This speech was made at a crisis in our foreign relations when
they were watched with more than the wonted anxiety, which
began with the hasty concession of belligerent rights, as early
as May 13, 1861. Among painful incidents may be mentioned the
affair of the Trent, with the attendant menace, the escape
of the Florida, and then of the Alabama, the damage to our
commerce by these British vessels, the report of other vessels
building for the Rebels, the swarm of British blockade-runners
with arms and powerful cannon, adverse speeches of British
statesmen, offensive articles of the British press, and
movements for the recognition of the Rebels as an independent
power.
As early as March 4, 1861, Mr. Gregory gave notice in the House
of Commons that on an early day he would call the attention
of her Majesty’s Government to the expediency of a prompt
recognition of the Southern Confederacy of America. April 16,
Mr. Gregory renewed his notice, and added a call for papers.
This motion was afterward deferred from April 30 to May 13,
and on May 16 until June 7, when it was finally postponed
_sine die_. After that frequent debates occurred in both
Houses of Parliament, involving the course of England to the
United States. As late as June 30, 1863, in the summer before
Mr. Sumner’s speech, a long debate was started in the House
of Commons by Mr. Roebuck, on presenting a petition praying
the House to enter into negotiations with the great powers of
Europe with the object of recognizing the independence of the
Confederate States. To all these things was now superadded
the open construction at Birkenhead of two powerful iron-clad
war-vessels, known as the Rebel rams.
The country was alarmed, for the contribution of these powerful
vessels to the Rebel navy was felt to be an open participation
in the Rebellion. Foreign war seemed to menace. Mr. Sumner, in
private correspondence with England during the summer, did not
hesitate to say, that, in his judgment, the sailing of these
Rebel rams from an English port, after the ample notice given,
would be equivalent to a declaration of war by England, not
unlike the seizure of the Spanish galleons or the bombardment
of Copenhagen. Our diplomatic correspondence shows a similar
sentiment in important official quarters. July 11, Mr. Adams,
our minister at London, after setting forth “a systematic plan
of warfare upon the people of the United States carried on from
the port of Liverpool, as well as in less degree from other
ports in the kingdom,” called the attention of Earl Russell to
“the construction and equipment of a steam vessel of war of
the most formidable kind now known,” and intimated that such
a proceeding would “be regarded by the Government and people
of the United States with the greatest alarm, as virtually
tantamount to a participation in the war by the people of Great
Britain.”[161] At different times he transmitted additional
papers, showing the character of these vessels. Meanwhile one
iron-clad ram, being launched, received her engines, and was
engaged in receiving her coal, ready to depart, when, September
4, Mr. Adams, transmitting further testimony, begged permission
to record, in the name of his Government, “this last solemn
protest against the commission of such an act of hostility
against a friendly nation.”[162] On the same day he received
a communication from Earl Russell, bearing date September
1, where, after setting forth the alleged insufficiency of
the testimony against the vessels, he says: “Her Majesty’s
Government are advised that they cannot interfere in any way
with these vessels.”[163] The next day Mr. Adams replied: “I
trust I need not express how profound is my regret at the
conclusion to which her Majesty’s Government have arrived.…
It would be superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship
that this is war. No matter what may be the theory adopted of
neutrality in a struggle, when this process is carried on, in
the manner indicated, from a territory and with the aid of the
subjects of a third party, that third party, to all intents
and purposes, ceases to be neutral. Neither is it necessary
to show that any government which suffers it to be done
fails in enforcing the essential conditions of international
amity towards the country against whom the hostility is
directed.”[164] On the very day of this reply, Mr. Seward, at
Washington, addressed Mr. Adams as follows: “Can the British
Government suppose for a moment that such an assault as is
thus meditated can be made upon us by British built, armed,
and manned vessels, without at once arousing the whole nation
and making a retaliatory war inevitable?… For the interest of
both countries, and of civilization, I hope they will not let
a blow fall from under their hands that will render peace
impossible.”[165] Mr. Beaman, in his essay on the Alabama
Claims, after examining this correspondence, says, it “shows,
that, if these rams had been allowed to escape, peace between
Great Britain and the United States would have been no longer
possible.”[166]
It is easy to see that the two countries were on the verge
of war. Happily, this was avoided by a tardy act, made known
to Mr. Adams by a note, under date of September 8: “Lord
Russell presents his compliments to Mr. Adams, and has the
honor to inform him that instructions have been issued which
will prevent the departure of the two iron-clad vessels from
Liverpool.”[167] The Rebel rams were stopped.
Meanwhile Mr. Sumner had accepted an invitation to speak in
New York on our foreign relations, at a time to be fixed by
himself. Watching the course of events, and seeing clearly the
alternative that presented itself to Mr. Adams and Mr. Seward,
he wrote at the close of August, fixing September 10th for his
speech; and here his purpose was twofold. Anxious to arrest the
fatal tendency, he was not without hope that he might obtain
a hearing in England, especially from the Cabinet, to most of
whom he was personally known; but, if unsuccessful in this
last frank effort for peace, then he trusted that his speech
would be a vindication of his country on the issue forced by
England, and an appeal to the moral sentiments of the civilized
world. On this account he dwelt especially on Slavery, and the
impossibility in a civilized age of recognizing a _new_ power
openly proclaiming this Barbarism as its corner-stone.
The reception of this speech at home was cordial and
sympathetic; in England it was the reverse, although there were
friendly exceptions. A few extracts from the American press
will show the unison with Mr. Sumner, which becomes important
in illustrating his position, and also the divergence of
sentiment in the two countries.
The New York press was outspoken.
* * * * *