mean anything in reality mean nothing. Is not God a name of this class?
Our 'state puppet showmen,' as my Lord Brougham nicknamed Priests, who
talk so much about Gods, forcibly remind one of that ingenious exhibitor
of puppets, who, after saying to his juvenile patronisers--'Look to the
right, and there you will see the lions a dewouring the dogs,' was
asked--Which is the lion and which is the dogs?' to which query he
replied, 'Vichever you please, my little dears, it makes no difference
votsomnever.' For in exactly the same spirit do our ghostly exhibitors,
they who set up the state puppet show meet the inquiries of the grown
children they make so handsomely (again we are under an obligation to
Lord Brougham) 'to pay for peeping.' Children of this sort would fain
know what is meant by the doctrines concerning the many 'true Gods' they
hear such precious rigmaroles about in Church and Conventicle, as well
as the many orthodox opinions of that God, whose name is there so often
'taken in vain.' But Priests like the showman in question, answer, in
language less inelegant to be sure, but substantially the same,
'Vichever you please, my little dears, it makes no difference
votsomnever.'
He who declared that the word God was invented by philosophers to screen
their own ignorance, taught a valuable truth, though the Author of this
Apology never fails mentally to Substitute _quacks_ for _philosophers_.
Saint Augustin more candid than modern theologians, said, 'God is a
being whom we speak of but whom we cannot describe, and who is superior
to all definitions.' Atheists on the other hand, as candidly deny there
is any such being. To them it seems that the name God stands for
nothing, is the archetype of nothing, explains nothing, and contributes
to nothing but the perpetuation of human imbecility, ignorance and
error. To them it represents neither shadow nor substance, neither
phenomenon nor thing, neither what is ideal nor what is real; yet is it
the name without full faith in which there could be no religion. If to
the name God some rational signification cannot be attached away goes,
or at least away _ought_ to go, that belief in something supernatural
which is 'the fundamental principle of all false metaphysics.' 'No such
belief can for a moment be entertained by those who see in nature the
cause of all effects, and treat with the contempt it merits, the
preposterous notion that out of nothing at the bidding of something, of
which one can make anything, started everything.
The famous Mr. Law, in his 'Appeal to all that doubt or disbelieve the
truths of the Gospel,' gratuitously allows 'it is the same impossibility
for a thing to be created out of nothing as by nothing,' for which
sensible allowance 'insane philosophy' owes him much. Indeed the dogma,
if true, proves all religion false, for it strikes full at belief in a
God, a belief which, it cannot be too often repeated, is to religion
what blood is to the brain and oxygen to the blood.
Materialism is hated by priests, because no consistent Materialist can
stop short of disbelief in God. He believes in Nature and Nature alone.
By Nature he understands unity. The ONE which; includes all, and is all.
That it pertains to the nature of substance to exist; and that all
substance is necessarily infinite, we are told by Spinoza, who
understood by substance that which exists in itself, and is conceived
through itself; _i.e._ the knowledge of which does not require the
knowledge of anything antecedent to it.
This substance of Spinoza is just the matter of Materialists. With him
most likely, with them certainly, matter and substance are convertible
terms. They have no objection to the word substance so long as it is the
sign of something substantial; for substantiality implies materiality.
Whether we say--Substance exists, and is conceived through itself;
_i.e._ the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of anything
antecedent to it, or--Matter exists and is conceived through itself;
_i.e._ 'the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of
anything antecedent to itself'--our meaning is exactly the same.
To exclude matter from our conception (if it were possible) would be to
think universal existence out of existence, which is tantamount to
thinking without anything to think about. The ideas of those who try
their brains at this odd sort of work, have been well likened to an
atmosphere of dust superintended by a whirlwind. They who assume the
existence of an unsubstantial _i.e._ immaterial First Cause, outrage
every admitted rule and every sound principle of philosophising. Only
pious persons with ideas like unto an atmosphere of dust superintended
by a whirl wind would write books in vindication of the monstrously
absurd assumption that there exists an unsubstantial Great First Cause
of all substantialities. Nothing can be wilder than the speculations of
such 'hair brained' individuals, excepting only the speculations of
those sharp-sighted enough to see reason and wisdom in them.
A Great Cause, or a Small Cause, a First Cause, or a Last Cause,
involves the idea of real existence, namely, the existence of matter. By
cause of itself, said Spinoza, I understand that which involves
existence, or that the nature of which can only be considered as
existent. And who does not so understand Cause? Why Gillespie and other
eminently dogmatic Christian writers whose Great First Cause cannot be
considered an entity, because they assert, yes, expressly assert its
immateriality.
If Nature is all, and all is Nature, nothing but itself could ever have
existed, and of course nothing but itself can be supposed ever to have
been capable of causing. To cause is to act, and though body without
action is conceivable, action without body is not. Neither can two
Infinites be supposed to tenant one Universe. Only 'most religious
philosophers' can pretend to acknowledge the being of an infinite God
co-existent with an infinite universe.
Atheists are frequently asked--What moves matter? to which question,
_nothing_ is the true and sufficient answer. Matter moves matter. If
asked how we know it does, our answer is, because we see it do so, which
is more than mind imaginers can say of their 'prime mover.' They tell us
mind moves matter; but none save the _second sighted_ among them ever
saw mind; and if they never saw mind, they never could have seen matter
pushed about by it. They babble about mind, but nowhere does mind exist
save in their mind; that is to say, nowhere but nowhere. Ask these
broad-day dreamers where mind is, _minus_ body? and very acutely they
answer, body is the mind and mind is the body.
That this is neither joke nor slander, we will show by reference to
No. 25 of 'The Shepherd,' a clever and well known periodical, whose
editor, [44:1] in reply to a correspondent of the 'chaotic' tribe,
said 'As to the question--where is magnetism without the magnet? We
answer, magnetism is the magnet, and the magnet is magnetism.' If so,
body is the mind and the mind is body; and our Shepherd, if asked,
'Where is mind without the body?' to be consistent, should answer, body
is the mind and the mind is the body. Both these answers are true or
both are false; and it must be allowed--
Each lends to each a borrowed charm,
Like pearls upon an Ethiop's arm.
Ask the 'Shepherd' where is mind without the body? and if not at issue
with himself, he must reply, mind is the man and man is the mind.
If this be so,--if the mind is the man and the man is the mind, which
none can deny who say magnetism is the magnet and the magnet
magnetism--how, in Reason's name, can they be different, or how can the
'Shepherd' consistently pretend to distinguish between them: yet he does
so. He writes about the spiritual part of man as though he really
believed there is such apart. Not satisfied, it would seem, with body,
like Nonentitarians of vulgarest mould, he tenants it with Soul or
Spirit, or Mind, which Soul, or Spirit, or Mind, according to his own
showing, is nothing but body in action: in other terms, organised matter
performing vital functions. Idle declamation against 'fact mongers' well
becomes such self-stultifying dealers in fiction. Abuse of
'experimentarians' is quite in keeping with the philosophy of those who
maintain the reality of mind in face of their own strange statement,
that magnetism is the magnet and the magnet magnetism.
But we deny that magnetism is the magnet. Those words magnetism and
magnet do not, it is true, stand for two things, but one thing: that one
and only thing called matter. The magnet is an existence; _i.e._, that
which moves. Magnetism is not an existence, but phenomenon, or, if you
please, phenomena. It is the effect of which magnetic body is the
immediate and obvious cause.
Cause implies action; and till Nonentitarians can explain how nothing
may contrive to cause something, they should assume the virtue of
modesty, even if they have it not. To rail at 'fact mongers' is,
doubtless, far easier than to overturn facts themselves. The 'Shepherd'
calls Atheists 'Chaotics' and Materialism 'the philosophy of lunacy,'
which is a very free and very easy way of 'Universalising.' But
arguments grounded on observation and experience are not to be borne
down by hard names. Man, like the magnet, is something--he acts. Dust
and ashes he was; dust and ashes he will be.--He may be touched, and
tasted, and seen, and smelt. In the immateriality of _his_ composition
no one believes; and none but Nonentitarians pretend to do so. He
thinks--thinking is the very condition of his existence. To think is to
live. To the sum total of vital manifestations we apply the term mind.
To call mind matter, or matter mind, is ridiculous--_genuine_ lunacy. It
would be as wise to call motion matter and wind up the spiritual work by
making nothing of both. The man who ran half round our planet in search
of his soul did not succeed in finding it. How should he when there is
no such thing as soul.
To evade the charge of Materialism, said Dr. Engledue, we
(Phrenologists) content ourselves with stating that the immaterial makes
use of the material to show forth its powers. What is the result of
this? We have the man of theory and believer in supernaturalism
quarrelling with the man of fact and supporter of Materialism. We have
two parties; the one asserting that man possesses a _spirit_ superadded
to, but not inherent in, the brain--added to it, yet having no necessary
connexion with it--producing material changes, yet immaterial--destitute
of any of the known properties of matter--in fact an _immaterial
something_ which in one word means nothing, producing all the cerebral
functions of man, yet not localised--not susceptible of proof; the other
party contending that the belief in spiritualism fetters and ties down
physiological investigation--that man's intellect is prostrated by the
domination of metaphysical speculation--that we have no evidence of the
existence of an essence, and that organised matter is all that is
requisite to produce the multitudinous manifestations of human and brute
cerebration.
We rank ourselves with the second party, and conceive that we must cease
speaking of 'the mind,' and discontinue enlisting in our investigations
a spiritual essence, the existence of which cannot be proved, but which
tends to mystify and perplex a question sufficiently clear if we confine
ourselves to the consideration of organised matter--its forms--its
changes--and its aberrations from normal structure. [46:1]
The eccentric Count de Caylus, when on his death-bed, was visited by
some near relations and a pious Bishop, who hoped that under such trying
circumstances he would manifest some concern respecting those
'spiritual' blessings which, while in health, he had uniformly treated
with contempt. After a long pause he broke silence by saying, 'Ah,
friends, I see you are anxious about my soul;' whereupon they pricked up
their ears with delight; before, however, any reply could be made, the
Count added, '_but the fact is I have not got one, and really my good
friends, you must allow me to know best_.'
If people in general had one tenth the good sense of this _impious_
Count, the fooleries of spiritualism would at once give place to the
philosophy of Materialism; and none would waste time in talking or
writing about nonentities. All would know that what theologians call
sometimes spirit, sometimes soul, and sometimes mind, is an imaginary
existence. All would know that the terms _immaterial something_, do in
very truth mean _nothing_. Count de Caylus died as became a man
convinced that soul is not an entity, and that upon the dissolution of
our 'earthly tabernacle,' the particles composing it cease to perform
vital functions, and return to the shoreless ocean of Eternal Being.
Pietists may be shocked by such _nonchalance_ in the face of their 'grim
monster,' but philosophers will admire an indifference to inevitable
consequences resulting from profoundest love of truth and contempt of
superstition. Count de Caylus was a Materialist, and no Materialist can
consistently feel the least alarm at the approach of what religionists
have every reason to consider the 'king of terrors.' Believers in the
reality of immaterial existence cannot be 'proper' Materialists.
Obviously, therefore, no believers in the reality of 'God' can be _bona
fide_ Materialists, for 'God' is a name signifying something or nothing;
in other terms, matter, or that which is not matter. If the latter, to
Materialists the name is meaningless--sound without sense. If the
former, they at once pronounce it a name too many; because it expresses
nothing that their word MATTER does not express better.
Dr. Young held in horror the Materialist's 'universe of dust.' But there
is nothing either bad or contemptible in dust--man is dust--all will be
dust. A _dusty_ universe, however _shocked_ the poetic Doctor, whose
writings analogise with--
Rich windows that exclude the light,
And passages that lead to nothing.
A universe of nothing was more to his taste than a universe of dust, and
he accordingly amused himself with the 'spiritual' work of imagining
one, and called its builder 'God.'
The somewhat ungentle 'Shepherd' cordially sympathises with Dr. Young in
his detestation of 'the Materialist's universe' of dust, and is sorely
puzzled to know how mere dust contrives to move without the assistance
of 'an immaterial power between the particles;' as if he supposed
anything could be between everything--or nothing be able to move
something. Verily this gentleman is as clever a hand at 'darkening
counsel by words without knowledge' as the cleverest of those he rates
so soundly.
We observe that motion is caused by body, and apart from body no one can
conceive the idea of motion. Local motion may, but general motion cannot
be accounted for. The Shepherd contends there is nothing more mysterious
than motion. There he is right; and had he said nothing is _less_
mysterious than motion he would have been equally so.
For telling these unpalatable truths the Atheist is bitterly detested.
'The Shepherd' is a most unorthodox kind of Pantheist; yet even he does
not scruple to swell the senseless cry against 'Godless infidels,' whom
he calls an almost infinite variety of bad names, and among other
shocking crimes accuses them of propounding a 'dead philosophy.' Yet the
difference between his Pantheism and our Atheism is only perceptible to
the microscopic eye of super-sublimated spiritualism. The subjoined is
offered to the reader's notice as a sample of Pantheism so closely
resembling Atheism, that, like the two Sosias in the play, to
distinguish them is difficult:
'What Coleridge meant by the motto (all Theology depends on mastering
the term nature) concerns us not. We appropriate the motto, but we do
not profess to appropriate it in the same sense as Coleridge
appropriated it. Every man must appropriate it for himself. Coleridge
perceived what every thinking mind has perceived--the difficulty of
believing in two self-determining powers, viz., God and Nature, as also
the consequences of regarding them as identical. If Nature be one power
and God another power, and if God be not responsible for what Nature
does, then Nature is a self-subsisting God. If God and Nature be
esteemed one universal existence, this is Pantheism, which is
denominated an accursed doctrine by the disciples of Sectarianism, and
formed no part of the creed, of the great dialectician of modern times.
The attempt to separate God from Nature will mistify the clearest head:
not even Coleridge could wade the depths of this vulgar Theology. Is
there any man who can rest satisfied in the faith of two independent
powers who exist together in any other sense than the two polar energies
of a magnet, which are really one? No: and men are afraid to regard them
as one. On the one hand they are puzzled to understand an unintelligible
absurdity, and on the other, they are afraid to admit a simple truism
which leads to the abolition of all ceremonial forms, and lip
professions of religion, and is execrated by priests and their
accomplices on this very account. We do not pretend to understand
anything. Every subject whatsoever is too high, too deep, and too broad
for us. But coming into a world where men act upon certain modes of
reasoning, which are unsatisfactory to our minds, we battle immediately
with these men, like an animalcule thrown into a glass of water amongst
other animalcules of opposite principles, and in doing so we act from
the impulse within which is our sole authority--that impulse within is
the preference we give to a mode of reasoning which begins by regarding
the existing of every kind and, degree as a 'perfect unity,' and making
the unity, responsible for every mode--the cause of every mode.' [49:1]
That is to say, dealing with it as what it is, the only existence; the
one, or all and in all. Can Atheists object to that? No, surely, for
they uniformly thus reason with respect to Nature; and unless traitors
to their own principles, cannot object to Pantheistical philosophy _as
here laid down_. Atheists say, Nature never had an Author--so do
Pantheists of the 'Shepherd' school. Atheists say Nature is at once the
womb and grave and cause and effect of all phenomena--so do they.
Atheists say 'death is nothing, and nothing death;' all matter breathing
the breath of life--so do they. Indeed, notwithstanding their talk about
God and Devil, they think Nature both, which amounts to denying both.
Can Atheists do more? or can Pantheists do so much without themselves
being Atheists?
But the Rev. Mr. Smith is no Atheist; at least he makes no profession of
Atheism. _Au contraire_, he makes fine sport with those who do. Himself
a Pantheist of the all-God school, he took to calling Atheists 'ugly
names,' as if quite innocent that no 'thinking mind' can fail to
perceive the downright lunacy, or something worse, of supposing a pin to
choose on the score of piety, between universal Deity and no Deity at
all. The 'Shepherd' of a new philosophic flock should have known better
than to attempt the reform of 'vulgar theology' by setting forth the
mystical nonsense of 'vulgar' Pantheism. All falsehood is 'vulgar'; but
the most 'vulgar' of falsehood is that which assumes the convenient garb
of transcendentalism, with a view to throw dust in the eyes of 'vulgar'
lookers-on. If Pantheists of this reverend gentleman's school are
neither sophists nor simpletons, Materialism is neither true nor false.
They do not plainly write down philosophy of so strangely negative a
kind; that would be too ridiculous; but every reader of the 'Shepherd'
knows that, in their way, they cleverly demonstrate all doctrine--their
own of course excepted--true _and_ false, which, no one need mount a
pair of 'universal' spectacles to see, comes to neither true _nor_
false. Spiritualism receives at their hands no better treatment than
Materialism, nor Southcottianism than either. Southcottianism (they say)
is true and false; Materialism is true and false; Spiritualism is true
and false: in brief, all doctrine, positive or negative, faithful or
unfaithful, is true and false, except the doctrine of Pantheism alias
Universalism, which is, bye and bye, to supersede every other. According
to this mystically wise, but rather inconsistent school, Atheists are
stupid as Christians, Christians stupid as Mohammedans, and Mohammedans
stupid as nearly everybody else. These men are peculiarly fitted to make
in the world of intellect the best possible 'arrangements for general
confusion.' Atheists in all but good sense, and seemingly without
knowing it, they contrive to mix up, with skill worthy of better
employment, a very novel and amusing species of philosophical
hodge-podge. Their Reverend leader or 'Shepherd' was wont to rail most
furiously against dogmatists, especially those of the Atheistic sort;
but his own dogmatism is at least a match for theirs. He did more than
dogmatize when combatting Materialism, he from ignorance or design,
libelled it by putting, according to a custom 'more honoured in the
breach than the observance,' words into the mouths of Materialists that
no real Materialist could utter. Take an example. In the periodical just
referred to and quoted from, [50:1] are these words:--'The mode of
(matter's) existence is the only subject in dispute. The Materialist
says, it is an infinite collection of dead unintelligent particles of
sand; the spiritualist, that it is the visible and tangible development
of an infinite, eternal, omnipresent, thinking, sentient mind.' Now, the
truth is, Materialists contend that matter _as a whole_ cannot in
strictness be considered either dead or living, intelligent or
non-intelligent, but simply matter; which matter when in certain
well-known states is called dead, and when in other equally well-known
states is called living. If where motion is there is life, then there is
no dead matter; for all matter, or at least all matter of which we have
experience, moves. To charge upon Materialists the dogma of matter's
deadness is a paltry trick which a writer like Mr. Smith should disdain
to practice. Nor does it become him to lecture Atheists about their
dogmatism, while from his own published writings can be adduced such
passages as the following:--
'We know that the two principal attributes of matter are visibility and
tangibility, and these two properties are purely spiritual or
immaterial. Thus resistance is nothing but that mysterious power we call
repulsion--a power which fills the whole universe--which holds the sun,
moon, and stars in its hand, and yet is invisible.'
This is what our Rev. Pantheist calls one of Spiritualism's 'splendid
arguments,' and splendidly absurd it certainly is; quite equal,
considered as a provocative of mirth, to Robert Owen's sublimest
effusions about that very mysterious and thoroughly incomprehensible
power which 'directs the atom and controuls the aggregate of nature.'
But the argument though 'splendid,' is false. Who is ignorant that
resistance is _not_ a power at all, though we properly enough give the
name resistance to one of matter's phenomena. Only half crazed
Spiritualists would confound phenomena with things by which they are
exhibited. Matter under certain circumstances resists, and under certain
other circumstances attracts. But neither repulsion nor attraction
exists, though we see every day of our lives that matter does repel and
does attract. Its doing so proves it is able to do so, and proves
nothing more. Mr. Smith says, 'if we want repose for our minds upon this
subject we may find it; but it can only be found in the universal mind.'
He does not however explain the co-existence of universal mind with
universal matter. He does not tell us how two universals could find room
in one universe.
'We are gravely assured (by spiritualising Pantheists among the rest)
that God is something out of time and space; but since our knowledge is
intuition comprehended under conception, we cannot have any knowledge of
that which is not received into the imaginary recipients of time and
space, and consequently God is not an entity.
'But here comes the jugglery--reason forms the idea of the soul or a
substance out of nature, by connecting substance and accident into
infinite and absolute substance. What is that verbiage, but that the
reason gives the name of soul to something that does not exist at all?'
'Reason forms the idea of God or of Supreme Intelligence out of Nature,
by connecting action and reaction into infinite and absolute
concurrence. What is God out of Nature? Where is out? Where is God? What
is God?--an absolute nothing.'