Too much have I spoken for your patience, if not enough for the cause.
But there is yet another topic, which I have reserved to the last,
because logically it belongs there, or at least can be best considered
in the gathered light of the previous discussion. Its immediate
practical interest is great. I refer to the _Concession of Belligerent
Rights_, being the first stage to independence. Great Britain led the
way in acknowledging the embryo government as belligerent on sea as
well as land, and by proclamation of the Queen declared neutrality
between the two parties,--thus lifting an embryo, which was nothing
else than animate Slavery, to equality _on sea_ as well as land with
its ancient ally, the National Government. Here was a blunder, if not
a crime, not merely in the alacrity with which it was done, but in
doing it at all. It was followed immediately by France, and then by
Spain, Holland, and Brazil. The concession of belligerent rights on
land was a name and nothing more, therefore I say nothing about it.
But the concession of _belligerent rights on the ocean_ is of widely
different character, and the two reasons against the recognition of
independence are equally applicable to this concession: _first_, the
embryo government has no _maritime_ or _naval_ belligerent rights _de
facto_, and, _secondly_, an embryo of Rebel Slavery cannot have the
character _de facto_ which would justify the concession of _maritime_
or _naval_ belligerence; so that, were the concession vindicated on the
first ground, it must fail on the second.
* * * * *
The concession of _ocean_ belligerence is a letter of license from
consenting powers to every Slavemonger cruiser, or rather it is the
countersign of these powers to the commission of every such cruiser.
Without such countersign the cruiser would be an outlaw, with no right
to enter a foreign port. The declaration of belligerence imparts legal
competence, and the right to testify by flag and arms. Without such
competence there would be no flag and no right to bear arms on the
ocean. Burke sententiously describes it as an “intermediate treaty
_which puts rebels in possession of the Law of Nations with regard to
war_.”[142] And this is plainly true.
The magnitude of this concession may be seen in three aspects: _first_,
in the immunities it confers, putting an embryo of Rebel Slavery on
_equality_ with established governments, making its cruisers lawful
instead of piratical, and opening to them boundless facilities at
sea and in port, so that they may obtain supplies and hospitality;
_secondly_, in the degradation it fastens upon the National Government,
which is condemned to see its ships treated on _equality_ with the
ships of Rebel Slavery, and also the just rule of “neutrality” between
belligerent powers invoked to fetter its activity against a giant
felony; and, _thirdly_, in the disturbance to commerce it sanctions,
by letting loose lawless sea-rovers armed with belligerent rights,
including the right of search, whose natural recklessness is left
unbridled and without remedy even from diplomatic intercourse. The
ocean is a common highway; but it is for the interest of all who
traverse it that the highway should not be disturbed by predatory
hostilities. Such a concession should be made with the greatest
caution, and then only under the necessity of the case, on the
overwhelming authority of _the fact_: for, from beginning to end, it is
simply a question of fact, absolutely dependent on those conditions and
prerequisites without which ocean belligerence cannot exist.
As a general rule, belligerent rights are conceded only where a rebel
government or contending party in a civil war has acquired such form
and body, that, for the time being, within certain limits, it is
sovereign _de facto_, so far at least as to command troops and _to
administer justice_. On this last point I dwell especially. It is the
capacity to administer justice which is the criterion, whether on land
or ocean. The concession of belligerence is the recognition of such
limited sovereignty, which bears the same relation to acknowledged
independence as gristle bears to bone. It is obvious that such
sovereignty may exist _de facto_ on land without existing _de facto_ on
ocean. It may prevail in armies, and yet fail in navies. In short, _the
fact_ may be one way on land and the other way _on ocean_. Nor can it
be inferred on ocean simply from existence on land. Our Supreme Court
has declared that there may be “a limited, partial war,” “a restrained
or limited hostility,” “an imperfect war, or a war as to certain
objects and to a certain extent.” Thus, on one occasion, hostilities
were authorized “on the high seas by certain persons in certain cases,”
but without authority “to commit hostilities on land.”[143] But by
the same rule there may be war on land and not on sea, and this may
follow from the necessity of the case. If Rebel Slavery does not come
within the conditions of ocean war, then, whatever its belligerence on
land, it cannot expect it on the ocean. Since every such concession
is adverse to the original government, and is made only under the
necessity of the case, it must be limited carefully to _the actual
fact_. Indeed, Mr. Canning, who has shed so much light on these topics,
openly took the ground that “belligerency is not so much a principle
as _a fact_.”[144] And the question then arises, whether Rebel Slavery
has acquired such _de facto_ sovereignty on the ocean as entitles it to
_ocean_ belligerent rights.
There are at least two “facts” patent to all: _first_, that Rebel
Slavery is without a single port into which even legal cruisers
can take prizes for adjudication; and, _secondly_, that the ships
which now presume to exercise _ocean_ belligerent rights in its
name--constituting that navy which a member of the British Cabinet
announced as “to be created”--were all “created” in England, which
is the _naval base_ from which they sally forth on predatory cruise,
without once entering a port of their own pretended government.
These two “facts” are different in nature. The first attaches
absolutely to the pretended power, rendering it incompetent to
exercise _belligerent jurisdiction_ on the ocean. The second attaches
to the individual ships, rendering them piratical. These simple and
unquestionable “facts” are the key to unlock the present question.
From the reason of the case, there can be no _ocean_ belligerent
without a port into which it can take prizes. Any other rule is
absurd. It is not enough to sail the sea, like the Flying Dutchman;
the _ocean_ belligerent must be able to touch the land, and that
land its own. This proceeds on the idea of civilized warfare, that
something more than _naked force_ is essential to the completeness of
capture. According to the earlier rule, transmutation of property was
accomplished by the “pernoctation” of the captured ship within the port
of the belligerent,--or, as it was called, _deductio infra præsidia_.
As early as 1414, under Henry the Fifth of England, there was an Act
of Parliament requiring privateers _to bring their prizes into a
port of the kingdom_, and to make a declaration thereof to a proper
officer, _before undertaking to dispose of them_.[145] The modern rule
interposes an additional check upon lawless violence, by requiring the
condemnation of a competent court. This rule, which is among the most
authoritative of the British Admiralty, is found in the famous letter
of Sir William Scott and Sir John Nicholl, addressed to John Jay, as
follows: “_Before the ship or goods can be disposed of by the captor_,
there must be a regular judicial proceeding, wherein both parties may
be heard, and condemnation thereupon as prize, in a Court of Admiralty,
judging by the Law of Nations and treaties.”[146] This is explicit, and
is plainly necessary for the protection of neutral commerce. But this
rule is French as well as English. It is part of International Law. A
_seizure_ is regarded merely as a _preliminary_ act, which does not
divest the property, though it paralyzes the right of the proprietor. A
subsequent act of condemnation by a competent tribunal is necessary to
determine if the seizure is valid. The question is compendiously called
_Prize or No Prize_. Where the property of neutrals is involved, this
requirement becomes of absolute necessity. In conceding belligerence,
all customary belligerent rights with regard to neutrals are conceded
also, so that neutral rights and interests are put in jeopardy. Here
we see at once the wrong done. If nothing is due to Civilization,
something is due to neutrals. Without dwelling on this point, I
content myself with the authority of two recent French writers.
M. Hautefeuille, in his elaborate work, says: “The cruiser is not
recognized as the proprietor of the objects seized, he cannot dispose
of them, but _it is his duty to present himself before the tribunal and
obtain a sentence declaring them to be prize_.”[147] A later writer,
M. Eugène Cauchy, whose work has appeared since our war began, says:
“A usage which evidently has its source in _natural equity_ requires,
that, before proceeding to divide the booty, there should be an inquiry
as to the regularity of the prize. _Every prize taken from an enemy
should be carried before the judge established by the sovereign of
the captor._”[148] But if the power calling itself belligerent cannot
comply with this condition,--if it has no port into which it can
bring the captured ship, and no court, according to the requirement
of the British Admiralty, with “a regular judicial proceeding wherein
both parties may be heard,”--it is clearly _not in a situation to
dispose of a ship or goods as prize_. Whatever its force in other
respects, it lacks a vital element of _ocean_ belligerence. In that
_semi_-sovereignty which constitutes belligerence on land there must be
provision for the _administration of justice_, without which there is
nothing but a mob. In that same _semi_-sovereignty on the ocean there
must be similar provision. It is not enough that there are ships duly
commissioned to take prizes, there must also be courts to try them;
and the latter are not less important than the former. Such is the
conclusion of reason, in harmony with acknowledged principles. How,
then, acknowledge belligerent rights where this condition is wanting?
Earl Russell himself, so swift to make this concession, is led
to confess the necessity of Prize Courts on the part of _ocean_
belligerents, and thus exposes the irrational character of his own
work. In a letter to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, occasioned by
the destruction of British cargoes, the Minister says: “The owners of
any British property, not being contraband of war, on board a Federal
vessel captured and destroyed by a Confederate vessel of war, _may
claim in a Confederate Prize Court compensation for destruction of such
property_.”[149] Even in the very speech announcing the belligerent
rights of our Rebels, including the right to visit and detain British
merchant vessels having enemy’s property on board and to confiscate
such property, Earl Russell was compelled to declare, that “it was
_necessarily implied_, as a condition of such acknowledgment, that the
detention was for the purpose of bringing the vessels detained before
an established Court of Prize, and that confiscation did not take place
until after condemnation by such competent tribunal.”[150] Such was the
express condition, obviously to secure justice. If there be no Prize
Court, then justice must fail; and with this failure tumbles _in fact_
the whole wretched pretension of _ocean_ belligerence, except in the
galvanism of a Queen’s proclamation or a Cabinet concession.
If a cruiser may at any time burn prizes, it is because of some
exceptional exigency in a particular case, and not according to general
rule, which practically declares that there can be no right to take
a prize, if there be no port into which it may be carried. The right
of capture and the right of trial are the complements of each other,
through which a harsh prerogative is supposed to be rounded into the
proper form of civilized warfare. Therefore every ship and cargo burned
by the captors for the reason that they had no port testifies that they
are without that vital sovereignty on the ocean which is needed in the
exercise of belligerent jurisdiction, and that they are not _ocean_
belligerents _in fact_. Nay, more, all these bonfires of the sea cry
out against the power which by precipitate concession furnished the
torch. As well invest the rebel rajahs of India, who never tasted salt
water, with this ocean prerogative, so that they too may rob and burn;
as well constitute land-locked Poland, now in arms for independence,
an ocean belligerent,--or enroll mountain Switzerland in the same
class,--or join with Shakespeare in giving to inland Bohemia an outlook
upon the ocean.[151]
To aggravate this concession, the ships are all built, rigged, armed,
and manned in Great Britain. It is out of British oak and British iron
that they are constructed, rigged with British ropes, made formidable
with British arms, provided with British gunners, and navigated by
British crews, so as to constitute in all respects a _British naval
expedition_. British ports supply the place of Rebel Slavemonger
ports. British ports are open to them, when their own are closed.
British ports constitute their _naval base of operations and supplies_,
furnishing everything needful, except an officer, the ship’s papers,
and a court for the trial of the prizes, each of which is essential
to the legality of the expedition. And yet these same ships, thus
equipped in British ports, and _never touching a port of the pretended
government_ in whose name they rob and burn,--being simply a rib taken
out of the side of England and prostituted to Rebel Slavery,--receive
the further passport of belligerence from the British Government, when
_in fact_ the belligerence does not exist. The whole proceeding, from
the laying of the keel in a British dockyard to the bursting flames
on the ocean, is a mockery of International Law and an insult to a
friendly power.
The case is sometimes said to be new; but it is new only as no
such “parricide” is provided against in express terms. It was not
anticipated. But the principles which govern it are as old as justice
and humanity, in the interests of which belligerent rights are said
to be conceded. Here it is all reversed, and it is now apparent,
that, whatever the motives of the British Government, the concession
was in behalf of _in_justice and _in_humanity. Burning ships and
scattered wrecks are the witnesses. If such a case is not condemned
by International Law, then has this law lost its virtue. Call such
cruisers by whatever polite term most pleases the ear, and you do not
change their character with their name. Without a home and without a
legal character, they are mere gypsies of the sea, disturbers of the
common highway, outlaws, and enemies of the human race.
There is a precedent which shows how impossible it is for a pretended
power, without a single port, to possess belligerent rights on the
ocean, and how impossible it is for the ship of such pretended power
to be anything but a felon ship. James the Second of England, after he
had ceased to be _de facto_ king, and while an exile without a single
port, undertook to issue letters of marque. It was argued unanswerably
before the Privy Council of William the Third, that a deposed prince
could not receive from any other sovereign “international privileges”;
“that, if he could grant a commission to take the ships of a single
nation, it would in effect be a general license to plunder, _because
those who were so commissioned would be their own judges of whatever
they took_”; and “that the reason of the thing, which pronounced that
robbers and pirates, when they formed themselves into a civil society,
became just enemies, pronounced also that a king without territory,
without power of protecting the innocent or punishing the guilty, _or
in any way of administering justice_, dwindled into a pirate, if he
issued commissions to seize the goods and ships of nations, _and that
they who took commissions from him must be held by legal inference to
have associated ‘sceleris causâ’ and could not be considered as members
of a civil society_.”[152] These weighty words are strictly applicable
to the present case. Whatever the force of Rebel Slavery on land, it
is no more on the ocean than the “deposed prince,” “without power of
protecting the innocent or punishing the guilty, _or in any way of
administering justice_”; and, like the prince, it has “dwindled into a
pirate,” except so far as sustained by British concession. In adducing
this precedent, I follow the learned ex-Chancellor, Lord Chelmsford,
who used it to show, that, without the concession of belligerent rights
to our Rebels, “any Englishman aiding them by fitting out a privateer
against the Federal Government would be guilty of piracy.”[153] But the
reasoning at the Privy Council shows, also, that the concession ought
not to have been made.
There is yet another British precedent, which shows how essential are
judicial proceedings before appropriation of a captured ship or cargo.
The case is memorable. It is none other than that of the famous Captain
Kidd, who, on indictment for piracy, as long ago as 1701, produced a
commission in justification. But it was at once declared not enough
to show a commission; _he must also show condemnation of the captured
ship_. The Lord Chief Baron of that day said, that, “if he had acted
pursuant to his commission, _he ought to have condemned the ship and
goods_”; that “by his not condemning them he seems to show his aim,
mind, and intention; that he did not act in that case by virtue of his
commission, but quite contrary to it, for he takes the ship and shares
the money and goods, and is taken in that very ship, … _so that there
is no color or pretence appears that he intended to bring this ship to
England to be condemned or to have condemned it in any of the English
plantations_”; and that, “whilst men pursue their commissions, they
must be justified, but when they do things not authorized, or never
acted by them, _it is as if there had been no commission at all_.”[154]
Captain Kidd was condemned to death and executed as a pirate. If he was
a pirate, worthy of death, then, by the same rule, those rovers who
rob cargoes, burn ships, and adorn their cabins with rows of stolen
chronometers, careless of a Prize Court, are entitled to small favor
from a civilized power.
Without considering more critically what should be the fate of these
ocean incendiaries, or what the responsibilities of England, out of
whom they came, I content myself with the conclusion that they are not
entitled to _ocean_ belligerence. And here let it be understood that
no question is possible with regard to an established power with access
to the ocean; for belligerent rights are fixed by International Law,
without foreign recognition; nor can the rights of such a power be a
precedent for any concession to a rebel community without ports and
Prize Courts.
_Pirate_ is a hard word; but Jefferson did not shrink from applying
it to “private armed vessels,” infesting our coasts, preying upon our
commerce, and making captures at the very entrance of our harbors,
as well as on the high seas. “They have carried them off,” he says,
“under pretence of legal adjudication; but, not daring to approach a
court of justice, they have plundered and sunk them by the way, or in
obscure places, where no evidence could arise against them, maltreated
the crews, and abandoned them in boats in the open sea or on desert
shores without food or covering.” These things, kindred to what is
done by our Rebel cruisers, he calls “enormities,” and he announces
that he has equipped a force “to bring the offenders in for trial as
_pirates_.”[155]
* * * * *
Even if Rebel Slavery, coagulated in embryo government, has arrived
at that _semi_-sovereignty _de facto_ on the ocean which justifies
belligerent rights, yet the Christian powers should indignantly decline
to make the concession, because by doing so they make themselves
accomplices in shameful crime. Here I avoid details. It is sufficient
to say that every argument of fact and reason, every whisper of
conscience and humanity, every indignant outburst of an honest man
against recognition of Slavery as an independent power, is equally
strong against any concession of ocean belligerence. Such concession
is half-way house to recognition, and can be made only where a nation
is ready, if the fact of independence be sufficiently established, to
acknowledge it, on the principle of Vattel, that “whosoever has a right
to the end has a right to the means.”[156] It is equally clear, that,
where a nation, on grounds of conscience, must refuse recognition of
independence, it cannot concede belligerence; for, _where the end is
forbidden, the means must be forbidden also_. The illogical absurdity
of such concession by Great Britain, so persistent always against
Slavery, and now for more than a generation the declared protectress of
the African race, becomes doubly apparent, when it is considered that
every Rebel ship built in England and invested with ocean belligerence
carries with it the Law of Slavery, so that, by British concession, the
ship becomes an _extension_ of _Slave_ territory and a floating _Slave_
castle.
And yet it is said that this impostor is entitled to ocean rights, and
the British Queen is made to proclaim them. Sad day for England, when
another wicked compromise was struck with Slavery, kindred to that
old treaty which mantles the cheeks of honest Englishmen, when the
slave-trade was protected and its profits secured to British subjects!
I know not the profits secured by the destruction of American commerce,
but I do know that the Treaty of Utrecht, crimson with the blood of
slaves, is not so crimson as that reckless proclamation which gave to
Slavery a frantic life, and helped for a time, nay, still helps, this
demon in the rage with which it battles against Human Rights. Such a
ship, with the law of Slavery on its deck and the flag of Slavery at
its mast-head, sailing for Slavery, fighting for Slavery, burning for
Slavery, and knowing no other sovereignty than the pretended government
of Rebel Slavery, can be nothing less in spirit and character than
a slave pirate and the enemy of the human race. Like produces like,
and the parent power, which is Slavery, must stamp itself upon the
ship, making it a floating offence to Heaven, with no limit to its
audacity,--wild, outrageous, impious, a monster of the deep, to be
hunted down by all who have not forgotten their duty alike to God and
man.
Meanwhile there is one simple act which the justice of England cannot
continue to refuse. That fatal concession, made in a moment of
eclipse, when reason and humanity were obscured, must be annulled. The
_blunder-crime_ must be renounced, so that Slave pirates may no longer
sail the sea, robbing, destroying, burning, with British license. Then
will they promptly disappear forever, and with them the occasion of
strife between two great powers, who ought to be, if not as mother and
child, at least as brothers among the nations. And may God in His mercy
help this consummation!
* * * * *
Here I leave this part of the subject, founding my objections on two
grounds.
(1.) The embryo of Rebel Slavery has not that degree of sovereignty _on
the ocean_ which is essential to belligerence there.
(2.) Even if it possessed the requisite sovereignty, no Christian
power can make such concession to it without shameful complicity with
Slavery.
Both are objections of _fact_. Either is sufficient. Even if the
belligerence seems to be established as _fact_, still its concession
in this age of Christian light must be impossible, except under some
temporary aberration, which, for the honor of England and the welfare
of Humanity, should speedily pass away.
* * * * *
Again, fellow-citizens, I crave forgiveness for this long trespass.
If the field traversed is ample, it has been brightened always by
the light of international justice, exposing clearly, from beginning
to end, the sacred landmarks of duty. I have been frank, disguising
nothing and keeping nothing back, so that you have been able to see the
perils to which the Republic is exposed from the natural tendency of
war to breed war, as exhibited in examples of history, and also from
the fatal proclivity of foreign powers to intermeddle, as exhibited
in recent instances of querulous criticism or intrusive proposition,
all adverse to the good cause, while pirate ships are permitted to
depredate on our commerce; then how the best historic instances testify
in favor of Freedom, and how all intervention of every kind, whether
by proffer of mediation or otherwise, becomes intolerable, when its
influence tends to the establishment of that soulless anomaly, a
professed Republic built on the hopeless and everlasting bondage of
a race; and especially how Great Britain is sacredly engaged by all
the logic of her history and all her traditions in unbroken lineage
against any such unutterable baseness; then how all the Christian
powers constituting the Family of Nations are firmly bound to set
their faces against any recognition of the embryo government.--first,
because its independence is not _in fact_ established, and, secondly,
because, even if _in fact_ established, its recognition is impossible
without criminal complicity in Slavery; and, lastly, how these same
Christian powers are firmly bound by the same twofold reasons against
any concession of ocean rights to this hideous pretender.
* * * * *
It only remains that the Republic should gird itself to the majesty
of its duties. War is terrible and hard to bear, with its waste, its
pains, its wounds, its funerals. But in this war we are not choosers.
We are challenged to the defence of country, and in this sacred cause
to crush Slavery. There is no alternative. Slavery began the combat,
staking life, _and determined to rule or die_. Let it die; and to this
end the country must be aroused. We need a song like “Scots who have
with Wallace bled.” The cause is greater now than then. We need words
like those of Luther, “half battles.” Ours is another Reformation
and another Revolution. The attempted revolution for Slavery we meet
by a counter revolution for Liberty. That we may continue freemen,
there must be no slaves; and thus our own security is linked with the
redemption of a race. Blessed lot, amidst the harshness of war, to
wield the arms and deal the blows under which the monster will surely
fall! The battle is mighty; for into Slavery has entered the Spirit of
Evil. It is persistent; for such a gathered wickedness, concentrated,
aroused, and maddened, must have a tenacity of life which will not
yield at once. But no might nor time can save it now.
That the whole war is contained in Slavery may be seen not only in
the acts of the National Government, but also in the confessions of
Rebel Slavemongers. Already the President has proclaimed that the
slaves throughout the whole Rebel region “are and henceforward shall be
free”; and in order to fix the irreversible character of this sublime
edict, he has further announced “that the Executive Government of the
United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof,
will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.”[157] An
enlightened commission is constituted to consider how these thronging
freedmen can be best employed for their own good and the national
defence. Already the sons of Africa, as mustered soldiers of the Union,
have shown a discipline and a bravery not unworthy of their ancient
fathers, when the prophet Jeremiah said, “Let the mighty men come
forth, the Ethiopians and the Libyans that handle the shield”;[158]
and still further, by their stature, by their appearance in the ranks,
and even by the unexpected testimony of sanitary statistics, according
to which for every black soldier disabled by sickness there are more
than ten white, thus making the army health of the black ten times as
sure as that of the white,--by all these things they have shown that
the Father of History, who is our earliest classical authority, was
not entirely mistaken, when he spoke of Ethiopia as “the most distant
region of the earth, whose inhabitants are the tallest, most beautiful,
and most long-lived of the human race.”[159] Even if these acts of the
National Government were less significant, all doubt is removed by
the Rebel Slavemongers themselves, who, in Satanic audacity, openly
avow that Slavery is the end and aim of the government they seek to
establish, so that the whole bloody war they wage is all in the name
of Slavery. Therefore, in battling against the Rebellion, we battle
against Slavery. Freedom is the growing inspiration of our armies
and the just inscription of our banners. Such a war is not a war of
subjugation, but a war of liberation, to save the Republic from a petty
oligarchy of taskmasters, and to rescue four millions of human beings
from cruel oppression. Not to subjugate, but to liberate, is the object
of our Holy War.
And yet British statesmen, forgetting for the moment all moral
distinctions, forgetting God, who will not be forgotten, gravely
announce that our cause must fail. Alas! individual wickedness is too
often successful; but a pretended nation, suckled in wickedness and
boasting its wickedness, a new Sodom, with all the guilt of the old,
waiting to be blasted, and yet, in barefaced effrontery, openly seeking
the fellowship of Christian powers, is doomed to defeat. Toleration
of such a pretension is practical atheism. Chronology and geography
are both offended. Piety stands aghast. In this age of light, and
in countries boasting civilization, there can be no place for its
barbarous plenipotentiaries. As well expect crocodiles crawling on
the pavements of London and Paris, or the carnivorous idols of Africa
installed for worship in Westminster Abbey and Notre Dame.
Even if the Republic were less strong, yet I am glad to believe that
the Rebellion must fail from the essential impossibility of any such
wicked success. The responsibilities of the Christian powers would be
increased by our weakness. Behind our blockade there would be _a moral
blockade_; behind our armies there would be the aroused judgment of
the civilized world. But not on that account can we hesitate. This is
no time to pause. Thus do I, who formerly pleaded so often for Peace,
now insist upon Liberty as its indispensable condition,[160]--clearly
because, in this terrible moment, there is no other way to that sincere
and solid peace without which is endless war. Even on economic grounds,
it were better that this war should proceed rather than recognize
any partition, which, beginning with humiliation, must involve the
perpetuation of armaments and break out again in blood. But there is
something worse than waste of money; it is waste of character. Give me
any peace but a liberticide peace. In other days the immense eloquence
of Burke was stirred against a regicide peace. But a peace founded on
the killing of a king is not so bad as a peace founded on the killing
of Liberty; nor can the saddest scenes of such a peace be so sad as
the daily life legalized by Slavery. A queen on the scaffold is not so
pitiful a sight as a woman on the auction-block.
While thus steady in purpose at home, we must not neglect that proper
moderation abroad which becomes the consciousness of strength and the
nobleness of our cause. The mistaken sympathy which foreign powers
bestow upon Slavery,--or, it may be, the mistaken insensibility,--under
the plausible name of “neutrality,” which they profess, will be worse
for them than for us. For them it will be a record of shame, which
their children would gladly blot out with tears. For us it will be only
another obstacle vanquished in the battle for Civilization, where,
unhappily, false friends are mingled with open enemies. Even if the
cause seem for a while imperilled by foreign powers, yet our duties are
none the less urgent. If the pressure be great, the resistance must be
greater. Nor can there be any retreat. Come weal or woe, this is the
place for us to stand.
I know not if a republic like ours can count even now upon the certain
friendship of any European power, unless it be the Republic of William
Tell. The very name is unwelcome to the full-blown representatives of
monarchical Europe, who forget how proudly, even in modern history,
Venice bore the title of _Serenissima Respublica_. It is for us to
change all this. Our consistent example will be enough. Thus far we
have been known chiefly through that vital force which Slavery could
only degrade, but not subdue. Now, at last, by the death of Slavery,
will the Republic begin to live. For what is life without Liberty?
Stretching from ocean to ocean, teeming with population, bountiful in
resources of all kinds, rejoicing in that righteousness which exalteth
a nation, and thrice happy in universal enfranchisement, it will be
more than conqueror. Nothing too vast for its power, nothing too minute
for its care. Triumphant over the foulest wrong ever inflicted, after
the bloodiest war ever waged, it will know the majesty of Right and the
beauty of Peace, prepared always to uphold the one and to cultivate
the other. Strong in its own mighty stature, filled with all the
fulness of a new life, and covered with a panoply of renown, it will
confess that no dominion is of value that does not contribute to human
happiness. Born in this latter day and child of its own struggles,
without ancestral claim, but heir of all the ages, it will stand forth
to assert the dignity of man, and wherever any member of the Human
Family can be succored, there its voice will reach,--as the voice of
Cromwell reached across France, even to the persecuted mountaineers of
the Alps. Such will be this Republic, upstart among the nations. Ay!
as steam-engine, telegraph, and chloroform are upstart. Comforter and
helper like these, it can know no bounds to its empire over a willing
world. But the first stage is the death of Slavery.