The battle of Salamis is a watchword of Greek triumph, and yet it by no
means solved the problem of independence, for a great army was still
in the country, enjoying the confidence and aid of many Greek allies.
The defeated Persian fleet itself was still of sufficient power to be a
lively danger.
The remainder of the fleet of Xerxes, which, flying from Salamis, arrived
in Asia, after transporting the king and his forces from the Chersonesus
to Abydos, wintered at Cyme. In the commencement of the spring it
assembled at Samos, where some other vessels had continued during the
winter. This armament was principally manned by Persians and Medes, and
was under the conduct of Mardontes, the son of Bagæus, and Artayntes,
son of Artachæus, whose uncle Amitres had been joined to him as his
colleague. As the alarm of their former defeat was not yet subsided,
they did not attempt to advance farther west, nor indeed did any one
impel them to do so. Their vessels, with those of the Ionians, amounted
to three hundred, and they stationed themselves at Samos, to secure
the fidelity of Ionia. They did not think it probable that the Greeks
would penetrate into Ionia, but would be satisfied with defending their
country. They were confirmed in this opinion, as the Greeks, after the
battle of Salamis, never attempted to pursue them, but were themselves
content to retire also.
With respect to their affairs at sea, the Persians were sufficiently
depressed; but they expected that Mardonius would do great things by
land. Remaining on their station at Samos, they consulted how they might
annoy the enemy, and they anxiously attended to the progress and affairs
of Mardonius.
The approach of the spring, and the appearance of Mardonius in Thessaly,
roused the Greeks. Their land army was not yet got together, but their
fleet, consisting of a hundred and ten ships, was already at Ægina,
under the command of Leotychides. He was descended in a right line from
Hercules. He was of the second royal family, and all his ancestors,
except the two named after Leotychides, had been kings of Sparta. The
Athenians were commanded by Xanthippus, son of Ariphron.
When the fleet of the Greeks had arrived at Ægina, the same individuals
who had before been at Sparta to entreat the assistance of that people to
deliver Ionia, arrived among the Greeks. Herodotus, the son of Basilides,
was with them; they were in all seven, and had together concerted the
death of Strattis, tyrant of Chios. Their plot having been discovered by
one of the accomplices, the other six had withdrawn themselves to Sparta,
and now came to Ægina to persuade the Greeks to enter Ionia: they were
induced, though not without difficulty, to advance as far as Delos. All
beyond this, the Greeks viewed as full of danger, as well because they
were ignorant of the country, as because they supposed the enemy’s forces
were in all these parts strong and numerous: Samos they considered as
not less remote than the pillars of Hercules. Thus the barbarians were
kept by their apprehensions from advancing beyond Samos, and the Greeks,
notwithstanding the solicitations of the Chians, would not move farther
eastward than Delos. Their mutual alarm thus kept the two parties at a
distance from each other.
Whilst the Greeks thus moved to Delos, Mardonius, who had wintered in
Thessaly, began to break up his quarters. His first step was to send an
European, whose name was Mys, to the different oracles, ordering him to
use his endeavours, and consult them all.
MARDONIUS MAKES OVERTURES TO ATHENS
[Sidenote: [479 B.C.]]
As soon as the oracular declarations had been conveyed to Mardonius, he
sent Alexander the Macedonian, son of Amyntas, ambassador to Athens. His
choice of him was directed from his being connected with the Persians
by ties of consanguinity and from his being a man of munificent and
hospitable spirit. For these reasons he deemed him the most likely to
conciliate the Athenians, who were represented to him as a valiant and
numerous people, and who had principally contributed to the defeats which
the Persians had sustained by sea. He reasonably presumed, that if he
could prevail on them to unite their forces with his own, he might easily
become master of the sea. His power by land was in his opinion superior
to all resistance, and as the oracles had probably advised him to make
an alliance with the Athenians, he hoped by these means effectually to
subdue the Greeks.
When Alexander arrived at Athens, as deputed by Mardonius, he delivered
the following speech: “Men of Athens, Mardonius informs you by me, that
he has received a commission from the king of the following import:
‘Whatever injuries the Athenians may have done me, I willingly forgive:
return them therefore their country; let them add to it from any other
they may prefer, and let them enjoy their own laws. If they will consent
to enter into an alliance with me, you have my orders to rebuild all
their temples which I have burned.’
“It will be my business to do all this unless you prevent me. I will now
give you my own sentiments: What infatuation can induce you to continue
your hostilities against a king to whom you can never be superior, and
whom you cannot always resist: you already know the forces and exploits
of Xerxes: neither can you be ignorant of the army under me. If you
should even repel and conquer us, of which if you be wise you can indulge
no hope, another army not inferior in strength will soon succeed ours. Do
not, therefore, by endeavouring to render yourselves equal to so great a
king, risk not only the loss of your native country, but the security of
your persons: accept, therefore, of our friendship, and avail yourselves
of the present honourable opportunity of averting the indignation of
Xerxes. Be free, and let us mutually enter into a solemn alliance without
fraud or treachery. Let, then, my offers prevail with you as their
importance merits, for to you alone of all the Greeks, the king forgives
the injuries he has sustained, wishing to become your friend.”
The Lacedæmonians having heard that this prince was gone to Athens to
invite the Athenians to an alliance with the Persians, were exceedingly
alarmed. They could not forget the oracle which foretold that they, with
the rest of the Dorians, should be driven from the Peloponnesus by a
junction of the Medes with the Athenians, to whom therefore they lost no
time in sending ambassadors. These were present at the Athenian council,
for the Athenians had endeavoured to gain time, well knowing that the
Lacedæmonians would learn that an ambassador was come to invite them to
a confederacy with the Persians, and would consequently send deputies to
be present on the occasion; they therefore deferred the meeting, that the
Lacedæmonians might be present at the declaration of their sentiments.
When Alexander had finished speaking, the Spartan envoys made this
immediate reply: “We have been deputed by the Spartans, to entreat you
not to engage in anything which may operate to the injury of our common
country, nor listen to any propositions of Xerxes; such a conduct would
not be equitable in itself, and would be particularly base in you from
various reasons: you were the first promoters of this war, in opposition
to our opinion; it was first of all commenced in vindication of your
liberties, though all Greece was afterwards drawn into the contest. It
will be most of all intolerable, that the Athenians should become the
instruments of enslaving Greece, who, from times the most remote, have
restored their liberties to many. Your present condition does not fail to
excite in us sentiments of the sincerest pity, who, for two successive
seasons, have been deprived of the produce of your lands, and have so
long seen your mansions in ruin. From reflecting on your situation, we
Spartans, in conjunction with your other allies, undertake to maintain,
as long as the war shall continue, not only your wives, but such other
parts of your families as are incapable of military service. Let not,
therefore, this Macedonian Alexander, softening the sentiments of
Mardonius, seduce you: the part he acts is consistent; a tyrant himself,
he espouses the interests of a tyrant. If you are wise you will always
remember, that the barbarians are invariably false and faithless.”
After the above address of the Spartans, the Athenians made this reply to
Alexander: “It was not at all necessary for you to inform us, that the
power of the Persians was superior to our own: nevertheless, in defence
of our liberties, we will continue our resistance to the utmost of our
abilities. You may be assured that your endeavours to persuade us into
an alliance with the barbarians never will succeed: tell, therefore,
Mardonius, on the part of the Athenians, that as long as the sun shall
continue its ordinary course, so long will we avoid any friendship with
Xerxes, and so long will we continue to resist him. Tell him, we shall
always look with confidence to the protecting assistance of those gods
and heroes whose shrines and temples he has contemptuously destroyed.
Hereafter do not you presume to enter an Athenian assembly with overtures
of this kind, lest whilst you appear to mean us well, you prompt us to do
what is abominable. We are unwilling that you should receive any injury
from us, having been our guest and our friend.”
The above was the answer given to Alexander; after which the Athenians
thus spoke to the Lacedæmonians: “That the Spartans should fear our
entering into an alliance with the barbarians seems natural enough;
but in doing this, as you have had sufficient testimonies of Athenian
firmness, you certainly did us injury. There is not upon earth a quantity
of gold, nor any country so rich or so beautiful, as to seduce us to take
part with the Medes, or to act injuriously to the liberties of Greece.
“If of ourselves we were so inclined, there still exist many important
circumstances to deter us: in the first place, what is of all motives
the most powerful, the shrines and temples of our deities, consumed by
fire, and levelled with the ground, prompt us to the prosecution of a
just revenge, and manifestly compel us to reject every idea of forming
an alliance with him who perpetrated these impieties. In the next place,
our common consanguinity, our using the same language, our worship of
the same divinities, and our practice of the same religious ceremonies,
render it impossible that the Athenians should prove perfidious. If you
knew it not before, be satisfied now, that as long as one Athenian shall
survive, we will not be friends with Xerxes; in the mean time, your
interest in our fortunes, your concern for the ruin of our mansions,
and your offers to provide for the maintenance of our families, demand
our gratitude, and may be considered as the perfection of generosity.
We will, however, bear our misfortunes as we may be able, and not be
troublesome to you; be it your care to bring your forces into the field
as expeditiously as possible; it is not probable that the barbarian will
long defer his invasion of our country, he will be upon us as soon as he
shall be informed that we have rejected his proposals: before he shall be
able to penetrate into Attica, it becomes us to advance to the assistance
of Bœotia.”
MARDONIUS MOVES ON ATHENS
On receiving this answer from the Athenians, the ambassadors returned
to Sparta. As soon as Mardonius heard from Alexander the determination
of the Athenians, he moved from Thessaly, directing by rapid marches
his course towards Athens. Wherever he came, he furnished himself with
supplies of troops. The princes of Thessaly were so far from repenting
of the part they had taken, that they endeavoured still more to animate
Mardonius. Of these, Thorax of Larissa, who had attended Xerxes in his
flight, now openly conducted Mardonius into Greece.
As soon as the army in its progress arrived at Bœotia, the Thebans
received Mardonius. They endeavoured to persuade him to fix his station
where he was, assuring him that a place more convenient for a camp, or
better adapted for the accomplishment of his purpose, could not be found.
They told him that by staying here he might subdue the Greeks without a
battle. He might be satisfied, they added, from his former experience,
that as long as the Greeks were united, it would be impossible for any
body of men to subdue them. “If,” said they, “you will be directed by our
advice, you will be able, without difficulty, to counteract their wisest
counsels. Send a sum of money to the most powerful men in each city:
you will thus create anarchy in Greece, and by the assistance of your
partisans, easily overcome all opposition.”
This was the advice of the Thebans, which Mardonius was prevented from
following, partly by his earnest desire of becoming a second time master
of Athens, and partly by his pride. He was also anxious to inform the
king at Sardis, by means of fires disposed at certain distances along
the islands, that he had taken Athens. Proceeding therefore to Attica,
he found it totally deserted; the inhabitants, as he was informed, being
either at Salamis or on board the fleet. He then took possession of
Athens a second time, ten months after its capture by Xerxes. Whilst he
continued at Athens, he despatched to Salamis, Murichides, a native of
the Hellespont, with the same propositions that Alexander the Macedonian
had before made to the Athenians.
Murichides went to the council, and delivered the sentiments of
Mardonius. A senator named Lycidas gave his opinion, that the terms
offered by Murichides were such as it became them to listen to, and
communicate to the people; he said this, either from conviction, or
seduced by the gold of Mardonius; but he had no sooner thus expressed
himself, than both the Athenians who heard him, and those who were
without, rushed with indignation upon him, and stoned him to death.[33]
They dismissed Murichides without injury. The Athenian women soon heard
of the tumult which had been excited at Salamis on account of Lycidas,
when, in a body mutually stimulating each other, they ran impetuously to
his house, and stoned his wife and his children.
ATHENS APPEALS TO SPARTA
These were the inducements with the Athenians for returning to Salamis:
as long as they entertained any expectation of assistance from the
Peloponnesus, they stayed in Attica; but when they found their allies
careless and inactive, and that Mardonius was already in Bœotia, they
removed with all their effects to Salamis. At the same time they sent
envoys to Lacedæmon, to complain that the Spartans, instead of advancing
with them to meet the barbarian in Bœotia, had suffered him to enter
Attica. They told them by what liberal offers the Persian had invited
them to his friendship; and they forewarned them, that if they were not
speedy in their communication of assistance, the Athenians must seek some
other remedy. The Lacedæmonians were then celebrating what are called the
_hyacinthia_, which solemnity, they deem of the highest importance; they
were also at work upon the wall of the isthmus, the battlements of which
were already erected.
The ephori heard the deputies, but deferred answering them till the next
day; when the morrow came, they put them off till the day following,
and this they did for ten days successively. In this interval, the
Peloponnesians prosecuted with great ardour on the isthmus, their work
of the wall, which they nearly completed. Why the Spartans discovered
so great an anxiety on the arrival of Alexander at Athens, lest the
Athenians should come to terms with the Medes, and why now they did
not seem to concern themselves about them, is more than we are able to
explain, unless it was that the wall of the Isthmus was unfinished, after
which they did not want the aid of the Athenians: but when Alexander
arrived at Athens, this work was not completed, although from terror of
the Persians they eagerly pursued it.
The answer and motions of the Spartans were finally these: on the day
preceding that which was last appointed, a man of Tegea, named Chileus,
who enjoyed at Lacedæmon greater reputation than any other foreigner,
inquired from one of the ephori what the Athenians had said; which
when he knew, he thus addressed them: “Things, O ephori, are thus
circumstanced. If the Athenians, withdrawing from our alliance, shall
unite with the Persian, strong as our wall on the isthmus may be, the
enemy will still find an easy entrance into the Peloponnesus. Let us
therefore hear them, before they do anything which may involve Greece in
ruin.”
The ephori were so impressed by what Chileus had said, that without
communicating with the deputies of the different states, whilst it was
yet night, they sent away a detachment of five thousand Spartans, each
accompanied by seven helots, under the conduct of Pausanias, son of
Cleombrotus.
With these forces Pausanias left Sparta: the deputies, ignorant of the
matter, when the morning came went to the ephori, having previously
resolved to return to their respective cities: “You, O Lacedæmonians,”
they exclaimed, “lingering here, solemnise the _hyacinthia_, and are
busy in your public games, basely deserting your allies. The Athenians,
injured by you, and but little assisted by any, will make their peace
with the Persians on the best terms they can obtain. When the enmity
betwixt us shall have ceased, and we shall become the king’s allies, we
shall fight with him wherever he may choose to lead us: you may know
therefore what consequences you have to expect.”
In answer to this declaration of the ambassadors, the ephori protested,
upon oath, that they believed their troops were already in Oresteum,
on their march against the strangers; by which expression they meant
the barbarians. The deputies, not understanding them, requested an
explanation. When the matter was properly represented to them, they
departed with astonishment to overtake them, accompanied by five thousand
armed troops from the neighbourhood of Sparta.
Whilst these were hastening to the isthmus, the Argives, as soon as they
heard of the departure of Pausanias at the head of a body of troops from
Sparta, sent one of their fleetest messengers to Mardonius in Attica.
They had before undertaken to prevent the Lacedæmonians from taking
the field. When the herald arrived at Athens, “I am sent,” said he to
Mardonius, “by the Argives, to inform you that the forces of Sparta are
already on their march, and we have not been able to prevent them; avail
yourself therefore of this information.” Saying this, he returned.
MARDONIUS DESTROYS ATHENS AND WITHDRAWS
Mardonius, hearing this, determined to stay no longer in Attica. He had
continued until this time, willing to see what measures the Athenians
would take; and he had refrained from offering any kind of injury to the
Athenian lands, hoping they would still make peace with him. When it was
evident that this was not to be expected, he withdrew his army, before
Pausanias and his detachment arrived at the isthmus. He did not however
depart without setting fire to Athens,[34] and levelling with the ground
whatever of the walls, buildings, or temples, still remained entire.
He was induced to quit his station, because the country of Attica was
ill adapted for cavalry, and because in case of defeat he had no other
means of escape but through straits where a handful of men might cut off
his retreat. He therefore determined to remove to Thebes, that he might
have the advantage of fighting near a confederate city and in a country
convenient for his cavalry.
Mardonius was already on his march, when another courier came in haste to
inform him, that a second body of a thousand Spartans was moving towards
Megara. He accordingly deliberated how he might intercept this latter
party. Turning aside towards Megara, he sent on his cavalry to ravage the
Megarian lands. These were the extreme limits on the western parts of
Europe, to which the Persian army penetrated.
Another messenger now came to tell him, that the Greeks were assembled
with great strength at the isthmus; he therefore turned back through
Decelea. The Bœotian chiefs had employed their Asopian neighbours as
guides, who conducted Mardonius first to Sphendaleas, and thence to
Tanagra. At Tanagra, Mardonius passed the night, and the next day came
to Scolos, in the Theban territory. Here the lands of the Thebans,
though the friends and allies of the Medes, were laid waste, not from
any enmity, but from the urgent necessities of the army. The general was
desirous to fortify his camp, and to have some place of refuge in case
of defeat. His camp extended from Erythræ, by Hysiæ, as far as Platæa,
on the banks of the Asopus. It was protected by a wall, which did not
continue the whole extent of the camp, but which occupied a space of ten
stadia in each of the four fronts.
Whilst Mardonius was stationed in Bœotia, all the Greeks who were
attached to the Persians supplied him with troops, and joined him in his
attack on Athens; the Phocians alone did not; these had indeed, and with
apparent ardour, favoured the Medes, not from inclination but necessity.
A few days after the entertainment given at Thebes, they arrived with a
thousand well-armed troops under the command of Harmocydes, one of their
most popular citizens. Mardonius, on their following him to Thebes, sent
some horsemen, commanding them to halt by themselves in the plain where
they were: at the same moment, all the Persian cavalry appeared in sight.
A rumour instantly circulated among those Greeks who were in the Persian
camp, that the Phocians were going to be put to death by the cavalry.
The same also spread through the Phocians, on which account their leader
Harmocydes thus addressed them:
“My friends, I am convinced that we are destined to perish by the swords
of these men, and from the accusations of the Thessalians. Let each
man therefore prove his valour. It is better to die like men, exerting
ourselves in our own defence, than to suffer ourselves to be slain tamely
and without resistance: let these barbarians know, that the men whose
deaths they meditate are Greeks.”
With these words Harmocydes animated his countrymen. When the cavalry had
surrounded them, they rode up as if to destroy them: they made a show
of hurling their weapons, which some of them probably did. The Phocians
upon this closed their ranks, and on every part fronted the enemy.
The Persians seeing this, faced about and retired. We are not able to
decide whether, at the instigation of the Thessalians, the Phocians were
actually doomed to death; or whether, observing them determined to defend
themselves, the Persians retired from the fear of receiving some injury
themselves, and as if they had been so ordered by Mardonius, merely
to make experiment of their valour. After the cavalry were withdrawn,
a herald came to them on the part of Mardonius: “Men of Phocis,” he
exclaimed, “be not alarmed; you have given a proof of resolution which
Mardonius had been taught not to expect; assist us therefore in the war
with alacrity, for you shall neither outdo me nor the king in generosity.”
The Lacedæmonians arriving at the isthmus, fortified their camp. As soon
as this was known to the rest of the Peloponnesians, all were unwilling
to be surpassed by the Spartans, as well they who were actuated by a love
of their country, as they who had seen the Lacedæmonians proceed on their
march. The victims which were sacrificed having a favourable appearance,
they left the isthmus in a body, and came to Eleusis. The sacrifices at
this place being again auspicious, they continued to advance, having been
joined at Eleusis by the Athenians, who had passed over from Salamis.
On their arrival at Erythræ, in Bœotia, they learned that the barbarians
were encamped near the Asopus; then they marched to the foot of Mount
Cithæron.
A PRELIMINARY SKIRMISH
As they did not descend into the plain[35] Mardonius sent the whole of
his cavalry against them, under the command of Masistius, called by
the Greeks Macistius. He was a Persian of distinction, and was on this
occasion mounted on a Nisæan horse, decorated with a bridle of gold, and
other splendid trappings. When they came near the Greeks, they attacked
them in squadrons, did them considerable injury, and by way of insult
called them women. The situation of the Megarians being most easy of
access, was most exposed to the enemy’s attack. Being hardly pressed
by the barbarians, they sent a herald, who thus addressed the Grecian
commanders: “We Megarians, O allies, are unable to stand the shock of
the enemy’s cavalry in our present position: if you are not speedy in
relieving us, we shall be compelled to quit the field.”
After this report of the heralds, Pausanias wished to see if any of
the Greeks would voluntarily offer themselves to take the post of the
Megarians. All refused, except a chosen band of three hundred Athenians,
commanded by Olympiodorus, the son of Lampon.
This body, which took upon itself the defence of a post declined by
all the other Greeks encamped at Erythræ, brought with them a band of
archers. The engagement, after an obstinate dispute, terminated thus:
The enemies’ horse attacked in squadrons; the steed of Masistius, being
conspicuous above the rest, was wounded in the side by an arrow; it
reared, and becoming unruly from the pain of the wound, threw its rider.
The Athenians rushed upon him, seized the horse, and notwithstanding
his resistance, killed Masistius. In doing this, however, they had some
difficulty, on account of his armour. Over a purple tunic he wore a
breastplate covered with plates of gold. This repelled all their blows,
which some person perceiving, killed him by wounding him in the eye.
The death of Masistius was unknown to the rest of his troops; they did
not see him fall from his horse, and were ignorant of his fate, their
attention being entirely occupied by succeeding in regular squadrons to
the charge. At length making a stand, they perceived themselves without a
leader. Upon this they rushed in with united force to bring off the body
of Masistius.
The Athenians seeing them advance in a collected body, called out for
relief. While the infantry were moving to their support, the body of
Masistius was vigorously disputed. While the three hundred were alone,
they were compelled to give ground, and recede from the body; but other
forces coming to their relief, the cavalry in their turn gave way, and,
with the body of their leader, lost a great number of their men. Retiring
for the space of two stadia, they held a consultation, and being without
a commander, determined to return to Mardonius. On their arrival at the
camp, the death of Masistius spread a general sorrow through the army,
and greatly afflicted Mardonius himself. They cut off the hair from
themselves, their horses, and their beasts of burden, and all Bœotia
resounded with their cries and lamentations. The man they had lost, was,
next to Mardonius, most esteemed by the Persians and the king.
The Greeks having not only sustained but repelled the attacks of the
cavalry, were inspired with increasing resolution. The body of Masistius,
which from its beauty and size deserved admiration, they placed on a
carriage, and passed through the ranks, while all quitted their stations
to view it. They afterwards determined to remove to Platæa; they thought
this a more commodious place for a camp than Erythræ, as well for other
reasons as because there was plenty of water. To this place, near
which is the fountain of Gargaphia, they resolved to go and pitch a
regularly fortified camp. Taking their arms, they proceeded by the foot
of Cithæron, and passing Hysiæ, came to Platæa. They drew themselves
up in regular divisions of the different nations, near the fountain of
Gargaphia and the shrine of the hero Androcrates, some on a gently rising
ground, others on the plain.
In the arrangement of the several nations, a violent dispute arose
betwixt the Tegeatæ and Athenians, each asserting their claim to one of
the wings, in vindication of which they appealed to their former as well
as more recent exploits. The Tegeatæ spoke to this effect:
“The post which we now claim has ever been given us by the joint consent
of the allies, in all the expeditions made beyond the Peloponnesus:
we not only speak of ancient but of less distant periods. After the
death of Eurystheus, when the Heraclidæ made an attempt to return to
the Peloponnesus, the rank we now vindicate was allowed us. With you,
O Lacedæmonians, we do not enter into competition, we are willing that
you should take your post in which wing you think proper; the command of
the other, which has so long been allowed us, we now claim. Not to dwell
upon the action we have recited, we are certainly more worthy of this
post than the Athenians. On your account, O Spartans, as well as for the
benefit of others, we have fought again and again with success and glory.
Let not then the Athenians be on this occasion preferred to us; for they
have never in an equal manner distinguished themselves in past or in more
recent periods.”
The Athenians made this reply: “We are well aware, that the motive of our
assembling here is not to spend our time in altercations, but to fight
the barbarians; but since it has been thought necessary to urge on the
part of the Tegeatæ their ancient as well as more recent exploits, we
feel ourselves obliged to assert that right, which we receive from our
ancestors, to be preferred to the Arcadians as long as we shall conduct
ourselves well. Those Heraclidæ, whose leader they boast to have slain
at the isthmus, after being rejected by all the Greeks with whom they
wished to take refuge from the servitude of the people of Mycenæ, found
a secure retreat with us alone. In conjunction with them we chastised
the insolence of Eurystheus, and obtained a complete victory over those
possessing the Peloponnesus. The Argives, who under Polynices fought
against Thebes, remaining unburied, we undertook an expedition against
the Cadmeans, recovered the bodies, and interred them in our country at
Eleusis. A further instance of our prowess was exhibited in our repulsion
of the Amazons, who advanced from the river Thermodon to invade Attica.
We were no less conspicuous at the siege of Troy.
“But this recital is vain and useless; the people who were then
illustrious might now be base, or dastards then, might now be heroes.
Enough therefore of the examples of our former glory, though we are still
able to introduce more and greater; for if any of the Greeks at the
battle of Marathon merited renown, we may claim this, and more also. On
that day we alone contended with the Persian, and after a glorious and
successful contest were victorious over an army of forty-six different
nations; which action must confessedly entitle us to the post we
claim; but in the present state of affairs, all dispute about rank is
unseasonable; we are ready, O Lacedæmonians, to oppose the enemy wherever
you shall choose to station us. Wherever we may be, we shall endeavour to
behave like men. Lead us on therefore, we are ready to obey you.”
When the Athenians had thus delivered their sentiments, the Lacedæmonians
were unanimous in declaring that the Arcadians must yield to the people
of Athens the command of one of the wings. They accordingly took their
station in preference to the Tegeatæ.
PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF PLATÆA
[Illustration: GREEK OFFICER
(After Hope)]
The Greeks who came afterwards, with those who were present before,
were thus disposed. The Lacedæmonians, to the number of ten thousand,
occupied the right wing; of these, five thousand were Spartans, who were
followed by thirty-five thousand helots lightly armed, allowing seven
helots to each Spartan. The Tegeatæ, to the number of fifteen hundred,
were placed by the Spartans next themselves, in consideration of their
valour, and as a mark of honour. Nearest the Tegeatæ were five thousand
Corinthians, who, in consequence of their request to Pausanias, had
contiguous to them three hundred Potidæans of Pallene. Next in order
were six hundred Arcadians of Orchomnene, three thousand Sicyonians,
eight hundred Epidaurians, and a thousand Trœzenians. Contiguous to
these last were two hundred Lepreatæ; next to whom were four hundred
Mycenæans and Tirynthians. Stationed by the Tirynthians were, in regular
succession, a thousand Phliasians, three hundred Hermionians, six hundred
Eretrians and Styrians; next came four hundred Chalcidians, five hundred
Ambracians, eight hundred Leucadians and Anactorians; to whom two hundred
Paleans of Cephallenia, and five hundred Æginetæ, successively joined.
Three thousand Megarians and six hundred Platæans were contiguous to
the Athenians, who to the number of eight thousand, under the command
of Aristides, son of Lysimachus, occupied the left wing at the other
extremity of the army.
The amount of this army, independent of the seven helots to each Spartan,
was thirty-eight thousand seven hundred men, all of them completely armed
and drawn together to repel the barbarian. Of the light-armed troops
were the thirty-five thousand helots, each well prepared for battle, and
thirty-four thousand five hundred attendant on the Lacedæmonians and
other Greeks,[36] reckoning a light-armed soldier to every man; the whole
of these therefore amounted to sixty-nine thousand five hundred.
Thus the whole of the Grecian army assembled at Platæa, including both
the heavy-and light-armed troops, was one hundred and eight thousand two
hundred men; adding to these one thousand and eight hundred Thespians,
who were with the Greeks, but without arms, the complete number was one
hundred and ten thousand. These were encamped on the banks of the Asopus.
The barbarian army having ceased to lament Masistius, as soon as they
knew that the Greeks were advanced to Platæa, marched also to that part
of the Asopus nearest to it; where they were thus disposed by Mardonius.
Opposed to the Lacedæmonians were the Persians, who, as they were
superior in number, fronted the Tegeatæ also. Of this body the select
part was opposed to the Lacedæmonians, the less effective to the Tegeatæ.
In making which arrangement, Mardonius followed the advice of the
Thebans. Next to the Persians were the Medes, opposed to the Corinthians,
Potidæans, Orchomenians, and Sicyonians. The Bactrians were placed
next, to encounter the Epidaurians, Trœzenians, Lepreatæ, Tirynthians,
Mycenæans, and Phliasians. Contiguous to the Bactrians the Indians
were disposed, in opposition to the Hermionians, Eretrians, Styrians,
and Chalcidians. The Sacæ, next in order, fronted the Ambracians,
Anactorians, Leucadians, Paleans, and Æginetæ. The Athenians, Platæans,
and Megarians were ultimately faced by the Bœotians, Locrians, Melians,
Thessalians, and a thousand Phocians. All the Phocians did not assist the
Medes; some of them, about Parnassus, favoured the Greeks, and from that
station attacked and harassed both the troops of Mardonius and those of
the Greeks who were with him. The Macedonians and Thessalians were also
opposed to the Athenians.
In this manner Mardonius arranged those nations who were the most
numerous and the most illustrious; with these were promiscuously mixed
bodies of Phrygians, Thracians, Mysians, Pæonians, and others. To
the above might be added the Ethiopians, and those Egyptians named
Hermotybians and Calasirians, who alone of that country follow the
profession of arms. These had formerly served on board the fleet,
whence they had been removed to the land-forces by Mardonius when at
Phalerum: the Egyptians had not been reckoned with those forces which
Xerxes led against Athens. We have before remarked, that the barbarian
army consisted of three hundred thousand men; the number of the Greek
confederates of Mardonius, as it was never taken, cannot be ascertained;
but as far as conjecture may determine, they amounted to about fifty
thousand men. Such was the arrangement of the infantry; the cavalry were
posted apart by themselves.
Both armies being thus ranged in nations and squadrons, on the following
day offered sacrifices. The sacrifices promised victory to the Greeks if
they acted on the defensive, but the contrary if, passing the Asopus,
they began the fight. Mardonius, though anxious to engage, had nothing
to hope from the entrails, unless he acted on the defensive only. He had
also sacrificed according to the Grecian rites, using as his soothsayer
Hegesistratus, an Elean, and the most illustrious of the Telliadæ.
The Spartans had formerly seized this man, thrown him into prison,
and menaced him with death, as one from whom they had received many
and atrocious injuries. In this distress, alarmed not merely for his
life, but with the idea of having previously to suffer many severities,
he accomplished a thing which can hardly be told. He was confined in
some stocks bound with iron, but accidentally obtaining a knife, he
perpetrated the boldest thing which has ever been recorded.
Calculating what part of the remainder he should be able to draw out,
he cut off the extremity of his foot; this done, notwithstanding he was
guarded, he dug a hole under the wall, and escaped to Tegea, travelling
only by night, and concealing himself in the woods during the day.
Eluding the strictest search of the Lacedæmonians, he came on the third
night to Tegea, his keepers being astonished at his resolution, for they
saw the half of his foot, but could not find the man. In this manner
Hegesistratus escaped to Tegea, which was not at that period in amity
with Sparta. When his wound was healed he procured himself a wooden
foot, and became an avowed enemy to Sparta. His animosity against the
Lacedæmonians proved ultimately of no advantage to himself; he was taken
in the exercise of his office at Zacynthus, and put to death. The fate
of Hegesistratus was subsequent to the battle of Platæa: at the time of
which we were speaking, Mardonius, for a considerable sum, had prevailed
with him to sacrifice, which he eagerly did, as well from his hatred of
the Lacedæmonians, as from the desire of reward; but the appearance of
the entrails gave no encouragement to fight, either to the Persians or
their confederate Greeks, who also had their own appropriate soothsayer,
Hippomachus of Leucadia. As the Grecian army continually increased,
Timagenidas of Thebes, son of Herpys, advised Mardonius to guard the pass
of Cithæron, representing that he might thus intercept great bodies, who
were every day thronging to the allied army of the Greeks.
The hostile armies had already remained eight days encamped opposite
to each other, when the above counsel was given to Mardonius. He
acknowledged its propriety, and immediately on the approach of night
detached some cavalry to that part of Cithæron leading to Platæa, a place
called by the Bœotians the “Three Heads,” by the Athenians the “Heads of
Oak.” This measure had its effect, and they took a convoy of five hundred
beasts of burden, carrying a supply of provisions from the Peloponnesus
to the army: with the carriages, they took also all the men who conducted
them. Masters of this booty, the Persians, with the most unrelenting
barbarity, put both men and beasts to death: when their cruelty was
satiated, they returned with what they had taken to Mardonius.
After this event two days more passed, neither army being willing to
engage. The barbarians, to irritate the Greeks, advanced as far as the
Asopus, but neither army would pass the stream. The cavalry of Mardonius
greatly and constantly harassed the Greeks. The Thebans, who were very
zealous in their attachment to the Medes, prosecuted the war with ardour,
and did everything but join battle; the Persians and Medes supported them
and performed many illustrious actions.
In this situation things remained for the space of ten days: on the
eleventh, the armies retaining the same position with respect to each
other, and the Greeks having received considerable reinforcements,
Mardonius became disgusted with their inactivity. He accordingly held a
conference with Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, who was one of the few
Persians whom Xerxes honoured with his esteem: it was the opinion of
Artabazus that they should immediately break up their camp, and withdraw
beneath the walls of Thebes, where was already prepared a magazine of
provisions for themselves, and corn for their cavalry: here they might
at their leisure terminate the war by the following measures. They had
in their possession a great quantity of coined and uncoined gold, with
an abundance of silver and plate: it was recommended to send these with
no sparing hand to the Greeks, and particularly to those of greatest
authority in their respective cities. It was urged, that if this were
done, the Greeks would soon surrender their liberties, nor again risk
the hazard of a battle. This opinion was seconded by the Thebans, who
thought that it would operate successfully. Mardonius was of a contrary
opinion, fierce, obstinate, and unyielding. His own army he thought
superior to that of the Greeks, and that they should by all means fight
before the Greeks received further supplies; that they should give no
importance to the declarations of Hegesistratus, but without violating
the laws of Persia, commence a battle in their usual manner. This opinion
of Mardonius nobody thought proper to oppose, for to him, and not to
Artabazus, the king had confided the supreme command of the army. He
therefore ordered that everything should be properly disposed to commence
the attack early in the morning.
When the night was far advanced, and the strictest silence prevailed
through the army, which was buried in sleep, Alexander, son of Amyntas,
general and prince of the Macedonians, rode up to the Athenian outposts,
and earnestly desired to speak with their commanders. On hearing this,
the greater number continued on their posts, while some hastened to their
officers, whom they informed that a horseman was arrived from the enemy’s
army, who, naming the principal Greeks, would say nothing more than that
he desired to speak with them.
The commanders lost no time in repairing to the advanced guard, where,
on their arrival, they were thus addressed by Alexander: “I am come, O
Athenians, to inform you of a secret which you must impart to Pausanias
only, lest my ruin ensue. Nor would I speak now, were not I anxious for
the safety of Greece. I from remote antiquity am of Grecian origin, and
I would not willingly see you exchange freedom for servitude: I have
therefore to inform you, that if Mardonius and his army could have drawn
favourable omens from their victims, a battle would long since have
taken place: intending to pay no further attention to these, it is his
determination to attack you early in the morning, being afraid, as I
suppose, that your forces will be yet more numerous. Be, therefore, on
your guard; but if he still defer his purpose of an engagement, do you
remain where you are, for he has provisions but for a few days more. If
the event of this war shall be agreeable to your wishes, it will become
you to make some efforts to restore my independence, who, on account of
my partiality to the Greeks, have exposed myself to so much danger in
thus acquainting you with the intention of Mardonius, to prevent the
barbarians attacking you by surprise. I am Alexander of Macedon.”
When he had thus spoken, he returned to his station in the Persian camp.
The Athenian chiefs went to the right wing, and informed Pausanias of
what they had learned from Alexander. Pausanias, who stood in much awe of
the Persians, addressed them thus in reply:
“As a battle is to take place in the morning, I think it advisable that
you, Athenians, should front the Persians, and we, those Bœotians and
Greeks who are now posted opposite to you. You have before contended with
the Medes, and know their mode of fighting by experience at Marathon; we
have never had this opportunity; but we have before fought the Bœotians,
and Thessalians; take, therefore, your arms, and let us exchange
situations.”
“From the first,” answered the Athenians, “when we observed the Persians
opposed to you, we wished to make the proposal we now hear from you; we
have been only deterred by our fear of offending you: as the overture
comes from you, we are ready to comply with it.”
This being agreeable to both, as soon as the morning dawned they
changed situations; this the Bœotians observed, and communicated to
Mardonius. The Persian general immediately exerted himself to oppose
the Lacedæmonians with his troops. Pausanias, on seeing his scheme thus
detected, again removed the Spartans to the right wing, as did Mardonius
instantly his Persians to the left.
[Illustration: THE FIELD OF PLATÆA]
THE BATTLE OF PLATÆA
When the troops had thus resumed their former posts, Mardonius sent
a herald with this message to the Spartans: “Your character, O
Lacedæmonians, is highly celebrated among all these nations, as men who
disdain to fly; who never desert your ranks, determined either to slay
your enemies or die. Nothing of this is true: we perceive you in the act
of retreating, and of deserting your posts before a battle is commenced:
we see you delegating to the Athenians the more dangerous attempt of
opposing us, and placing yourselves against our slaves, neither of which
actions is consistent with bravery. We are, therefore, greatly deceived
in our opinion of you; we expected, that from a love of glory you would
have despatched a herald to us, expressing yourselves desirous to
combat with the Persians alone. Instead of this we find you alarmed and
terrified; but as you have offered no challenge to us, we propose one to
you. As you are esteemed the most illustrious of your army, why may not
an equal number of you on the part of the Greeks, and of us on the part
of the barbarians, contend for victory? If it be agreeable to you, the
rest of our common forces may afterwards engage; if this be unnecessary,
we will alone engage; and whichever conquers shall be esteemed victorious
over the whole of the adverse army.”
The herald, after delivering his commission, waited some time for an
answer; not receiving any, he returned to Mardonius. He was exceedingly
delighted, and already anticipating a victory, sent his cavalry to attack
the Greeks; these with their lances and arrows materially distressed the
Grecian army, and forbade any near approach. Advancing to the Gargaphian
fountain, which furnished the Greeks with water, they disturbed and
stopped it up. The Lacedæmonians alone were stationed near this fountain,
the other Greeks, according to their different stations, were more or
less distant, but all of them in the vicinity of the Asopus; but as
they were debarred from watering here, by the missile weapons of the
cavalry, they all came to the fountain. In this predicament the leaders
of the Greeks, seeing the army cut off from the water, and harassed
by the cavalry, came in crowds to Pausanias on the right wing, to
deliberate about these and other emergencies. Unpleasant as the present
incident might be, they were still more distressed from their want of
provision; their servants, who had been despatched to bring this from the
Peloponnesus, were prevented by the cavalry from returning to the camp.
The Grecian leaders, after deliberating upon the subject, determined,
if the Persians should for one day more defer coming to an engagement,
to pass to the island opposite to Platæa, and about ten stadia from the
Asopus and the fountain Gargaphia, where they were at present encamped.
This island is thus connected with the continent: the river, descending
from Cithæron to the plain, divides itself into two streams, which, after
flowing separately for about the distance of three stadia, again unite,
thus forming the island which is called Oëroë, who, according to the
natives, is the daughter of Asopus.
The Greeks by this measure proposed to themselves two advantages; first
to be secure of water, and secondly to guard against being further
annoyed by the enemy’s cavalry. They resolved to decamp at the time of
the second watch by night, lest the Persians, perceiving them, should
pursue and harass them with their cavalry. It was also their intention,
when arrived at the spot where the Asopian Oëroë is formed by the
division of the waters flowing from Cithæron, to detach one-half of their
army to the mountain to relieve a body of their servants, who, with a
convoy of provisions, were there encompassed.
After taking the above resolutions, they remained all that day much
incommoded by the enemy’s horse: when these, at the approach of evening,
retired, and the appointed hour was arrived, the greater part of the
Greeks began to move with their baggage, but without any design of
proceeding to the place before resolved on. The moment they began to
march, occupied with no idea but that of escaping the cavalry, they
retired towards Platæa, and fixed themselves near the temple of Juno,
which is opposite to the city, and at the distance of twenty stadia from
the fountain of Gargaphia: in this place they encamped.
Pausanias, observing them in motion, gave orders to the Lacedæmonians to
take their arms, and follow their route, presuming they were proceeding
to the appointed station. The officers all showed themselves disposed to
obey the orders of Pausanias, except Amompharetus, the son of Poliadas,
captain of the band of Pitanatæ, who asserted that he would not fly
before the barbarians, and thus be accessory to the dishonour of Sparta:
he had not been present at the previous consultation, and knew not what
was intended. Pausanias and Euryanax, though indignant at his refusal to
obey the orders which had been issued, were still but little inclined
to abandon the Pitanatæ, on the account of their leader’s obstinacy;
thinking, that by their prosecuting the measure which the Greeks in
general had adopted, Amompharetus and his party must unavoidably perish.
With these sentiments the Lacedæmonians were commanded to halt, and pains
were taken to dissuade the man from his purpose, who alone, of all the
Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ, was determined not to quit his post.
At this crisis the Athenians determined to remain quietly on their
posts, knowing it to be the genius of the Lacedæmonians to say one thing
and think another. But as soon as they observed the troops in motion,
they despatched a horseman to learn whether the Lacedæmonians intended
to remove, and to inquire of Pausanias what was to be done. When the
messenger arrived, he found the men in their ranks, but their leaders
in violent altercation. Pausanias and Euryanax were unsuccessfully
attempting to persuade Amompharetus not to involve the Lacedæmonians
alone in danger by remaining behind, when the Athenian messenger came up
to them. At this moment, in the violence of dispute, Amompharetus took up
a stone with both his hands, and throwing it at the feet of Pausanias,
exclaimed: “There is my vote for not flying before the foreigners!”
Pausanias, after telling him that he could be only actuated by frenzy,
turned to the Athenian, who delivered his commission. He afterwards
desired him to return, and communicate to the Athenians the state in
which he found them, and to entreat them immediately to join their
forces, and act in concert, as should be deemed expedient.
The messenger accordingly returned to the Athenians, whilst the Spartan
chiefs continued their disputes till the morning. Thus far Pausanias
remained indecisive, but thinking, as the event proved, that Amompharetus
would certainly not stay behind, if the Lacedæmonians actually advanced,
he gave orders to all the forces to march forward by the heights, in
which they were followed by the Tegeans. The Athenians, keeping close to
their ranks, pursued a route opposite to that of the Lacedæmonians; these
last, who were in great awe of the cavalry, advanced by the steep paths
which led to the foot of Mount Cithæron; the Athenians marched over the
plain.
Amompharetus, never imagining that Pausanias would venture to abandon
them, made great exertions to keep his men on their posts; but when he
saw Pausanias advancing with his troops, he concluded himself effectually
given up; taking therefore his arms, he with his band proceeded slowly
after the rest of the army. These continuing their march for a space of
ten stadia, came to a place called Agriopius, near the river Moloës,
where is a temple of the Eleusinian Ceres, and there halted, waiting
for Amompharetus and his party. The motive of Pausanias in doing this
was, that he might have the opportunity of returning to the support
of Amompharetus, if he should be still determined not to quit his
post. Here Amompharetus and his band joined them; the whole force of
the enemy’s horse continuing as usual to harass them. As soon as the
Barbarians discovered that the spot where the Greeks had before encamped
was deserted, they put themselves in motion, overtook, and materially
distressed them.
Mardonius being informed that the Greeks had decamped by night, and
seeing their former station unoccupied, led the Persians over the Asopus,
and pursued the path which the Greeks had taken, whom he considered
as flying from his arms. The Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ were the sole
objects of his attack, for the Athenians, who had marched over the plain,
were concealed by the hills from his view. The other Persian leaders
seeing the troops moving, as if in pursuit of the Greeks, raised their
standards, and followed the rout with great impetuosity, but without
regularity or discipline; they hurried on with tumultuous shouts,
considering the Greeks as absolutely in their power.
When Pausanias found himself thus pressed by the cavalry, he sent a
horseman with the following message to the Athenians: “We are menaced,
O Athenians, by a battle, the event of which will determine the freedom
or slavery of Greece; and in this perplexity you, as well as ourselves,
have, in the preceding night, been deserted by our allies. It is
nevertheless our determination to defend ourselves to the last, and to
render you such assistance as we may be able. If the enemy’s horse had
attacked you, we should have thought it our duty to have marched with
the Tegeatæ, who are in our rear, and still faithful to Greece, to your
support. As the whole operation of the enemy seems directed against
us, it becomes you to give us the relief we materially want; but if
you yourselves are so circumstanced, as to be unable to advance to our
assistance, at least send us a body of archers. We confess, that in this
war your activity has been far the most conspicuous, and we therefore
presume on your compliance with our request.”
The Athenians, without hesitation, and with determined bravery, advanced
to communicate the relief which had been required. When they were already
on their march, the confederate Greeks, in the service of the king,
intercepted and attacked them: they were thus prevented from assisting
the Lacedæmonians, a circumstance which gave them extreme uneasiness. In
this situation the Spartans, to the amount of fifty thousand light-armed
troops, with three thousand Tegeatæ,[37] who on no occasion were
separated from them, offered a solemn sacrifice, with the resolution of
encountering Mardonius.
The victims, however, were not auspicious, and in the mean time many of
them were slain, and more wounded. The Persians, under the protection
of their bucklers, showered their arrows upon the Spartans with
prodigious effect. At this moment Pausanias, observing the entrails still
unfavourable, looked earnestly towards the temple of Juno at Platæa,
imploring the interposition of the goddess, and entreating her to prevent
their disgrace and defeat.
Whilst he was in the act of supplicating the goddess, the Tegeatæ
advanced against the barbarians: at the same moment the sacrifices became
favourable, and Pausanias, at the head of his Spartans, went up boldly to
the enemy. The Persians, throwing aside their bows, prepared to receive
them. The engagement commenced before the barricade: when this was thrown
down, a conflict took place near the temple of Ceres, which was continued
with unremitted obstinacy till the fortune of the day was decided.
The barbarians, seizing their adversaries’ lances, broke them in
pieces, and discovered no inferiority either in strength or courage;
but their armour was inefficient, their attack without skill, and their
inferiority, with respect to discipline, conspicuous. In whatever manner
they rushed upon the enemy, from one to ten at a time, they were cut in
pieces by the Spartans.
_Mardonius Falls and the Day is Won_
The Greeks were most severely pressed where Mardonius himself, on a white
horse, at the head of a thousand chosen Persians, directed his attack.
As long as he lived, the Persians, both in their attack and defence,
conducted themselves well, and slew great numbers of the Spartans; but as
soon as Mardonius was slain, and the band which fought near his person,
and which was the flower of the army, was destroyed, all the rest turned
their backs and fled. They were much oppressed and encumbered by their
long dresses, besides which, being lightly armed, they had to oppose men
in full and complete armour.
On this day, as the oracle had before predicted, the death of Leonidas
was amply revenged upon Mardonius, and the most glorious victory which
has ever been recorded, was then obtained by Pausanias. Mardonius was
slain by Æmnestus, a Spartan of distinguished reputation. Æmnestus long
after this Persian war, together with three hundred men, was killed in an
engagement at Stenyclarus, in which he opposed the united force of the
Messenians.
The Persians, routed by the Spartans at Platæa, fled in the greatest
confusion towards their camp, and to the wooden entrenchment which they
had constructed in the Theban territories. It seems somewhat surprising
that although the battle was fought near the grove of Ceres, not a single
Persian took refuge in the temple, nor was slain near it; but the greater
part of them perished beyond the limits of the sacred ground. Such was
the issue of the battle of Platæa.
Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, who had from the first disapproved of
the king’s leaving Mardonius behind him, and who had warmly, though
unsuccessfully, endeavoured to prevent a battle, determined on the
following measures. He was at the head of no small body of troops; they
amounted to forty thousand men: being much averse to the conduct of
Mardonius, and foreseeing what the event of an engagement must be, he
prepared and commanded his men to follow him wherever he should go, and
to remit or increase their speed by his example. He then drew out his
army, as if to attack the enemy; but he soon met the Persians flying from
them: he then immediately and precipitately fled with all his troops in
disorder, not directing his course to the entrenchment or to Thebes, but
towards Phocis, intending to gain the Hellespont with all possible speed.
Of those Greeks who were in the royal army, all except the Bœotians, from
a preconcerted design, behaved themselves ill. The Bœotians fought the
Athenians with obstinate resolution: those Thebans who were attached to
the Medes made very considerable exertions, fighting with such courage,
that three hundred of their first and boldest citizens fell by the
swords of the Athenians. They fled at length, and pursued their way to
Thebes, avoiding the route which the Persians had taken with the immense
multitude of confederates, who, so far from making any exertions, had
never struck a blow.
In the midst of all this tumult, intelligence was conveyed to those
Greeks posted near the temple of Juno, and remote from the battle,
that the event was decided, and Pausanias victorious. The Corinthians
instantly, without any regularity, hurried over the hills which lay at
the foot of the mountain, to arrive at the temple of Ceres. The Megarians
and Phliasians, with the same intentions, posted over the plain, the more
direct and obvious road. As they approached the enemy, they were observed
by the Theban horse, commanded by Asopodorus, son of Timander, who,
taking advantage of their want of order, rushed upon them and slew six
hundred, driving the rest towards Mount Cithæron. Thus did these perish
ingloriously.
The Persians, and a promiscuous multitude along with them, as soon as
they arrived at the entrenchment, endeavoured to climb the turrets before
the Lacedæmonians should come up with them. Having effected this, they
endeavoured to defend themselves as well as they could. The Lacedæmonians
soon arrived, and a severe engagement commenced.
Before the Athenians came up, the Persians not only defended themselves
well, but had the advantage, as the Lacedæmonians were ignorant of the
proper method of attack; but as soon as the Athenians advanced to their
support, the battle was renewed with greater fierceness, and was long
continued. The valour and firmness of the Athenians finally prevailed.
Having made a breach they rushed into the camp: the Tegeatæ were the
first Greeks that entered, and were they who plundered the tent of
Mardonius, taking from thence, among other things, the manger from
which his horses were fed, made entirely of brass, and very curious.
This was afterwards deposited by the Tegeatæ in the temple of the Alean
Minerva: the rest of the booty was carried to the spot where the common
plunder was collected. As soon as their entrenchment was thrown down,
the barbarians dispersed themselves different ways, without exhibiting
any proof of their former bravery; they were, indeed, in a state of
stupefaction and terror, from seeing their immense multitude overpowered
in so short a period.
AFTER THE BATTLE
So great was the slaughter made by the Greeks, that of this army, which
consisted of three hundred thousand men, not three thousand escaped, if
we except the forty thousand who fled with Artabazus. The Lacedæmonians
of Sparta lost ninety-one men; the Tegeatæ sixteen; the Athenians
fifty-two.[38]
Of those who most distinguished themselves on the part of the barbarians,
are to be reckoned the Persian infantry, the Sacian cavalry, and
lastly, Mardonius himself. Of the Greeks, the Tegeatæ and Athenians
were eminently conspicuous; they were, nevertheless, inferior to the
Lacedæmonians. The most daring of the Spartans, was Aristodemus; the same
who alone returning from Thermopylæ fell into disgrace and infamy; next
to him, Posidonius, Phylocyon, and Amompharetus the Spartan, behaved the
best. Nevertheless, when it was disputed in conversation what individual
had on that day most distinguished himself, the Spartans who were
present said, that Aristodemus, being anxious to die conspicuously, as
an expiation of his former crime, in an emotion of fury had burst from
his rank, and performed extraordinary exploits; but that Posidonius had
no desire to lose his life, and therefore his behaviour was the more
glorious: but this remark might have proceeded from envy. All those slain
on this day, were highly honoured, except Aristodemus. To him, for the
reason above mentioned, no respect was paid, as having voluntarily sought
death.
Among the troops of the Æginetæ, assembled at Platæa, was Lampon, one of
their principal citizens, and son of Pytheas. This man went to Pausanias,
giving him the following most impious counsel: “Son of Cleombrotus, what
you have done is beyond comparison splendid, and deserving admiration.
The deity, in making you the instrument of Greece’s freedom, has placed
you far above all your predecessors in glory: in concluding this business
so conduct yourself that your reputation may be still increased, and
that no barbarian may ever again attempt to perpetrate atrocious actions
against Greece. When Leonidas was slain at Thermopylæ, Mardonius and
Xerxes cut off his head, and suspended his body from a cross. Do the same
with respect to Mardonius, and you will deserve the applause of Sparta
and of Greece, and avenge the cause of your uncle Leonidas.” Thus spake
Lampon, thinking he should please Pausanias.
“Friend of Ægina,” replied Pausanias, “I thank you for your good
intentions, and commend your foresight; but what you say violates every
principle of equity.[39] After elevating me, my country, and this recent
victory, to the summit of fame, you again depress us to infamy, in
recommending me to inflict vengeance on the dead. You say, indeed, that
by such an action I shall exalt my character; but I think it is more
consistent with the conduct of barbarians than of Greeks, as it is one
of those things for which we reproach them. I must therefore dissent
from the Æginetæ, and all those who approve their sentiments. For me, it
is sufficient to merit the esteem of Sparta, by attending to the rules
of honour, both in my words and actions: Leonidas, whom you wish me to
avenge, has, I think, received the amplest vengeance. The deaths of this
immense multitude must sufficiently have atoned for him, and for those
who fell with him at Thermopylæ. I would advise you in future, having
these sentiments, to avoid my presence; and I would have you think it a
favour, that I do not punish you.”
Pausanias afterwards proclaimed by a herald, that no person should touch
any of the booty; and he ordered the helots to collect the money into
one place. They, as they dispersed themselves over the camp, found tents
decorated with gold and silver, couches of the same, goblets, cups, and
drinking vessels of gold, besides sacks of gold, and silver cauldrons
placed on carriages. The dead bodies they stripped of bracelets, chains,
and scimitars of gold; to their habits of various colours they paid no
attention. Many things of value the helots secreted, and sold to the
Æginetæ; others, unable to conceal, they were obliged to produce. The
Æginetæ from this became exceedingly rich; for they purchased gold of the
helots at the price of brass.
From the wealth thus collected, a tenth part was selected for sacred
purposes. To the deity of Delphi was presented a golden tripod, resting
on a three-headed snake of brass: it was placed near the altar. To the
Olympian god they erected a Jupiter, ten cubits high: to the god of
the isthmus, the figure of Neptune, in brass, seven cubits high. When
this was done, the remainder of the plunder was divided among the army,
according to their merits; it consisted of Persian concubines, gold,
silver, beasts of burden, with various riches. What choice things were
given to those who most distinguished themselves at Platæa, has never
been mentioned, though certain presents were made them. It is certain,
that a tenth part of the whole was given to Pausanias, consisting among
other things of women, horses, talents, and camels.
It is further recorded, that when Xerxes fled from Greece, he left all
his equipage to Mardonius: Pausanias seeing this composed of gold,
silver, and cloth of the richest embroidery, gave orders to the cooks
and domestics to prepare an entertainment for him, as for Mardonius. His
commands were executed, and he beheld couches of gold and silver, tables
of the same, and everything that was splendid and magnificent. Astonished
at the spectacle, he again with a smile directed his servants to prepare
a Lacedæmonian repast. When this was ready the contrast was so striking,
that he laughing sent for the Grecian leaders: when they were assembled,
he showed them the two entertainments. “Men of Greece,” said he, “I have
called you together to bear testimony to the king of Persia’s folly,
who forsook all this luxury to plunder us who live in so much poverty.”
These were the words which Pausanias is said to have used to the Grecian
leaders.
In succeeding times, many of the Platæans found on the field of battle,
chests of gold, silver, and other riches. This thing also happened: when
the flesh had fallen from the bones of the dead bodies, the Platæans, in
removing them to some other spot, discovered a skull as one entire bone,
without any suture. Two jaw bones also were found with their teeth, which
though divided were of one entire bone, the grinders as well as the rest.
The body of Mardonius was removed the day after the battle; but it is not
known by whom.
[Illustration: SARCOPHAGI AT PLATÆA]
The Greeks, after the division of the plunder at Platæa, proceeded to
inter their dead, each nation by themselves. The Lacedæmonians sunk three
trenches: in the one they deposited the bodies of their priests; in the
second were interred the other Spartans; in the third, the helots. The
Tegeatæ were buried by themselves, but with no distinction: the Athenians
in like manner, and also the Megarians and Phliasians who were slain by
the cavalry. Mounds of earth were raised over the bodies of all these
people. With respect to the others shown at Platæa, they were raised by
those, who being ashamed of their absence from the battle, wished to
secure the esteem of posterity.
THE GREEKS ATTACK THEBES
Having buried their dead on the plain of Platæa, the Greeks, after
serious deliberation, resolved to attack Thebes, and demand the
persons of those who had taken part with the Medes. Of these the most
distinguished were Timagenidas and Attaginus, the leaders of the
faction. They determined, unless these were given up, not to leave Thebes
without utterly destroying it.
On the eleventh day after the battle, they besieged the Thebans,
demanding the men whom we have named. They refused to surrender them,
in consequence of which their lands were laid waste and their walls
attacked. This violence being continued, Timagenidas, on the twentieth
day, thus addressed the Thebans: “Men of Thebes, since the Greeks are
resolved not to retire from Thebes till they shall either have destroyed
it, or you shall deliver us into their power, let not Bœotia on our
account be farther distressed. If their demand of our persons be merely
a pretence to obtain money, let us satisfy them from the wealth of the
public, as not we alone but all of us have been equally and openly active
on the part of the Medes; if their real object in besieging Thebes is
to obtain our persons, we are ready to go ourselves, and confer with
them.” The Thebans approving his advice, sent immediately a herald to
Pausanias, saying they were ready to deliver up the men. As soon as this
measure was determined, Attaginus fled, but his children were delivered
to Pausanias, who immediately dismissed them, urging that infants could
not possibly have any part in the faction of the Medes. The other Thebans
who were given up, imagined they should have the liberty of pleading
for themselves, and by the means of money hoped to escape. Pausanias
suspecting that such a thing might happen, as soon as he got them in his
power, dismissed all the forces of the allies; then removing the Thebans
to Corinth, he there put them to death.
THE FLIGHT OF THE PERSIAN REMNANT
Artabazus son of Pharnaces fled from Platæa to the Thessalians. They
received him with great hospitality, and entirely ignorant of what had
happened, inquired after the remainder of the army. The Persian was
fearful that if he disclosed the whole truth, he might draw upon him
the attack of all who knew it, and consequently involve himself and
army in the extremest danger. This reflection had before prevented his
communication of the matter to the Phocians: and on the present occasion
he thus addressed the Thessalians:
“I am hastening, as you perceive, with great expedition to Thrace, being
despatched thither from our camp with this detachment, on some important
business. Mardonius with his troops follows me at no great distance: show
him the rights of hospitality and every suitable attention. You will
finally have no occasion to repent of your kindness.”
He then proceeded through Thessaly and Macedonia, immediately to Thrace,
with evident marks of being in haste. Directing his march through the
midst of the country, he arrived at Byzantium, with the loss of great
numbers of his men, who were either cut in pieces by the Thracians, or
quite worn out by fatigue and hunger. From Byzantium, he passed over his
army in transports, and thus effected his return to Asia.
CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS IN IONIA
On the very day[40] of the battle of Platæa, a victory was gained at
Mycale in Ionia. Whilst the Grecian fleet was yet at Delos, under the
command of Leotychides the Lacedæmonian, ambassadors came to them
from Samos. On their arrival, they sought the Grecian leaders, whom
Hegesistratus (one of the ambassadors) addressed with various arguments.
He urged that as soon as they should show themselves, all the Ionians
would shake off their dependence, and revolt from the Persians; he told
them that they might wait in vain for the prospect of a richer booty.
He implored also their common deities, that being Greeks, they would
deliver those who also were Greeks from servitude, and avenge them
on the barbarian. He concluded by saying, that this might be easily
accomplished, as the ships of the enemy were slow sailers, and by no
means equal to those of the Greeks.
The Samians, with an oath, engaged to become the confederates of the
Greeks. Leotychides then dismissed them all excepting Hegesistratus, who,
on account of his name, he chose to take along with him. The Greeks,
after remaining that day on their station, on the next sacrificed with
favourable omens; Deiphonus, son of Evenius of Apollonia, in the Ionian
Gulf, being their minister.
The Greeks having sacrificed favourably, set sail from Delos towards
Samos. On their arrival at Calami of Samos, they drew themselves up
near the temple of Juno, and prepared for a naval engagement. When
the Persians heard of their approach, they moved with the residue of
their fleet towards the continent, having previously permitted the
Phœnicians to retire. They had determined, after a consultation, not to
risk an engagement, as they did not think themselves a match for their
opponents. They therefore made towards the continent, that they might
be covered by their land forces at Mycale, to whom Xerxes had intrusted
the defence of Ionia. These, to the amount of sixty thousand, were under
the command of Tigranes the Persian, one of the handsomest and tallest
of his countrymen. To these troops the commanders of the fleet resolved
to retire: it was also their intention to draw their vessels on shore,
and to throw up an intrenchment round them, which might equally serve
as a protection to their vessels and themselves. After this resolution,
they proceeded on their course, and were carried near the temple of the
Eumenidæ at Mycale. Here the Persians drew their ships to land, defending
them with an intrenchment formed of stones, branches of fruit trees cut
down upon the spot, and pieces of timber closely fitted together. In
this position they were ready to sustain a blockade, and with hopes of
victory, being prepared for either event.
When the Greeks received intelligence that the barbarians were retired to
the continent, they considered them as escaped out of their hands. They
were exceedingly exasperated, and in great perplexity whether they should
return or proceed towards the Hellespont. Their ultimate determination
was to follow the enemy towards the continent. Getting therefore all
things ready for an engagement by sea, and providing themselves with
scaling ladders, and such other things as were necessary, they sailed
to Mycale. When they approached the enemy’s station, they perceived no
one advancing to meet them; but beheld the ships drawn on shore, secured
within an intrenchment, and a considerable body of infantry ranged
along the coast. Leotychides upon this advanced before all the rest in
his ship, and coming as near the shore as he could, thus addressed the
Ionians by a herald:
“Men of Ionia, all you who hear me, listen to what I say, for the
Persians will understand nothing of what I tell you. When the engagement
shall commence, remember first of all our common liberties; in the next
place take notice, our watch-word is Hebe. Let those who hear me, inform
all who do not.”
The motive of this conduct was the same with that of Themistocles at
Artemisium. These expressions, if not intelligible to the barbarians,
might make the desired impression on the Ionians; or if explained to the
former, might render the fidelity of the latter suspected.
When Leotychides had done this, the Greeks approached the shore,
disembarked, and prepared for battle. The Persians observing this, and
knowing the purport of the enemy’s address to the Ionians, took their
arms from the Samians, suspecting them of a secret attachment to the
Greeks. The Samians had purchased the freedom of five hundred Athenians,
and sent them back with provisions to their country, who having been
left in Attica, had been taken prisoners by the Persians, and brought
away in the barbarian fleet. The circumstance of their thus releasing
five hundred of the enemies of Xerxes, made them greatly suspected. To
the Milesians, under pretence of their knowledge of the country, the
Persians confided the guard of the paths to the heights of Mycale: their
real motive was to remove them to a distance. By these steps the Persians
endeavoured to guard against those Ionians, who might wish, if they had
the opportunity, to effect a revolt. They next heaped their bucklers upon
each other, to make a temporary rampart.
THE BATTLE OF MYCALE
The Greeks being drawn up, advanced to attack the barbarians: as they
were proceeding, a herald’s wand was discovered on the beach, and a
rumour circulated through the ranks, that the Greeks had obtained a
victory over the forces of Mardonius and Bœotia.[41] On the same day that
their enemies were slaughtered at Platæa, and were about to be defeated
at Mycale, the rumour of the former victory being circulated to this
distance, rendered the Greeks more bold, and animated them against every
danger. It appears farther worthy of observation, that both battles took
place near the temple of the Eleusinian Ceres. The battle of Platæa, as
we have before remarked, was in the vicinity of the temple of Ceres; the
one at Mycale was in a similar situation.
The Athenians, who with those that accompanied them, constituted
one-half of the army, advanced by the coast, and along the plain: the
Lacedæmonians and their auxiliaries made their way by the more woody and
mountainous places.
Whilst the Lacedæmonians were making a circuit, the Athenians in
the other wing were already engaged. The Persians, as long as their
entrenchment remained uninjured, defended themselves well, and without
any inferiority; but when the Athenians, with those who supported them,
increased their exertions, mutually exhorting one another, that they and
not the Lacedæmonians might have the glory of the day, the face of things
was changed; the rampart was thrown down, and a sensible advantage was
obtained over the Persians. They sustained the shock for a considerable
time, but finally gave way, and retreated behind their entrenchments. The
Athenians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Trœzenians, rushed in with them;
for this part of the army was composed of these different nations.
When the wall was carried, the barbarians gave no testimony of their
former prowess, but, except the Persians, indiscriminately fled. These
last, though few in number, vigorously resisted the Greeks, who poured
in upon them in crowds. Artayntes and Ithamitres, the commanders of
the fleet, saved themselves by flight: but Mardontes, and Tigranes the
general of the land-forces, were slain. Whilst the Persians still refused
to give ground, the Lacedæmonians and their party arrived, and put all
who survived to the sword. Upon this occasion many of the Greeks were
slain, and among a number of the Sicyonians, Perilaus their leader. The
Samians, who were in the Persian army, and from whom their weapons had
been taken, no sooner saw victory incline to the side of the Greeks,
than they assisted them with all their power. The other Ionians seeing
this, revolted also, and turned their arms against the barbarians. The
Milesians had been ordered, the better to provide for the safety of the
Persians, to guard the paths to the heights, so that in case of accident
the barbarians, under their guidance, might take refuge on the summits
of Mycale; with this view, as well as to remove them to a distance, and
thus guard against their perfidy, the Milesians had been so disposed; but
they acted in direct contradiction to their orders. Those who fled, they
introduced directly into the midst of their enemies, and finally were
active beyond all the rest in putting them to the sword. In this manner
did Ionia a second time revolt from the Persian power.
AFTER MYCALE
In this battle the Athenians most distinguished themselves, and next
to the Athenians, they who obtained the greatest reputation were the
Corinthians, Trœzenians, and Sicyonians. The greater number of the
barbarians being slain, either in the battle or in the pursuit, the
Greeks burned their ships, and totally destroyed their wall: the plunder
they collected upon the shore, among which was a considerable quantity
of money. Having done this, they sailed from the coast. When they came
to Samos, they deliberated on the propriety of removing the Ionians to
some other place, wishing to place them in some part of Greece where
their authority was secure; but they determined to abandon Ionia to the
barbarians. They were well aware both of the impossibility of defending
the Ionians on every emergency, and of the danger which these would
incur from the Persians, if they did not. The Peloponnesian magistrates
were of opinion, that those nations who had embraced the cause of the
Medes should be expelled, and their lands given to the Ionians. The
Athenians would not consent that the Ionians should be transported from
their country, nor would they allow the Peloponnesians to decide on the
destruction of Athenian colonies. Seeing them tenacious of this opinion,
the Peloponnesians no longer opposed them. Afterwards the people of
Samos, Chios, Lesbos, and the other islands who had assisted with their
arms in the present exigence, were received into the general confederacy,
having by an oath, promised constant and inviolable fidelity. This
ceremony performed, they sailed towards the Hellespont, meaning to
destroy the bridge, which they expected to find in its original state.
The barbarians who saved themselves by flight, came to the heights
of Mycale, and thence escaped in no great numbers to Sardis. During
the retreat, Masistes, son of Darius, who had been present at the
late unfortunate engagement, severely reproached Artayntes the
commander-in-chief: among other things, he said, that in the execution of
his duty he had behaved more like a woman than a man, and had materially
injured the interests of his master. To say that a man is more dastardly
than a woman is with the Persians the most infamous of all reproaches.
Artayntes, after bearing the insult for some time, became at length so
exasperated, that he drew his scimitar, intending to kill Masistes. He
was prevented by Xenagoras, son of Praxilaus, a native of Halicarnassus,
who happening to be behind Artayntes, seized him by the middle, and threw
him to the ground: at the same time the guards of Masistes came up.
Xenagoras by this action not only obtained the favour of Masistes, but so
much obliged Xerxes, by thus preserving his brother, that he was honoured
with the government of all Cilicia. Nothing further of consequence
occurred on their way to Sardis, where they found the king, who after his
retreat from Athens, and his ill success at sea, had there resided.
The Greeks, sailing from Mycale towards the Hellespont, were obliged by
contrary winds to put in at Lectum: thence they proceeded to Abydos. Here
they found the bridge, which they imagined was entire, and which was the
principal object of their voyage, effectually broken down. They on this
held a consultation; Leotychides, and the Lacedæmonians with him, were
for returning to Greece; the Athenians, with their leader Xanthippus,
advised them to continue where they were, and make an attempt on the
Chersonesus. The Peloponnesians returned; but the Athenians, passing
from Abydos to the Chersonesus, laid siege to Sestus. To this place, as
by far the strongest in all that district, great numbers had retired
from the neighbouring towns, as soon as it was known that the Greeks
were in the Hellespont: among others was Œobazus of Cardia, a Persian
who had previously collected here all that remained of the bridge. The
town itself was possessed by the native Æolians, but they had with
them a great number of Persians and other allies. The governor of this
place, under Xerxes, was Artayctes, a Persian, of a cruel and profligate
character.
Whilst they were prosecuting the siege, the autumn arrived. The
Athenians, unable to make themselves masters of the place, and uneasy
at being engaged in an expedition so far from their country, entreated
their leaders to conduct them home. They refused to do this, till they
should either succeed in their enterprise, or be recalled by the people
of Athens, so intent were they on the business before them.
The besieged, under Artayctes, were reduced to such extremity of
wretchedness, that they were obliged to boil for food the cords of which
their beds were composed. When these also were consumed, Artayctes,
Œobazus, and some other Persians, fled, under cover of the night,
escaping by an avenue behind the town, which happened not to be blockaded
by the enemy.
When the morning came, the people of the Chersonesus made signals to
the Athenians from the turrets, and opened to them the gates. The
greater part commenced a pursuit of the Persians, the remainder took
possession of the town. Œobazus fled into Thrace; but he was here seized
by the Absinthians, and sacrificed, according to their rites, to their
god Plistorus: his followers were put to death in some other manner.
Artayctes and his adherents, who fled the last, were overtaken near
the waters of Ægos, where, after a vigorous defence, part were slain,
and part taken prisoners. The Greeks put them all in chains, Artayctes
and his son with the rest, and carried them to Sestus. Conducting him
therefore to the shore where the bridge of Xerxes had been constructed,
they there crucified him; though some say this was done upon an eminence
near the city of Madytus. The son was stoned in his father’s presence.
The Athenians, after the above transactions, returned to Greece, carrying
with them, besides vast quantities of money, the fragments of the bridge,
to be suspended in their temples.[b]
A REVIEW OF RESULTS
The disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxes, and
the little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both contempt for
Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men
by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are
just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive
contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making
war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks, now that the
period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was in a high
degree disorderly and inefficient: the men indeed, individually taken,
especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of
soldiers, but their arms and their organisation were wretched--and their
leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior,
in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldier-like order
as well as in arms: but here too the leadership was defective, and the
disunion a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather
the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the malignity of Herodotus,
insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the
proceedings of the Greeks throughout these critical years, are forced
to deal very harshly with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge
of the facts depends, and who intimates plainly that, in spite of the
devoted courage displayed, not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ
than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to
the imbecility, cowardice, and credulous rashness of Xerxes. Had he
indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus or the judgment of
Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of management, or
any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great
a superiority of force; but it is certain that all their courage as
soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a
higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit of co-operation,
than that which they actually manifested.
A GLANCE FORWARD
One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see
the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under Alexander of
Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no
improvement has taken place during this long interval, that the scheme
of defence under Darius Codomannus labours under the same defects as
that of attack under Xerxes, that there is the same blind and exclusive
confidence in pitched battles with superior numbers, that the advice of
Mentor the Rhodian, and of Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus
and Artemisia, that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as
Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous temerity
as that which threw away the Persian fleet at Salamis, and that the
Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that
individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at Platæa.
But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great: the
orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained and even augmented,
while the generalship and power of military combination has reached a
point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may
be esteemed a sort of creation during this interval, and will be found
to go through various stages: Demosthenes and Brasidas, the Cyreian army
and Xenophon, Agesilaus, Iphicrates, Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon,
Alexander: for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics,
though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to
themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or
Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes
and that of Alexander we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece,
serving as herald and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe, with the
stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual,
but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for
war or for peace.
It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of combination,
political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian history during
the next two centuries, take their rise. They are brought into agency
through the altered position and character of the Athenians--improvers,
to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great
creators of marine tactics and manœuvring in Greece, and the earliest
of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organising and directing
the joint action of numerous allies and dependents, thus uniting the two
distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon--ability in command, with
vigour in execution.
In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia
under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy
any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member: the post of second
dignity in the line at Platæa had indeed been adjudged to her, but only
after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in
ostensible rank, she was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer the
same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly
done more, than all the other allies put together: even on land at
Platæa, her hoplites had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline,
and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry superior even to
the Spartans: nor had any Athenian officer committed so perilous an act
of disobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mycale,
when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the
Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important
object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and
forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these
exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals gifted with any
talents for command, whom this momentous conquest had thrown up, were
both of them Athenians: first, Themistocles; next, Aristides. From the
beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unreserved
Panhellenic patriotism, which had been most ungenerously requited by the
Peloponnesians; who had kept within their isthmian walls, and betrayed
Attica twice to hostile ravage; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably,
but the second time a culpable neglect, in postponing their outward
march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel, that
while they had left Attica unprotected, they owed their own salvation
at Salamis altogether to the dexterity of Themistocles and the imposing
Athenian naval force.
Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief
by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their
city and country, with a large proportion of their movable property
irrecoverably destroyed, we might naturally expect to find the former,
if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in
Attica, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city
by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the same selfishness
again prevalent among them; ill-will and mistrust for the future,
aggravated by an admiration which they could not help feeling, overlays
all their gratitude and sympathy.[g]
FOOTNOTES
[33] A man of the name of Cyrsilus had ten months before met a similar
fate for having advised the people to stay in their city and receive
Xerxes. The Athenian women in like manner stoned his wife. During the
French Revolution the women of Paris, better distinguished by the name
of _Poissardes_, in every particular imitated this brutality, and
whoever differed with them in opinion were exposed to the danger of the
_Lanterne_.[c]
[34] The fate of Athens has been various. It was first burned by Xerxes;
the following year by Mardonius; it was a third time destroyed in the
Peloponnesian War; it received a Roman garrison to protect it against
Philip son of Demetrius, but was not long afterwards ravaged and defaced
by Sulla; in the reign of Arcadius and Honorius it was torn in pieces by
Alaric, king of the Goths.[c]
[35] Plutarch relates some particulars previous to this event, which are
worth transcribing:
Whilst Greece found itself brought to a most delicate crisis, some
Athenian citizens of the noblest families of the place, seeing themselves
ruined by the war, and considering that with their effects they had also
lost their credit and their influence, held some secret meetings, and
determined to destroy the popular government of Athens; in which project
if they failed, they resolved to ruin the state, and surrender Greece
to the barbarians. This conspiracy had already made some progress, when
it was discovered to Aristides. He at first was greatly alarmed, from
the juncture at which it happened; but as he knew not the precise number
of conspirators, he thought it expedient not to neglect an affair of so
great importance, and yet not to investigate it too minutely, in order
to give those concerned opportunity to repent. He satisfied himself with
arresting eight of the conspirators; of these, two as the most guilty
were immediately proceeded against, but they contrived to escape. The
rest he dismissed, that they might show their repentance by their valour,
telling them, that a battle should be the great tribunal to determine
their sincere and good intentions to their country.[c]
[36] Let it be remembered, to the honour of Greece, that on this occasion
the Greeks, whose number only amounted to one hundred and ten thousand,
were opposed by fifty thousand of their treacherous countrymen.[c]
[37]
Of the Spartans there were 5,000
Seven helots to each Spartan 35,000
Lacedæmonians 5,000
A light-armed soldier to each Lacedæmonian 5,000
Tegeatæ 1,500
Light-armed Tegeatæ 1,500
------
Total 53,000[c]
[38] The Greeks, according to Plutarch, lost in all 1360 men: all those
who were slain of the Athenians were of one particular tribe. Plutarch
is much incensed at Herodotus for his account of this battle; but the
authority of our historian seems entitled to most credit.[c] [Bury,
however, thinks he gave the Athenians too large a share in the victory.]
[39] Pausanias altered materially afterwards. He aspired to the supreme
power, became magnificent and luxurious, fierce and vindictive.[e]
[40] [Bury declares it to have been a few days later.]
[41] It is unnecessary to remark, that the superstition of Herodotus is
in this passage conspicuous. Diodorus Siculus is most sagacious, when
he says that Leotychides, and those who were with him, knew nothing of
the victory of Platæa; but that they contrived this stratagem to animate
their troops. Polyænus relates the same in his _Stratagemata_.[e] “These
things which happen by divine interposition,” says Herodotus, “are made
known by various means.”
[Illustration: WINGED VICTORY
(From a Greek Statuette now in the British Museum)]
[Illustration: A GREEK DRINKING HORN]