Hurrekee Ghât--Chain Bridles--Sir Thomas Dallas--Victory of Sir
Harry Smith at Aliwal--Umballa--Preparations of the Sikhs--Capture
of Dhurmkote--Loodianna--Runjoor Singh--Buddiwal--Sirdar Ajeet
Singh--Invalids at Loodianna--The Pattiala Rajah--Alarm at
Loodianna--Siege-train in Danger--Convoy inadequately protected--Sikh
Artillery at Aliwal--Major Lawrenson--Singular Formation of the Sikh
Infantry at Aliwal--16th Lancers--Desperation of the Sikhs--Colonel
Cureton--Charge of Lancers--Marshal Marmont's Opinion--Sikhs evacuate
Buddiwal--Rapid Movements of the Sikhs--Brigadiers Godby and Hicks.
THE Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief inspected the 9th
Lancers on the morning of the 21st of January. An incessant report of
guns of a heavy calibre was heard all day, from the other side of the
river. This afternoon I rode in company with my commanding officer to
the Hurrekee Ghât, near which was our picquet, to enquire about two
boats, said to have been captured by the enemy. We, however, saw only a
couple of old boats and a great many unarmed people near them.
On the 23rd a false alarm caused the Commander-in-Chief to order us
out, and we all stood to our horses at the head of our lines, from
twelve till four o'clock, P.M.
On the 25th several of our officers had chain reins made for their
regimental bridles, because in the last action the enemy had cut some
of the bridles of the 3rd Light Dragoons, with their swords, by which
their riders became powerless, having lost all command over their
horses.
This brings to my recollection an anecdote told me of the late
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Dallas, of the Madras Cavalry, well known
in the wars with Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultan, as the best horseman
and most experienced swordsman, in the Madras army, having often proved
himself the victor in single combat, and killed his man. One of the
enemy was noted for possessing a scimitar of the first quality; Sir
Thomas, then a Captain, and this man made an agreement to this effect,
that they were to fight together, and that the native was not to cut
the Captain's reins, nor he to use his pistols. After a long encounter
the man violated the engagement and cut the Captain's reins, which
were not of steel, upon which the latter drew his pistol and shot his
opponent dead on the spot.
In a country like India every officer should go on service, furnished
with a chain rein, for without it many a man has lost his life;
besides, it is neither heavy nor inconvenient. The dragoons and
troopers should also be supplied with them. The natives use them as
well as coats of chain armour, and many of the Sikhs, as I myself
witnessed, wore even breast plates and back pieces of steel. I picked
up a steel helmet in the Sikh camp at the battle of Sobraon, which now
serves to decorate my father's dining-room.
On the 28th of January, the Royal Lancers were in readiness the whole
day to turn out at a moment's notice, as the Sikhs shewed themselves in
great force, and appeared as if bent upon mischief.
January 29th. Intelligence was received in Camp of the splendid
victory gained by Major-General Sir Harry Smith over the Sikhs under
the command of Runjoor Singh, at Aliwal, on the 28th. The force under
Sir Harry having captured the whole of the enemy's guns, forty-eight
in number, and put to rout their army of 24,000 men, our whole line
turned out at sunrise, when a royal salute was fired in honour of the
day. After the salute, the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief
passed up the line, and the former addressed each regiment separately.
These addresses are not unusual in India.
The battle of Ferozeshah, it will be remembered, was fought on the
21st and 22nd of December, 1845, so that about five weeks had elapsed
since the last feat of arms. More troops were now advancing to the
frontier, and several hundred hackeries, laden with shot, shells,
powder, and stores of all kinds, were coming up. Engineer officers,
too, were in great request; for it now became known that our assiduous
enemy was fortifying Sobraon, on the left bank of the Sutlej, between
Loodianna and Ferozepore. In fact the Sikhs were working hard at their
entrenchments day and night.
We had not as yet received our military stores and supplies from
Delhi. A well-stocked magazine, was apparently much needed. Many
considered that Umballa was the most advantageous spot for establishing
such a depôt, being 150 miles from Ferozepore, and seventy-one from
Loodianna. Ferozepore was thought too isolated; delay, therefore, was
imperative, and it was of no use to anticipate events.
The reader may easily conclude that the Sikhs, seeing our additional
troops, guns and stores moving up to the army, did not remain idle,
for they had a great game at stake, being no less than the future fate
of a kingdom. They were buoyed up by their success at Buddiwal; the
whole army under Tej Singh had re-crossed the Sutlej. The bridge-head,
which secured so important an advantage, was enlarged; and, in the very
face of the British army, they unremittingly carried on their warlike
preparations. They seemed confident of victory, and ready to carry war
and destruction into the very heart of their enemy's country, when our
unlooked-for and glorious victory at Aliwal, proved to them that they
were not invincible.
The announcement in our camp, on the 29th, of Sir Harry Smith's victory
at Aliwal, caused considerable sensation. As for myself, I must confess
that it was a great disappointment to me not to have taken a part in
this engagement. I had written just before to Sir Harry Smith, who, as
I have already observed, had been in the Rifle Brigade with my father,
during the Peninsular war, expecting that he would have some fighting,
and asking to be employed as his aide-de-camp. It was now too late. The
news of the brilliant victory came, and put an end to all chance of my
witnessing a battle in that quarter.
The object of Sir Harry in moving from our camp was doubtless to
prevent the Sikhs from marching towards Delhi and intercepting our
supplies. He succeeded in taking the little town and fort of Dhurmkote,
which was filled with grain, and thus secured the regular supplies of
the army. Having accomplished the reduction of the place, he received
intelligence from head-quarters, that Runjoor Singh had crossed the
Sutlej with 40,000 Sikhs, and had taken up a position on the road to
Loodianna, for the purpose of intercepting our supplies from that town,
which he threatened with an attack. This was accompanied by an order to
Sir Harry Smith to proceed immediately to Loodianna.
Four regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, and eighteen guns
composed the whole of the detachment under the command of this brave
general, when on the 21st of January he proceeded to Buddiwal, a small
garrison close to Loodianna, which was occupied by Runjoor Singh, and
10,000 of his men. Sir Harry Smith endeavoured by a détour to reach
Loodianna, and effect a junction with the Brigade stationed there,
before undertaking any engagement with the Sikhs. The latter, however,
relying upon their superior numbers, provoked an attack by a brisk fire
from their formidable artillery. A severe contest followed, and the
British General after sustaining heavy losses, deemed it prudent to
fall back upon Loodianna. This he effected by a very skilful evolution,
and succeeded in holding the place.
Dr. M'Gregor, in his history of the Sikhs,[23] states that Runjoor
Singh, younger brother of Lena Singh Mujetheea,[24] commanded the
division of the Sikh army destined to act against Loodianna, as well
as to seize the siege-train in progress to join our army, which were
the two objects to be held in view by Sir Harry Smith. Dr. M'Gregor
says: "Had he (Sir Harry) stopped to return the fire of the Sikhs at
Buddiwal, all fear for Loodianna might have been removed; but then
there was the risk, that if discomfited, Runjoor Singh might have
crossed the country, and captured the siege train, which was escorted
by only a Native Infantry regiment, and the 11th Light Cavalry, with a
few Artillerymen. The condition of Sir Harry Smith was such, that he
could not hope effectually to drive Runjoor Singh across the Sutlej
that day, and he probably considered--like a good general, brought
up in the school of Wellington, and disciplined in a corps like the
immortal old 95th--that half measures were worse than useless. Besides,
though making a great sacrifice of baggage, and even of lives, there
was the hope that his forbearance would be construed into fear by the
Sikhs, who might, in consequence, be induced to meet him in a fair
field, where he would have an opportunity of accomplishing the two
objects which he had in view; namely, the defence of Loodianna, and the
safety of the train, closing all, perhaps, with the entire discomfiture
of the Sikhs, when his troops should be a little refreshed." The whole
of the Sikh force was not, it was believed, at Buddiwal, therefore the
apprehension of Sir Harry Smith, doubtless, was that the other division
might get to Loodianna. Buddiwal was at the time in the possession
of Sirdar Ajeet Singh, a chief under our protection, who, after the
operations at Moodkee and Ferozeshah, burnt a portion of the barracks
of H.M. 50th Foot, at Loodianna, and then took possession of Buddiwal,
where he made prisoner Assistant-Surgeon R.G.D. Banon, 62nd Foot (now
Surgeon of the 96th Foot), and kept him in confinement for twenty-five
days,--twelve of which in irons. The Sikhs in vain tried to induce him
and the other Europeans who were in the fort, to join their army. They
were released after the battle of Sobraon.
It is said, that though Sir Harry Smith was ordered not to fight before
he had made a junction with Colonel Wheeler's detachment, yet that as
the Sikhs had been moving to the south of Buddiwal, an action must
inevitably have ensued, to prevent their advance towards our convoy.
There were said to be three roads from Buddiwal to Loodianna. Buddiwal
lies to the south-east of Aliwal and between it and Sirhind. Runjoor
Singh's force was double that of Sir Harry Smith, besides which he had
a large number of guns.
The fort at Loodianna contained all the sick of H.M. and the H.C.
troops, which had marched from thence to join the army, as well as the
ladies, women, and children belonging to those regiments. The only
troops left there were the two Goorkha corps, the Nusseeree and Sirmoor
Battalions,[25] but they were afterwards increased by the arrival of
the 30th Native Infantry, the 1st Light Cavalry, and about 1,500 of the
Pattiala Horse. The Pattiala Rajah was under our protection, and was
one of those chiefs who early rendered assistance to our army, both
in men, money, and supplies. He died very suddenly, soon after the
battle of Ferozeshah, not without suspicion of having been poisoned,
which is by no means an unusual method of securing the succession to a
Rajahship. It is not impossible that he may have been killed by some
of the true Sikhs, for his strenuous support of the British. A mystery
hangs over this affair; and if we were to discard mystery from the
records of Indian narratives, we should have little left to relate.
The deceased Rajah's successor more than fulfilled the expectations of
the Governor-General, and was, at the close of the campaign, confirmed
in the possession of his estates, and invested by Lord Hardinge with
the style and title of Maharajah, in consideration of his important
services.
The alarm at Loodianna was natural, for a Sikh force having burnt down
part of the cantonments, the appearance of a second, and more powerful
force would be conclusive in the minds of most persons as to the fate
of the station. _It fama per urbes Subathoo et Simla._ At Umballa the
alarm was still greater. Dr. M'Gregor, in his History of the Sikhs, p.
136, writes: "We may smile at the fears which prompted this fugacious
movement,[26] but had Sir Harry Smith not advanced to Loodianna, there
is every reason to believe that the siege-train might have been lost,
Loodianna pillaged and burnt, the hill stations destroyed, and Umballa,
and even other places in the Provinces, sacked and occupied; so that
the movement of the 1st division was one of the utmost importance,
and not only prevented such sad disasters, but was followed by one of
the best managed actions on record." That the train was in some danger
is evident, from the fact that the Commander-in-Chief despatched for
its security the 3rd Infantry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier
Taylor, towards Dhurmkote, which lies to the west of Aliwal, and about
half way between Loodianna and Ferozepore. On the 30th of January, this
Brigade returned to camp.
Now, if we look at the map we shall see, that on the 28th, the day of
the battle of Aliwal, the convoy would have been but a short distance
south-west from Dhurmkote, perhaps twenty miles. And, again, if we
suppose a line to be drawn from Dhurmkote, in a direction twenty miles
to the south-east, which extreme point is called Bussean, we shall
find that the Sikh troops at Buddiwal were very near to the convoy,
on the night of the 27th of January. The escort for the convoy was
extremely weak; for a corps of Native Infantry, and another of Native
Cavalry, would not (after the late actions), have been above 1,200 men
strong. This convoy was very inadequately protected, and such as our
brave Commander-in-Chief would not have sent. Until joined by Taylor's
brigade, from the neighbourhood of Kurnaul, it was in imminent danger.
Had the Sikhs seized the convoy, the battle of Sobraon could not have
taken place when it did; moreover, from delay, the season would have
been sickly; and great loss must have ensued from this cause alone.
There are some circumstances which occurred at the battle of Aliwal,
deserving of prominent notice. The enemy had a great many guns, which
were playing with considerable effect upon the British troops. Major,
now Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Lawrenson, C.B., who commanded the Brigade
of Horse Artillery, finding his men and horses falling, to save the
delay of waiting for orders, instantly galloped up his brigade of guns
to within a short distance of the Sikhs, wheeled round, unlimbered,
and, by a brisk cannonade soon forced their gunners to quit their guns
for a time. Had the cavalry charged at the same moment, I am assured
they would have taken the guns. It was one of those exhibitions of
decision and promptitude in war, which well merits, and did receive its
reward. It was probably the suddenness of the movement which prevented
the immediate support by troops.
The Sikhs made a singular disposition of their infantry in this battle
for receiving the charges of the British cavalry. Instead of forming
in squares they were arranged into triangles, the apex being in front
and opposed to the British, the men also in the rear, or base line,
knelt down, so that when the 16th Lancers broke through the front face
they were received by fixed bayonets. The French system was followed
in these dispositions; and a few French officers were alone wanting to
animate the enemy with hopes of success, however futile such hopes must
have proved. For, opposed to a force commanded by one of our ablest
and most experienced generals, nothing but ruin and utter destruction
could, under any circumstances have fallen to the lot of our rash,
though brave foe.
The 16th Lancers suffered greatly, for the Sikhs fought with the most
obstinate bravery. Preferring a voluntary death, even when all hope of
resistance was at an end, they determined that their lives should be
purchased at a high cost. Captain Bere of that gallant regiment was
most successful in his efforts, having been seen to charge through
the wedge of Sikhs, and back again more than once. And cordially do
I congratulate a brother officer, Lieutenant T.J. Francis, on having
had the good fortune to be present in this glorious action. He had
but lately returned from England, and, at the commencement of the
campaign, was on his way to the upper provinces with a detachment of
recruits. Being anxious not to lose the opportunity of seeing service
with Sir Harry Smith's division, Lieutenant Francis hastened up, and
arriving opportunely for the battle, obtained permission to accompany
the 16th Lancers to the field. After the action, Brigadier Cureton,
who commanded the cavalry, thanked Lieutenant Francis for his valuable
services, which commendation I had the pleasure of reading from a copy
of an extract from the brigade orders a day or two after.
The late Colonel Cureton of the 16th Lancers, who was unfortunately
killed at Ramnuggur, had been known to say that Lancers should never
be employed in charges with the enemy in less than a squadron, and
from the results of this battle many cavalry officers have questioned
whether the lance is the best weapon for cavalry in India. In the
charges at Aliwal the Sikhs have been known to receive the point into
their bodies and then to kill their adversary by cutting him down. The
Sikh could not extract the lance, nor had the Lancer time to draw his
sword.
There is no doubt that Lancers should never charge in small parties.
Nothing less than a wing should attempt to break squares of infantry.
The charge in line, of a broken enemy is another thing. Marshal
Marmont, in his "Esprit des Instructions Militaires," p. 45-50, says:
"Cavalry should have one pistol; heavy cavalry, with lances and sabres
and some few carbines, should be employed to fight infantry, the
light cavalry to finish. The hussar or light cavalry soldier will,
single-handed, beat the lancer. Cuirassiers should be armed with the
lance and straight sword. The first rank should charge with the lance
couched, and the second rank with the sabre in hand. As soon as the
shock is effected, and the ranks are mingled, the sabres must do
their duty. Lancers are equally successful against cavalry in line,
especially if the enemy have only sabres. The cavalry in line should
have lances chiefly, the sabre as an auxiliary."
Though Marmont was educated as an artillery officer, his great
military experience entitles his opinion to be received with due
respect, no matter to which branch of the profession he may refer. The
Lancers were not employed in the Peninsular war, nor yet at Waterloo,
consequently the 16th is the first Lancer regiment which has had the
honour of testing the lance in open conflict, and against bodies of
hostile infantry.
After the engagement at Buddiwal on the 22nd of January 1846, the Sikh
troops under Runjoor Singh suddenly evacuated that place, and proceeded
in the direction of Loodianna, keeping close to the river, where they
secured a number of boats with the apparent intention of re-crossing
to the right bank to join the main army. Whether this was a feint, or
whether Runjoor Singh, having received intimation of the advance of
reinforcements with whom his forces might not be equal to cope, desired
to secure the means of a hasty retreat; or, whether he was following
the example of Tej Singh, and acting a double part, remains uncertain.
However this may be, Sir Harry Smith lost no time in taking possession
of the place which had been evacuated by the Sikhs, who were soon
after joined by a large reinforcement of their own body. The troops
under Runjoor Singh, amounting to between 15,000 and 16,000 men, were
immediately on the move, and preparing for fresh aggressions.
Sir Harry Smith saw that a collision was inevitable, and his own
strength having been reinforced from head-quarters, he proceeded, on
the morning of the 28th to reconnoitre the enemy's troops, and, if
compelled, to give him battle. Sir Harry encountered them near the
village of Aliwal, on their way to Jugraon, with the intention of
occupying that town. The Sikhs, finding that Sir Harry was about to
out-flank them, suddenly changed their position, and drew up along a
ridge with their right flanking the village of Aliwal, and their left
resting on their own entrenched camp. With the extraordinary agility
and rapidity of action which characterized the Sikhs throughout their
engagements with the army of the Sutlej, the centre division of the
Khalsa troops instantly threw up entrenchments, behind which they
hastily placed their strong artillery, and opened a murderous fire upon
the British.
Sir Harry's force amounted to only 11,000 men, being a fourth less than
that of the enemy, but like an able tactician, knowing that by the
superior activity and disposition of his troops he could bring more men
into action against the different salient points of attack, than the
enemy who opposed him, he overcame the odds of numbers.
Notwithstanding the sharp fire of the Sikhs, he ordered a halt while
he took a rapid survey of the nature of the country, and the position
of the troops. His quick eye instantly recognised and decided on the
mode of attack. He saw that by carrying the village of Aliwal, he
should be able to throw himself upon the enemy's left and centre. This
was effected with great promptitude and valour, by Brigadiers Godby
and Hicks, who captured two guns. The general then made a skilful and
effective charge upon the right wing, where the enemy was worsted;
but the contest with the left was for some time doubtful, and the
onslaught deadly. Three times did our British Lancers charge into the
midst of the closely serried ranks of their brave opponents, whom they
literally cut to pieces. To the very last their indomitable spirit did
not forsake the Sikhs, they fell back in a body to a distance of a few
paces, discharged a full volley into the faces of their conquerors,
and then retreated towards the ford on the Sutlej. Although beaten,
they were not dismayed; and although their leader, Runjoor Singh, was
the first to fly and basely quit the field, leaving his brave followers
to conquer or die, their courage never quailed. Again they rallied
and made one last and vigorous effort. Though defeat had made them
desperate, and they fought like men who jeoparded all, it was a defeat,
and they were compelled to give way.
It was a magnificent and hard-fought battle: as ably conducted as it
was skilfully planned.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 23: Vol. ii., p. 133.]
[Footnote 24: Lena Singh had left the Punjaub before the Sikhs crossed
the Sutlej, and went to Benares, and subsequently to Calcutta. At one
time he was placed under surveillance, after his brother's attack on
Loodianna. Lena Singh, no doubt, hoped to prevent the confiscation of
his estates on this side of the Sutlej.]
[Footnote 25: These corps were raised in May, 1815, soon after the
late Sir David Ochterlony's victories at Malown. The Goorkhas are the
bravest and most active native troops in India. They are also excellent
shots at game.]
[Footnote 26: No smiling affair, we should think! Ladies, women and
children, flying to Meerut, Saharunpore, and Mussooree.]