coming in contact with each other to produce that imagination. For these
two properties or qualities to exist there must be matter for them to
exist in; and for matter to exist there must be space for it to exist
in, and so on. Matter might exist without two different properties to
produce an imagination; but neither two properties nor one property can
exist without matter for it to exist in. Man may exist for a time as he
does when he is dead without an imagination; but the imagination cannot
exist without the material man. Matter cannot become non-existent, but
the imagination can and does become so. Matter therefore is the reality
and the imagination a nonentity, an unsubstantial idea; or an
imagination only.' [52:1]
The anonymous writer of the passages here given within inverted commas
clearly draws the line of demarcation between the real and the unreal.
His remarks on imagination are specially important. Theologians do not
seem to be aware that imagination is a modification of mind, and mind
itself a modification of sensibility--no sensations--no thought--no
life. Though awkwardly expressed, there is truth in the dogma of
Gassendi--_ideas are only transformed sensations._ All attempts to
conceive sensibility without organs of sense are vain. As profitably
might we labour to think of motion where nothing exists to be moved, as
sensibility where there is no organ of sense. We often see organs void
of sensibility, but who ever saw, or who can imagine sensibility
independent of organs? Pantheists and other Divinitarians write about
mind as if it were an existence; nay, they claim, for it the first place
among existences, according to 'mere matter' the second. The 'Shepherd'
plainly tells us mind is a _primary_ and matter a _secondary_ existence.
Having conjured up an Universal Mind God, it was natural he should try
to establish the supremacy of mind--but though a skilful logician he
will be unable to do so. Experience is against him. On experience of
natural operations Materialists base their conclusion that matter
without mind is possible, and mind without matter is impossible. It has
been proved that even the modification of mind called imagination is
indebted for all its images, yea, for its very existence as imagination,
to the material world.
D'Alembert states in the Discourse prefixed to the French Encyclopaedia
that 'the objects about which our minds are occupied are either
spiritual or material, and the media employed for this purpose are our
ideas either directly received or derived from reflection'--which
reflection he tells us 'is of two kinds, according as it is employed in
reasoning on the objects of our direct ideas, or in studying them as
models for imitation.' And then he tells us 'the imagination is a
creative faculty, and the mind, before it attempts to create, begins by
reasoning upon what it sees and knows.' He lauds the metaphysical
division of things into Material and Spiritual, appending however to
such laudation these remarkable words--'With the Material and Spiritual
classes of existence, philosophy is equally conversant; but as for
imagination, her imitations are imitations entirely confined to the
material world.'
Des Cartes, in his second 'Meditation,' says--_Imaginari nihil aliud est
quam rei corporeos figuram seu imaginem contemplari_--which sentence
indicates that he agreed with D'Alembert as to the exclusive limitation
of imagination to things material and sensible.
The same opinion seems to have been held by Locke, who in the concluding
chapter of his 'Essay on the Human Understanding,' states as something
certain, and therefore beyond dispute, that 'the understanding can only
compass, first--the nature of things as they are in themselves, their
relations and manner of operation--or secondly, that which man ought to
do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end,
especially happiness--or thirdly, the ways and means by which the
knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and
communicated.'
Adam Smith too, in book 5, c. 1, of his 'Wealth of Nations,' assures us
the ancient Greek philosophy was divided, into three branches--Physics,
Ethics, and Logic; and after praising such general division of
philosophy, as being perfectly agreeable to the nature of things, says
that, 'as the human, mind and the Deity, in whatever their essence may
be supposed to consist, are parts of the great system, of the universe,
and parts too, productive of the most important effects, whatever was
taught in the ancient schools of Greece concerning their nature, made a
part of the system of Physics.'
Dr. Campbell, in his 'Philosophy of Rhetoric,' ventures to assign 'local
habitation,' as well as 'name' to spirit itself. Nay, he makes something
of Deity, and the Soul; for spirit, says he, which here comprises only
the Supreme Being and the human Soul, is surely as much included under
the idea of natural object as body is, and is knowable to the
philosopher purely in the same way--by observation and experience.
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of these
opinions--they are eminently worthy of attention. If God is a
spirit--and spirit 'is surely as much a natural object as body is'--the
idea of something supernatural cannot for one instant be entertained. If
God is really no more than a 'part' of the great system of the universe,
to immaterialise Him is absurd, inconsistent, and idolatrous. Let it be
granted that God is 'part of nature, and a part too, productive of most
important effects;' and what Logician will be fool-hardy enough to
declare Him without body, parts, or passions?
Nor are Locke's _dicta_ as to the compass of the understanding easier to
be explained away than these of Dr. Campbell and Adam Smith. If we
cannot know more than 'the nature of things as they are in themselves,'
their relations, manner of operation, &c. only ignorant or cunning men
will pretend acquaintance with the supernatural. That nothing natural
can possibly conceive what is above nature is indeed so palpably true as
to deserve a place among philosophical axioms. Imagination itself,
however lofty, wild, or daring its flights, cannot quit the
universe--matter is its prison, where, like Sterne's starling, it is
'caged and can't get out.' Fortunately, however, imagination, though a
prisoner, has abundance of room to legitimately exercise itself in. But,
is it not obvious that if, as Des Cartes and D'Alembert contended, the
'imitations of imagination are imitations entirely confined to the
material world,' all conceits about a Supernatural somebody, or
Supernatural somebodies, are necessarily false, because of purely
natural origin, and should be viewed as at best 'mere cobwebs of
learning, admirable indeed, for the fineness of the thread and work, but
of no substance or profit.' [54:1]
It is unfortunate for Theologians that the fundamental principle of
their 'science' either cannot be comprehended, or, if comprehended,
cannot be reconciled with any known principle of nature. 'God is,' they
pompously declare; but what He is they are unable to tell us, without
contradicting themselves and each other. Some say God must be material;
some say, nay, He must be no such thing; some will have Him spiritual,
others immaterial, others again neither spiritual nor material, nor
immaterial, nor even conceivable. Some say, if a Spirit, He can only be
known by His place and figure; some not. Some call Him the author of
Sin, some the permitter of sin, while some are sure He could not
consistently, with his own perfections, either authorize sin or grant to
sinners a permit. Some say He made the Devil, others that the Most Low
bedevil'd himself; others that He created Him angelic and upright, but
could not keep him so. Some say He hardens men's hearts, others that
they harden their own hearts; others again, that to harden men's hearts
is the Devil's peculiar and exclusive privilege. Some say He has
prepared a Hell for all wicked people, others that Hell will receive
many good as well as tricked, while others cannot believe either the
just or the unjust, the faithful or the unfaithful, will be consigned to
perdition and made to endure torments unutterable by a God 'whose tender
mercies are over all his works.' Some affirm His omnipotency, some deny
it; some say He is no respecter of persons, some the reverse. Some say
He is Immensity, others that He fills Immensity; others that He don't
fill anything, though 'the Heaven, of Heavens cannot contain Him;'
others again, that He neither contains nor is contained, but 'dwells on
his own thoughts.' Some say He created matter out of nothing; some say
it is quite a mistake--inasmuch as creation meant bringing order out of
chaos. Some say He is not one person, but three persons--the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Ghost, which together constitute Godhead; others that
He is 'one and indivisible,' while others believe Him 'our father which
art in heaven,' but will have nothing to do with the Son and the Holy
Ghost, Unitarians, for example, one of whose popular preachers in the
town of Manchester, was about twelve months ago charged with having in
the course of a single sermon 'killed, two Gods, one Devil, and slacked
out Hell Fire.'
The names of Newton and Clarke are held in great esteem by all who are
familiar with the history of mechanical and metaphysical philosophy. As
a man of science, there is no individual, ancient or, modern, who would
not suffer by comparison with Sir Isaac Newton; while common consent has
assigned to Dr. Samuel Clarke the first place among religious
metaphysicians. It would be difficult, if not impossible; to cite any
other Theists of better approved reputation than these two, and
therefore we introduce them to the reader's notice in this place; for as
they ranked among the most philosophic of Theists, it might be expected
that their conceptions of Deity, would be clear, satisfactory, and
definite.--Let us see, then, _in their own writings_, what those
conceptions were.
Newton conceived God to be one and the same for ever, and everywhere,
not only by his own virtue or energy, but also in virtue of his
substance--Again, 'All things are contained in him and move in him, but
without reciprocal action.' (_sed sine mutua passione_) God feels
nothing from the movements of bodies; nor do they experience any
resistance from his universal presence. [56:1]
Pause reader, and demand of yourself whether such a conception of Deity
is either clear, satisfactory, or definite,--God. is _one_.--Very
good--but one _what_? From the information, 'He is the same for ever and
everywhere,' we conclude that Newton thought him a Being. Here however,
matter stops the way; for the idea of Being is in all of us inseparably
associated with the idea of substance. When told that God is an 'Immense
Being,' without parts, and consequently unsubstantial, we try to think
of such a Being; but in vain. Reason puts itself in a _quandary_, the
moment it labours to realise an idea of absolute nothingness; yet
marvellous to relate, Newton did distinctly declare his Deity 'totally
destitute of body,' and urged that _fact_ as a _reason_ why He cannot be
either seen, touched, or understood, and also as a _reason_ why He ought
not to be adored under any corporeal figure!
The proper function of 'Supernaturality or Wonder,' according to
Phrenologists, is to create a belief in the reality of supernatural
beings, and begets fondness for news, particularly if extravagant. Most
likely then, such readers of our Apology as have that organ 'large' will
be delighted with Newton's rhodomontade about a God who resists nothing,
feels nothing, and yet with condescension truly divine, not only
contains all things, but permits them to move in His motionless and
'universal presence'; for 'news' more extravagant, never fell from the
lips of an idiot, or adorned the pages of a prayer-book.
By the same great _savan_, we are taught that God governs all, not as
the soul of the world, but as the Lord and sovereign of all things; that
it is in consequence of His sovereignty He is called the Lord God, the
Universal Emperor--that the word God is relative, and relates itself
with slaves--and that the Deity is the dominion or the sovereignty of
God, not over his own body, as those think who look upon God as the soul
of the world, but over slaves--from all which _slavish_ reasoning, a
plain man who had not been informed it was concocted by Europe's pet
philosopher, would infallibly conclude some unfortunate lunatic had
given birth to it. That there is no creature now tenanting Bedlam who
would or could scribble purer nonsense about God than this of Newton's,
we are well convinced--for how could the most frenzied of brains imagine
anything more repugnant to every principle of good sense than a
self-existent, eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent Being, creator of all
the worlds, who acts the part of 'universal emperor,' and plays upon an
infinitely large scale, the same sort of game as Nicholas of Russia, or
Mohammed of Egypt plays upon a small scale. There cannot be slavery
where there is no tyranny, and to say as Newton did, that we stand in
the same relation to a universal God, as a slave does to his earthly
master, is practically to accuse such God, at reason's bar, of
_tyranny_. If the word of God is relative, and relates itself with
slaves, it incontestably follows that all human beings are slaves, and
Deity is by such reasoners degraded into the character of universal
slave-driver. Really theologians and others who declaim so bitterly
against 'blasphemers,' and take such very stringent measures to punish
'infidels,' who speak or write of their God, should seriously consider
whether the worst, that is, the least religious of infidel writers, ever
penned a paragraph so disparaging to the character of that God they
affect to adore, as the last quoted paragraph of Newton's. If even it
could be demonstrated that there _is_ a super-human Being, it cannot be
proper to clothe him in the noblest human attributes--still less can it
be justifiable in pigmies, such as we are, to invest Him with odious
attributes belonging only to despots ruling over slaves. Besides, how
can we imagine a God who is 'totally destitute of body and of corporeal
figure,' to have any kind of attributes? Earthly emperors we know to be
substantial and common-place sort of beings enough, but is it not sheer
abuse of reason to argue as though the character of God were at all
analogous to theirs; or rather, is it not a shocking abuse of our
reasoning faculties to employ them at all about a Being whose existence,
if it really have an existence, is perfectly enigmatical, and allowed to
be so by those very men who pretend to explain its character and
attributes? We find no less a sage than Newton explicitly declaring as
incontestable truth, that God exists necessarily--that the same
necessity obliges him to exist always and everywhere--that he is all
eyes, all ears, all brains, all arms, all feeling, all intelligence, all
action--that he exists in a mode by no means corporeal, and yet this
same sage, in the self-same paragraph, acknowledges God is _totally
unknown to us_.
Now, we should like to be informed by what _reasonable_ right Newton
could pen a long string of 'incontestible truths,' such as are here
selected from his writings, with respect to a Being of whom, by his own
confession, he had not a particle of knowledge. Surely it is not the
part of a wise man to write about that which is 'totally unknown' to
him, and yet that is precisely what Newton did, when he wrote about God.
There is, however, one remark of his respecting the God he thought
necessarily existed, worthy of notice, which is, that 'human beings
revere and adore Gad on account of his (supposed) sovereignty, and
worship him like his slaves;' for to all _but_ worshippers, the practice
as well as principle of worship does appear pre-eminently slavish.
Indeed, the Author has always found himself unable to dissociate the
idea of worshipping beings or things of which no one has the most remote
conception, from that of genuine hypocrisy. Christians despise the rude
Heathen for praying to a Deity of wood or stone, whom he soundly cudgels
if his prayer is not granted; and yet their own treatment of Jehovah,
though rather more respectful, is equally ridiculous. When praying, they
lay aside truth, sincerity, and sanity. Their language is the language
of fawning, lying, imbecile, cowardly slaves. Intending to exalt, they
debase the imaginary object of their adoration. They presume Him to be
unstable as themselves, and no less greedy of adulation than
Themistocles the Athenian, who, when presiding at certain games of his
countrymen, was asked which voice pleased him best? _'That,'_ replied
he, _'which sings my praises.'_ They love to enlarge on 'the moral
efficacy of prayer,' and would have us think their 'omnipotent tyrant'
best pleased with such of his 'own image' as best 'sing his praises.' Of
their 'living God' they make an amplified Themistocles, and thus reduce
(conscientiously, no doubt,) the Creator to a level with His creature.
The author is without God; but did he believe there is one, still would
he scorn to _affect_ for Him a love and a reverence that nothing natural
can feel for the supernatural; still would he scorn to _carry favour_
with Deity by hypocritical and most fulsome adulation.
Finely did Eschylus say of Aristides--
To be and not to seem is this man's maxim;
His mind reposes on its proper wisdom,
And wants no other praise.
Tell us, ye men of mystery, shall a God need praises beneath the dignity
of a man? Shall the Creator of Nature act less worthily than one of his
creatures? To do God homage, we are quite aware, is reckoned by
Christians among their highest duties. But, nevertheless, it seems to us
impossible that any one can love an existence or creature of which he
never had any experience. Love is a feeling generated in the human
breast, by certain objects that strike the sense--and in no other
conceivable way can love be generated! But God, according to Newton, is
neither an _object_ nor a _subject_, and though, all eyes, all ears, all
brains, all arms, all feeling, all intelligence, and all action, he is
_totally unknown to us_. If Christians allow this to be a true
description of the God they worship, we wish to understand how they can
love Him so vehemently as they affect to do--or how they can pay any
other than _lip_ homage to so mysterious a Deity? It is usual for slaves
to feign an affection for their masters that they do not, cannot
feel--but that believers in a God should imagine that he who 'searcheth
all hearts,' can be ignorant of what is passing in theirs, or make the
tremendous mistake of supposing that their _lip homage_, or interested
expressions of love, are not _properly_ appreciated by the Most High
God, and 'Universal Emperor,' is indeed very strange. To overreach or
deceive a God who created the heavens and the earth, is altogether
beyond the power of puny mortals. Let not therefore those who bend the
knee, while the heart is unbent, and raise the voice of thankful
devotion, while all within is frost and barrenness, fancy they have
stolen a march upon their Deity; for surely _if_ the lord liveth, he
judgeth rightly of these things. But it were vain to expect that those
who think God is related to his creatures as a despot is related to his
slaves, will hope to please that God by aught save paltry, cringing, and
dishonestly despicable practices. Yet, no other than a despotic God has
the great Newton taught us to adore--no other than mere slaves of such a
God, has he taught us to deem ourselves. So much for the Theism of
Europe's chief religious philosopher. Turn we now to the Theism of
Dr. Samuel Clarke.
He wrote a book about the being and attributes of God, in which he
endeavoured to establish, first, that 'something has existed from all
eternity;' second, that 'there has existed from eternity some one
unchangeable and independent Being;' third, that 'such unchangeable and
independent Being, which has existed from all eternity, without any
external cause of its existence, must be necessarily existent;' fourth,
that 'what is the substance or essence of that Being, which is
necessarily existing, or self-existent, we have no idea--neither is it
possible for us to comprehend it;' fifth, that 'the self-existent Being
must of necessity be eternal as well as infinite and omnipresent;'
sixth, that 'He must be one, and as he is the self-existent and original
cause of all things, must be intelligent;' seventh, that 'God is not a
necessary agent, but a Being endowed with liberty and choice;' eighth,
that 'God is infinite in power, infinite in wisdom, and, as He is
supreme cause of all things, must of necessity be a Being infinitely
just, truthful, and good--thus comprising within himself all such moral
perfections as becomes the supreme governor and judge of the world.'
These are the leading dogmas contained in Clarke's book--and as they are
deemed invincible by a respectable, though not very numerous, section of
Theists, we will briefly examine the more important of them.
The dogma that _something has existed from all eternity_, as already
shown, is perfectly intelligible, and may defy contradiction--but the
real difficulty is to satisfactorily determine _what that something is_.
Matter exists; and as no one can even imagine its non-existence or
annihilation, the materialist infers _that_ must be the eternal
something. Newton as well as Clarke thought the everlasting Being
destitute of body, and consequently without parts, figure, motion,
divisibility, or any other such properties as we find in matter--_ergo_,
they did not believe matter to be the eternal something; but if not
matter, again we ask, what can it be? Of bodilessness or incorporiety no
one, even among those who say their God is incorporeal, pretend to have
an idea. Abady insisted that _the question is not what incorporiety is,
but whether it be?_ Well, we have no objection to parties taking that
position, because there is nothing more easy than to dislodge those who
think fit to do so--for this reason: the advocates of nothing, or
incorporiety, can no more establish by arguments drawn from unquestioned
facts, that incorporiety _is_ than they can clearly show _what_ it is.
It has always struck the Author as remarkable that men should so
obstinately refuse to admit the possibility of matter's necessary
existence, while they readily embrace, not only as possibly, but
certainly, true, the paradoxical proposition that a something, having
nothing in common with anything, is necessarily existent. Matter is
everywhere around and about us. We ourselves are matter--all our ideas
are derived _from_ matter--and yet such is the singularly perverse
character of human intellect that, while resolutely denying the
possibility of matter's eternity, an immense number of our race embrace
the incredible proposition that matter was created in time by a
necessarily existing Being who is without body, parts, passions, or
positive nature!
The second dogma informs us that this always-existing Being is
unchangeable and independent. One unavoidable inference from which is
that Deity is itself immoveable, as well as unconnected with the
universe--for a moveable Being must be a changeable Being by the very
fact of its motion; while an independent Being must be motiveless, as it
is evident all motives result from our relationship to things external;
but an independent Being can have no relations, and consequently must
act without motives. Now, as no human action can be imagined without
necessary precursors in the shape of motives, reasoning from analogy, it
seems impossible that the unchangeable and independent Being, Clarke was
so sure must ever have existed, could have created the universe, seeing
he could have had no _motive_ or _inducement_ to create it.