O Land of Solon, Plato, and of men
Whose glorious like earth ne’er shall see again!
--NICHOLAS MICHELL.
Our information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the
repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.
Cleomenes and Leotychides, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging
to the elder or Eurysthenid, the latter to the younger or the Proclid,
race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Proclid
king Demaratus: and Cleomenes had even gone so far as to tamper with the
Delphian priestess for this purpose. His manœuvre being betrayed shortly
afterwards, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he
retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed
the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm
the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their
turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his
renewed lease did not last long: his habitual violence of character
became aggravated into decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his
stick whomsoever he met; and his relatives were forced to confine him in
chains under a helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained
this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully
and perished.
But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually more
disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divine
agency, recognised on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause:
Cleomenes had gone mad (they affirmed) through habits of intoxication,
learnt from some Scythian envoys who had come to Sparta.
The general course of the war with Ægina, and especially the failure
of the enterprise concerted with Nicodromus in consequence of delay
in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon
the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is
from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that
decided tendency towards maritime activity which coincided so happily
with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian
history as well as a new career for themselves.
The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians
at Marathon has been dwelt upon. Miltiades, the victor in that field,
having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described,
Aristides and Themistocles became the chief men at Athens: and the
former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary
uprightness in magisterial functions ensured to him lofty esteem from
the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies,
some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became
partisans of his rival Themistocles, who had all the talents necessary
for bringing them into co-operation: and the rivalry between the two
chiefs became so bitter and menacing, that even Aristides himself is
reported to have said, “If the Athenians were wise, they would cast both
of us into the barathrum.”
THEMISTOCLES AND ARISTIDES
[Illustration: THEMISTOCLES]
[Sidenote: [489-481 B.C.]]
Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are
unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them
was the important change of policy above alluded to,--the conversion of
Athens from a land-power into a sea-power; the development of this new
and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities, this
change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistocles.
On that account, if for no other reason, Aristides would probably be
found opposed to it: but it was moreover a change not in harmony with
that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life, and
narrow range of active duty and experience which Aristides seems to
have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman
was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed
soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a
remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas, and the
quickness of his intelligence: the land-service was a type of steadiness
and inflexible ranks, the sea-service that of mutability and adventure.
Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers:
though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian
seaman, whose training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits
of obedience far more complete, than that of the Athenian hoplite or
horseman: a training beginning with Themistocles, and reaching its full
perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian War.
In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to
acquire nautical practice, Themistocles displayed all that sagacious
appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time for which
Thucydides gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristides,
though the honester politician of the two, was at this particular crisis
the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with
Ægina, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of
the Athenian harbour, but there was also in the distance a still more
formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been
driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch
still remained with undiminished means of aggression as well as increased
thirst for revenge; and Themistocles knew well that the danger from that
quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur
again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of
Datis to Marathon; against which the best defence would be found in a
numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of
Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer,
extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire.
Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius
of Themistocles, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with
energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against
Persia. Not only were two hundred new ships built, and citizens trained
as seamen, but the important work was commenced, during the year when
Themistocles was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying a
new harbour for Athens at Piræus, instead of the ancient open bay of
Phalerum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Piræus
with its three separate natural ports, admitting of being closed and
fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience.
It is not too much to say with Herodotus, that the Æginetan war was “the
salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves
a maritime power.” The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently
made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organisation of
Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a
fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years
between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to
be avenged was, in truth, the result of accident. First, the revolt of
Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes at
his first accession towards Hellenic matters--postponing until 480 B.C.,
an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486
B.C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden
walls--the great engine of her subsequent salvation.
Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been
built--a considerable amount of public money--was also by good fortune
now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of
the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion,
that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium in Attica, and the valuable
produce which they rendered to the state. At what time they first began
to be worked, we have no information; but it seems hardly possible that
they could have been worked with any spirit or profitable result, until
after the expulsion of Hippias and the establishment of the democratical
constitution of Clisthenes. Neither the strong local factions, by which
different portions of Attica were set against each other before the
time of Pisistratus--nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two
sons--were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the
democracy of Clisthenes first brought Attica into one systematic and
comprehensive whole, with equal rights assigned to each part, and with a
common centre at Athens--the power of that central government over the
mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole people
to respect agreements concluded with individual undertakers, would give
a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of Laurium. It was
the practice of the Athenian government either to sell, or to let for a
long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to
individuals or companies; on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid
down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one twenty-fourth part of the
gross produce.
We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at the
time when Themistocles made his proposition to enlarge the naval force,
a great sum arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution
was on the point of being made among the citizens--ten drachmæ [about
8 shillings or $2] to each man. Themistocles availed himself of this
precious opportunity--set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina,
and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia--and
prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the
purpose of obtaining an efficient navy. One cannot doubt that there must
have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by
opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution; insomuch that
the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive
as predominant over a present gain, deserves notice as an earnest of
their approaching greatness.
Immense indeed was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely
by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came
to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The
orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the
Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would
of course become known throughout Greece proper; especially the vast
labour bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme
of wondering talk with every Thasian or Acanthian citizen who visited
the festival games in the Peloponnesus. All these premonitory evidences
were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby
the exiled Demaratus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from
Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition. The formal
announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object
of his wrath and vengeance. Other Grecian cities might thus hope to
escape without mischief: so that the prospect of the great invasion did
not at first provoke among them any unanimous disposition to resist.
Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from Sardis in
the autumn of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont,
addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and
water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta,
were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning
identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them
sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle; while both
at the same time joined to convene a Panhellenic congress at the Isthmus
of Corinth, for the purpose of organising resistance against the expected
invader.
CONGRESS AT CORINTH
[Sidenote: [481 B.C.]]
We have pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of
Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts,
into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present
congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has
more of a Panhellenic character than any political event which has yet
occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those
Peloponnesian states which constitute the immediate allies of Sparta:
it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous
instigation: moreover it seeks to combine every city of Hellenic race and
language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it--even
the Cretans, Corcyræans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states
do not actually come, but earnest efforts are made to induce them to
come: the dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are entreated to
marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose--the
defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new
fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything
which has gone before--enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties
connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the
hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her
to manage--and thus introducing increased habits of co-operation among
the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandisement among
the leaders. The congress at the Isthmus of Corinth marks such further
advance in the centralising tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to
promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not
be found realised.
Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value. While most of the
deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities,
to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all
their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among
particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent,
as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between
Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions
of _medising_ (_i.e._, embracing the cause of the Persians), which had
been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius.
But her present conduct afforded no countenance to such suspicions:
she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures
of defence, and willingly consented to accommodate her difference with
Athens. In this work of reconciling feuds, so essential to the safety
of Greece, the Athenian Themistocles took a prominent part, as well as
Cheileus of Tegea in Arcadia. The congress proceeded to send envoys
and solicit co-operation from such cities as were yet either equivocal
or indifferent, especially Argos, Corcyra, and the Cretan and Sicilian
Greeks; and at the same time to despatch spies across to Sardis, for the
purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.
These spies presently returned, having been detected, and condemned to
death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes,
who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should
be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus
magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the
discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical
period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent
and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the
treacherous--Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and
indeed something more than human. Of course such an impression would be
encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we
may even trace the manifestation of a wish to get rid of the Athenians
altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance
to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic
life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic
religion, the Delphian temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and
uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys
performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber
near the priestess Aristonice, when she at once exclaimed: “Wretched
men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head,
body, feet, and hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the train of
the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only your city, but other
cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods--which are
now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreshadow, by drops of blood
on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the
sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow.”
So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess.
The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not carry it back
to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an
influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here as elsewhere
the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who
advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of
supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring
guise: “O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these
boughs of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable
concerning our country; else we quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here
until death.” Upon which the priestess replied: “Athene with all her
prayers and all her sagacity cannot propitiate Olympian Zeus. But this
assurance I will give you, firm as adamant. When everything else in the
land of Cecrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athene that the wooden
wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children.
Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but
turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O
divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at
the seed-time or at the harvest.”
This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first. It left open
some hope of escape, though faint, dark, and unintelligible: and the
envoys wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing probably
the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people,
the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations.
What was meant by “the wooden wall”? Some supposed that the Acropolis
itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade,
was the refuge pointed out; but the greater number, and among them most
of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that
the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors,
while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all
idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning
Attica forever: the last lines of the oracle, wherein it was said
that Salamis would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to
portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat. Such was
the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine
will. It harmonised completely with the despairing temper then prevalent,
heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle;
and emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope
of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens--and of Greece
generally, which would have been helpless without Athens--now hung upon a
thread, when Themistocles, the great originator of the fleet, interposed
with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to insure the proper use
of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as
the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been
called in the oracle by some such epithet as “wretched Salamis:” but the
fact that it was termed “divine Salamis,” indicated that the parties,
destined to perish there, were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks
themselves. He encouraged his countrymen therefore to abandon their
city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden
wall recommended by the god, but with full determination to fight and
conquer on board. Great indeed were the consequences which turned upon
this bold stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been
persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of
the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they would in
their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.
Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing
less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have
enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from
the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by
emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers:
nay, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the
real saviour of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the
Peloponnesian War--at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of
her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired, by most of the Grecian
states--he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular
with his hearers generally, and he apologises for it as something wrung
from him against his will by the force of the evidence. Nor was it only
that the Athenians dared to stay and fight against immense odds: they,
and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby
it was enabled to succeed, as will appear further in the sequel.
But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which
they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies
met at the Isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognise some
one commanding state: and with regard to the land-force, no one dreamt
of contesting the pre-eminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet,
her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only
sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought
two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen.
Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should
command at sea and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies
manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one
but a Spartan. To the honour of the Athenians, they at once waived their
pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force
at this moment of peril would be compromised. To appreciate this generous
abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that
the love of pre-eminence was among the most prominent attributes of the
Hellenic character; a prolific source of their greatness and excellence,
but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their
crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal
honour and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.
[Sidenote: [481-480 B.C.]]
We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resistance,
prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on
shipboard, when the necessity should arrive; furnishing two-thirds of
the whole fleet, and yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until
the last moment; sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in
the common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states
under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the march of
Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the isthmus was trying, with little
success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action. Among the cities
north of Attica and the Peloponnesus, the greater number were either
inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Bœotia, or were
at least lukewarm in the cause of independence: so rare at this trying
moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Platæans fifty-three years
afterwards) was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the
invader. Even in the interior of the Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos
maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the
congress to send special envoys to Argos, setting forth the common danger
and soliciting co-operation. The result is certain, that no co-operation
was obtained--the Argives did nothing throughout the struggle; but as
to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory
statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed
that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of
dissuasion from the Delphian oracle--exacting only as conditions that the
Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should
equally divide the honours of headship with Argos.
Such was the story told by the Argives themselves, but seemingly not
credited either by any other Greeks, or by Herodotus himself. The
prevalent opinion was, that the Argives had a secret understanding with
Xerxes, and some even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited
him into Greece, as a means both of protection and of vengeance to
themselves against Sparta after their defeat by Cleomenes. And Herodotus
himself evidently believed that they _medised_, though he is half afraid
to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the
angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards. It
is certain that in act the Argives were neutral.
The Cretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory
injunctions from the oracle; the Corcyræans promised without performing,
and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious
loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty
triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent
they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from
Corcyra; but they took care not to sail round Cape Malea, or to reach the
scene of action.
The envoys who visited Corcyra proceeded onward on their mission to
Gelo the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus
as more powerful than any state in Greece, we shall speak more fully in
a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now, that he rendered
no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever
might have been his inclinations; for the same year which brought the
Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected by the Carthaginians
for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks
to the defence of their own island. It seems even probable that this
simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and
Carthaginians.
The endeavours of the deputies of Greeks at the isthmus had thus produced
no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the
Corcyræans. It was about the time when Xerxes was about to pass the
Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B.C., that the first actual step
for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though
the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadæ were among the companions
of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with
every promise of ready submission from their countrymen--yet it seems
that these promises were in reality unwarranted. The Aleuadæ were at
the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the
Pisistratidæ: while most of the Thessalians were disposed to resist
Xerxes--for which purpose they now sent envoys to the isthmus, intimating
the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost
entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence,
adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own
separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly a
body of ten thousand Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of
the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistocles, were despatched by
sea to Alus in Achaia Phthiotis, where they disembarked and marched by
land across Achaia and Thessaly. Being joined by the Thessalian horse,
they occupied the defile of Tempe, through which the river Peneus makes
its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.
THE VALE OF TEMPE
[Illustration: GREEK STANDARD BEARER]
The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempe formed then, and forms
still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer,
from lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly. The lofty mountain
precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some
places for a road: it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute
men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous
host. But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they
could not hold--first, because the powerful fleet of Xerxes would be
able to land troops in their rear; secondly, because there was also a
second entrance passable in summer, from upper Macedonia into Thessaly,
by the mountain passes over the range of Olympus. It was in fact by this
second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempe, that
the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the
auspices of Alexander, king of Macedon, tributary to them and active in
their service. That prince sent a communication of the fact to the Greeks
at Tempe, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the
countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless
position. He passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be
acting as such, in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance to
Persia: but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator; and as such
the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of
which we shall hear more hereafter. On the present occasion, the Grecian
commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance
into Thessaly, besides Tempe, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps
it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and
considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians
at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk.
So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery,
justifying or seeming to justify the friendly advice of Alexander, that
they remained only a few days at Tempe, then at once retired back to
their ships, and returned by sea to the Isthmus of Corinth--about the
time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.
This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and
discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of Mount Cithæron
and of the Megarid territory without defence, and it served either as
reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states, north of
that boundary, to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of them
had already begun to do before. When Xerxes in the course of his march
reached the Thermaic Gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds
whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a
third portion of the Hellenic name--the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænianes,
Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Locrians, Dorians, Melians, Phthiotic Achæans,
and Bœotians. Among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or
Platæa. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested
active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the
stimulus of the Aleuadæ, whose party now became predominant: they were
probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend
them.
Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all
this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the
resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six
weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from
Tempe and the arrival of Xerxes at Therma, no new plan of defence was yet
thoroughly organised; for it was not until that arrival became known at
the isthmus, that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to
occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.[b]
XERXES REVIEWS HIS HOST
Xerxes having ranged and numbered his armament, was desirous to take a
survey of them all. Mounted in his car, he examined each nation in its
turn. To all of them he proposed certain questions, the replies to which
were noted down by his secretaries. In this manner he proceeded from
first to last through all the ranks, both of horse and foot. When this
was done, the fleet also was pushed off from land, whilst the monarch,
exchanging his chariot for a Sidonian vessel, on the deck of which he
sat beneath a golden canopy, passed slowly the heads of the ships,
proposing in like manner questions to each, and noting down the answers.
The commanders had severally moored their vessels at about four plethra
from shore, in one uniform line, with their sterns out to sea, and their
crews under arms, as if prepared for battle. Xerxes viewed them, passing
betwixt their prows and the shore.
When he had finished his survey, he went on shore; and sending for
Demaratus, the son of Ariston, who accompanied him in this expedition
against Greece, he thus addressed him: “From you, Demaratus, who are
a Greek, and, as I understand from yourself and others, of no mean or
contemptible city, I am desirous of obtaining information: do you think
that the Greeks will presume to make any resistance against me? For my
own part, not to mention their want of unanimity, I cannot think that
all the Greeks, joined to all the inhabitants of the west, would be able
to withstand my power: what is your opinion on this subject?” “Sir,”
said Demaratus, in reply, “shall I say what is true, or only what is
agreeable?” Xerxes commanded him to speak the truth.
“Since,” answered Demaratus, “you command me to speak the truth, it shall
be my care to deliver myself in such a manner that no one hereafter,
speaking as I do, shall be convicted of falsehood. Greece has ever been
the child of poverty; for its virtue it is indebted to the severe wisdom
and discipline, by which it has tempered its poverty, and repelled its
oppressors. To this praise all the Dorian Greeks are entitled; but
I shall now speak of the Lacedæmonians only. You may depend upon it
that your propositions, which threaten Greece with servitude, will be
rejected; and if all the other Greeks side with you against them, the
Lacedæmonians will engage you in battle. Make no inquiries as to their
number, for if they shall have but a thousand men, or even fewer, they
will fight you.”
“What, Demaratus,” answered Xerxes, smiling, “think you that a thousand
men will engage so vast a host? Tell me, you who, as you say, have been
their prince, would you now willingly engage with ten opponents? If your
countrymen be what you describe them, according to your own principles
you, who are their prince, should be equal to two of them. If, therefore,
one of them be able to contend with ten of my soldiers, you may be
reasonably expected to contend with twenty: such ought to be the test
of your assertions. But if your countrymen really resemble in form and
size you, and such other Greeks as appear in my presence, it should seem
that what you say is dictated by pride and insolence; for how can it be
shown that a thousand, or ten thousand, or even fifty thousand men, all
equally free, and not subject to the will of an individual, could oppose
so great an army? Granting them to have five thousand men, we have still
a majority of a thousand to one; they who like us are under the command
of one person, from the fear of their leader, and under the immediate
impression of the lash, are animated with a spirit contrary to their
nature, and are made to attack a number greater than their own; but they
who are urged by no constraint will not do this. If these Greeks were
even equal to us in number, I cannot think they would dare to encounter
Persians. The virtue to which you allude, is to be found among ourselves,
though the examples are certainly not numerous; there are of my Persian
guards men who will singly contend with three Greeks. The preposterous
language which you use can only, therefore, proceed from your ignorance.”
“I knew, my lord, from the first,” returned Demaratus, “that by speaking
truth I should offend you. I was induced to give you this representation
of the Spartans, from your urging me to speak without reserve. You may
judge, sir, what my attachment must be to those who, not content with
depriving me of my paternal dignities, drove me ignominiously into exile.
Your father received, protected, and supported me: no prudent man will
treat with ingratitude the kindness of his benefactor. I will never
presume to engage in fight with ten men, nor even with two, nor indeed
willingly with one; but if necessity demanded, or danger provoked me, I
would not hesitate to fight with any one of those, who is said to be a
match for three Greeks. The Lacedæmonians, when they engage in single
combat, are certainly not inferior to other men, but in a body they are
not to be equalled. Although free, they are not so without some reserve;
the law is their superior, of which they stand in greater awe than
your subjects do of you: they are obedient to what it commands, and it
commands them always not to fly from the field of battle, whatever may
be the number of their adversaries. It is their duty to preserve their
ranks, to conquer or to die. If what I say seem to you absurd, I am
willing in future to be silent. I have spoken what I think, because the
king commanded me, to whom may all he desires be accomplished.”
Xerxes smiled at these words of Demaratus, whom he dismissed without
anger, civilly from his presence. After the above conference, he removed
from Doriscus the governor who had been placed there by Darius, and
promoted in his room Mascames, son of Megadostes. He then passed through
Thrace with his army, towards Greece.
To this Mascames, as to the bravest of all the governors appointed either
by himself or by Darius, Xerxes sent presents every year, and Artaxerxes,
son of Xerxes continued to do the same to his descendants. Before this
expedition against Greece, there had constantly been governors both in
Thrace and the Hellespont, all of whom, except Mascames, the Greeks
afterwards expelled: he alone retained Doriscus in his subjection, in
defiance of the many and repeated exertions made to remove him. It was in
remembrance of these services, that he and all his descendants received
presents from the kings of Persia.
The only one of all those expelled by the Greeks, who enjoyed the good
opinion of Xerxes, was Boges, the governor of Eion; he always mentioned
this man in terms of esteem, and all his descendants were honourably
regarded in Persia. Boges was not undeserving his great reputation:
when he was besieged by the Athenians, under the conduct of Cimon, son
of Miltiades, he might, if he had thought proper, have retired into
Asia; this he refused, and defended himself to the last extremity, from
apprehensions that the king might ascribe his conduct to fear. When no
provisions were left, he caused a large pile to be raised; he then slew
his children, his wife, his concubines, and all his family and threw them
into the fire; he next cast all the gold and silver of the place from the
walls into the Strymon; lastly, he leaped himself into the flames. This
man is, therefore, very deservedly extolled by the Persians.
Xerxes, in his progress from Doriscus to Greece, compelled all the people
among whom he came to join his army. All this tract of country, as far
as Thessaly, as we have before remarked, had been made tributary to the
king, first by Megabazus, and finally by Mardonius.
Xerxes having passed the exhausted bed of the Lissus, continued his march
beyond the Grecian cities of Maronea, Dicæa, and Abdera. He proceeded
onward through the more midland cities, in one of which is a lake almost
of thirty stadia in circumference, full of fish, but remarkably salt: the
waters of this proved only sufficient for the beasts of burden. The name
of the city is Pistyrus. These Grecian and maritime cities were to the
left of Xerxes as he passed them.
The nations of Thrace, through which he marched are these: the Pæti,
Cicones, Bistones, Sapæi, Dersæi, Edoni, and the Satræ. The inhabitants
of the maritime towns followed by sea; those inland were, except the
Satræ, compelled to accompany the army by land. The Satræ, as far as we
know, never were subdued.
Xerxes continued to advance, and passed by two Pierian cities, one called
Phagra, the other Pergamus; to his right he left the mountain Pangæus,
keeping a westward direction, till he came to the river Strymon. To this
river the magi offered a sacrifice of white horses. After performing
these and many other religious rites to the Strymon, they proceeded
through the Edonian district of the Nine Ways, to where they found
bridges thrown over the Strymon: when they heard that this place was
named the Nine Ways, they buried there alive nine youths and as many
virgins, natives of the country. This custom of burying alive was common
in Persia; and Amestris, the wife of Xerxes, when she was of an advanced
age, commanded fourteen Persian children of illustrious birth to be
interred alive in honour of that deity, who, as they suppose, exists
under the earth.
On his arrival at Acanthus, the Persian monarch interchanged the rites of
hospitality with the people, and presented each with a Median vest: he
was prompted to this conduct by the particular zeal which they discovered
towards the war, and from their having completed the work of the canal.
As soon as the royal will was made known by the heralds, the inhabitants
of the several cities divided the corn which they possessed, and employed
many months in reducing it to meal and flour. Some there were, who
purchased at a great price the finest cattle they could procure, for the
purpose of fattening them: others, with the same view of entertaining
the army, provided birds both of the land and the water, which they
preserved in cages and in ponds. Many employed themselves in making cups
and goblets of gold and silver, with other utensils of the table: these
last-mentioned articles were intended only for the king himself, and
his more immediate attendants; with respect to the army in general, it
was thought sufficient to furnish them with provision. On the approach
of the main body, a pavilion was erected, and properly prepared for the
residence of the monarch, the rest of the troops remained in the open
air. From the commencement of the feast to its conclusion, the fatigue
of those who provided it is hardly to be expressed. The guests, after
satisfying their appetite, passed the night on the place; the next
morning, after tearing up the pavilion, and plundering its contents, they
departed, without leaving anything behind them.
Upon this occasion the witty remark of Megacreon of Abdera, has been
handed down to posterity. If the Abderites, he observed, had been
required to furnish a dinner as well as a supper, they must either
have prevented the visit of the king by flight, or have been the most
miserable of human beings.
These people, severe as was the burden, fulfilled what had been enjoined
them. From Acanthus, Xerxes dismissed the commanders of his fleet,
requiring them to wait his orders at Therma. Therma is situated near the
Thermæan Gulf, to which it gives its name. He had been taught to suppose
this the most convenient road; by the command of Xerxes, the army had
marched from Doriscus to Acanthus, in three separate bodies: one went by
the seacoast, moving with the fleet, and was commanded by Mardonius and
Masistes; a second proceeded through the midst of the continent, under
the conduct of Tritantæchmes and Gergis; betwixt these went the third
detachment, with whom was Xerxes himself, and who were led by Smerdomenes
and Megabyzus.
As soon as the royal mandate was issued, the navy entered the canal which
had been cut at Mount Athos, and which was continued to the gulf. Taking
on board a supply of troops from these places, the fleet advanced towards
the Thermæan Gulf, and doubling the Toronean promontory of Ampelos, they
proceeded by a short cut to the Canastrean cape, the point, which of all
the districts of Pallene, projects farthest into the sea. Coasting onward
to the station appointed, they supplied themselves with troops from the
cities in the vicinity of Pallene, and the Thermæan Gulf. From Ænea the
fleet went in a straight direction to the Thermæan Gulf, and the coast
of Mygdonia; it ultimately arrived at Therma, where they waited for the
king. Directing his march this way, Xerxes, with all his forces, left
Acanthus, and proceeded over the continent through Pæonia and Crestonia.
In the course of this march, the camels, which carried the provisions,
were attacked by lions: in the darkness of the night they left their
accustomed abode, and without molesting man or beast, fell upon the
camels only. That the lions should attack the camels alone, animals they
had never been known before to devour, or even by mistake to have seen,
is a fact which we are totally unable to explain.
On his arrival at Therma, Xerxes halted with his army, which occupied
the whole of the coast from Therma and Mygdonia, as far as the rivers
Lydias and Haliacmon, which forming the limits of Bottiæis and Macedonia,
meet at last in the same channel. Here the barbarians encamped. Xerxes,
viewing from Therma, Olympus and Ossa, Thessalian mountains of an
extraordinary height, betwixt which was a narrow passage where the
Peneus poured its stream, and where was an entrance to Thessaly, he
was desirous of sailing to the mouth of this river. For the way he
had determined to march as the safest was through the high country of
Macedonia, by the Perrhæbi, and the town of Gonnus. He instantly however
set about the accomplishment of his wish. He accordingly went on board a
Sidonian vessel, for on such occasions he always preferred the ships of
that country; leaving here his land forces, he gave the signal for all
the fleet to prepare to set sail. Arriving at the mouth of the Peneus, he
observed it with particular admiration, and desired to know of his guides
if it would not be possible to turn the stream, and make it empty itself
into the sea in some other place.
Thessaly is said to have been formerly a marsh, on all sides surrounded
by lofty mountains[25]; to the east by Pelion and Ossa, whose bases meet
each other; to the north by Olympus, to the west by Pindus; to the south
by Othrys. The space betwixt these is Thessaly, into which depressed
region many rivers pour their waters.
Xerxes inquiring of his guides whether the Peneus might be conducted
to the sea by any other channel, received from them, who were well
acquainted with the situation of the country, this reply: “As Thessaly,
O King, is on every side encircled by mountains, the Peneus can have no
other communication with the sea.” “The Thessalians,” Xerxes is said
to have answered, “are a sagacious people. They have been careful to
decline a contest for many reasons, and particularly as they must have
discerned that their country would afford an easy conquest to an invader.
All that would be necessary to deluge the whole of Thessaly, except
the mountainous parts, would be to stop up the mouth of the river, and
thus throw back its waters upon the country.” This observation referred
to the sons of Aleuas, who were Thessalians, and the first Greeks who
submitted to the king. He presumed that their conduct declared the
general sentiments of the nation in his favour. After surveying the place
he returned to Therma.
He remained a few days in the neighbourhood of Pieria, during which
interval a detachment of the third of his army was employed in clearing
the Macedonian mountain, to facilitate the passage of the troops into
the country of the Perrhæbi. The messengers who had been sent to require
earth and water of the Greeks returned, some with and some without it.
Xerxes sent no messengers either to Athens or to Sparta, for when Darius
had before sent to these places, the Athenians threw his people into
their pit of punishment, the Lacedæmonians into wells, telling them to
get the earth and water thence, and carry it to their king. A long time
after the incident we have related, the entrails of the victims continued
at Sparta to bear an unfavourable appearance, till the people, reduced
to despondency, called a general assembly, in which they inquired by
their heralds, if any Lacedæmonian would die for his country. Upon this
Sperthies, son of Aneristus, and Bulis, son of Nicolaus, Spartans of
great accomplishments and distinction, offered themselves to undergo
whatever punishment Xerxes the son of Darius should think proper to
inflict on account of the murder of his ambassadors. These men therefore
the Spartans sent to the Medes, as to certain death.
The magnanimity of these two men, as well as the words which they used,
deserve admiration. On their way to Susa they came to Hydarnes, a native
of Persia, and governor of the vanquished places in Asia near the sea:
he entertained them with much liberality and kindness, and addressed
them as follows: “Why, O Lacedæmonians, will you reject the friendship
of the king? From me, and from my condition, you may learn how well he
knows to reward merit. He already thinks highly of your virtue, and if
you will but enter into his service, he will doubtless assign to each of
you some government in Greece.” “Hydarnes,” they replied, “your advice
with respect to us is inconsistent: you speak from the experience of your
own but with an entire ignorance of our situation. To you servitude is
familiar; but how sweet a thing liberty is, you have never known, if you
had, you yourself would have advised us to make all possible exertions to
preserve it.”
When introduced, on their arrival at Susa, to the royal presence, they
were first ordered by the guards to fall prostrate, and adore the king,
and some force was used to compel them. But this they refused to do, even
if they should dash their heads against the ground. They were not, they
said, accustomed to adore a man, nor was it for this purpose that they
came. After persevering in such conduct, they addressed Xerxes himself
in these and similar expressions: “King of the Medes, we are sent by
our countrymen to make atonement for those ambassadors who perished
at Sparta.” Xerxes with great magnanimity said he would not imitate
the example of the Lacedæmonians. They in killing his ambassadors had
violated the laws of nations; he would not be guilty of that with which
he reproached them, nor, by destroying their messengers, indirectly
justify their crime.[c]
FOOTNOTES
[25] [Rennell[d] remarks that this description of Thessaly and that of
the Straits of Thermopylæ prove how well Herodotus had considered the
scenes of particular actions.[f]]
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