wish. Yet our reason tells
us as plainly as it tells us any general truth which is too large to be
presented in detail, that there is nothing in the nature of things
themselves, as far as we can see, antagonistic to the supposition of their
having been self-evolved. Only on the ground, therefore, of our own
intellectual deficiencies; only because as yet, by the self-evolutionary
hypothesis, the inner order does not completely answer to the outer order;
only because the number and complexity of subjective relations have not yet
been able to rival those of the objective relations producing them; only on
this ground do we refuse to assent to the obvious deductions of our
reason.[29]
'And here I may observe, further, that the presumption in favour of atheism
which these deductions establish is considerably fortified by certain _à
posteriori_ considerations which we cannot afford to overlook. In
particular, I reflect that, as a matter of fact, the theistic theory is
born of highly suspicious parentage,--that Fetichism, or the crudest form
of the theory of personal agency in external nature, admits of being easily
traced to the laws of a primitive psychology; that the step from this to
Polytheism is easy; and that the step from this to Monotheism is necessary.
If it is objected to this view that it does not follow that because some
theories of personal agency have proved themselves false, therefore all
such theories must be so--I answer, Unquestionably not; but the above
considerations are not adduced in order to _negative_ the theistic theory:
they are merely adduced to show that the human mind has hitherto
undoubtedly exhibited an undue and a vicious tendency to interpret the
objective processes of nature in terms of its own subjective processes; and
as we can see quite well that the current theory of personal agency in
nature, whether or not true, is a necessary outcome of intellectual
evolution, I think that the fact of so abundant an historical analogy ought
to be allowed to lend a certain degree of antecedent suspicion to this
theory--although, of course, the suspicion is of a kind which would admit
of immediate destruction before any satisfactory positive evidence in
favour of the theory.[30]
'But what is 'the satisfactory positive evidence' that is offered me?
Nothing, save an alleged subjective incapacity on the part of my opponent
adequately to conceive of the fact of cosmic harmony as due to physical
causation alone. Now I have already commented on the weakness of his
position; but as my opponent will doubtless resort to the consideration
that inconceivability of an opposite is, after all, the best criterion of
truth which at any given stage of intellectual evolution is available, I
will now conclude my overthrow by pointing out that, even if we take the
argument from teleology in its widest possible sense--the argument, I mean,
from the general order and beauty of nature, as well as the gross
constituent part of it from design--even taking this argument in its widest
sense and upon its own ground (which ground, I presume, it is now
sufficiently obvious _can_ only be that of the inconceivability of its
negation), I will conclude my examination of this argument by showing that
it is quite as inconceivable to predicate cosmic harmony an effect of
Intelligence, as it is to predicate it an effect of Non-intelligence; and
therefore that the argument from inconceivability admits of being turned
with quite as terrible a force upon Theism as it can be made to exert upon
Atheism.
'"In metaphysical controversy, many of the propositions propounded and
accepted as quite believable are absolutely inconceivable. There is a
perpetual confusing of actual ideas with what are nothing but pseud-ideas.
No distinction is made between propositions that contain real thoughts and
propositions that are only the forms of thoughts. A thinkable proposition
is one of which the _two terms can be brought together in consciousness
under the relation said to exist between them_. But very often, when the
subject of a proposition has been thought of as something known, and when
the predicate of a proposition has been thought of as something known, and
when the relation alleged between them has been thought of as a known
relation, it is supposed that the proposition itself has been thought. The
thinking separately of the elements of a proposition is mistaken for the
thinking of them in the combination which the proposition affirms. And
hence it continually happens that propositions which cannot be rendered
into thought at all are supposed to be not only thought but believed. The
proposition that Evolution is caused by Mind is one of this nature. The two
terms are separately intelligible; but they can be regarded in the relation
of effect and cause only so long as no attempt is made to put them together
in this relation.
'"The only thing which any one knows as Mind is the series of his own
states of consciousness; and if he thinks of any mind other than his own,
he can think of it only in terms derived from his own. If I am asked to
frame a notion of Mind divested of all those structural traits under which
alone I am conscious of mind in myself, I cannot do it. I know nothing of
thought save as carried on in ideas originally traceable to the effects
wrought by objects on me. A mental act is an unintelligible phrase if I am
not to regard it as an act in which states of consciousness are severally
known as like other states in the series that has gone by, and in which the
relations between them are severally known as like past relations in the
series. If, then, I have to conceive evolution as caused by an 'originating
Mind,' I must conceive this Mind as having attributes akin to those of the
only mind I know, and without which I cannot conceive mind at all.
'"I will not dwell on the many incongruities hence resulting, by asking how
the 'originating Mind' is to be thought of as having states produced by
things objective to it, as discriminating among these states, and classing
them as like and unlike; and as preferring one objective result to another.
I will simply ask, What happens if we ascribe to the 'originating Mind' the
character absolutely essential to the conception of mind, that it consists
of a series of states of consciousness? Put a series of states of
consciousness as cause and the evolving universe as effect, and then
endeavour to see the last as flowing from the first. I find it possible to
imagine in some dim way a series of states of consciousness serving as
antecedent to any one of the movements I see going on; for my own states of
consciousness are often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But
how if I attempt to think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actions
throughout the universe--to the motions of the multitudinous stars
throughout space, to the revolutions of all their planets round them, to
the gyrations of all these planets on their axes, to the infinitely
multiplied physical processes going on in each of these suns and planets? I
cannot think of a single series of states of consciousness as causing even
the relatively small groups of actions going on over the earth's surface. I
cannot think of it even as antecedent to all the various winds and the
dissolving clouds they bear, to the currents of all the rivers, and the
grinding actions of all the glaciers; still less can I think of it as
antecedent to the infinity of processes simultaneously going on in all the
plants that cover the globe, from scattered polar lichens to crowded
tropical palms, and in all the millions of quadrupeds that roam among them,
and the millions of millions of insects that buzz about them. Even a single
small set of these multitudinous terrestrial changes I cannot conceive as
antecedent a single series of states of consciousness--cannot, for
instance, think of it as causing the hundred thousand breakers that are at
this instant curling over on the shores of England. How, then, is it
possible for me to conceive an 'originating Mind,' which I must represent
to myself as a _single_ series of states of consciousness, working the
infinitely multiplied sets of changes _simultaneously_ going on in worlds
too numerous to count, dispersed throughout a space that baffles
imagination?
'"If, to account for this infinitude of physical changes everywhere going
on, 'Mind must be conceived as there' 'under the guise of simple Dynamics,'
then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind must be divested of all
attributes by which it is distinguished; and that, when thus divested of
its distinguishing attributes, the conception disappears--the word Mind
stands for a blank....
'"Clearly, therefore, the proposition that an 'originating Mind' is the
cause of evolution is a proposition that can be entertained so long only as
no attempt is made to unite in thought its two terms in the alleged
relation. That it should be accepted as a matter of _faith_ may be a
defensible position, provided good cause is shown why it should be so
accepted; but that it should be accepted as a matter of _understanding_--as
a statement making the order of the universe comprehensible--is a quite
indefensible position."'[31]
§ 47. We have now heard the pleading on both sides of the ultimate issue to
which it is possible that the argument from teleology can ever be reduced.
It therefore devolves on us very briefly to adjudicate upon the contending
opinions. And this it is not difficult to do; for throughout the pleading
on both sides I have been careful to exclude all arguments and
considerations which are not logically valid. It is therefore impossible
for me now to pass any criticisms on the pleading of either side which have
not already been passed by the pleading of the other. But nevertheless, in
my capacity of an impartial judge, I feel it desirable to conclude this
chapter with a few general considerations.
In the first place, I think that the theist's antecedent objection to a
scientific mode of reasoning on the score of its symbolism, may be regarded
as fairly balanced by the atheist's antecedent objection to a metaphysical
mode of reasoning on the score of its postulating an unknowable cause. And
it must be allowed that the force of this antecedent objection is
considerably increased by the reflection that the _kind_ of unknowable
cause which is thus postulated is that which the human mind has always
shown an overweening tendency to postulate as a cause of natural phenomena.
I think, therefore, that neither disputant has the right to regard the _à
priori_ standing of his opponent's theory as much more suspicious than that
of his own; for it is obvious that neither disputant has the means whereby
to estimate the actual value of these antecedent objections.
With regard, then, to the _à posteriori_ evidence in favour of the rival
theories, I think that the final test of their validity--_i.e._, the
inconceivability of their respective negations--fails equally in the case
of both theories; for in the case of each theory any proposition which
embodies it must itself contain an infinite, _i.e._, an
inconceivable--term. Thus, whether we speak of an Infinite Mind as the
cause of evolution, or of evolution as due to an infinite duration of
physical processes, we are alike open to the charge of employing
unthinkable propositions.
Hence, two unthinkables are presented to our choice; one of which is an
eternity of matter and of force,[32] and the other an Infinite Mind, so
that in this respect again the two theories are tolerably parallel; and
therefore, all that can be concluded with rigorous certainty upon the
subject is, that neither theory has anything to gain us against the other
from an appeal to the test of inconceivability.
Yet we have seen that this is a test than which none can be more ultimate.
What then shall we say is the final outcome of this discussion concerning
the rational standing of the teleological argument? The answer, I think, to
this question is, that in strict reasoning the teleological argument, in
its every shape, is inadequate to form a basis of Theism; or, in other
words, that the logical cogency of this argument is insufficient to justify
a wholly impartial mind in accepting the theory of Theism on so insecure a
foundation. Nevertheless, if the further question were directly put to me,
'After having heard the pleading both for and against the most refined
expression of the argument from teleology, with what degree of strictly
rational probability do you accredit it?'--I should reply as follows:--'The
question which you put I take to be a question which it is wholly
impossible to answer, and this for the simple reason that the degree of
even rational probability may here legitimately vary with the character of
the mind which contemplates it.' This statement, no doubt, sounds
paradoxical; but I think it is justified by the following considerations.
When we say that one proposition is more conceivable than another, we may
mean either of two very different things, and this quite apart from the
distinction previously drawn between symbolic conceptions and realisable
conceptions. For we may mean that one of the two propositions presents
terms which cannot possibly be rendered into thought at all in the relation
which the proposition alleges to subsist between them; or we may mean that
one of the two propositions presents terms in a relation which is more
congruous with the habitual tenor of our thoughts than does the other
proposition. Thus, as an example of the former usage, we may say, It is
more conceivable that two and two should make four than that two and two
should make five; and, as an example of the latter usage, we may say, It is
more conceivable that a man should be able to walk than that he should be
able to fly. Now, for the sake of distinction, I shall call the first of
these usages the test of _absolute_ inconceivability, and the second the
test of _relative_ inconceivability. Doubtless, when the word
"inconceivability" is used in the sense of relative inconceivability, it is
incorrectly used, unless it is qualified in some way; because, if used
without qualification, there is danger of its being confused with
inconceivability in its absolute sense. Nevertheless, if used with some
qualifying epithet, it becomes quite unexceptionable. For the process of
conception being in all cases the process of establishing relations in
thought, we may properly say, It is relatively more conceivable that a man
should walk than that a man should fly, since it is _more easy_ to
establish, the necessary relations in thought in the case of the former
than in the case of the latter proposition. The only difference, then,
between what I have called absolute inconceivability and what I have called
relative inconceivability consists in this--that while the latter admits of
_degrees_, the former does not.[33]
With this distinction clearly understood, I may now proceed to observe that
in everyday life we constantly apply the test of relative inconceivability
as a test of truth. And in the vast majority of cases this test of relative
inconceivability is, for all practical purposes, as valid a test of truth
as is the test of absolute conceivability. For as every man is more or less
in harmony with his environment, his habits of thought with regard to his
environment are for the most part stereotyped correctly; so that the most
ready and the most trustworthy gauge of probability that he has is an
immediate appeal to consciousness as to whether he _feels_ the probability.
Thus every man learns for himself to endow his own sense of probability
with a certain undefined but massive weight of authority. Now it is this
test of relative conceivability which all men apply in varying degrees to
the question of Theism. For if, from education and organised habits of
thought, the probability in this matter appears to a man to incline in a
certain direction, when this probability is called in question, the whole
body of this organised system of thought rises in opposition to the
questioning, and being individually conscious of this strong feeling of
subjective opposition, the man declares the sceptical propositions to be
more inconceivable to him than are the counter-propositions. And in so
saying he is, of course, perfectly right. Hence I conceive that the
acceptance or the rejection of metaphysical teleology as probable will
depend entirely upon individual habits of thought. The test of absolute
inconceivability making equally for and against the doctrine of Theism,
disputants are compelled to fall back on the test of relative
inconceivability; and as the direction in which the more inconceivable
proposition will here seem to lie will be determined by previous habits of
thought, it follows that while to a theist metaphysical teleology will
appear a probable argument, to an atheist it will appear an improbable one.
Thus to a theist it will no doubt appear more conceivable that the Supreme
Mind should be such that in some of its attributes it resembles the human
mind, while in other of its attributes--among which he will place
omnipresence, omnipotence, and directive agency--it transcends the human
mind as greatly as the latter "transcends mechanical motion;" and therefore
that although it is true, as a matter of logical terminology, that we ought
to designate such an entity "Not mind" or "Blank," still, as a matter of
psychology, we may come nearer to the truth by assimilating in thought this
entity with the nearest analogies which experience supplies, than by
assimilating it in thought with any other entity--such as force or
matter--which are felt to be in all likelihood still more remote from it in
nature. On the other hand, to an atheist it will no doubt appear more
conceivable, because more simple, to accept the dogma of an eternal
self-existence of something which we call force and matter, and with this
dogma to accept the implication of a necessary self-evolution of cosmic
harmony, than to resort to the additional and no less inconceivable
supposition of a self-existing Agent which must be regarded both as Mind
and as Not-mind at the same time. But in both cases, in whatever degree
this test of relative inconceivability of a negative is held by the
disputants to be valid in solving the problem of Theism, in that degree is
each man entitled to his respective estimate of the probability in
question. And thus we arrive at the judgment that the rational probability
of Theism legitimately varies with the character of the mind which
contemplates it. For, as the test of absolute inconceivability is equally
annihilative in whichever direction it is applied, the test of relative
inconceivability is the only one that remains; and as the formal conditions
of a metaphysical teleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and
the formal conditions of a physical explanation of cosmic harmony are no
less undoubtedly present on the other hand, it follows that a theist and an
atheist have an equal right to employ this test of relative
inconceivability. And as there is no more ultimate court of appeal whereby
to decide the question than the universe as a whole, each man has here an
equal argumentative right to abide by the decision which that court awards
_to him individually_--to accept whatever probability the sum-total of
phenomena appears to present to his particular understanding. And it is
needless to say that experience shows, even among well-informed and
accurate reasoners, how large an allowance must thus be made for personal
equations. To some men the facts of external nature seem to proclaim a God
with clarion voice, while to other men the same facts bring no whisper of
such a message. All, therefore, that a logician can here do is to remark,
that the individuals in each class--provided they bear in mind the strictly
_relative_ character of their belief--have a similar right to be regarded
as holding a rational creed: the grounds of belief in this case logically
vary with the natural disposition and the subsequent training of different
minds.[34]
It only remains to show that disputants on either side are apt to endow
this test of relative inconceivability with far more than its real logical
worth. Being accustomed to apply this test of truth in daily life, and
there finding it a trustworthy test, most men are apt to forget that its
value as a test must clearly diminish in proportion to the distance from
experience at which it is applied. This, indeed, we saw to be the case even
with the test of absolute inconceivability (see Chapter V.), but much more
must it be the case with this test of relative inconceivability. For,
without comment, it is manifest that our acquired sense of probability, as
distinguished from our innate sense of possibility, with regard to any
particular question of a transcendental nature, cannot be at all comparable
with its value in the case of ordinary questions, with respect to which our
sense of probability is being always rectified by external facts. Although,
therefore, it is true that both those who reject and those who retain a
belief in Theism on grounds of relative conceivability are equally entitled
to be regarded as displaying a rational attitude of mind, in whatever
degree either party considers their belief as of a higher validity than the
grounds of psychology from which it takes its rise, in that degree must the
members of that party be deemed irrational. In other words, not only must a
man be careful not to confuse the test of relative inconceivability with
that of absolute conceivability--not to suppose that his sense of
probability in this matter is determined by an innate psychological
inability to conceive a proposition, when in reality it is only determined
by the difficulty of dissociating ideas which have long been habitually
associated;--but he must also be careful to remember that the test of
relative inconceivability in this matter is only valid as justifying a
belief of the most diffident possible kind.
And from this the practical deduction is--tolerance. Let no man think that
he has any argumentative right to expect that the mere subjective habit or
tone of his own mind should exert any influence on that of his fellow; but
rather let him always remember that the only legitimate weapons of his
intellectual warfare are those the _material_ of which is derived from the
external world, and only the _form_ of which is due to the forging process
of his own mind. And if in battle such weapons seem to be unduly blunted on
the hardened armoury of traditional beliefs, or on the no less hardened
armoury of confirmed scepticism, let him remember further that he must not
too confidently infer that the fault does not lie in the character of his
own weapons. To drop the figure, let none of us forget in how much need we
all stand of this caution:--Knowing how greatly the value of arguments is
affected, even to the most impartial among us, by the frame of mind in
which we regard them, let all of us be jealously careful not to
over-estimate the certainty that our frame or habit of mind is actually
superior to that of our neighbour. And, in conclusion, it is surely
needless to insist on the yet greater need there is for most of us to bear
in mind this further caution:--Knowing with what great subjective
opposition arguments are met when they conflict with our established modes
of thought, let us all be jealously careful to guard the sanctuary of our
judgment from the polluting tyranny of habit.
* * * * *