Richard Bond, the Messman--Sikh Grass-cutters--Choice of
Camps--General Lloyd's Opinions--Lieut.-Colonel Irvine and Sir H.
Maddock--Position at Sobraon--Brigadier E. Smith's Plan--Colonel
Irvine's Plan--Goolab Singh's Policy--Sir Robert Dick's
Division--Major-General Gilbert's Division--Sir Harry Smith's
Division--Brigadier A. Campbell--Sir Joseph Thackwell--Brigadier
Scott--British Batteries--Rockets--Sikh Batteries--Assault on the Sikh
Entrenchments--Brigadier Stacey--Captain Cunningham's Account--The
10th Foot--Lieut.-Colonel Franks--Sikh Entrenchments stormed--Sirdar
Sham Singh destroys the Pontoon--Sikh Retreat cut off--Great Loss of
the Sikhs--Peace Principles inapplicable to India--Sikhs driven across
the Sutlej--Tej Singh.
ON the 30th of January, 1846, about noon, we moved out and proceeded
a distance of two miles, expecting to meet the Sikh cavalry, who were
encamped by the bridge of boats, but after having waited for two or
three hours we were doomed to be again disappointed.
On the 1st of February, our mess-waiter, Richard Bond, died, he had
been for some weeks past in bad health, yet, being anxious not to be
separated from his regiment, in which he had served for many years,
the poor man accompanied us from Cawnpore, and though apparently of
an Herculean frame, an insidious malady gained upon him; and on the
1st of February poor Bond was numbered among those who have been.
_Mors sola fatetur quantula sint hominum corpuscula._ He was an old
and meritorious servant: and as a member of the Mess Committee at this
period, I feel happy in paying this passing tribute to his memory.
Whilst on an out-line picquet on the 2nd, I heard most distinctly the
Sikh drums from the camp in our right front, about six o'clock in the
afternoon. During the day also my patrols brought in five grass-cutters
in the employ of the enemy. After having questioned them I released
them with a warning not to appear near our camp again. This was by no
means an uncommon ruse de guerre, while pretending to cut grass they
were in fact spying out the land.
On the 7th of February, our regiment again changed ground, from the
right to the extreme left. The whole army was encamped in a line nearly
parallel to the river Sutlej, from which it was distant not more than
a mile and a quarter, and in some parts even less. It is a rule in
forming a camp, not to make it within reach of the fire of the enemy's
guns; and at the same time to shew as extended a front as possible,
both for the purpose of overawing the adversary, and of watching his
movements. The same rule applies on having crossed a river, to avoid
exposure to the fire of the enemy who occupies the bank which you have
quitted.
In reference to the choice of camps, I may perhaps be excused if I
again refer to the able and very scarce work on the Art of war by the
well known author of the "Seven Years' War in Germany."
"The choice of camps," he says, "depends on two principles: the one
geometrical and the other the effect of genius. The first consists in
calculating the distance relative to the number and species of troops
which compose the army; the other in seeing all the combinations that
may be formed on a given piece of ground, with a given army, and in the
choice of that precise combination which is most advantageous. This
unacquirable and sublime talent is much superior to the other, and
independent of it. Great geniuses have a sort of intuitive knowledge;
they see at once the cause and its effect, with the different
combinations which unite them--they do not proceed by common rules
successively from one idea to another, by slow and languid steps. No,
the _whole_ with all its circumstances and various combinations is like
a picture, all together present to their mind: these want no geometry,
but an age produces few of this kind of men; and, in the common run of
Generals, geometry and experience will help them to avoid gross errors.
"The perfection of our art would be, no doubt, to find a construction
or an order of battle equally proper for all kinds of ground. But this
being impossible, the only thing remaining for them to do is to find
such a construction and such a formation of the troops as may, with
the greatest simplicity, and, consequently velocity, be adapted to
those numberless circumstances which occur. This should be the constant
subject of their studies, but can never be obtained without geometry."
[Illustration: POSITIONS of the BRITISH and SIKH CAMPS on the 4th
Feb. 1846
_London, Longman & Co._]
February the 8th. Sunday. Dined at half-past six, with my brother
officers, at the mess of the 3rd Light Dragoons. They are encamped on
our right, at the distance of about a quarter of a mile. As in the
field, so at the mess-table, the Lieutenant-Colonel of this fine
corps, Colonel White, C.B. (now aide-de-camp to the Queen), appeared
to be beloved by his officers; indeed they have no small reason to be
proud of one, so universally esteemed and respected by the cavalry
division of the army of the Sutlej.
The battle was at hand: already were preparations making to meet those
gallant men, the Sikhs, in mortal combat. On the evening of the 9th,
Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine, of the engineers, came into the camp, having
been sent to the frontier at the recommendation of Sir Herbert Maddock,
Deputy-Governor of Bengal. Troops had been detached from the army to
meet the large convoy coming from Delhi, with ammunition and stores;
for the operations against the enemy at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and
Aliwal, had exhausted the greater part of our gun ammunition. Indeed,
as I have already observed, that on the 22nd of December, 1845, when
Tej Singh came before Ferozeshah, the British had no shot left. The
force under Brigadier Campbell, however, brought up 4,300,000 rounds
of musket ball cartridges, and twelve 12-pounders, with shot and other
missiles, otherwise my gallant friend, Sir Harry Smith, would not have
had the means of fighting the splendid battle of Aliwal.
And now we come to the 10th of February, the day on which the memorable
battle of Sobraon, the crowning battle of the Sikh campaign of 1845-46
was fought, and which most persons expected would be the last.
The fate of the Punjaub seemed to hang by a thread; from the 22nd of
December, 1845, to the 28th of January, 1846, no military operations
had occurred till Sir Harry Smith gained the battle of Aliwal. The
Sikhs' strongly entrenched position at Sobraon still remained to be
taken; defended as it was by 30,000 regular troops, besides being
equally strong by nature and art. By nature, as situated on the banks
of the river, in the form of a half moon, having many and great
impediments in its front; by art, the triple form of the entrenchments,
bristled with a triple row of guns, which must be silenced before an
entrance could be effected; a bridge of boats in its rear, by which
the besieged might retire if they chose; and, moreover, batteries
commanding the rear of the flanks of the entrenchment, which enabled
them to fire upon any troops attempting to storm the works: added to
which, the men could come over the pontoon bridge to assist in serving
the guns in the works; and this they actually did.
Major-General, Sir Harry Smith, after the battle of the 28th of
January, in which he had lost 589 killed and wounded, joined His
Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, on the 8th of February. It was
judged expedient to wait for his arrival before the attack on Sobraon
could be safely made. Part of the siege train, too, had arrived, to
ensure the safety of which, it may be recollected, was the principal
object in detaching Sir Harry Smith.
A plan had been proposed by the late Brigadier E. Smith, C.B., Chief
Engineer, but when the nature of the proposed attack was explained to
Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine, a senior officer, who had been sent by Sir
T. Herbert Maddock, to join the army, which he had only reached on the
9th, the day before the battle, he is said to have taken a different
view.
It is recorded, that in the year 1776, Sir W. Howe, in a despatch on
the American entrenchments, wrote: "If I could have made approaches I
could easily have taken the enemy's entrenchments."[27]
Whether Colonel Irvine proposed to make approaches I cannot say;
certain it is, that it was agreed to follow the plan laid down by
Brigadier Smith, Colonel Irvine being of opinion that it would be
better to leave the conduct of the affair in the hands of the officer
who had formed a digested plan. Had Brigadier Smith been superseded,
a delay of two or three days at least must have ensued. Now, without
knowing the exact cause for the delay, it is stated in the "Blue Book"
that certain proposals had been made by the Lahore Durbar, or by some
of the principal chiefs. Some say, that the celebrated Goolab Singh of
Cashmere had made certain offers, to which an answer was required in
three days. An officer of artillery remarked to the Commander-in-Chief,
that the remainder of the supplies, stores, etc., from Delhi, would
reach camp in two days. Lord Gough, in his Despatch of the 13th of
February, says:--"Part of my siege train having come up with me, I
resolved, on the morning of the 10th, to dispose our mortars and
battering guns," etc.[28] This waiting of two days or more would have
consumed more time than it was thought politically right to expend. We
must remember that an answer was required in three days. Now, if Goolab
Singh was the real proposer of these terms, it would seem that it could
not answer to grant them. Perhaps he undertook to pay us the expenses
of the war, to reduce the Sikh army, and to accept a British Resident
at Lahore; these conditions, or something like them, must have been
proposed.
Such offers could not have satisfied the government of India, because,
when after the treaty of 1846, we took a slice of the Punjaub
(Jullundur), and allowed the Sikh Durbar to keep up an army of 32,000
men, they raised more, either openly or covertly; hence, if they acted
thus under our own eye, while holding the reins of government at
Lahore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that they would follow up
the plan _in extenso_ in our absence, for a Resident would have been no
adequate check.
Goolab Singh was evidently playing a game for himself: if he could be
the means of saving the country, then Cashmere ought to be his reward;
but, when affairs went in a contrary direction, he was forced to be
no longer an actor on the scene. But, distrusting Goolab Singh, and
supposing him to have been a traitor to his country, yet might he not
be meditating the destruction of the English? He had his own troops
with which he could turn the scale against us. Thus, whatever were the
terms, or the nature of the terms, they were clearly less than we could
accede to.
Colonel Irvine, as I have remarked, instead of acting as Chief
Engineer, became an aide-de-camp, and partly a spectator.
The reader will doubtless imagine, and justly so, that we had more shot
and shell on the road to join us; but time--that important element in
our lives, which when once lost cannot be recalled--time, in military
matters is everything. This was a well-known saying of Napoleon's,
and the truth of it is evident to less able soldiers. The old plan,
therefore, and not the new mode of attack, was the order of the day.
Owing to the peculiar form of the enemy's entrenchment, it was decided
that the battering-train and disposable field-artillery should be put
in position in an extended semi-circle, embracing within its fire the
works of the Sikhs. On the morning of the 10th, a heavy mist prevented
the intended cannonade from beginning at daybreak as was proposed. It
must be borne in mind, that, strictly speaking, the attack on a strong
entrenched position is usually made in the same way as upon a fort or
outwork: for forts are, sometimes, surrounded by entrenchments, thus
making the fort a kind of citadel, as it were, though it may not be so
called technically.
This mist, though unfavourable for artillery is often favourable for
troops, for enabling them to form under cover near such works and
entrenchments.
Major-General Sir Robert Dick's division was placed on the margin
of the river Sutlej, ready to commence the assault. The 7th Brigade
belonging to this division, and led by Brigadier Stacey, was to head
the attack, supported by the 6th Brigade of the same division, at a
distance of two hundred yards. A reserve which was entrenched at the
village of Rodawalla, was in readiness to move forward if required.
In the centre, Major-General Gilbert's division was deployed for
support or attack, with its right resting on Little Sobraon. With
regard to this division, it has been stated by an officer of an
infantry corps, that it was not intended that it should attack in the
first instance, but it so happened that Major-General Gilbert[29] with
that decided conduct which marked all his actions, finding that the
left attack on the enemy's right had not succeeded, determined at once
to make his attack in front.
As I have before observed, there were impediments in the front, of
which we were ignorant; they were in the nature of an embankment,
and when our troops came up, this embankment, lying between them and
the entrenchment, prevented the British from easily mounting it and
entering the enclosure; the only means, therefore, by which they could
effect this, was by moving to the right and left of this impediment.
It will not be a matter of surprise therefore, that a little confusion
occurred, and that our troops were in some slight degree jammed
together. But we must defer the result to its proper place, and proceed
with the order for the movements of the other troops.
Major-General Sir Harry Smith's Division was formed near the village of
Guttah, with its right thrown up towards the Sutlej. It was determined
to threaten by feigned attacks, the enemy's horse, under Rajah Lall
Singh Misr, which was stationed on the other side of the river. There
was a ford at Hurrekee Ghât at which were drawn up the 16th Lancers,
who would thus have been enabled to cross over and attack the Sikh
cavalry, if circumstances had called for aid. Besides, as there was a
ford there, the enemy might have thought of crossing himself, for the
purpose of attempting to turn our left flank.
Brigadier A. Campbell took up an intermediate position, between the
divisions of Major-General Gilbert's right, and Major-General Sir
Harry Smith's left. Campbell's brigade was to the rear of Sir Harry's
division, the better to effect this object, for it is desirable, on
occasions like these, not to place the cavalry within reach of cannon
shot.
Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B. commanding the cavalry
division, had under him Brigadier Scott, C.B.,[30] who held a reserve
in the first brigade on our left, ready to act as circumstances might
render necessary. Brigadier Scott, as well as the Major-General, had
commanded cavalry in the Affghan campaign, when Ghuznee was taken, in
July 1839, and proceeded to Cabool; so that, should the presence of Sir
Joseph Thackwell have been required in any other part of the field of
action, he had as his second in command, an officer whom he well knew,
and in whom he could place the most implicit confidence, for it must
always be recollected that it is of great advantage to have an officer
in the field, who has had experience in Indian warfare. It cannot be
supposed that an officer just come from Europe can all at once, be
prepared to command a brigade composed of Lancers, Dragoons, and native
Cavalry. Surely a little experience is requisite. Besides in India,
from the nature of the service, a Lieutenant-Colonel often commands a
Brigade; while in Europe that command would generally devolve upon a
Major-General.
Our battery of 9-pounders, twelve of which had been reamed up to
12-pounders, opened their fire near Little Sobraon, a village a short
way in advance, between Major-General Gilbert's and Major-General
Sir Harry Smith's divisions. Our artillery was thus placed,--five
24-pounder howitzers on our right, three 12-pounders (reamed) on the
right of the 29th Foot, No. 19 battery on the left of Major-General
Gilbert's right brigade; then between General Gilbert's left and
the 62nd Foot there were six 8-inch howitzers, and six 5-1/2-inch
howitzers; on the left of the 62nd Foot there were eight 8-inch
howitzers and five 18-pounders flanked by the 9th Foot and the
26th regiment of Native Infantry. On the extreme right there were
forty-eight guns and howitzers, besides twelve guns, etc. on the
right and left of Major-General Sir Robert Dick's division. In fact
Major-General Sir Harry Smith's division was wheeled up to its left, so
as to throw a flanking fire into the enemy's left. Also, Major-General
Sir Robert Dick's division on the left, wheeled up to its right, so as
to fire into the enemy's right.
Owing to the mist before mentioned, it was half-past-six A.M. before
the whole of our artillery fire was brought into full play; the object
of this fire was to silence the enemy's guns and to destroy their
works before we assaulted the place. There was also a rocket battery.
It must be remembered that the enemy had upwards of a hundred guns to
fire against our sixty-two guns and the rocket battery. Rockets, the
reader must be aware, were formerly much used in Indian warfare among
the native armies. They were tried at Hattrass in 1817, with the force
under the command of the late Major-General Sir W.S. Whish, K.C.B.,
but there was too much wind. On the present occasion the wind was not
unfavourable. As the enemy's camp on the other side of the river was
set on fire, the means by which that important service was effected may
be disputed.
We must bear in mind that the Sikh guns were like those of a fortress,
protected by walls, not _en barbette_, _i.e._ open all round. Besides
this there was a triple line of trenches. The Sikhs also had two
batteries on the other side of the river. When these batteries were
silenced, the gunners came over by the bridge of boats, to the works
on our side, to aid and to replace the gunners who had been killed or
wounded. The bridge was said to be mined in case of accident, that is
to say, if they were pursued in the retreat they could have blown it up
to prevent our pursuing them.
It is clear that the mist had delayed the practice of the batteries,
but still the artillery played upon the enemy's works for two hours.
A more powerful battery would have been desirable; and it is said that
this was Colonel Irvine's reason for proposing the delay. However, in
all battles, there are two main points of consideration; first the
military delays, and then the political delays, we know are sometimes
dangerous. No doubt a casual observer would have exclaimed, "Why not
wait for more guns? Recollect Ferozeshah; you tarried fifty days for
this attack, during which time the enemy strengthened his position. You
have more guns, more shot and shell coming up. Recollect also, you fell
short of shot on the 22nd of December at Ferozeshah!" The late Captain
J.D. Cunningham, of the Engineers, who was present at the battles of
Aliwal and Sobraon, wrote thus: "The officers of artillery naturally
desired that their guns, the representatives of a high art, should
be used agreeably to the established rules of the engineers; or that
ramparts should be breached in front and swept in flank, before they
were stormed by defenceless battalions; but such deliberate tediousness
of process did not satisfy the judgment or the impatience of the
commanders, and it was arranged that the whole of the heavy ordnance
should be planted in masses opposite particular points of the enemy's
entrenchments, and, that when the Sikhs had been shaken by a continuous
storm of shot and shells, the right, or weakest part of the position,
should be assaulted in line, by the strongest of the three investing
divisions, which, together mustered nearly 15,000 men," the enemy being
30,000 men.[31]
A military friend of mine, Major W. Hough, of the Bengal establishment,
formerly a deputy Judge-Advocate, and author of some most valuable
works on Military Law, and other subjects, has suggested that the
attack in column is the more usual mode of assault, and has adduced
many proofs that such a system has been at different periods acted
upon, both in ancient and modern warfare.
Now let us look at the other side of the picture. Proposals had been
made by the Sikh Sirdars, some say by Goolab Singh, which were refused.
Had Goolab Singh's troops mutinied and refused to obey his orders,
he would have said that he was helpless; it was possible that these
same troops might be anxious to join Sham Singh in the entrenchments,
a movement which it was the great object of the British chiefs to
prevent.
As to the artillery, which is not surpassed by any artillery in the
world, in celerity of movement, in precision of fire, or in any of
the qualities which render this branch of the service illustrious,
they could not perform impossibilities. They were deficient in that
indispensable desideratum, shot. To have continued firing till all
our shot was expended, and thus have exposed our want of it to the
enemy, would have been very unwise; for, had the infantry failed in the
attack, they might have retired, and our artillery resumed their fire.
Hence it was that the British artillery ceased for a while to send
forth its missives of death.
After two, or two and a half hour's firing, and at about nine o'clock,
Brigadier Stacey's Brigade, supported on either flank by two batteries
of Foot and a troop of Horse Artillery, moved to the attack in good
order, with Brigadier Stacey at their head. This gallant officer was
armed with sword and buckler, the most effective weapons for such an
attack, where you may come into personal contact with men who, after
the custom of their country, are armed in this peculiar manner.
'Ἁμφἱ σἁρ 'ὡμοισιν βἁλετο ξἱφος ἁργυρὁηον,
----αὑτἁρ ἑπειτα σἁκος μἑγα τε στιβαρὁν τε.
_Homer. Iliad_ III. lines 334-5.
The troops marched in line. Captain Cunningham[32] says:--
"The left division of the British army, advanced in even order, and
with a light step to the attack; but the original error of forming
the regiments in line instead of in column, rendered the contest more
unequal than such assaults need necessarily be. Every shot from the
enemy's lines told upon the expanse of men, and the greater part of the
division was driven back by the deadly fire of muskets and swivels and
enfilading artillery.
"On the extreme left, the regiments effected an entrance amidst the
advanced banks and trenches of petty out-works, where possession could
be of little avail, but their comrades on the right were animated by
the partial success; they chafed under the disgrace of a repulse,
and forming themselves instinctively into wedges and masses, and
headed by an old and fearless leader, they rushed forward in wrath."
Major-General Sir Robert H. Dick, K.C.B. and K.C.H., was mortally
wounded close to the trenches whilst cheering on his men; but we must
reserve to a future page a further mention of this brilliant and noble
officer.
The artillery took up positions to aid these divisions at a gallop.
Brigadier Stacey's Brigade drove the Sikhs in confusion before them,
within the area of their encampment. The 10th Foot, headed by their
dauntless leader, Lieut.-Colonel T.H. Franks, entered; and here
the work of carnage commenced, for now it was that hundreds of our
indomitable foe fell under the withering fire of this gallant corps,
Lieut.-Col. Franks having particularly cautioned his men not to fire
until within the works of the enemy.
Let the reader pause and imagine the thunder of 120 guns on both sides
reverberating for a length of time
"As if the clouds their echo did repeat,"
and he will have but a very faint conception of the mighty grandeur
of those awe-inspiring sounds. Never shall I forget the majesty of the
whole scene.
"No pen can write, no pencil trace the sound."
Seeing that Brigadier Stacey's Brigade might incur the whole weight of
the attack, the centre and right divisions were ordered to advance.
The centre division experienced great difficulty, for the mound in
front was a very serious impediment. The Sikhs, sword in hand, strove
to regain the points of the entrenchments which they had lost: it was
not until the cavalry of the left wing under Major-General Sir Joseph
Thackwell advanced and dashed into the entrenchments, in single file,
through the openings effected by the pioneers in the mound, re-forming
as they passed; and finally the full weight of three divisions of
infantry with every available field-gun had been brought to bear
against the resolute enemy, that victory crowned our efforts. The work
was gloriously achieved. The insult offered to the British arms was
avenged; and England stood triumphant.
For the important services which Brigadier Scott rendered in this
action in leading his brigade into the enemy's entrenchment, he
was honoured with the gratifying distinction of being appointed
aide-de-camp to Her Majesty the Queen. At the taking of Ghuznee, July
23rd, 1839, Sir Joseph Thackwell and Brigadier Scott were employed
in destroying the enemy who had escaped from the fort; they were,
therefore, not novices at their work.
At Sobraon, our cavalry could not pursue the enemy as he retreated
across the river; and, to have proceeded by Hurrekee Ghât, the nearest
ford, would have been too late. The veteran Sirdar, Sham Singh, who
commanded in the entrenchments, was engaged at his devotions when
he first heard of the attack. As he must have known that our stores
had not all arrived, for the Sikhs had accurate intelligence of our
movements, he did not anticipate an attack from us so soon. Summoning
his chiefs, Sham Singh reminded them of the great stake at issue, and
bade them fight nobly and exterminate the infidel Feringhees (English).
He assured his officers and men that the way of glory lay before them;
and, to prevent their retreating, boldly commanded the two centre boats
of the bridge to be cut away, so that his army could not pass over the
pontoon. The order was obeyed; and, when forced to fly, the enemy in
vain attempted the bridge, and were constrained to take to the river.
Encumbered with arms, many attempted to swim across the river, which
had risen seven or eight inches a day or two before; but all their
efforts were unavailing. Hundreds and hundreds were drowned, or fell
under the fire of our guns.
The press in England have condemned this general slaughter of our
defenceless foe; but the answer, in extenuation, is, I believe, that
the Sikhs had cruelly and relentlessly cut to pieces our wounded men at
Ferozeshah.
If we regard the morality of the measure, we must not, at the same
time, overlook the consequences which would have ensued from our
sparing this resolute foe; for, at this time, we had yet to cross this
river; and we were by no means certain but that we should have to fight
another battle.
Messrs. Cobden and Co. must discover some golden rule for keeping the
peace in India; for it would be a hard matter to find a single Sikh
chief who is not ready to fight. The Rajpoot would laugh and say:
"Sirs, it is my trade, as the calico line is yours; we were born
soldiers." This universal Peace Association is, I have no doubt, a very
amiable fraternity; yet let not its members, being deceived themselves,
try to deceive others. The world still lieth in wickedness. Some
divines understand the words of our Saviour, when he said, "I came not
to send peace upon the earth, but the sword," to signify, there are
very many religions in the world, and these will give rise to fighting.
The Sikh would say: "You English have come and conquered the best and
fairest portions of India, and now you are trying to annex the rest of
the country; can you wonder that every man's hand is lifted up against
you?"
Even Mr. Cobden must allow that to fight _pro aris et focis_, is not a
very despicable employment. Until all nations and lands are prepared
to join the league--until the time that all standing armies shall be
dispensed with--and until right and might can keep their place--away
with such empty talk! We must fraternize at home before we can hope to
do so abroad. The natives of India do not understand those fine-drawn
distinctions of our European policy. They know that the strongest will
attack them if they can, and that the only plan of defence is to
maintain armies.
The continent of Europe may be likened to India in one respect.
Comprising various sovereignties, as in India, there are many
independent princes. The native chief, like Alexander the Great,
sighs when no more conquests are to be made! India, besides, is not a
commercial country, like Europe; and all its inhabitants cannot plough
or work at a trade. India has been, for centuries, the arena of strife.
From the year 1187, when Delhi was seized by a Mahomedan conqueror, to
the present year, anarchy, rapine, and war, have been stalking over
the land. Thrice three thousand times blessed will be that period
when every man of every nation shall have "turned his sword into a
ploughshare, and his spear into a pruning-hook!" Until then, in order
to ensure peace, let us be armed for war.
In Europe a sovereign loses a portion of his dominions, when it is
taken by a monarch more powerful than himself. The league of the
Holy Alliance contracted by four kings, in 1815, has not been able
to preserve peace. The principle of _uti possidetis_, or, "as you
are," of 1815, is not recognised in 1854. The Russians and Austrians
have attacked Hungary, and Hungary has fought for her independence.
The Neopolitans have sent an expedition to Sicily, and the Sicilians
have sighed for independence. The French are masters of Rome, and
Rome has longed for a republic, and thus we might multiply examples.
Independence, the natural right of all countries, cannot generally be
obtained except by war.
But _revenons à nos moutons_, the Sikhs again succumb. The battle
of Sobraon has been fought and lost by them: at noon on the 10th of
February, not a living Sikh remained on the left bank of the Sutlej.
At about two o'clock P.M., I rode leisurely through the enemy's
entrenchments, and witnessed the horrible slaughter that had taken
place; even at that time, a few determined artillerymen occasionally
sent a ball across the river, to the dismay of our plundering camp
followers. A mine, too, would now and then explode, and hurl the
heedless and inquisitive into eternity, for the entrenchment was
completely undermined; and during the following night and morning,
explosions were every now and then heard in the camp.
During the action, the 9th Lancers advanced at about eleven o'clock
A.M., under a heavy fire, in two lines, for the purpose of charging the
enemy, when I commanded the left troop of the second squadron; after
a time, however, as no opportunity to charge was allowed, we again
fell back. The 9th Lancers left their camp at four o'clock A.M., and
returned to it between five and six o'clock P.M., not a little tired,
as the reader may imagine.
Thus the day, which rose so bright upon the landscape, after the mists
of the early morning had been dispelled by the brilliant rays of the
sun, was darkened by a battle and slaughter and death, ere the shades
of evening closed upon it. The indomitable Sikhs, whose bravery was
but the more aroused by the defeat at Aliwal, and whose feelings had
been harrowed by the sight of the corpses of their unavenged comrades
slain in that battle, who were still borne along the stream, and who
had entered upon the contest with the resolve to conquer or die, these
brave fellows were now lying in hundreds, or rather in thousands upon
thousands, on the field of carnage, or floating along the sweeping
flood of the Sutlej, while others fled in wild confusion before
their victorious foe. But where were now their leaders?--the men who
had instigated the revolt, and who with dastardly duplicity sought
their private interests by simulated friendship with both parties?
Where was Tej Singh, the chief commander of the Sikh forces? When the
British opened the assault, Tej Singh commanded the entrenchment, but
as soon as we had effected breaches in the mound, and the fire from
his batteries began to slacken, when his followers were falling thick
around him, when the British, led on by their gallant commanders,
fought resolutely for every inch of ground, Tej Singh, instead of
manfully leading on fresh troops, and animating them by his example,
like a base traitor, again deserted his post; he fled at the first
brush, and, as at the battle of Ferozeshah, abandoned his troops,
and, in their destruction, sought, and effected his own escape;
Goolab Singh, who had played his cards so well, was at the side of
the Maharannee, counselling the adoption of such measures as would
virtually promote his own interests; while the intriguer, Lall Singh,
lay with his cavalry higher up the river in a careless, unmilitary
position, conscious of being closely watched by the English.
Far different was the conduct and deportment of Sirdar Sham Singh, of
Attaree. In accordance with the vow so solemnly made to his men that he
would die in the conflict, and thus offer up himself as a propitiatory
sacrifice for his country's weal to appease the wrath of Govind, he
clothed himself in a white garment, as one who had devoted himself to
death, and calling upon all around to follow him, he unflinchingly
led on his rapidly thinning ranks, with the assurance of the Gooroo's
eternal reward to those who should fall in defence of their country;
and, at last, covered with wounds, the fine old veteran sunk down a
lifeless corpse, amidst the slaughtered bodies of his brave followers.
The Commander-in-Chief estimated the loss of the Sikhs in this decisive
battle at from 12,000 to 15,000 men; while that on the side of the
British was, 320 killed, and 2,063 wounded, making our total loss
2,383.[33]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 27: Field of Mars, 1801.]
[Footnote 28: War in India, Despatches of Lords Hardinge and Gough.
Second Edition. London, 1846; p. 116.]
[Footnote 29: Afterwards, Major-General Sir Walter Raleigh Gilbert,
Bart., G.C.B. (since deceased).]
[Footnote 30: Lieutenant-Colonel, 9th Lancers, and formerly
Lieutenant-Colonel in the 4th Light Dragoons, from which, like the
author, he was removed into his present corps, when the 4th was put on
the English establishment, on its return from Bombay in 1842. Colonel
and A.D.C. to the Queen.]
[Footnote 31: History of the Sikhs, p. 319.]
[Footnote 32: History of the Sikhs, p. 325.]
[Footnote 33: See Appendix XI.]