The Committee do not leave this conclusion to rest merely on
unanswerable reason. Authorities add to the testimony.
Here is the judgment of Chancellor Walworth, of New York, pronounced in
1835, before this subject had become the occasion of political strife.
The testimony of the learned Chancellor is the more important, when it
is considered that he has always acted politically with the Democracy,
which has been the support of Slavery.
“I have looked in vain among the powers delegated to Congress
by the Constitution for any general authority to that body to
legislate on this subject. It certainly is not contained in any
express grant of power, and it does not appear to be embraced
in the general grant of incidental powers contained in the last
clause of the Constitution relative to the powers of Congress.
The law of the United States respecting fugitives from justice
and fugitive slaves is not a law to carry into effect any of
the powers expressly granted to Congress, ‘or any other power
vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or any department or officer thereof.’”[353]
Here, also, is the judgment of Chief Justice Hornblower, of New Jersey,
pronounced in 1836. Having shown that the clause in question confers no
power on Congress, he proceeds as follows.
“In short, if the power of legislation upon this subject
is not given to Congress in the second section of the fourth
article of the Constitution, it cannot, I think, be found in
that instrument. The last clause of the eighth section of the
first article gives to Congress a right to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution _all
the powers_ vested by the Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
But the provisions of the second section of the fourth article
of the Constitution cover no grant to, confide no trust, and
vest _no powers_ in, the Government of the United States. The
language of the whole of that section is to establish certain
principles and rules of action by which the contracting parties
are to be governed in certain specified cases. The stipulations
respecting the rights of citizenship, and the delivery of
persons fleeing from justice or escaping from bondage, _are
not grants of power_ to the General Government, to be executed
by it in derogation of State authority, but they are in the
nature of treaty stipulations, resting for their fulfilment
upon the enlightened patriotism and good faith of the several
States. The argument in favor of Congressional legislation,
founded on the suggestion that some of the States might refuse
a compliance with these constitutional provisions, or neglect
to pass any laws to carry them into effect, _is entitled to no
weight_.”[354]