In the opinion of some, the power with which we shall one day have a

relation the most immediate, next to that of France, is Great Britain.

But it ought to be considered, that this power loses every day her

consideration, and runs towards her ruin. Her riches, in which her

power consisted, she has lost with us, and never can regain. With us

she has lost her Mediterranean trade, her African trade, her German

and Holland trade, her ally, Portugal, her ally, Russia, and her

natural ally, the House of Austria; at least, as being unable to

protect these as she once did, she can obtain no succor from them. In

short, one branch of commerce has been lopped off after another, and

one political interest sacrificed after another, She resembles the

melancholy spectacle of a great wide spreading tree, that has been

girded at the root. Her endeavors to regain these advantages, will

continually keep alive in her breast the most malevolent passions

towards us. Her envy, her jealousy, and resentment, will never leave

us, while we are what we must unavoidably be, her rivals in the

fisheries, in various other branches of commerce, and even in naval

power. If peace should unhappily be made, leaving Canada, Nova Scotia,

or the Floridas, or any of them, in her hands, jealousies and

controversies will be perpetually arising. The degree, therefore, of

intercourse with this nation, which will ever again take place, may

justly be considered as problematical, or rather the probability is,

that it will never be so great as some persons imagine; moreover, I

think that every citizen in the present circumstances, who respects

his country, and the engagements she has taken, ought to abstain from

the foresight of a return of friendship between us and the English,

and act as if it never was to be.

But it is lawful to consider, that which will probably be formed

between the Hollanders and us. The similitude of manners, of religion,

and in some respects of constitution, the analogy between the means by

which the two republics arrived at independency, but above all the

attractions of commercial interest, will infallibly draw them

together. This connexion will not probably show itself, before a peace

or a near prospect of peace. Too many motives of fear or interest

place the Hollanders in a dependance on England, to suffer her to

connect herself openly with us at present. Nevertheless, if the King

of Prussia, could be induced to take us by the hand, his great

influence in the United Provinces might contribute greatly to

conciliate their friendship for us. Loans of money, and the operations

of commercial agents or societies, will be the first threads of our

connexions with this power. From the essays and inquiries of your

Commissioners at Paris, it appears, that some money may be borrowed

there, and from the success of several enterprises by the way of St

Eustatia, it seems that the trade between the two countries is likely

to increase, and possibly Congress may think it expedient to send a

Minister there. If they should, it will be proper to give him a

discretionary power to produce his commission or not, as he shall find

it likely to succeed, to give him full powers and clear instructions

concerning the borrowing of money; and the man himself above all

should have consummate prudence, and a caution and discretion, that

will be proof against every trial.

If Congress could find any means of paying the interest annually in

Europe, commercial and pecuniary connexions would strengthen

themselves from day to day, and if the fall of the credit of England

should terminate in bankruptcy, the Seven United Provinces, having

nothing to dissemble, would be zealous for a part of those rich

benefits, which our commerce offers to the maritime powers, and by an

early treaty with us secure those advantages, from which they have

already discovered strong symptoms of a fear of being excluded by

delays. It is scarcely necessary to observe to Congress, that Holland

has lost her influence in Europe to such a degree, that there is

little other regard for her remaining but that of a prodigal heir for

a rich usurer, who lends him money at a high interest. The State

which is poor and in debt has no political stability. Their army is

very small, and their navy is less. The immense riches of individuals

may possibly be in some future time the great misfortune of the

nation, because the means of defence are not proportioned to the

temptation which is held out for some necessitous, avaricious, and

formidable neighbor to invade her.

The active commerce of Spain is very inconsiderable; of her passive

commerce, we shall not fail to have a part; the vicinity of this

power, her forces, her resources, ought to make us attentive to her

conduct, but if we may judge of the future by the past, I should hope

we had nothing to fear from it. The genius and interest of the nation

incline it to repose. She cannot determine upon war but in the last

extremity, and even then she sighs for peace. She is not possessed of

the spirit of conquest, and we have reason to congratulate ourselves,

that we have her for the nearest and principal neighbor. Her conduct

towards us at this time will perhaps appear equivocal and indecisive,

her determinations appear to be solely the fruit of the negotiations

of the Court of Versailles. But it ought to be considered, she has not

had motives so pressing as those of France to take in hand our

defence. Whether she has an eye upon the Floridas, or what other terms

she may expect from Congress, they are no doubt better informed than I

am. To their wisdom it must be submitted to give her satisfaction, if

her terms are moderate, and her offers in proportion. This conduct may

conciliate her affection and shorten delays, a point of great

importance, as the present moment appears to be decisive.

Portugal, under the administration of the Marquis de Pombal, broke

some of the shackles by which she was held to England. But the

treaty, by which a permanent friendship is established between the

Crowns of Spain and Portugal, was made in 1777, an event that the

English deplore as the greatest evil, next to the irrecoverable loss

of the colonies, arising from this war, because they will now no

longer be able to play off Portugal against Spain, in order to draw

away her attention as well as her forces, as in former times. But as

Portugal has not known how to deliver herself entirely from the

influence of England, we shall have little to hope from her; on the

other hand, such is her internal weakness, that we have absolutely

nothing to fear. We shall necessarily have commerce with her, but

whether she will ever have the courage to sacrifice the friendship of

England for the sake of it is uncertain.

It would be useless to consider that infinite number of little

sovereignties into which Germany is divided, and develope all their

political interests. This task is as much beyond my knowledge as it

would be useless to Congress. They will have few relations friendly or

hostile with this country, excepting in two branches of commerce, that

of merchandise and that of soldiers. The latter, infamous and

detestable as it is, has been established between a nation, once

generous, humane, and brave, and certain princes, as avaricious of

money as they are prodigal of the blood of their subjects; and such is

the scarcity of cash, and the avidity for it in Germany, and so little

are the rights of humanity understood and respected, that sellers will

probably be found as long as buyers. America will never be found in

either class. The State of Germany, with which we may have commerce of

an honorable kind, is the House of Austria, one of the most powerful

in Europe. She possesses very few countries, however, near the sea.

Ostend is the principal city, where she might have established a trade

of some consequence, if the jealousy of the maritime Powers had not

constantly opposed it. France, Spain, Holland, and England, have been

all agreed in their opposition, and the treaty of Utrecht, ratified

more than once by subsequent treaties, has so shackled this port, that

it will be impossible to open a direct trade to it, without some new

treaty, which possibly may not be very distant. England may possibly

make a new treaty with Austria, and agree to privileges for this port,

in order to draw away the advantages of the American trade from France

and Spain; and in such a treaty Holland may possibly acquiesce, if not

accede to it. The port of Trieste enjoys liberty without limits, and

the Court of Vienna is anxious to make its commerce flourish. Situated

as it is at the bottom of the Gulf of Trieste, the remotest part of

the Gulf of Venice, tedious and difficult as the navigation of those

seas is, we could make little use of it at any time, and none at all

while this war continues.

This Court would seize with eagerness the advantages, that are

presented to her by the independence of America, but an interest more

powerful restrains her, and although she is certainly attentive to

this revolution, there is reason to believe she will be one of the

last powers to acknowledge our independence. She is so far from being

rich, that she is destitute of the means of making war without

subsidies, as is proved by the peace which has lately been made. She

has occasion for the succors of France or of England to put in motion

her numerous armies. She conceives easily, that the loss of the

resources and credit of the English has disabled them to pay the

enormous subsidies, which, in former times, they have poured into the

Austrian coffers. She sees therefore with a secret mortification, that

she shall be hereafter more at the mercy of France, who may choose her

ally, and prefer at her pleasure either Austria or Prussia, while

neither Vienna nor Berlin will be able, as in times past, to choose

between Paris and London, since the latter has lost her past opulence

and pecuniary resources. It is our duty to remark these great changes

in the system of mankind, which have already happened in consequence

of the American war. The alienation of Portugal from England, the

peace of Germany, and that between Petersburg and Constantinople, by

all which events England has lost, and France gained, such a

superiority of influence and power, are owing entirely to the blind

division of that policy and wealth, which the English might have still

enjoyed, from the objects of their true interests and honor, to the

ruinous American war.

The Court of Berlin flatters itself, that the connexions which have

heretofore so long united France and Prussia will renew themselves

sooner or later. This system is more rational than that which subsists

at this day. The king of Prussia may then wait without anxiety the

consequences of the present revolution, because it tends to increase

the resources of his natural ally. The jealousy between the Emperor

and the King of Prussia, and that between the Houses of Bourbon and

Austria, are a natural tie between France and Prussia. The rivalry

between France and Great Britain is another motive, too natural and

too permanent for the former to suffer the King of Prussia to be long

the ally of the latter. One of the favorite projects of Prussia, that

of rendering the port of Emden a place of flourishing trade, interests

him most powerfully in our independence. Silesia, one of his best

provinces, has already felt the influence of it, and, sensible of the

force that empires derive from commerce, he is earnestly desirous to

see it introduced between America and his States; which gives ground

to believe, that as Austria will be one of the last so Prussia will be

one of the first to acknowledge our independence; an opinion which is

rendered more probable by the answer, which was given by the Baron de

Schulenburg to Mr Arthur Lee, and the influence of the King of Prussia

in the United Provinces, which is greater than that of any other

Power, arising from his great military force, and the vicinity of his

dominions. His near relation to the Stadtholder and the Prince of

Brunswick, is an additional motive to cultivate his friendship. The

Electorate of Saxony, with a fruitful soil, contains a numerous and

industrious people, and most of the commerce between the east and the

west of Europe passes through it. The fairs of Leipsic have drawn

considerable advantages for these four years from our trade. This

Power will see with pleasure the moment, which shall put the last hand

to our independence. The rest of Germany, excepting Hamburgh and

Bremen, have no means of opening a direct commerce with us; with the

latter we have no connexion at present; in the former all the commerce

of Lower Germany is transacted; here we shall soon have occasion to

establish an agent or consul.

Poland, depopulated by the war and a vicious government, reduced by a

shameful treaty to two thirds of her ancient dominion, destitute of

industry and manufactures, even of the first necessity, has no

occasion for the productions of America. Dantzic sees her ancient

prosperity diminish every day. There is, therefore, little probability

of commerce, and less of any political connexion between that nation

and us.

Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, comprehended under the denomination of

the northern powers, have been thought by some to be interested in our

return to the domination of Great Britain. Whether they consider

themselves in this light or not, their late declarations against the

right of England to interrupt their navigation, and their arming for

the protection of their commerce on the ocean, and even in the English

channel, are unequivocal proofs of their opinion concerning the right

in our contest, and of their intentions not to interfere against us.

It is very true, that the articles of commerce which they produce, are

in many respects the same with those of America. Yet if we consider

that we shall have occasion to purchase from them large quantities of

hemp and sailcloth, and that our productions of timber, pitch, tar,

and turpentine, are less profitable with us without bounties, than

some other branches of labor, it is not probable that we shall lower

the price of these articles in Europe so much as some conjecture, and

consequently our increased demand upon those countries for several

articles will be more than a compensation to them for the small loss

they may sustain, by a trifling reduction in the price of those

articles. It is not probable that the Courts of Petersburg, Stockholm,

and Copenhagen have viewed with indifference the present revolution,

if they have been apprehensive of being hurt by it in some respects,

which however I think must have been a mistaken apprehension; yet the

motive of humbling the pride of the English, who have endeavored to

exercise their domination, even over the northern seas, and to render

the Danish and Swedish flag dependent on theirs, has prevailed over

all others, and they are considered in Europe as having given their

testimony against the English in this war.

Italy, a country which declines every day from its ancient prosperity,

offers few objects to our speculations. The privileges of the port of

Leghorn, nevertheless, may render it useful to our ships, when our

independence shall be acknowledged by Great Britain, if, as we once

flattered ourselves, the Court of Vienna might receive an American

Minister. We were equally in error respecting the Court of the Grand

Duchy of Tuscany, where an Austrian prince reigns, who receives all

his directions from Vienna, in such a manner that he will probably

never receive any person in a public character, until the chief of his

house has set him the example. The King of the two Sicilies is in the

same dependence on the Court of Madrid, and we may depend upon it, he

will conform himself to all it shall suggest to him. This prince has

already ordered the ports of his dominions to be open to American

vessels, public and private, and has ordered his Ambassador at Paris

to apply to your Commissioners for a description of the American flag,

that our vessels might be known, and receive no molestation upon their

appearance in his harbors.

The Court of Rome, attached to ancient customs, would be one of the

last to acknowledge our independence, if we were to solicit for it.

But Congress will probably never send a Minister to his Holiness, who

can do them no service, upon condition of receiving a Catholic Legate

or Nuncio in return, or in other words, an ecclesiastical tyrant,

which it is to be hoped the United States will be too wise ever to

admit into their territories.

The States of the King of Sardinia are poor, and their commerce is

very small. The little port of Villa Franca will probably see few

American vessels, nor will there be any close relations, either

commercial or political, between this prince and us.

The republic of Genoa is scarcely known at this day in Europe, but by

those powers who borrow money. It is possible that some small sums

might be obtained there, if Congress would fall upon means of insuring

a punctual payment of interest in Europe.

Venice, heretofore so powerful, is reduced to a very inconsiderable

commerce, and is in an entire state of decay.

Switzerland is another lender of money, but neither her position nor

her commerce can occasion any near relation with us.

Whether there is anything in these remarks worth the trouble of

reading, I shall submit to the wisdom of Congress, and subscribe

myself, with the highest consideration, your most obedient and humble

servant,

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO JAMES LOVELL.

Braintree, August 13th, 1779.

My Dear Sir,

Since I have had opportunity to converse a little in this country, and

to read a few gazettes, I find that questions have been agitated here

in the newspapers, and in private circles, as well as in Congress,

concerning his Excellency, the Count de Vergennes, and Mr Arthur Lee,

which seem to make it necessary that I should send the enclosed

copies.[47] You can judge better than I whether it will be of any

public utility to lay them before Congress. My first letter, and his

Excellency's answer, I can see no objection to laying before

Congress; but as the rest[48] contain little else besides mutual

compliments, perhaps it will be as well to conceal them. I submit the

whole, however, to your discretion, and am, with much esteem, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTES:

[47] See these letters in Arthur Lee's Correspondence, Vol. II. pp.

224, 227.

[48] See the present volume, under the dates of February 16th, 1779,

p. 294; February 21st, p. 298; February 27th, p. 299.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Braintree, September 10th, 1779.

Sir,

Looking over the printed journals of the 15th of last April, I find in

the report of the Committee appointed to take into consideration the

foreign affairs of the United States, and also the conduct of the late

and present Commissioners of these States, the two following articles.

1. "That it appears to them, that Dr Franklin is Plenipotentiary for

these States at the Court of France; Dr Arthur Lee, Commissioner for

the Court of Spain; Mr William Lee, Commissioner for the Courts of

Vienna and Berlin; Mr Ralph Izard, Commissioner for the Court of

Tuscany; that Mr John Adams was appointed one of the Commissioners at

the Court of France, in the place of Mr Deane, who had been appointed

a joint Commissioner with Dr Franklin and Dr Arthur Lee, but that the

said commission of Mr Adams is superseded by the Plenipotentiary

commission to Dr Franklin.

2. "That in the course of their examination and inquiry, they find

many complaints against the said Commissioners, and the political and

commercial agency of Mr Deane, which complaints, with the evidence in

support thereof, are herewith delivered, and to which the Committee

beg leave to refer."

The word "said" in the second article, refers to the Commissioners

mentioned in the first, and as my name is among them, I learn from

hence, that there were some complaints against me, and that the

evidence in support of them was delivered to Congress by the

Committee.

I therefore pray, that I may be favored with copies of those

complaints, evidences, and the names of my accusers, and the witnesses

against me, that I may take such measures as may be in my power to

justify myself to Congress.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Boston, September 23d, 1779.

Sir,

I had yesterday the honor of your letter of the 7th of this month. I

thank you, Sir, for your obliging congratulations on my return to my

family and country.

The reason why my letters of the 27th of February, and the 1st of

March, arrived so late was, that they were delivered at the time of

their dates to gentlemen then bound to the seaports, who expected to

sail directly for America, but were disappointed of passages, until

the vessels sailed under the convoy of the Sensible.

I have not my letter book here, but I do not remember that they

contained anything of much consequence, so that I suppose the

inconvenience of their late arrival was not much.

You will be pleased to make my most respectful compliments to the

members of Congress, and believe me, with great esteem, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO JAMES LOVELL.

Braintree, October 17th, 1779.

My Dear Sir,

What shall I say to your favors of the 27th and 28th of September,

which came by the last post? The unanimity of my election surprises

me, as much as the delicacy, importance, and danger of the trust

distress me. The appointment of Mr Dana to be Secretary pleases me

more than my own to be Minister, Commissioner, Negotiator, call it

what you will. I have communicated to him your letters in confidence,

and all other material intelligence I had, and hope he will not

decline, but you know the peculiarities of his situation, and if he

should refuse, I hope you will not force your name out of nomination

again. I did not suppose that such characters would be willing to go

as Secretaries, because I did not know your plan, otherwise I should

not have mentioned Mr Jennings to Mr Gerry for one to Dr Franklin.

Your mastery of the language, and your indefatigability, would make

you infinitely useful in any of these departments.

I rejoice that you produced my letter to the Count de Vergennes and

his answer before the choice, because it contained a testimony in

favor of Mr Lee, which was his due.[49] I am very much affected at his

recall, because I know his merit, and, therefore, I am glad I was not

placed in his stead, for suspicions would have arisen, and

reflections would have been cast upon me, as having favored his

removal in order to make room, which I certainly did not. I am

infinitely obliged to you for those letters, and for that received the

post before last, but I really tremble for your health. Let me entreat

you, for the sake of our country, to take care of it. If I was to

apply myself as you do, I should soon go to study politics in another

sphere. Yet I am so selfish as to beg the continuance of your favors

to me, and I pledge myself to you, I will not be in debt any more than

may be made by the intrinsic difference in the value of the letters,

which will be unavoidable.

I thank you for the extract from Mr Izard's letter. I am not a little

surprised at its contents. It was written, I see, to his friend, and I

suppose intended in confidence. I am fully persuaded he did not

intend, that the whole should have been laid before Congress.[50] I

utterly deny that I ever used to him any such language, as the

indecent paragraph that closes what he says about me. Indeed, that is

manifestly his own inference, and in his own words, from what he says

he had heard me say, and he draws the same from what Dr Franklin and

Mr Deane had said upon the same subject. I further deny that I ever

_threatened_ him with the displeasure of Congress, for writing his

opinion concerning these articles to Congress, or for suggesting them

to the Commissioners. But to enter into all the conversations that

have passed between Mr Izard and me respecting those articles, and

many other points in order to give a full and fair representation of

those conversations, would fill a small volume. Yet there never was

any angry or rude conversation between him and me, that I can

recollect. I lived with him on good terms, visited him and he me,

dined with his family, and his family with me, and I ever told him,

and repeated it often, that I should be always obliged to him for his

advice, opinions, and sentiments upon any American subject, and that I

should always give it its due weight, although I did not think myself

bound to follow it any further than it seemed to me to be just. As

Congress have declined giving me the charges against me by their

authority, and have, upon the whole, acquitted me with so much

splendor, it would look like a littleness of soul in me to make myself

anxious, or give them any further trouble about it. And as I have in

general so good an opinion of Mr Izard's attachment to his country,

and of his honor, I shall not think myself bound to take any further

notice of this fruit of his inexperience in public life, this peevish

ebullition of the rashness of his temper. I have written a few other

observations to Mr Gerry on the same subject. You and he will compare

these with them for your private satisfaction, but be sure that they

are not exposed where they will do harm to the public, to Mr Izard, or

me, unnecessarily.

If I should go abroad, cannot you lend me twenty or thirty complete

sets of the journals? They are much wanted in Europe. A set of them is

a genteel present, and perhaps would do me and the public more service

than you are aware of. If Congress, or some Committee would order it,

I should be very glad.

I am, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTES:

[49] See these letters in Arthur Lee's Correspondence, Vol. II. pp.

224, 227.

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