“Be assured, my dear Sir, my judgment, whatever it may be
worth, has been for years, and now is, in perfect accordance
with yours in relation to the unconstitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Laws of 1793 and 1850.”[355]
Other judicial opinions might be adduced; but, as they have been
pronounced since controversy on this question, they would be less
regarded.
There are opinions, pronounced in the Senate, which, from the
characters of their authors, are entitled to peculiar consideration.
It will be remembered that Mr. Webster gave his support to the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850; but, whatever may have been his vote,
so far as his personal authority could go, _he condemned the Act as
unconstitutional_. Here is his opinion, in the famous speech of the 7th
March, 1850.
“I have always thought that the Constitution addressed itself
to the Legislatures of the States, or to the States themselves.
It says that those persons escaping to other States ‘shall be
delivered up,’ and I confess I have always been of the opinion
that it was an injunction upon the States themselves. When it
is said that a person escaping into another State, and coming,
therefore, within the jurisdiction of that State, shall be
delivered up, _it seems to me the import of the clause is, that
the State itself, in obedience to the Constitution, shall cause
him to be delivered up_. _That is my judgment. I have always
entertained that opinion, and I entertain it now._”[356]
“I have always entertained that opinion, and I entertain it now.” Such
are the emphatic words by which Mr. Webster declares his judgment of
the unconstitutionality of this Act.
He was not alone. Mr. Mason, the actual author of the Act of Congress,
exposed its unconstitutionality in the very speech by which he
introduced it.
“In my reading of these clauses of the Constitution for
extradition of fugitives of both classes, _I advance the
confident opinion_ that it devolves upon the States the duty
of providing by law both for their capture and delivery.… I
say, then, Sir, that the true intent of the Constitution was
to devolve it upon the States, as a federal duty, to enforce,
by their own laws, within their respective limits, both these
clauses of extradition.”[357]