THE LOGICAL STANDING OF THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEING OF A GOD.
§ 36. But the discussion must not end here. Inexorable logic has forced us
to conclude that, viewing the question as to the existence of a God only by
the light which modern science has shed upon it, there no longer appears to
be any semblance of an argument in its favour. Let us then turn upon
science herself, and question her right to be our sole guide in this
matter. Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that the
hypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as certainly
superfluous is the very basis of all science is certainly true. There can
no longer be any more doubt that the existence of a God is wholly
unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the universe, than there is
doubt that if I leave go of my pen it will fall upon the table. Nay, the
doubt is even less than this, because while the knowledge that my pen will
fall if I allow it to do so is founded chiefly upon empirical knowledge (I
could not predict with _à priori_ certainty that it would so fall, for the
pen might be in an electrical state, or subject to some set of unknown
natural laws antagonistic to gravity), the knowledge that a Deity is
superfluous as an explanation of anything, being grounded on the doctrine
of the persistence of force, is grounded on an _à priori_ necessity of
reason--_i.e._, if this fact were not so, our science, our thought, our
very existence itself, would be scientifically impossible.
But now, having thus stated the case as strongly as I am able, it remains
to question how far the authority of science extends. Even our knowledge of
the persistence of force and of the primary qualities of matter is but of
relative significance. Deeper than the foundations of our experience,
"deeper than demonstration--deeper even than definite cognition,--deep as
the very nature of mind,"[24] are these the most ultimate of known truths;
but where from this is our warrant for concluding with certainty that these
known truths are everywhere and eternally true? It will be said that there
is a strong analogical probability. Perhaps so, but of this next: I am not
now speaking of probability; I am speaking of certainty; and unless we deny
the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, we cannot but conclude that
there is no absolute certainty in this case. As I deem this consideration
one of great importance, I shall proceed to develop it at some length. It
will be observed, then, that the consideration really amounts to
this:--Although it must on all hands be admitted that the fact of the
theistic hypothesis not being required to explain any of the phenomena of
nature is a fact which has been demonstrated _scientifically_, nevertheless
it must likewise on all hands be admitted that this fact has not, and
cannot be, demonstrated _logically_. Or thus, although it is unquestionably
true that so far as science can penetrate she cannot discern any
speculative necessity for a God, it may nevertheless be true that if
science could penetrate further she might discern some such necessity. Now
the present discussion would clearly be incomplete if it neglected to
define as carefully this the logical standing of our subject, as it has
hitherto endeavoured to define its scientific standing. As a final step in
our analysis, therefore, we must altogether quit the region of experience,
and, ignoring even the very foundations of science and so all the most
certain of relative truths, pass into the transcendental region of purely
formal considerations. In this region theist and atheist must alike consent
to forego all their individual predilections, and, after regarding the
subject as it were in the abstract and by the light of pure logic alone,
finally come to an agreement as to the transcendental probability of the
question before them. Disregarding the actual probability which they
severally feel to exist in relation to their own individual intelligences,
they must apply themselves to ascertain the probability which exists in
relation to those fundamental laws of thought which preside over the
intelligence of our race. In fine, it will now, I hope, be understood that,
as we have hitherto been endeavouring to determine, by deductions drawn
from the very foundations of all possible science, the _relative_
probability as to the existence of a God, so we shall next apply ourselves
to the task of ascertaining the _absolute_ probability of such
existence--or, more correctly, what is the strictly _formal_ probability of
such existence when its possibility is contemplated in an absolute sense.
§ 37. To begin then. In the last resort, the value of every probability is
fixed by "ratiocination." In endeavouring, therefore, to fix the degree of
strictly formal probability that is present in any given case, our method
of procedure should be, first to ascertain the ultimate ratios on which the
probability depends, and then to estimate the comparative value of these
ratios. Now I think there can be no doubt that the value of any probability
in this its last analysis is determined by the number, the importance, and
the definiteness of the relations known, as compared with those of the
relations unknown; and, consequently, that in all cases where the sum of
the unknown relations is larger, or more important, or more indefinite than
is the sum of the known relations, it is an essential principle that the
value of the probability decreases in exact proportion to the decrease in
the similarity between the two sets of relations, whether this decrease
consists in the number, in the importance, or in the definiteness of the
relations involved. This rule or canon is self-evident as soon as pointed
out, and has been formulated by Professor Bain in his "Logic" when treating
of Analogy, but not with sufficient precision; for, while recognising the
elements of number and importance, he has overlooked that of definiteness.
This element, however, is a very essential one--indeed the most essential
of the three; for there are many analogical inferences in which either the
character or the extent of the unknown relations is quite indefinite; and
it is obvious that, whenever this is the case, the value of the analogy is
proportionably diminished, and diminished in a much more material
particular than it is when the diminution of value arises from a mere
excess of the unknown relations over the known ones in respect of their
number or of their importance. For it is evident that, in the latter case,
however little value the analogy may possess, the exact degree of such
value admits of being _determined_; while it is no less evident that, in
the former case, we are precluded from estimating the value of the analogy
at all, and this just in proportion to the indefiniteness of the unknown
relations.
§ 38. Now the particular instance with which we are concerned is somewhat
peculiar. Notwithstanding we have the entire sphere of human experience
from which to argue, we are still unable to gauge the strictly logical
probability of any argument whatsoever; for the unknown relations in this
case are so wholly indefinite, both as to their character and extent, that
any attempt to institute a definite comparison between them and the known
relations is felt at once to be absurd. The question discussed, being the
most ultimate of all possible questions, must eventually contain in itself
all that is to man unknown and unknowable; the whole orbit of human
knowledge is here insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to institute
the required measurements.
§ 39. I think it is desirable to insist upon this truth at somewhat greater
length, and, for the sake of impressing it still more deeply, I shall
present it in another form. No one can for a single moment deny that,
beyond and around the sphere of the Knowable, there exists the unfathomable
abyss of the Unknowable. I do not here use this latter word as embodying
any theory: I merely wish it to state the undoubted fact, which all must
admit, viz., that beneath all our possible explanations there lies a great
Inexplicable. Now let us see what is the effect of making this necessary
admission. In the first place, it clearly follows that, while our
conceptions as to what the Unknowable contains may or may not represent the
truth, it is certain that we can never discover whether or not they do.
Further, it is impossible for us to determine even a definite _probability_
as to the existence (much less the nature) of anything which we may suppose
the Unknowable to contain. We may, of course, perceive that such and such a
supposition is more _conceivable_ than such and such; but, as already
indicated, the fact does not show that the one is in itself more definitely
_probable_ than the other, unless it has been previously shown, either that
the capacity of our conceptions is a _fully adequate measure_ of the
Possible, or that the proportion between such capacity and the extent of
the Possible is a proportion that can be _determined_. In either of these
cases, the Conceivable would be a fair measure of the Possible: in the
former case, an exact equivalent (_e.g._, in any instance of contradictory
propositions, the most conceivable would _certainly_ be true); in the
latter case, a measure any degree less than an exact equivalent--the degree
depending upon the _then_ ascertainable disparity between the extent of the
Possible and the extent of the Conceivable. Now the Unknowable (including
of course the Inconceivable Existent) is a species of the Possible, and in
its name carries the declaration that the disparity between its extent and
the extent of the Conceivable (_i.e._, the other species of the Possible)
is a disparity that cannot be determined. We are hence driven to the
conclusion that the most apparently probable of all propositions, if
predicated of anything within the Unknowable, may not in reality be a whit
more so than is the most apparently improbable proposition which it is
possible to make; for if it is admitted (as of course it must be) that we
are necessarily precluded from comparing the extent of the Conceivable with
that of the Unknowable, then it necessarily follows that in no case
whatever are we competent to judge how far an _apparent_ probability
relating to the latter province is an _actual_ probability. In other words,
did we know the proportion subsisting between the Conceivable and the
Unknowable in respect of relative extent and character, and so of inherent
probabilities, we should then be able to estimate the actual value of any
apparent probability relating to the latter province; but, as it is, our
ability to make this estimate varies inversely as our inability to estimate
our ignorance in this particular. And as our ignorance in this particular
is total--_i.e._, since we cannot even approximately determine the
proportion that subsists between the Conceivable and the Unknowable,--the
result is that our ability to make the required estimate in any given case
is absolutely _nil_.
§ 40. I have purposely rendered this presentation in terms of the highest
abstraction, partly to avoid the possibility of any one, whatever his
theory of things may be, finding anything at which to object, and partly in
order that my meaning may be understood to include all things which are
beyond the range of possible knowledge. Most of all, therefore, must this
presentation (if it contains anything of truth) apply to the question
regarding the existence of Deity; for the _Ens Realissimum_ must of all
things be furthest removed from the range of possible knowledge. Hence, if
this presentation contains anything of truth--and of its rigidly accurate
truth I think there can be no question--the assertion that the
Self-existing Substance is a Personal and Intelligent Being, and the
assertion that this Substance is an Impersonal and Non-Intelligent Being,
are alike assertions wholly destitute of any assignable degree of logical
probability, I say _assignable_ degree of logical probability, because that
_some_ degree of such probability may exist I do not undertake to deny. All
I assert is, that if we are here able to institute any such probability at
all, we are unable logically to assign to it any determinate degree of
value. Or, in other words, although we may establish some probability in a
sense relative to ourselves, we are unable to know how far this probability
is a probability in an absolute sense. Or again, the case is not as though
we were altogether unacquainted with the Possible. Experience undoubtedly
affords us some information regarding this, although, comparatively
speaking, we are unable to know how much. Consequently, we must suppose
that, in any given case, it is more likely that the Conceivable should be
Possible than that the Inconceivable should be so, and that the Conceivably
Probable should exist than that the Conceivably Improbable should do so: in
neither case, however, can we know _what degree_ of such likelihood is
present.
§ 41. From the foregoing considerations, then, it would appear that the
only attitude which in strict logic it is admissible to adopt towards the
question concerning the being of a God is that of "suspended judgment."
Formally speaking, it is alike illegitimate to affirm or to deny
Intelligence as an attribute of the Ultimate. And here I would desire it to
be observed, that this is the attitude which the majority of
scientifically-trained philosophers actually have adopted with regard to
this matter. I am not aware, however, that any one has yet endeavoured to
formulate the justification of this attitude; and as I think there can be
no doubt that the above presentation contains in a logical shape the whole
of such justification, I cannot but think that some important ends will
have been secured by it. For we are here in possession, not merely of a
vague and general impression that the Ultimate is super-scientific, and so
beyond the range of legitimate prediction; but we are also in possession of
a logical formula whereby at once to vindicate the rationality of our
opinion, and to measure the precise degree of its technical value.
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