“what can he be doing? what has become of him? Let him never more

present himself before me; I discharge him this very minute!” The

servant makes his appearance, and he asks him, in a contemptuous tone,

where he comes from; the man replies he has been where he was sent

to, and gives a faithful account of his errand. You would often take

Menalcas for what he is not, for an idiot; for he does not listen,

and speaks still less; for a madman, because he talks to himself, and

indulges in certain grimaces and involuntary motions of the head;

for proud and discourteous, because when you bow to him, he may pass

without looking at you, or look at you and not return your bow; for a

man without any feeling, for he talks of bankruptcy in a family where

there is such a blot; of executions and the scaffold before a person

whose father has been beheaded; of plebeians before plebeians who

have become rich and pretend to be of noble birth. He even intends

to bring up his illegitimate son in his house, and pretends he is a

servant; and though he would have his wife and children know nothing

about the matter, he cannot forbear calling him his son every hour of

the day. He resolves to let his son marry the daughter of some man of

business, yet he now and then boasts of his birth and ancestors, and

that no Menalcas has ever made a misalliance. In short, he seems to be

absent minded, and to pay no attention to the conversation going on; he

thinks and speaks at the same time, but what he says is seldom about

what he thinks; so that there is hardly any coherence and sequence in

his talk; he often says “yes” when he should say “no,” and when he

says “no,” you must suppose he would say “yes.” When he answers you so

pertinently, his eyes are fixed on your countenance, but it does not

follow that he sees you; he looks neither at you nor at any one, nor at

anything in the world. All that you can draw from him, even when he is

most sociable and most attentive, are some such words as these: “Yes,

indeed; it is true; very well; really; indeed; I believe so; certainly;

O Heaven!” and some other monosyllables, even not always used on

the right occasions. He never is with those with whom he appears to

be; he calls his footman very seriously “Sir,” and his friend “La

Verdure;”[547] says “Your Reverence” to a prince of the royal blood,

and “Your Highness” to a Jesuit. When he is at mass, and the priest

sneezes, he cries out aloud, “God bless you!” He is in the company

of a magistrate of serious disposition, and venerable by his age and

dignity, who asks him whether a certain event happened in such and such

a way, and Menalcas replies, “Yes, miss.” As he came one day from the

country, his footmen plotted to rob him and succeeded; they jumped down

from behind his coach, presented the end of a torch to his breast, and

demanded his purse, which he gave up.[548] When he came home he told

his friends what had happened, and when they asked for details he said

they had better inquire of his servants, who also were present.

(8.) Impoliteness is not a vice of the mind, but the consequence of

several vices; of foolish vanity, of ignorance of oneʼs duties, of

idleness, of stupidity, of absence of mind, of contempt for others, and

of jealousy. Though it only shows itself outwardly, it is not the less

odious, because it is a fault which is always visible and manifest;

however, it gives more or less offence, according as the motives for

displaying it are more or less offensive.

(9.) If we say of an angry, captious, quarrelsome, melancholy, formal,

capricious person, that it is all owing to his temper, it is not to

find an excuse for him, whatever people may think, but an involuntary

acknowledgment that such great faults admit of no remedy.

What we call good temper is a thing too much neglected among men; they

ought to understand that they should not alone be good, but also appear

to be so, at least if they are inclined to be sociable and disposed to

friendly intercourse; in other words, if they would be men. We do not

require wicked men to be gentle and urbane; in these qualities they

are never wanting, for they employ them to ensnare the simple, and to

find a larger field for their operations; but we wish kind-hearted men

always to be tractable, accessible, and courteous; so that there should

no longer be any reason for saying that wicked men do harm and that

good men make others uncomfortable.

(10.) The generality of men proceed from anger to insults; others act

differently, for they first give offence and then grow angry; our

surprise at such behaviour always supersedes resentment.

(11.) Men do not sufficiently take advantage of every opportunity for

pleasing other people. When a person accepts a certain post, it seems

that he intends to acquire the power of obliging others without using

it; nothing is quicker and more readily given than a refusal, whilst

nothing is ever granted until after mature reflection.

(12.) Know exactly what you are to expect from men in general, and

from each of them in particular, and then mix with the people around

you.

(13.) If poverty is the mother of all crimes, lack of intelligence is

their father.

(14.) A knave can hardly be a very intelligent man; a clear and

far-seeing mind leads to regularity, honesty, and virtue; it is want

of sense and penetration which begets obstinacy in wickedness as well

as in duplicity; in vain we endeavour to correct such a man by satire;

it may describe him to others, but he himself will not know his own

picture; it is like scolding a deaf man. It would be well, please

gentlemen of sense and culture, and avenge everybody, if a rogue were

not so constituted as to be without any feeling whatever.

(15.) There are some vices for which we are indebted to none but

ourselves, which are innate in us, and are strengthened by habit; there

are others we contract which are foreign to us. Sometimes men are

naturally inclined to yield without much difficulty, to be urbane, and

to desire to please; but by the treatment they meet from those whom

they frequent and on whom they depend, they soon lose all moderation,

and even change their disposition; they grow melancholy and peevish to

a degree ere this unknown to them; their temper is completely changed,

and they are themselves astonished at their being rude and tetchy.

(16.) Some people ask why the whole bulk of mankind does not

constitute one nation, and does not like to speak the same language,

obey the same laws, and agree among themselves to adopt the same

customs and the same worship? For my part, observing how greatly

minds, tastes, and sentiments differ, I am astonished to see seven or

eight persons, living under the same roof and within the same walls,

constitute one family.[549]

(17.) There are some extraordinary fathers, who seem, during the whole

course of their lives, to be preparing reasons for their children for

being consoled at their deaths.[550]

(18.) Everything is strange in the dispositions, morals, and

manners of men: one person who during his whole lifetime has been

melancholy, passionate, avaricious, fawning, submissive, laborious,

and egotistical, was born lively, peaceable, indolent, ostentatious,

and with lofty feelings, abhorring anything base; want, circumstances,

and dire necessity have compelled him and caused such a great change.

Such a manʼs inmost feelings can really not be described, for too many

external things have altered, changed, and upset him, so that he is not

exactly what he thinks he is himself or what he appears to be.

(19.) Life is short and tedious, and is wholly spent in wishing; we

trust to find rest and enjoyment at some future time, often at an age

when our best blessings, youth and health, have already left us. When

at last that time has arrived, it surprises us in the midst of fresh

desires; we have got no farther when we are attacked by a fever which

kills us; if we had been cured, it would only have been to give us more

time for other desires.

(20.) A man requesting a favour from another, surrenders himself at

discretion to the personage from whom he expects it, but when he is

quite sure it will be granted, he temporises, parleys, and capitulates.

(21.) It is so usual for men not to be happy, and so essential for

every blessing to be acquired with infinite trouble, that what is

obtained easily is looked upon with suspicion. We can hardly understand

how anything which costs us so little can be greatly to our advantage,

or how by strictly honest means we can so easily obtain what we want;

we may think we deserve our success, but we ought very seldom to depend

on it.

(22.) A man who says he is not born happy may at least become so by the

happiness his friends and relatives enjoy, but envy deprives him even

of this last resource.

(23.) Whatever I may somewhere have said,[551] it is, perhaps, wrong to

be dejected. Men seem born to misfortune, pain, and poverty, and as few

escape this, and as every kind of calamity seems to befall them, they

ought to be prepared for every misfortune.

(24.) Men find it so very difficult to make business arrangements, they

are so very touchy where their smallest interests are concerned, they

are so bristling over with difficulties, so willing to deceive and so

unwilling to be deceived, they place so high a value on what belongs to

themselves, and are so apt to undervalue what belongs to others, that

I admit I cannot understand how and in what way marriages, contracts,

acquisitions, conventions, truces, treaties, and alliances are brought

about.

(25.) Among some people arrogance supplies the place of grandeur,

inhumanity of decision, and roguery of intelligence.

Knaves easily believe others as bad as themselves; there is no

deceiving them, neither do they long deceive.

I would rather at any time be considered a fool than a rogue.

We never deceive people to benefit them, for knavery is a compound of

wickedness and falsehood.

(26.) If there were not so many dupes in this world there would be

fewer of those men called shrewd or sharp, who are honoured for having

been artful enough in deceiving others during the whole course of their

lives, and are proud of having done so. Why should you expect Erophilus

not to presume on himself and his shrewdness, whose breach of faith,

bad actions, and roguery, instead of doing him any harm, have procured

him favours and rewards, even from those whom he has either never

served or to whom he has done an ill turn?

(27.) We hear nothing in the squares and in the streets of great

cities, and out of the mouths of the passers-by, but such words as

“writs, executions, interrogatories, bonds, and pleadings.” Is there

not the smallest equity more left in this world? Or is it, on the

contrary, full of people who coolly ask for what is not due to them, or

who distinctly refuse to pay what they owe?

The invention of legal documents to remind men of what they promised,

and to convince them that they did so, is a shame to humanity.

If you suppress passion, interest, and injustice, how quiet would

the greatest cities be! The necessities of life, and the means of

satisfying them, are the cause of nearly half the difficulties.

(28.) Nothing is of greater assistance to a man for bearing quietly the

wrongs done to him by relatives and friends than his reflections on

the vices of humanity; on the difficulty men have in being constant,

generous, and faithful, or on their loving anything better than their

own interests. He knows the extent of their power, and does not require

them to penetrate solid bodies, to fly in the air, or to give every

one his due; he may dislike mankind in general for having no greater

respect for virtue; but he finds excuses for individuals, and even

loves them from higher motives, whilst he does his best to require

himself as little indulgence as possible.

(29.) There are certain things which we most passionately desire,

and of which the mere thought carries us away and throws us into an

ecstasy: if we happen to obtain them, we are less sensible of them than

we thought we should be, and we enjoy them the less because we aspire

to get some of greater importance.

(30.) There exist some evils so terrible and some misfortunes so

horrible that we dare not think of them, whilst their very aspect

makes us shudder; but if they happen to fall on us, we find ourselves

stronger than we imagined; we grapple with our ill luck, and behave

better than we expected we should.

(31.) Sometimes a pretty house which we inherit, or a fine horse, or

a handsome dog which is given to us, or some hangings, or a clock

presented to us, will alleviate a great grief, and make us feel less

acutely a great loss.

(32.) Suppose men were to live for ever in this world, I do not think I

could discover what more they could do than they do at present.

(33.) If life be wretched, it is hard to bear it; if it be happy, it is

horrible to lose it; both come to the same thing.

(34.) There is nothing men are so anxious to keep, and yet are so

careless about, as life.

(35.) Irene is at great cost conveyed to Epidaurus;[552] she visits

Æsculapius in his temple, and consults him about all her ailings. She

complains first that she is weary and excessively fatigued, and the

god replies that the long journey she just made is the cause of this;

she says that she is not inclined to eat any supper, and the oracle

orders her to eat less dinner; she adds she cannot sleep at night, and

he prescribes her to lie a-bed by day; she complains of her corpulency,

and asks how it can be prevented; the oracle replies she should get up

before noon and now and then use her legs to walk; she declares that

wine disagrees with her, the oracle bids her drink water; she suffers

from indigestion, and he tells her she must diet herself. “My sight

begins to fail me,” says Irene. “Use spectacles,” says Æsculapius. “I

grow weak,” continues she; “I am not half so strong nor so healthy as

I was.” “You grow old,” says the god. “But how,” asks she, “can I get

rid of this disease?” “The shortest way to cure it, Irene, is to die,

as your mother and grandmother have done.” “Son of Apollo!” exclaimed

Irene, “is this all the advice you give me? Is this the skill praised

by all, and for which every one reveres you? What rare and secret

things did you tell me, and what remedies have you prescribed for me,

which I did not know before?” “Why did you not take these, then,” the

god replied, “without coming such a long distance to consult me, and

shortening your days by such a tedious journey?”[553]

(36.) Death happens but once, yet we feel it every moment of our

lives; it is worse to dread it than to suffer it.

(37.) Restlessness, fear, and dejection cannot delay death, but, on the

contrary, hasten it; I only question whether man, who is mortal, should

indulge in much laughing.

(38.) Whatever is certain in death is slightly alleviated by what is

not so infallible; the time when it shall happen is undefined, but it

is more or less connected with the infinite, and what we call eternity.

(39.) When we are sighing for the loss of our past blooming youth,

which will return no more, let us think that decrepitude will come,

when we shall regret the mature age we have reached and do not

sufficiently value.

(40.) The fear of old age disturbs us, yet we are not certain of

becoming old.

(41.) We hope to grow old, and yet we dread old age; or, in other

words, we are willing to live, and afraid to die.

(42.) A man had better yield to nature and fear death, than be engaged

in continual conflicts, provide himself with arguments and reflections,

and be always combating his own feelings in order not to fear it.

(43.) If some persons died, and others did not die, death would indeed

be a terrible affliction.

(44.) A long disease seems to be a halting-place between life and

death, that death itself may be a comfort to those who die and to those

who are left behind.

(45.) Humanly speaking, there is something good in death, namely, that

it puts an end to old age. That death which prevents decrepitude comes

more seasonably than that which ends it.

(46.) Men regret their life has been ill-spent, but this does not

always induce them to make a better use of the time they have yet to

live.

(47.) Life is a kind of sleep; old men have slept longer than others,

and only begin to wake again when they are to die. If, then, they

take a retrospect of the whole course of their lives, they frequently

discover neither virtues nor commendable actions to distinguish one

year from another; they confound one time of their life with another

time, and see nothing of sufficient note by which to measure how long

they have lived. They have dreamt in a confused, indistinct, and

incoherent way; but, nevertheless, they are aware, as all people who

wake up, that they have slept for a long while.

(48.) There are but three events which concern man: birth, life, and

death. They are unconscious of their birth, they suffer when they die,

and they neglect to live.

(49.) There is a time preceding the power of reasoning, when, like

animals, we live by instinct alone, and of which memory retains no

vestiges. There is a second period, when reason is developed, formed,

and might act, if it were not obscured and partly extinguished by vices

of the constitution, and a sequence of passions following one another

till the third and last age; reason then, being in its full strength,

should produce something; but it is chilled and impaired by years,

disease, and sorrow, and rendered useless by the machinery getting old

and out of gear; yet these three periods constitute the whole life of

man.

(50.) Children are overbearing, supercilious, passionate, envious,

inquisitive, egotistical, idle, fickle, timid, intemperate, liars, and

dissemblers; they laugh and weep easily, are excessive in their joys

and sorrows, and that about the most trifling objects; they bear no

pain, but like to inflict it on others; already they are men.

(51.) Children are neither for the past nor the future, but enjoy the

present, which we rarely do.

(52.) There seems to be but one character in childhood; at that age

morals and manners are nearly all the same, and it is only by paying

great attention that we can perceive any difference, which, however,

increases in the same proportion as reason does, whilst the passions

and vices gather strength as well; these alone make men so unlike each

other and so at variance with themselves.

(53.) Children already possess those faculties which are extinct in

old men, namely, imagination and memory, and which are very useful to

them in their little sports and amusements; by the help of these they

repeat what they have heard, imitate what they see done, exercise all

trades, either in busying themselves with many small labours or in

copying the movements and gestures of various workmen; are guests at

a sumptuous feast and entertained most luxuriously; are transported

to enchanted palaces and places; have splendid carriages and a large

retinue, though they are by themselves; are at the head of armies, give

battle, and enjoy the delights of obtaining a victory; converse with

kings and with the greatest princes; are themselves monarchs, have

subjects, possess treasures which they make of leaves or sand; and know

then, what they will ignore in afterlife, to be satisfied with their

fortune and to be masters of their own happiness.

(54.) There are no outward vices, nor bodily defects, which children do

not perceive; they observe them at once, and know how to describe them

in suitable terms, for more exact definitions could not be invented;

but when they become men, they, in their turn, contract the same

imperfections which they ridiculed.

The only anxiety children have is to find out the weaknesses of their

masters, and of the persons they have to obey; as soon as they have

taken once advantage of these, they get the upper hand, and obtain an

influence over these people which they never part with: for what once

deprived these persons of their superiority will always prevent them

recovering it.

(55.) Idleness, indolence, and laziness, vices so natural to children,

disappear as soon as they begin to play; they are then lively,

attentive, exact observers of rule and order, never pardon the least

slip, and several times begin again one and the same thing, in which

they failed; these are sure forebodings that they may, hereafter,

neglect their duties, but will forget nothing that can promote their

pleasures.

(56.) To children everything seems great; courtyards, gardens,

houses, furniture, men, and animals; to men the things of the world

appear so, and, I dare say, for the same reason, because they are

little.

(57.) Children begin among themselves with a democracy, where every

one is master; and what is very natural, it does not suit them for

any length of time, and then they adopt a monarchy. One of them

distinguishes himself from among the rest, either by greater vivacity,

strength, and comeliness, or by a more exact knowledge of their various

sports and of the little laws which regulate them; all the others

submit to him, and then an absolute government is established, but only

in matters of pleasure.

(58.) Who can doubt but that children conceive, judge, and reason

consistently? If only in small things consider they are children, and

without much experience; if they make use of an indifferent phraseology

it is less their fault than their parentsʼ and mastersʼ.

(59.) It destroys all confidence in the minds of children, and

alienates them as well, to punish them for faults they have not

committed, or even to be severe with them for trifling offences; they

know exactly, and better than any one, what they deserve, and seldom

deserve more than they dread; when they are chastised, they know if it

is justly or unjustly, whilst unjust punishments do them more harm than

not to be punished at all.

(60.) Man does not live long enough to be benefited by his faults; he

is committing them during the whole course of his life, and it is as

much as he can do, if, after many errors, he dies at last improved.

Nothing revives more a man than the knowledge that he has avoided doing

some foolish action.

(61.) Men are loath to particularise their faults; they conceal them

or blame some other person for them, and this gives the “spiritual

director”[554] an advantage over the father-confessor.

(62.) The faults of blockheads are sometimes so great and so difficult

to foresee, that wise men are puzzled by them; they are only of use to

those who commit them.

(63.) A party spirit betrays the greatest men to act as meanly as the

vulgar herd.

(64.) Vanity and propriety lead us to act in the same way and in the

same manner as we should do through inclination or a feeling of duty; a

man died lately in Paris of a fever which he got by sitting up at night

with his wife, for whom he did not care.[555]

(65.) All men in their hearts covet esteem, but are loath any one

should discover their anxiety to be esteemed; for men wish to be

considered virtuous; and men would no longer be thought virtuous, but

fond of esteem and praises, and vain, were they to derive any other

advantages from virtue than virtue itself. Men are very vain, and of

all things hate to be thought so.

(66.) A vain man finds it to his advantage to speak well or ill of

himself; a modest man never talks of himself.

We cannot better understand how ridiculous vanity is, and what a

disgraceful vice it is, than by observing how careful it is not to be

seen, and how often it hides itself underneath a semblance of modesty.

False modesty is the highest affectation of vanity; it never shows

a vain man in his true colours, but, on the contrary, enhances his

reputation, through the very virtue which is the opposite of the vice

constituting his real character; it is a falsehood. False glory is the

rock on which vanity splits; it induces a desire in men to be esteemed

for things they indeed possess, but which are frivolous and unworthy of

being noticed; it is an error.

(67.) Men speak of themselves in such a manner, that though they admit

they are guilty of some trifling faults, these very faults imply

noble talents or great qualities. Thus they complain of a bad memory,

though quite satisfied with the large amount of common sense and

sound judgment they possess; submit to being reproached for absence

of mind and musing, imagining them the concomitants of intelligence;

acknowledge being awkward and not able to do anything with their hands,

and comfort themselves for being without these small qualities by the

knowledge of possessing those of the understanding or those innate

feelings which every one allows them. In owning their indolence they

always intimate they are disinterested and entirely cured of ambition;

they are not ashamed of being slovenly, which shows they merely are

careless of little things, and seems to imply that they solely occupy

themselves with solid and important matters. A military man affects

to say that it was rashness or curiosity which carried him into the

trenches on a certain day, or in a dangerous spot, without being on

duty or ordered to do so; and he adds that the general reprimanded him

for it. Thus a man possessing brains or a solid genius and an innate

circumspection which other men endeavour in vain to acquire; a man who

has strengthened his mind by a long experience; to whom the number,

weight, variety, difficulty, and importance of affairs merely procure

some occupation without embarrassing him; who, by his extensive

knowledge and penetration masters all events; who does not consult all

the remarks ever written on the art of governments and politics, but

is, perhaps, one of those sublime minds created to sway others, and

from whose example those rules were first made; who is diverted, by

the great things he does, from those pleasant and agreeable things he

might read, and who, on the contrary, loses nothing by recapitulating

and turning over, as it were, his own life and actions: a man, so

constituted, may easily, and without compromising himself, admit that

he knows nothing of books and never reads.[556]

(68.) Men intend sometimes to conceal their imperfections, or attenuate

the opinion of others about them, by frankly acknowledging them. “I am

very ignorant,” says some man who knows nothing; “I am getting old,”

says a second above threescore; “I am far from rich,” says a third who

is wretchedly poor.

(69.) There is either no such thing as modesty, or it is mistaken for

something quite different, if we think it to be an inward sentiment,

debasing man in his own eyes, and which is a supernatural virtue we

call humility. Man naturally thinks of himself with pride and conceit,

and thinks thus of no one but himself; modesty only aims at modifying

this disposition so that no one shall suffer by it; it is an external

virtue, which commands our looks, gait, words, tone of voice, and

obliges a man ostensibly to act with others as if in reality he did not

despise them.

(70.) There are many people in this world who inwardly and habitually

draw a comparison between themselves and others, always give a

decision in favour of their own merits, and behave accordingly.

The "Characters" of Jean de La Bruyère · 第 17 / 37 段