The practice of robbing merchants on the high seas, a remnant of the

ancient piracy, though it may be accidentally beneficial to particular

persons, is far from being profitable to all engaged in it, or to the

nation that authorises it. In the beginning of a war, some rich ships,

not upon their guard, are surprised and taken. This encourages the

first adventurers to fit out more armed vessels, and many others to do

the same. But the enemy at the same time become more careful, arm

their merchant ships better, and render them not so easy to be taken;

they go also more under protection of convoys; thus while the

privateers to take them are multiplied, the vessels subject to be

taken, and the chances of profit, are diminished, so that many cruises

are made, wherein the expenses overgo the gains; and as is the case in

other lotteries, though particulars have got prizes, the mass of

adventurers are losers, the whole expense of fitting out all the

privateers, during a war, being much greater than the whole amount of

goods taken. Then there is the national loss of all the labor of so

many men during the time they have been employed in robbing; who

besides spend what they get in riot, drunkenness, and debauchery, lose

their habits of industry, are rarely fit for any sober business after

a peace, and serve only to increase the number of highwaymen and

housebreakers. Even the undertakers, who have been fortunate, are by

sudden wealth led into expensive living, the habit of which continues

when the means of supporting it ceases, and finally ruins them; a just

punishment for their having wantonly and unfeelingly ruined many

honest innocent traders and their families, whose subsistence was

employed in serving the common interests of mankind.

Should it be agreed and become a part of the law of nations, that the

cultivators of the earth are not to be molested or interrupted in

their peaceable and useful employment, the inhabitants of the sugar

islands would perhaps come under the protection of such a regulation,

which would be a great advantage to the nations who at present hold

those islands, since the cost of sugar to the consumer in those

nations, consists not merely in the price he pays for it by the pound,

but in the accumulated charge of all the taxes he pays in every war,

to fit out fleets and maintain troops for the defence of the islands

that raise the sugar, and the ships that bring it home. But the

expense of treasure is not all. A celebrated philosophical writer

remarks, that when he considered the wars made in Africa, for

prisoners to raise sugars in America, the numbers slain in those wars,

the numbers that, being crowded in ships, perish in the

transportation, and the numbers that die under the severities of

slavery, he could scarce look on a morsel of sugar without conceiving

it spotted with human blood. If he had considered also the blood of

one another, which the white nations shed in fighting for those

islands, he would have imagined his sugar not as spotted only, but as

thoroughly dyed red. On these accounts I am persuaded, that the

subjects of the Emperor of Germany, and the Empress of Russia, who

have no sugar islands, consume sugar cheaper at Vienna, and Moscow,

with all the charge of transporting it after its arrival in Europe,

than the citizens of London or of Paris. And I sincerely believe, that

if France and England were to decide, by throwing dice, which should

have the whole of their sugar islands, the loser in the throw would be

the gainer. The future expense of defending them would be saved; the

sugars would be bought cheaper by all Europe, if the inhabitants might

make it without interruption, and whoever imported the sugar, the same

revenue might be raised by duties at the custom houses of the nation

that consumed it. And, on the whole, I conceive it would be better for

the nations now possessing sugar colonies to give up their claim to

them, let them govern themselves, and put them under the protection of

all the powers of Europe as neutral countries, open to the commerce of

all, the profits of the present monopolies being by no means

equivalent to the expense of maintaining them.

* * * * *

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO B. FRANKLIN.

Translation.

Versailles, January 18th, 1783.

Sir,

It is essential that I should have the honor of conferring with you,

Mr Adams, and your other colleagues, who are in Paris. I therefore

pray you to invite these gentlemen to come out to Versailles with you

on Monday, before ten o'clock in the morning. It will be well, also,

if you will bring your grandson. It will be necessary for much

writing and translating from English into French to be done. The

object for which I ask this interview is very interesting to the

United States.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

DE VERGENNES.

* * * * *

TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Passy, January 18th, 1783.

Sir,

Agreeably to the notice just received from your Excellency, I shall

acquaint Mr Adams with your desire to see us on Monday before ten

o'clock, at Versailles; and we shall endeavor to be punctual. My other

colleagues are absent; Mr Laurens being gone to Bath, in England, to

recover his health, and Mr Jay into Normandy. I shall bring my

grandson, as you direct.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

* * * * *

BENJAMIN VAUGHAN TO B. FRANKLIN.

Paris, January 18th, 1783.

My Dearest Sir,

I cannot but in the most earnest manner, and from recent

circumstances, press your going early to Versailles tomorrow; and I

have considerable reason to think, that your appearance there will not

displease the person whom you address. I am of opinion, that it is

very likely that you will have the glory of having concluded the peace

by this visit; at least I am sure, if the deliberations of tomorrow

evening end unfavorably, that there is the strongest appearance of

war; if they end favorably, perhaps little difficulty may attend the

rest.

After all, the peace will have as much that is conceded in it, as

England can in any shape be made just now to relish, owing to the

stubborn demands, principally of Spain, who would not, I believe, upon

any motive recede from her conquests. What I wrote about Gibraltar

arrived after the subject, as I understand, was canvassed, and when it

of course must have appeared impolitic eagerly and immediately to

revive it.

You reproved me, or rather reproved a political scheme yesterday, of

which I have heard more said favorably by your friends at Paris, than

by any persons whatever in London. But do you, my dear Sir, make this

peace, and trust our common sense respecting another war. England,

said a man of sense to me the other day, will come out of the war like

a convalescent out of disease, and must be re-established by some

physic and much regimen. I cannot easily tell in what shape a

bankruptcy would come upon England, and still less easily in what mode

and degree it would affect us; but if your confederacy mean to

bankrupt us now, I am sure we shall lose the great fear that would

deter us from another war. Your allies, therefore, for policy and for

humanity's sake, will, I hope, stop short of this extremity;

especially as we should do some mischief to others, as well as to

ourselves.

I am, my dearest Sir, your devoted, ever affectionate, and ever

obliged,

B. VAUGHAN.

* * * * *

TO JOHN ADAMS.

Passy, January 19th, 1783.

Sir,

Late last night I received a note from Count de Vergennes, acquainting

me that it is very essential he should have a conference with us, and

requesting that I would inform my colleagues. He desires that we may

be with him before ten on Monday morning. If it will suit you to call

here, we may go together in my carriage. We should be on the road by

eight o'clock.

With great regard, I have the honor to be, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Passy, January 21st, 1783.

Sir,

I have just received your letters of November 9th and December 3d.

This is to inform you, and to request you to inform the Congress, that

the preliminaries of peace between France, Spain, and England, were

yesterday signed, and a cessation of arms agreed to by the Ministers

of those powers, and by us in behalf of the United States, of which

act, so far as relates to us, I enclose a copy. I have not yet

obtained a copy of the preliminaries agreed to by the three Crowns,

but hear, in general, that they are very advantageous to France and

Spain. I shall be able, in a day or two, to write more fully and

perfectly. Holland was not ready to sign preliminaries, but their

principal points are settled. Mr Laurens is absent at Bath, and Mr Jay

in Normandy, for their healths, but will both be here to assist in

forming the Definitive Treaty. I congratulate you and our country on

the happy prospects afforded us by the finishing so speedily this

glorious Revolution, and am, with great esteem, Sir, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

* * * * *

JOHN JAY TO B. FRANKLIN.

Paris, January 26th, 1783.

Sir,

It having been suspected, that I concurred in the appointment of your

grandson to the place of Secretary to the American commission for

peace _at your instance_, I think it right, thus unsolicited, to put

it in your power to correct the mistake.

Your general character, the opinion I had long entertained of your

services to our country, and the friendly attention and aid with which

you had constantly favored me after my arrival in Spain, impressed me

with a desire of manifesting both my esteem and attachment by stronger

evidence than professions. That desire extended my regard for you to

your grandson. He was then indeed a stranger to me, but the terms in

which you expressed to Congress your opinion of his being qualified

for another place of equal importance, were so full and satisfactory,

as to leave me no room to doubt of his being qualified for the one

above mentioned. I was, therefore, happy to assure you, in one of the

first letters I afterwards wrote you from Spain, that in case a

Secretary to our commission for peace should become necessary, and the

appointment be left to us, I should take that opportunity of evincing

my regard for you, by nominating him, or words to that effect. What I

then wrote, was the spontaneous suggestion of my own mind,

unsolicited, and I believe unexpected by you.

When I came here on the business of that commission, I brought with me

the same intentions, and should always have considered myself engaged

by honor, as well as inclination, to fulfil them, unless I had found

myself mistaken in the opinion I had imbibed of that young gentleman's

character and qualifications; but that not being the case, I found

myself at liberty to indulge my wishes, and be as good as my word. For

I expressly declare, that your grandson is, in my opinion, qualified

for the place in question, and that, if he had not been, no

consideration would have prevailed upon me to propose, or join in his

appointment.

This explicit and unreserved statement of facts is due to you, to him,

and to justice, and you have my consent to make any use of it that you

may think proper.

I have the honor to be, Sir, with great respect,

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

FROM M. ROSENCRONE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN DENMARK,

TO M. DE WALTERSTORFF.

Translation.

Copenhagen, February 22d, 1783.

Sir,

As I know you are on the point of making a tour to France, I cannot

omit warmly recommending to you to endeavor, during your stay at

Paris, to gain as much as possible, the confidence and esteem of Mr

Franklin.

You will recollect, Sir, what I said to you in our conversations, of

the high respect which all the King's Ministry have for that Minister.

You have witnessed the satisfaction with which we have learned the

glorious issue of this war for the United States of America, and how

fully we are persuaded, that it will be for the general interest of

the two States to form, as soon as possible, reciprocal connexions of

friendship and commerce. Nothing, certainly, would be more agreeable

to us, than to learn by your letters, that you find the same

dispositions in Mr Franklin, and in that case it seems to me the

shortest way of accelerating these new connexions would be to take the

treaty between the Congress and the States-General for the basis, and

that Mr Franklin should communicate to us his ideas on the changes or

additions which he might think reciprocally useful in the treaty of

commerce, which Congress might conclude with us.

We should eagerly and frankly reply to such overtures; and, as soon as

the changes thus agreed on shall have met the approbation of Congress,

one of the persons commissioned by that body, then in Europe, might,

in order to gain time, come here with full powers to conclude, leaving

on both sides the most particular stipulations for the negotiations of

the Ministers which those States shall, in the sequel, send to reside

with each other.

I shall finish, Sir, with hoping that you may happily terminate the

visits you have proposed to make to the different parts of France; and

it is with sentiments of the most distinguished respect, that

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROSENCRONE.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Passy, March 7th, 1783.

Sir,

I but this moment hear of this opportunity, by which I can only send

you a line to acquaint you, that I have concluded the treaty with

Sweden, which was signed on Wednesday last. You will have a copy by

the first good opportunity. It differs very little from the plan sent

me; in nothing material.[13] The English Court is in confusion by

another change of Ministry, Lord Shelburne and his friends having

resigned; but it is not yet certainly known who will succeed, though

Lord North and Mr Fox are talked of as two, they being reconciled!! I

cannot add, but that I am, with great esteem, Sir, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

_P. S._ The change in the Ministry is not supposed of any importance

respecting our definitive treaty, which must conform to the

preliminaries; but we shall see.

FOOTNOTE:

[13] This treaty is printed in the public _Journals of Congress_,

Vol. IV. p. 241, under the date of July 29th, 1783.

* * * * *

DAVID HARTLEY TO B. FRANKLIN.

London, March 12th, 1783.

My Dear Friend,

It is a long while since I have heard from you, or indeed since I

wrote to you. I heartily congratulate you on those pacific events,

which have already happened, and I wish to see all other final steps

of conciliation succeed speedily. I send you copies of two papers,

which I have already communicated to Mr Laurens; the one called

_Conciliatory Propositions, in March, 1783_; the other _A Sketch of a

Provisional Treaty of Commerce for opening the Ports between Great

Britain and the United States of America without Delay_; to each of

which is prefixed a short state of the argument on each head.

As for the news of this country, you have doubtless heard, that Lord

Shelburne's administration has for some time been considered as at an

end; although no other has been as yet substituted in the place of it.

It was understood yesterday, and I believe with good foundation, that

what is now called the Portland party have been applied to, and they

are now considered as the party most likely to succeed. As far as my

wishes go, such an event would be most satisfactory to me. I have

known the Duke of Portland for many years, and by experience I know

him to be a nobleman of the strictest honor, and of the soundest whig

principles, sincere and explicit in every thought and transaction,

manly in his judgment, and firm in his conduct. The kingdom of

Ireland, of which he was lately Lord Lieutenant, bears unanimous

testimony to this character of him. The Cavendish family, (a good whig

name) Mr Fox, Lord Fitzwilliam, &c. &c. form the core of his system

and connexions. I most earnestly wish to see a firm administration

upon a whig foundation, which I should consider as a solid basis, on

the part of this country, for a perpetual correspondence of amity and

conciliation with America. I am very anxious to hear of your health.

God bless you.

Ever your most affectionate,

D. HARTLEY.

* * * * *

_Conciliatory Propositions, March, 1783._

Terms of peace having been agreed upon between Great Britain and

France, on the 20th of January, 1783, there need not be any further

delay in proceeding to conclude the proposed treaty between Great

Britain and the United States of America, upon the basis of the

provisional articles of the 30th of November, 1782.

It is to be observed, that none of the articles of the provisional

treaty are to take effect, until the conclusion of the definitive

treaty with America, at which time likewise all places in the American

States, in possession of the British arms, are to be evacuated, and

the British army withdrawn from the United States (by article 7.) If

therefore it should be wished on the part of Great Britain to bring

forward the fifth article respecting the loyalists, before the

conclusion of the definitive treaty with America, the bayonet should

be withdrawn from the American breast, by the voluntary removal of the

British troops with all convenient despatch. This condition of the

removal of the troops is likewise necessary, before any provisional

terms of commerce with America can take place.

By the 6th article of the provisional treaty, all future confiscations

in America are precluded, although the prosecutions at present

subsisting are not to be stopped before the definitive treaty. But if

the substantial pledge of returning amity on the part of Great

Britain, viz. the removal of the troops should be voluntarily

anticipated, it would be but reasonable that all prosecutions should

be immediately abated on the part of America; and to facilitate the

removal of the troops, the loyalists may be permitted to remain in

safety and unmolested, (if they choose to remain) from the period of

removing the troops, until twelve months after the definitive treaty.

There is another article of the provisional treaty, the delay of which

is much to be lamented, viz. the mutual release of prisoners of war on

both sides. As this is an article of reciprocity, both sides from

principles of humanity are equally interested to bring it forward into

effect speedily, that those unhappy captives may not alone suffer the

miseries of war in the time of peace.

Upon these considerations, the following supplemental terms of a

treaty between Great Britain and the United States are proposed.

1. That the British troops shall be withdrawn with all convenient

speed.

2. That the commissioners on both sides do proceed to the conclusion

of the definitive treaty.

3. That the commissioners do speedily negotiate a provisional

convention of commerce (hereunto annexed) to take place immediately.

The terms of this temporary convention, not to be pleaded on either

side in the negotiation of final and perpetual treaty of commerce,

between Great Britain and the United States.

4. That the commissioners do negotiate a perpetual treaty of commerce.

5. That all prosecutions of the loyalists in America be immediately

abated, and that they be permitted to remain until twelve months after

the definitive treaty, unmolested in their endeavors to obtain

restitution of their estates.

6. That all prisoners on both sides be immediately released.

7. That intercourse of amity and commerce do immediately take place

between Great Britain and the United States of America.

* * * * *

_Sketch of a Provisional Treaty of Commerce._

As soon as preliminaries of peace are signed with any independent

States, such as Spain, France, and Holland, the course of mutual

commerce emerges upon the same terms and conditions as were existing

antecedent to the war, the new duties imposed during the war excepted.

The case between Great Britain and America is different, because

America, from a dependent nation before the war, emerges an

independent nation after the war. The basis, therefore, of a

provisional treaty between Great Britain and the United States would

be simply to arrange such points as would emerge after the war,

impracticable and discordant to the newly established independence of

the American States, and to leave all others, as much as possible,

untouched. For instance, that all instrumental regulations, such as

papers, bonds, certificates, oaths, and all other documents should be,

between Great Britain and the United States, upon the same footing,

and no other than as between Great Britain and any other independent

nation, but that all duties, drawbacks, bounties, rights, privileges,

and all pecuniary considerations, should emerge into action and effect

as before. I say emerge as before, not stipulated for any fixed term,

because I am speaking of a provisional _treaty_, not of a provisional

_bill_ of commerce, for a specified period. By this means, all

difficulties, which otherwise would be accumulated, and obstruct a

temporary and provisional act are avoided _in limine_. The ports will

be immediately opened, upon specified and known conditions. If the

legislature of either country thinks proper to introduce on its own

part any new conditions or regulations, even previous to the intended

treaty of commerce, that will not shut the ports again generally but

only operate _pro tanto_ according to the case; on which side soever

any novel condition should arise, the other will likewise be at

liberty to make any corresponding regulations as between independent

nations. The great object is to open the ports between Great Britain

and the United States, immediately on the signature of preliminaries

of peace, as between France and Great Britain. By the proposition

above stated, Great Britain and France, and Great Britain and the

United States respectively, on the subject of intercourse of commerce,

would emerge again after the war into situations relatively similar to

their situation before the war.

The Crown of Great Britain is enabled by the Conciliatory Act of 1782

to repeal, annul, make void, or suspend, for any time or times, the

operation and effect of any act of Parliament, or any clause,

provision, matter, or thing therein contained, relating to the

colonies or plantations now become the United States of America; and,

therefore, the crown is not only competent to conclude, but likewise

to carry into effect any provisional treaty of commerce with America.

The first foundation must be laid in the total repeal of the

Prohibitory Act of December, 1775, not only as prohibiting commerce

between Great Britain and the United States, but as the corner stone

of the war; by giving up universally all American property at sea to

military plunder, without any redress to be obtained by law in any

British Court of Admiralty. After this, all obstructions from the act

of navigation and other acts regulating the commerce of the States of

America (formerly dependent upon Great Britain,) may be removed.

Instructions may be sent to the Commissioners of the customs to

dispense with bonds, certificates, &c. which by the old laws are

required to be discharged or attested by supposed governors, naval or

customhouse officers in America. The questions of drawbacks, bounties,

&c. after opening the ports, may remain free points of discussion and

regulation, as between States having no commercial treaty subsisting

between them. As the Crown is competent to open an intercourse of

commerce with America by treaty, this mode is preferable to any act of

Parliament, which may be only a jealous and suspicious convention _ex

parte_. This mode by treaty avoids the accumulated difficulties, which

might otherwise obstruct the first opening of the ports by act of

Parliament, and above all, it secures an alternate binding part of the

bargain, which no act of Parliament can do.

Breviate of the treaty, viz. Provisional for intercourse and commerce

between Great Britain and the United States of America.

1. That all ports shall be mutually open for intercourse and commerce.

2. And therefore the King of Great Britain agrees to the repeal of the

prohibitory acts, viz. 16 Geo. 3, chap. 5, &c. The King of Great

Britain likewise agrees by instructions, according to the laws of

Great Britain, to his Commissioners of customs and other officers, to

remove all obstructions to American ships either entering inwards or

clearing outwards, which may arise from any acts of Parliament

heretofore regulating the commerce of the American States, under the

description of British colonies or plantations, so as to accommodate

every circumstance to the reception of their ships, as the ships of

independent States.

3. All duties, drawbacks, bounties, rights, privileges, and all other

money considerations shall remain, respecting the United States of

America, upon the same footing as they now remain respecting the

province of Nova Scotia in America, or as if the aforesaid States had

remained dependent upon Great Britain. All this subject to regulations

or alterations by any future acts of the Parliament of Great Britain.

4. On the part of the States of America, it is agreed that all laws

prohibiting the commerce of Great Britain shall be repealed.

5. Agreed upon the same part, that all ships, and merchandise of the

British dominions shall be admitted upon the same terms as before the

war, except any imposts laid during the war. All this subject to

future regulations or alterations by the legislatures of the American

States respectively.

6. The principles and spirit of this treaty to be supported on either

side by any necessary supplemental arrangements. No tacit compliance

on the part of America in any subordinate points to be argued at any

time hereafter to the prejudice of their independence.

* * * * *

TO DAVID HARTLEY.

Passy, March 23d, 1783.

Dear Sir,

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 04 · 第 6 / 34 段