THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE.—NAPOLEON.
Napoleon, as we have said above,[58] “proposed to assemble his own
forces with all possible secrecy in the neighborhood of Charleroi,”
and this step was, of course, the essential preliminary to the opening
of the campaign. The five corps of which the army was to be chiefly
composed, were widely separated from each other, and each was at a
considerable distance from Charleroi. The 1st and 2d Corps lay to the
westward of Charleroi, in the neighborhood of Lille and Valenciennes
respectively, the 3d and 4th Corps to the southeastward of Charleroi,
near Mezières and Metz; the 6th Corps was at Laon, about half way
from Charleroi to Paris, and the Guard partly at Paris, and partly,
not far off, at Compiègne. The four cavalry corps were stationed to
the north of Laon, between that place and Avesnes. The larger part of
these commands were placed on or near the frontier, and any movements
on their part were likely to be observed by the enemy. Nevertheless
the concentration of the army was safely and secretly effected. The
4th Corps, which was near Metz, broke camp as early as the 6th of
June, the 1st Corps, which was near Lille, as early as the 9th, the
Guard left Paris on the 8th, the other corps left their encampments at
somewhat later dates. The Emperor left Paris at half-past three o’clock
on the morning of the 12th, and so well were his calculations made
that, on the evening of the 14th, his headquarters were at Beaumont,
not more than sixteen miles south of Charleroi, with the entire army
within easy reach. And, by the expedient which he adopted, of causing
demonstrations to be made at various points on the frontier, from the
English Channel on the west almost to Metz on the east, he diverted the
attention of the enemy’s pickets and created false alarms, so that his
formidable army was concentrated without arousing the serious concern
of the chiefs of the allied armies.
On the evening of the 14th, at Avesnes, the Emperor issued to his
soldiers one of his stirring orders;[59] he reminded them that this
was the anniversary of Marengo and Friedland; he called upon them to
conquer or die.
As confirming what has been said above as to his plans and
expectations, he wrote to his brother Joseph the same morning, as
follows:[60] “To-morrow I go to Charleroi, where the Prussian army is;
that will occasion either a battle or the retreat of the enemy.” To the
same effect he wrote at the same time to Davout:[61] “I shall pass the
Sambre to-morrow, the 15th. If the Prussians do not retire, we shall
have a battle.” These letters show how perfectly clear his plan lay in
his own mind,—not as a project of separating the allied armies from one
another by occupying any points on the line by which they communicated
with each other, but as an intention of attacking and defeating the
army of Blücher before it could be supported by that of Wellington,
unless, indeed, it should fall back before him.
That evening at Beaumont was issued a general order[62] for the forward
movement of the army, to commence at half-past two o’clock the next
morning, the 15th. For each corps special directions were given, and
also for each of the three divisions of the Imperial Guard,—Marshal
Mortier, its commander, having through illness been obliged to remain
at Avesnes. The 2d Corps, followed by the 1st, was to advance on the
left of the army; the 3d and 6th and the Guard on the centre; and
the 4th Corps, which was at Philippeville, on the right. Charleroi
was stated to be the general objective point of the movement: but
Reille was warned that the 2d Corps would probably cross the Sambre
at Marchienne, a few miles higher up, and Gérard was by a later
order[63][64] directed to cross with the 4th Corps at Châtelet, a
little lower down. The sappers were to precede each column to repair
the roads and bridges, which had been in the past few months broken up
by the French, in order to obstruct the march of the allies, should
they cross the frontier. The centre columns were to be preceded by the
cavalry of the 3d Corps and by the cavalry-corps of General Pajol. The
other three cavalry-corps, under the command of Marshal Grouchy, were
to follow the army. (See Map 2.)
By the carelessness of the headquarters-staff in sending but one
officer to Vandamme, and in not requiring a receipt[65] from him, and by
the accident of this officer being thrown from his horse and failing
to deliver his message, Vandamme did not get this order in season; he
consequently was not able to get the 3d Corps on the road till seven
o’clock. This delay was, of course, vexatious, and operated to hinder
the movement upon Charleroi, and to render it less decisive than it
otherwise would have been.
An unhappy incident occurred to the 4th Corps. General Bourmont, who
commanded its leading division, deserted to the enemy, accompanied by
his staff. Bourmont was an old royalist, but he had apparently given in
his unqualified adhesion to the imperial cause. His treason could not
but have a very unfortunate effect on the soldiers, creating a feeling
of distrust in their officers, particularly in those of high rank.
With these deductions, the day of the fifteenth of June was decidedly
a successful one for the French. Although the Prussian General Zieten,
who, with the 1st Prussian Corps, held the line of the Sambre, having
advance-posts on the right or south bank, opposed at all points to the
French a skilful and obstinate resistance,[66] the superiority of his
adversaries was too decided for a successful stand to be made anywhere.
In the centre, the operations were under the immediate direction of
the Emperor, who mounted his horse at three in the morning.[67] In the
march on Charleroi the Young Guard followed the cavalry, Vandamme’s
Corps having been, as we have seen, delayed. Everywhere the enemy
were pushed back. Pajol entered Charleroi about noon. Here a halt was
made to allow Vandamme time to arrive, and the enemy took up a strong
position on the heights of Gilly, a little to the north and east of
Charleroi. Their firm attitude seems to have imposed somewhat[68] on
Marshal Grouchy, who had come up with the cavalry-corps of Exelmans,
and on Vandamme, who in the afternoon arrived and took his proper post
in the advance; and it was not until about five o’clock,[69] when
Napoleon assumed command in person, and with a vigor that savored
perhaps of impatience assaulted the position, putting in even the
cavalry of the headquarters-guard, that the enemy gave way, and retired
to Fleurus.
Vandamme and Grouchy, with Pajol’s and Exelmans’ cavalry, bivouacked a
mile or two south of Fleurus. The Guard rested between Charleroi and
Gilly; the 6th Corps on the south bank of the river, near Charleroi.
On the right, the corps of Gérard crossed the river at Châtelet, and
remained for the night on the road to Fleurus.
Thus, three corps,—the 3d, 4th, and 6th,—the Guard, and the greater
part of the cavalry, were concentrated near Charleroi and between
that place and Fleurus, ready to attack the Prussians at Fleurus or
Sombreffe the next day.
The Emperor’s headquarters were fixed at Charleroi.
Coming now to the operations of the left wing,—Reille, at the head
of the 2d Corps, starting from Leers, on the Sambre, at three in the
morning, drove the enemy from point to point, occupying the various
bridges across the river, until he reached Marchienne.[70] By the terms
of an order[71] dated 8.30 A.M. he was allowed to pass the Sambre at
this point, and by another order, which is not preserved, but only
referred to in an order to d’Erlon,[72] he was directed to march on
Gosselies, and to attack a body of the enemy which appeared to be
there. In obedience to his instructions, Reille crossed the bridge at
Marchienne and moved directly upon Jumet, a village on the road leading
from Charleroi to Brussels. Here he encountered a Prussian rear guard,
which he quickly overthrew, and at once moved upon Gosselies. It was
“at this moment,” when he was marching on Gosselies, he says, that
Marshal Ney arrived and took command.[73] This was about five o’clock
in the afternoon.[74]
Ney, who had just overtaken the army on the march, had ridden over from
Charleroi, where he had seen the Emperor, and had received[75] from him
the command of the 1st and 2d Corps. Napoleon had told him that Reille
was marching on Gosselies, and, when he reached Reille, he found him,
as we have just seen, in the very act.
On his arrival at Gosselies, Ney carried forward with himself to
Frasnes the cavalry of the 2d Corps, Piré’s, and the division of
Bachelu. About half-past six,[76] Ney with these troops drove
the enemy,—a brigade under Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar,—from
Frasnes. They fell back to Quatre Bras. The division of Girard
was sent in pursuit of the Prussians, who had retired from
Gosselies on Fleurus. The other two divisions,—those of Jerome and
Foy,—remained at Gosselies. A division of cavalry of the Guard,
under Lefebvre-Desnouettes, about 2000 strong, which had been lent
temporarily to Ney, was placed by him in support of the troops at
Frasnes.[77] Ney remained at Frasnes till a late hour in the evening.
Thus the 2d Corps had accomplished its tasks for the day. Its commander
had shown himself energetic and capable. The advance at Frasnes
observed the enemy’s post at Quatre Bras. The troops had had a very
exhausting day and needed a good night’s rest.
The 1st Corps, under the Count d’Erlon, did not do so well by any
means. To begin with, d’Erlon did not start at 3 A.M., as he was
ordered to do, but at 4 o’clock.[78] His troops had no fighting
to do; they simply followed in the rear of the 2d Corps.[79] They
had, to be sure,[80] five miles farther to go, having bivouacked at
Solre-sur-Sambre, and they were, no doubt, affected by that tendency
to delay which seems always to attend the last half of a long marching
column; it is well known that the last half never keeps up, relatively,
with the first half. D’Erlon had also been required to detach part of
his troops at the various crossings of the Sambre.[81] But these facts
afford no adequate explanation of the tardiness of this corps. At
night d’Erlon’s headquarters were at Marchienne; his leading division,
Durutte’s, had reached Jumet;[82] but at least one-fourth of his troops
had not crossed the river. Nevertheless, by an order[83] dated 3 P.M.,
d’Erlon had been informed that Reille had been ordered to march on
Gosselies and to attack the enemy there, and that the Emperor wished
him, d’Erlon, also to march on Gosselies and to support this operation.
Later in the day, or perhaps in the evening,[84] after Marshal Ney
had assumed command of the two corps, d’Erlon was informed[85] that
it was the Emperor’s intention that he should join the 2d Corps at
Gosselies, and that Ney would also give him orders to that effect.[86]
This last sentence must imply that Napoleon had enjoined on Ney to
bring up these troops. It is true that Charras[87] says that, on the
evening of the 15th, the 1st Corps was in echelon from Marchienne to
Jumet, implying that all the troops had crossed the river; and this
is the generally accepted belief.[88] But we find a despatch,[89]
dated at Marchienne at 3 A.M. of the 16th, from the chief-of-staff
of the 3d division of the 1st corps, Marcognet’s, to General Noguès,
who commanded the 1st brigade of that division, informing him that
the 2d brigade would remain at Marchienne until the arrival of the
1st division, that of General Allix. This shows beyond a doubt that,
notwithstanding the order of three o’clock in the afternoon for the 1st
Corps to reach Gosselies and support Reille in attacking the enemy,
and the subsequent order to the same effect, yet, at three o’clock in
the morning of the 16th, twelve hours afterwards, one division had not
arrived at the river, and another division (two brigades) was still
at Marchienne. This state of facts, it must be recollected, existed
when the whole 2d Corps had been at and beyond Gosselies for more than
eight hours! It is impossible not to blame d’Erlon for this excessive
tardiness in the movements of his corps,—not only for not having
executed the order of three o’clock in the afternoon to proceed at once
to Gosselies, but generally, for not having seen to it that his troops
were, during the entire march, within a short distance[90] of the 2d
Corps, a measure certainly, when all the circumstances are taken into
account,—and especially that the advance of Reille was to be made in an
enemy’s country and was actually stoutly resisted,—of the most obvious
necessity. And it must not be forgotten that in Belgium in the middle
of June, it is light until nine o’clock in the evening, and the sun
rises before four.
It may be remarked that the controversies which have been waged in
regard to the truth of Napoleon’s statement that he, on the 15th, gave
Ney verbal orders to seize and occupy Quatre Bras, have deflected the
attention of historians from the subject now under consideration,—the
conduct of d’Erlon in regard to the march of the 1st Corps on the
15th,—a subject closely connected, as we shall hereafter see, with the
operations of the army on the succeeding day.
In regard to the much vexed question referred to above, we shall say
nothing here. It is not pretended that Napoleon gave to Ney on the
15th any written orders to go to Quatre Bras. Napoleon’s statement[91]
that he gave him verbal orders to that effect has been denied, and
is widely disbelieved. We prefer, for many reasons, to confine our
narrative to generally admitted facts, or to those which admit of
definite proof. What we have to say about this matter will be found in
the Notes to this chapter.
In summing up the situation, we may fairly conclude, that, with the
exception of the backwardness of the 1st Corps, the progress made
during the day had been satisfactory to the Emperor. He says himself:—
“All the Emperor’s manœuvres had succeeded to his wishes; he had it
thenceforth in his power to attack the armies of the enemy in detail.
To avoid this misfortune, the greatest that could befall them, the
only means they had left was to abandon the ground, and assemble at
Brussels or beyond that city.”[92]
Napoleon had in fact concentrated in front of Fleurus a sufficient
force wherewith to fight the Prussians, if, as he thought it not
unlikely, they should risk a battle on the next day. He was not
apprehensive of the Anglo-Dutch army joining their allies in this
battle, for Wellington, as he calculated, could not concentrate in
season a sufficient force to overcome the two corps which, under
Ney, he intended should occupy Quatre Bras the next forenoon. He had
purposely abstained from occupying Sombreffe, for he feared that if he
did this, Blücher, finding his communications with Wellington blocked
at this point, would retire without a battle, and endeavor to effect
a junction with the English at Wavre, or elsewhere to the northward;
whereas, so long as the road which connected his army with that of
Wellington remained free, Blücher might with confidence be expected to
risk a battle for the preservation of that line of communication, that
is, at or near Fleurus, with the expectation of being reinforced by his
ally. But if he ventured upon this course, Napoleon expected to beat
him, for Napoleon calculated that, by the occupation of Quatre Bras
the next morning, he could prevent Blücher’s receiving any assistance
from his Anglo-Dutch allies.
A letter[93] written by Baron Fain, one of the Emperor’s secretaries,
to Joseph Bonaparte, dated Charleroi, June 15th, at 9 o’clock in the
evening, states that the Emperor has just returned, very much fatigued,
having been on horseback since three in the morning, and has thrown
himself on his bed for a few hours’ repose; but that he will mount his
horse again at midnight. This, however, as we shall see hereafter, he
did not do, as at midnight Marshal Ney came to confer with him, having
just ridden back from his extreme front at Frasnes.
FOOTNOTES:
[58] _Ante_, p. 4.
[59] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 324, No. 22,052: App. C, I; _post_, p. 362.
[60] Ib., vol. 28, p.322, No. 22,050.
[61] Ib., vol. 28, p. 323, No. 22,051.
[62] Ib., vol. 28, p. 325, No. 22,053: App. C, II; _post_, p. 363.
[63] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 62.
[64] Charras, vol. I, pp. 101,117: La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 57, n. _Cf._
Stanhope, pp. 65, 248.
[65] Maurice, p. 547: Sept. 1890.
[66] For a valuable discussion of Zieten’s conduct, see Col. F.
Maurice’s Article on Waterloo in the United Service Magazine for
October, 1890.
[67] Corresp. vol. 28, p. 330, No. 22,055: Baron Fain to Prince Joseph.
[68] But see Grouchy: Observations, pp. 60 _et seq._
[69] Charras, vol. 1, p. 111.
[70] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 99, 100.
[71] Doc. Inéd., III, p. 22; App. C, III; _post_, p. 366.
[72] Ib., V, p. 25; App. C, V; _post_, p. 367. See Napoléon à Waterloo,
p. 58.
[73] Doc. Inéd., p. 56: Statement of General Reille.
[74] Charras, vol. 1, p. 123.
[75] Doc. Inéd., p. 4, statement of Colonel Heymès. The hour given
by Heymès, seven o’clock, is much too late. We can fix the time of
this conversation from a statement of Marshal Grouchy’s. That officer
(Observations, p. 61) tells us that on going to Charleroi to take his
orders from the Emperor just before the attack on Gilly, he found him
giving instructions to Ney. The attack on Gilly was ordered, as we have
seen above, at five o’clock, so that Ney must have joined the Emperor
some time before five, and probably reached Reille about half or
three-quarters of an hour later. _Cf._ Van Loben Sels, p. 140.
[76] Report of Prince Bernard, given in full in Van Loben Sels, p. 134,
n. Heymès’ statement is all wrong as to the hours. He says Ney met the
Emperor at seven, put himself at the head of the 2d Corps at eight, and
occupied Frasnes at ten. Doc. Inéd., p. 4.
[77] Doc. Inéd., pp. 4, 5. Col. Heymès’ Statement.
[78] See Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 53, where d’Erlon’s order to his
troops to break camp at 4 A.M., instead of at 3 A.M., as had been
directed, is given in full, and severely commented on.
[79] Charras, vol. 1, p. 98. _Cf_ the 10 A.M. order to d’Erlon: Doc.
Inéd., IV, p. 24; App. C., iv; _post_, p. 367. This directed d’Erlon to
cross the Sambre at Marchiennes or Ham, and take up a position close to
that of Reille.
[80] Ib., p. 98, n.
[81] Charras, vol. 2, pp. 207, 208.
[82] Durutte’s statement, Doc. Inéd., p. 71, that this Corps camped at
night beyond Gosselies, is wholly unsupported. Durutte probably meant
Jumet, not Gosselies. The divisions of Foy and Jerome, of the 2d Corps,
occupied Gosselies.
[83] Doc. Inéd., V., p. 25; App. C, v; _post_, p. 367.
[84] At six or seven o’clock, Charras thinks. Charras, vol. 2, p. 224.
[85] Doc. Inéd., VI., p. 25; App. C, vi; _post_, p. 368.
[86] In some unaccountable way Chesney (Waterloo, pp. 118, 119) has
overlooked these orders that Napoleon gave to d’Erlon to close up
on Reille at Gosselies. The _Documents Inédits_ are not among the
authorities given in the List which follows his Table of Contents,
although they are referred to on page 119, and this may account for
this regrettable oversight. His blame of Napoleon, which is very
severe, is, therefore, entirely undeserved.
[87] Charras, vol. 1, p. 110.
[88] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 91; Siborne, vol. 1, p. 82; Quinet, p. 90;
Hooper, p. 76: The author of “Napoléon à Waterloo” alone states (p. 34)
that a part of the 1st Corps had not crossed at night. See also p. 60.
[89] Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 144; App. C, vii; _post_, p. 368.
[90] Charras, vol. 1, p. 98.
[91] Corresp. vol. 31, p. 199: Gourgaud, p. 47.
[92] Corresp. vol. 31; p. 202.
[93] Corresp. vol. 28; p. 330, No. 22,055.
_NOTES TO CHAPTER IV._
1. Marshal Ney was acting under considerable disadvantage during
this afternoon and evening. We have spoken of this subject before.
His difficulties are well pointed out by Colonel Maurice in a recent
paper,[94] in which much stress is laid, and very justly, on the fact
that Ney had not with him a proper staff. It is true that Ney was no
neophyte in the practice of war, and that he was perfectly well known
to his corps-commanders, and in fact to his entire command. But he
arrived at the front late in the day,—at nearly five o’clock in the
afternoon,—and with but a single staff-officer. It was only natural and
right that he should personally occupy himself with the conduct of the
advance to Frasnes, that he should accompany the cavalry, and should
attend to the posting of Bachelu’s infantry division in support. And
he may very possibly have found the leading division of the 1st Corps,
Durutte’s, between Jumet and Gosselies[95] on his return, late in the
evening, from Frasnes to the latter place. That the 1st Corps had not
fully executed its part of the programme must have been, however, only
too plain to him; and the necessity of exerting himself energetically
to bring it up to the front[96] if he would have his whole command
well in hand for to-morrow’s work must have appeared, in view of
d’Erlon’s slowness, most imperative. At least, there is every reason to
suppose this.
2. As to whether Napoleon accomplished as much as he had intended to
accomplish, or as much as he ought to have intended to accomplish, on
this day of the fifteenth of June, writers have differed. Those who,
like Jomini and Charras,[97] maintain the theory that his intention was
to seize both Sombreffe and Quatre Bras at once, and those who, like
Rogniat, insist that this ought to have been his intention, whatever it
may in reality have been, hold that the operations of this first day
were incomplete. Jomini says:—[98]
“Napoleon had to renounce the idea of pushing on the 15th as far as
Sombreffe and Quatre Bras, which were to be the pivots of all his
after movements.” “One may feel assured,” says Charras,[99] “that the
haste which Napoleon intended should characterize the march of the
army had for its object the occupation of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe
on the first day of the campaign. This occupation failed, in
consequence of a considerable loss of time; the principal avenue of
communication between Blücher and Wellington remained free, although
menaced; it is for this reason that we hold that Napoleon told the
truth in writing that ‘this loss of time was very injurious’ and that
we add,—the day of the 15th had been incomplete.”
The passage to which Charras here refers is to be found in the
Memoirs,[100] and it runs thus:—
“On the same day [the 15th], the attack of the woods before Fleurus,
which had been ordered to commence at four o’clock in the afternoon,
did not take place until seven o’clock. Night came on before the
troops could enter Fleurus, where it had been the project of the
chief to place his headquarters that very day. This loss of seven
[_sic_][101] hours was very injurious at the opening of a campaign.”
A. Let us first consider this question so far as it affects the
operations of the centre and right of the army,—that is, with reference
to the non-occupation of Sombreffe on the 15th.
Rogniat’s criticism, that the Emperor ought to have aimed at seizing
Sombreffe on the 15th, is especially interesting, as it was answered by
Napoleon himself from St. Helena.
“He [Napoleon] ought to have carried his whole army the same day
as far as Fleurus, by a forced march of eight to ten leagues, and
to have pushed his advance guard as far as Sombreffe; but, instead
of hastening to arrive in the midst of his enemies, he stopped at
Charleroi, whether because he was retarded by the bad weather or for
other motives.”[102]
To this Napoleon replied:—[103]
“The Emperor’s intention was that his advance guard should occupy
Fleurus,[104] keeping [the bulk of] his troops concealed behind
the wood near this city;[105] he took good care not to let his army
be seen, _and, above all, not to occupy Sombreffe_.[106] This [the
occupation of Sombreffe] would of itself have caused the failure of
all his manœuvres; for then Marshal Blücher would have been obliged
to make Wavre the place for the concentration of his army, the battle
of Ligny would not have taken place, and the Prussian army would not
have been obliged to give battle [as it did] in its then not fully
concentrated condition, and not supported by the English army.”
In his “Réponse aux Notes critiques de Napoléon,”[107] Rogniat
criticises this observation as follows:—
“In occupying Sombreffe on the 15th, Napoleon would have won, without
striking a blow, the immense result of isolating the two opposing
armies in order to fight them separately, a result which the victory
of Ligny, so dearly purchased, did not obtain for him.”[108]
While Rogniat thus condemns Napoleon for not having proposed to himself
to occupy Sombreffe on the 15th, Charras[109] summarily dismisses
Napoleon’s statement just quoted, as unworthy of serious attention. Not
to have aimed at occupying Sombreffe on the 15th, he says, would have
been contrary to “the very principles of his strategy.” He accordingly
finds that in this respect Napoleon had failed on the evening of the
15th to attain his objective point.
Jomini’s view[110] of Napoleon’s plan, as we have seen above, coincides
with that of Charras.[111]
In respect to these criticisms, we observe in the first place that
these writers have adduced no sufficient reason for distrusting
Napoleon’s own account of his plan and intentions. That account is
perfectly clear and consistent throughout. He wanted, he tells us, to
fight at the outset a decisive battle with one of the allied armies.
He looked for great results from such a battle. He expected, he says,
that the Prussians would be promptly concentrated, and would offer
battle near Fleurus,—to the south of Sombreffe; and that owing to the
unreadiness of the Anglo-allied army, and his proposed seizure of
Quatre Bras on the first day of the campaign, he would be able to fight
the Prussians, isolated, for the time being, from the English.[112]
While he claims to have ordered the occupation of Quatre Bras on the
first day, he nowhere says that he proposed to occupy Sombreffe on the
first day. When he is criticised for not having attempted this, he
maintains that he was right. He considered, he says, that Blücher’s
object in fighting a battle at this stage in the campaign must be the
maintenance of his communications with his allies;[113] the Prussians
would, therefore, fight, if they fought at all, to the south of the
Namur-Quatre-Bras turnpike, somewhere to the south of Sombreffe. And,
as he expected great and perhaps decisive results[114] from such a
battle, he contented himself on the 15th of June with threatening
with his centre and right this turnpike, and purposely abstained from
occupying Sombreffe. For if Blücher should find Sombreffe occupied and
his line of communications with Wellington actually in the enemy’s
hands, it was probable, so Napoleon thought, that he would retire to
some point further north, where a union of the two armies could easily
be effected, and so this opportunity of fighting the Prussians alone
and isolated from the English would be lost.
In the second place, we fail to see that the plan which Rogniat blames
Napoleon for not having adopted, and which Jomini and Charras believe
he really entertained, but failed to carry into effect, that is, the
plan of occupying both Sombreffe and Quatre Bras on the 15th, was an
improvement in any way over Napoleon’s plan as described by himself,
as stated above. These writers would have Napoleon begin the campaign
by separating the two hostile armies by occupying two points on the
road by which they communicated with each other. Napoleon says that
if he had done this, while the two armies would certainly have been
separated, his chances of dealing decisively with one of them, alone
and unsupported by its ally, would most likely have vanished. And the
probabilities are that Napoleon was right in this opinion. Blücher
would naturally have retired, if he had found the Namur-Quatre-Bras
road occupied at Sombreffe by the French in force; he would have tried
to concert with Wellington some combined operation in the neighborhood
of Wavre or Brussels; and thus the opportunity which Napoleon had at
Ligny, where the Prussians were exposed to the attack of the main
French army without the assistance of a single English soldier, would
not have been offered by Blücher.
It seems to us that Napoleon is right in his contention, and that the
great chance which he had at the battle of Ligny of defeating one of
his two adversaries alone and unsupported, was in exact accordance
with his expectations, and, was, as much as such things ever are, the
result of his well-calculated dispositions.
We conclude, therefore, that there is no good reason to suppose
that Napoleon intended on the evening of the 15th to push forward
to Sombreffe and hold the Namur-Nivelles road at that point. He may
very possibly have expected to fix his headquarters at Fleurus,
but, although he did not succeed in doing this, his object had been
substantially attained at the close of the first day of the campaign,
so far as the operations of the right and centre were concerned.
B. Let us now consider the other branch of the question,—Did Napoleon
intend to occupy Quatre Bras on the 15th?
(1.) If we are correct in the view taken above, namely, that Napoleon
did not intend to seize Sombreffe on the 15th, because he feared that
if Blücher found his line of communications with Wellington occupied in
force at Sombreffe, he would retire to the northward, and there form
a junction with the Anglo-Dutch army, it would seem at first blush as
if Blücher might be expected to take the same course if he found the
turnpike to Nivelles occupied in force by the enemy at Quatre Bras. But
this seems to be pushing the argument too far. Blücher could hardly be
expected to be affected by the report of the occupation of Quatre Bras
so much as by the expulsion of Zieten’s Corps from Sombreffe, and by
the occupation of that place by the main French army. Theoretically, so
to speak, the seizure of any one point on the Namur-Nivelles turnpike
ought to produce the same effect on Marshal Blücher’s mind, and,
therefore, on his subsequent movements, as the seizure of any other.
Yet one can easily see that, practically, this might not be so. On the
other hand, there was certainly the risk that Blücher would not fight
at or near Sombreffe unless he thought he could count on receiving aid
from Wellington, and this expectation could hardly be entertained, if
he knew that the French were in possession of Quatre Bras. Still, the
importance of preventing Wellington, by an early occupation of Quatre
Bras, from assisting the Prussians in their resistance to the attack
which he hoped to make upon them the next day, may well have induced
Napoleon to give on the 15th to Marshal Ney orders to occupy Quatre
Bras at once, and to take the chance of the result of this step being
the withdrawal of the Prussian army to Wavre or Brussels.
(2.) But the matter is really of very little consequence, so far, at
least, as the successful carrying out of Napoleon’s plan is concerned.
Let us assume that Napoleon is correct in his statement that he gave
a verbal order to Ney on the 15th to push forward to Quatre Bras. We
have nevertheless just seen that the Memoirs testify to the Emperor’s
general satisfaction on the evening of the 15th with the progress that
had been made during the day, notwithstanding the non-occupation of
Quatre Bras. Napoleon has in fact nowhere said that it was _necessary_
to occupy Quatre Bras on the 15th. The written orders to Ney, on the
morning of the 16th, which we shall shortly have occasion to consider,
imply that, at the time he wrote them, Napoleon was content with Ney’s
having on the 15th occupied Frasnes and threatened Quatre Bras, and
that he then desired the movement on the latter point to take place on
the forenoon of the 16th, while he himself was massing his troops for
the advance on Sombreffe and the expected battle with the Prussians in
the afternoon. In truth, when we consider that the bulk of the army
under Napoleon in person could hardly have been in condition to engage
the Prussians at daybreak of the 16th, we can easily comprehend that
Napoleon,—whatever he might have enjoined on Ney at five o’clock in the
afternoon before, when he no doubt expected that much more progress
would be made before the next morning than actually was made,—should
have been quite content with Ney’s not having reached a point so far
to the front as Quatre Bras.[115]
As for Jomini[116] and Charras,[117] they admit that, when Napoleon
perceived the impossibility of seizing Sombreffe on the 15th, he ceased
to desire the occupation of Quatre Bras, and was quite content with
Ney’s advance remaining for the night at Frasnes. In their conclusion
we may, for the reasons we have just given, well agree, without
committing ourselves to their theory of Napoleon’s plan, which, as we
have seen above, differs materially from his own account of it.
We conclude, therefore, that the result of the operations of the first
day had also been satisfactory so far as the non-occupation of Quatre
Bras was concerned. But Marshal Ney’s command was far from being well
in hand at the close of the day, as we have had occasion to point out
above.[118]
3. But, it may fairly be asked, in view of what has been said, assuming
that Napoleon gave Ney a verbal order at five o’clock in the afternoon
of the 15th, why, if the non-occupation of Quatre Bras by Ney on that
evening did not really disarrange Napoleon’s plans, did Napoleon blame
Marshal Ney for not having occupied it? Because, in the first place, it
was a disobedience of orders; secondly, because Napoleon believed that
Ney’s stopping at Frasnes, this side of Quatre Bras, was dictated by
an exaggerated caution, which it was equally surprising and annoying
to find in a man like Ney; and, thirdly because when he came to write
his narrative of the campaign, he connected this hesitation to take
risks, which Ney had evinced on the 15th, with Ney’s very singular
management of his command on the next day,—of which we can here say
nothing without anticipating our story. It was to Ney’s supposed faulty
arrangements on the 16th that the Emperor—who never knew all the facts
of the case, by the way,—naturally attributed the failure of the 1st
Corps to take part either in the battle of Quatre Bras or in that of
Ligny. Hence we find Napoleon severe on Ney for not boldly pushing out
to Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th, not because it was necessary
to occupy the cross-roads that night,—for the next morning would have
done quite as well,—but because Ney’s hesitation seemed to the Emperor
to indicate in him a lack of that boldness and energy on which he had
always counted hitherto with entire confidence.
4. In what has just been said, we have assumed that Napoleon gave to
Ney a verbal order at five o’clock on the 15th to push forward with the
two corps and seize Quatre Bras. But was this the fact?
This question has been the subject of a great deal of controversy, as
every student of the campaign knows to his cost. In our view, as we
have just pointed out, it is not a matter of much consequence. Napoleon
nowhere claims that the failure of Marshal Ney to carry out this order
was a serious matter, although he does attribute his failure to carry
it out to an undue prudence and an unnecessary caution, for which he
censures him. Still, the matter has been so hotly contested, that it
may be best to address ourselves to it briefly.
The statements in Gourgaud’s narrative[119] and the Memoirs,[120] that
Napoleon ordered Ney, at their meeting near Gilly, to advance boldly
to Quatre Bras with his two corps and to take up a position beyond
it, with guards on the roads to Nivelles, Brussels and Namur, are
exceedingly positive and explicit. These statements were written in
1818 and 1820. The only piece of strictly contemporaneous evidence
that we have is the statement in the official bulletin of the
army,[121] which was sent off from Charleroi on the evening of the
15th, that Ney’s headquarters were that evening at Quatre Bras,—and
it certainly is a very strong confirmation of Gourgaud and the
Memoirs.[122]
Again, the reason given in Gourgaud[123] and the Memoirs[124] as
inducing Ney to halt this side of Quatre Bras, namely, that he deemed
it unwise to advance further to the front than the main body had
proceeded,—judging by the sound of the cannon, which came from the
neighborhood of Fleurus and Gilly,—is a very natural[125] one. It is no
doubt the reason he gave to the Emperor at their interview that very
night at Charleroi.
Neither Ney nor Soult have left any statements in writing[126] about
the matter. Nor is it claimed that Ney ever made any verbal statement
on the subject. Thiers[127] asserts that Soult “frequently said * * *
that on the afternoon of the fifteenth of June he heard Napoleon order
Marshal Ney to proceed to Quatre Bras,” and he cites the memoirs of
General Berthezène, who commanded one of Vandamme’s divisions, to the
effect that Soult had told him that Napoleon gave these orders to Ney.
On the other hand we have a statement of Ney’s son, then Duke of
Elchingen, that Colonel Heymès, Ney’s aide-de-camp, said in 1841
to him,[128] that the name of Quatre Bras was not pronounced in the
conversation between the Emperor and Marshal Ney on the afternoon of
the 15th. The Duke furthermore tells us[129] that in 1829, Marshal Soult
told him and Colonel Heymès that the Emperor had no idea of having
Quatre Bras occupied on the evening of the 15th, and gave no orders to
that effect.
But how is it possible to reconcile this hearsay evidence, with the
undeniable fact that the official bulletin states Ney’s headquarters on
the evening of the 15th to be at Quatre Bras? It is surely much more
likely that these reports by Marshal Ney’s son, of statements by Heymès
and Soult, of their recollections, given respectively fourteen and
twenty-six years after the occurrence, are defective in some way, than
that the bulletin made up on the very evening should have contained a
statement that Ney was at Quatre Bras when he had never been directed
to go there. The contents of the bulletin must have been known to
Soult, the chief-of-staff of the army; in fact, the bulletin itself
must have been either actually composed by him or under his immediate
direction; and it is simply incredible that he should have inserted a
statement that Ney’s headquarters were, on the evening of the 15th,
at Quatre Bras if he knew that the Emperor had no intention of having
Quatre Bras occupied that evening, and had given no orders to that
effect. It is to be noted also that Charras makes but an incidental
mention of the bulletin,[130] which is the only bit of contemporaneous
evidence that we have, and confines his discussion of the testimony
to an examination of these reported sayings of Soult and Heymès. When
we take also into account that, in his carefully drawn Narrative,[131]
Heymès does not explicitly state that Quatre Bras was not mentioned,
that there is nothing whatever from Soult over his own signature, that
these sayings of Soult and Heymès rest on mere hearsay evidence, and
that they were spoken, if spoken at all, many years after the campaign,
it is evident that the statement in the bulletin is by far the best
evidence that we have. The mention of Quatre Bras in the bulletin was
made at the time,—before any controversy had arisen,—it was moreover a
mere incidental mention, and cannot be supposed to have been intended
to serve a purpose of any kind.
Where the evidence is so conflicting, it is impossible for many persons
to make up their minds. As we remarked before, the matter is not one of
any great importance in its bearing on the fortunes of the campaign.
The question, whether Ney received at five in the afternoon of the
15th of June verbal orders to seize Quatre Bras that evening, is of
consequence mainly with reference to the scope of Napoleon’s plan at
that moment, and also with respect to his reproach of unwarrantable
hesitation on the part of Marshal Ney. It seems to us, we frankly say,
on the whole, almost certain that the order was given. At any rate, we
can hardly doubt that, when the bulletin was sent off that evening to
Paris, it was believed at the headquarters of the army that Marshal Ney
was at Quatre Bras; we must admit this, unless we gratuitously invent
an intention to deceive the public on a point of this kind. And as Ney
could hardly have been supposed to occupy Quatre Bras without orders,
he must have been supposed by those who drew up the bulletin,—that is,
Soult, the chief-of-staff of the army, and the Emperor himself,—to
have proceeded to Quatre Bras in conformity with the verbal order given
him that afternoon.[132]
The fact that the subsequent written orders to proceed to Quatre Bras,
issued on the morning of the 16th, make no mention either of this
verbal order, or of Ney’s failure to comply with it, does not seem
to us to tend in any way to show that the verbal order had not been
given. There would not only be no need of referring to such a fact in a
subsequent written order, but such a mention of it would be unusual and
unmilitary.[133] What light, if any, the contents of the written orders
throw on the question of the previous giving of a verbal order, is a
matter that will be considered hereafter.
FOOTNOTES:
[94] United Service Magazine: Sept., 1890: pp. 541 _et seq._
[95] Doc. Inéd., p. 71. Statement of General Durutte. As we have before
remarked, this officer probably mistook Jumet for Gosselies. See
_ante_, p. 50, note 25.
[96] “An error was committed by suffering it [the 1st Corps] to remain,
during the night of the 15th, echeloned between Marchienne and Jumet.”
Gourg. p. 66.
[97] _Ante_, pp. 12, 13.
[98] Jomini, p. 125. Jomini says (p. 123) that “Napoleon gave Grouchy
a verbal order to push as far as Sombreffe that very evening, if
possible”; but no evidence of such an order is cited. See Jomini’s
letter to the Duc d’Elchingen, pp. 225, 226. _Cf._ La Tour d’Auvergne,
p. 69. That Napoleon nowhere blames Grouchy for not having pushed on
to Sombreffe on the 15th,—taken in connection with his censure of Ney
for not having seized Quatre Bras that evening,—is pretty good evidence
that he neither ordered nor expected Grouchy to reach Sombreffe.
[99] Charras, vol. 1, p. 116: _cf._ vol. 2, p. 225, Note K.
[100] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 249.
[101] Evidently a misprint for “three”; the word “seven” having
obviously been carelessly repeated.
[102] Rogniat: Consid., p. 339: cited in Corresp., vol. 31, p. 471.
[103] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 471.
[104] Rogniat claims that there is a serious inconsistency between
this statement, as to the occupation of Fleurus by the advance guard,
and that in the Memoirs, where it is said that the Emperor intended to
place his headquarters there. This seems rather hypercritical. Charras
(vol. 2, p. 221) says “It stands to reason that if he had had his
headquarters in that city [Fleurus], he would have occupied Sombreffe.”
But this is surely going too far. Headquarters might well have been in
Fleurus, while the Prussians held the heights of Brye and Sombreffe,
and even the villages of Ligny and St. Amand; and this actually was the
case the next day,—the 16th. Fleurus, half way between Charleroi and
Sombreffe, was a very natural place for the Emperor to aim at as his
resting place for the night of the 15th.
[105] Clausewitz, ch. 30, p. 60. But see Rogniat, Réponse, p. 262.
[106] The italics are our own.
[107] pp. 264, 265.
[108] It is not easy to see what is meant here. It is certain that,
without having occupied Sombreffe on the 15th, Napoleon did fight the
Prussians separately on the 16th. That Ligny was not a more decisive
victory was due to special causes.
[109] Vol. 1, p. 115, note. Quinet, p. 102, does not follow Charras
here.
[110] Jomini, pp. 123, 125.
[111] La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 73 _et seq._ takes the same view.
[112] Vaudoncourt, vol. 3, 2d part, pp. 134, 135, states the Emperor’s
plan with admirable clearness. But on pp. 165, 166, he slides into the
theory of Jomini.
[113] _Cf._ Clausewitz, ch. 22, p. 46. “It was certainly to be assumed
that both generals would remain in communication with each other.”
[114] “Bonaparte hoped, if he met Blücher’s main body, to destroy it by
a quick attack, before Wellington could arrive.” Ib., ch. 22, p. 46.
[115] But see La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 75, 76.
[116] Jomini, pp. 125, 215.
[117] Charras, vol. 1, p. 124. _Cf._ Quinet, p. 102.
[118] _Ante_, pp. 51, 52. Gourg. p. 66.
[119] Gourgaud, p. 47.
[120] Corresp. vol. 31, p. 199.
[121] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 333: “L’Empereur a donné le commandement
de la gauche au prince de la Moskowa, qui a eu le soir son quartier
général aux Quatre Chemins, sur la route de Bruxelles.” This Bulletin
was printed in the “Moniteur” of the 18th. App. C, viii; _post_, pp.
369, 370. It is to be found in Jones, pp. 378, 379.
[122] Marshal Grouchy, in 1818, only three years after the battle, in
the first edition of the pamphlet which he published in Philadelphia,
entitled “Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815, publiée
par le Général Gourgaud,” in defending himself for having, on the 18th
of June, as he claims, strictly obeyed his orders, instead of marching
to the sound of the cannon of Waterloo, says (p. 32):—
“Besides, this way of looking at the matter was fortified in my eyes
by the disapproval which Napoleon had shown in my presence of the
conduct of Marshal Ney. _I had heard him blame him for having suspended
the movement of his troops on the 15th at the sound of the cannonade
between Gilly and Fleurus_, for having halted Reille’s Corps between
Gosselies and Frasnes, and for having sent a division towards Fleurus,
where the fighting was going on, _in place of keeping himself to the
execution, pure and simple, of his orders, which prescribed to him to
march on Quatre Bras_. (The italics are ours.)
And again, when speaking of his own refusal to entertain the suggestion
that he should march to the sound of the cannon, he says (p. 61):—
“Could I, moreover, so soon forget that Napoleon had censured Marshal
Ney for having halted at the sound of the cannon which were being fired
near Fleurus, for having sent troops in that direction, and for having
permitted himself to depart from the literal execution of his orders?”
Grouchy must be referring here to the scene at the Emperor’s
headquarters on the night of the 15th and 16th (see _post_, p. 116).
In the edition published in Philadelphia in 1819, and in the
reproduction of the pamphlet from this edition in Paris in the same
year, Grouchy omits the statement that he heard the emperor blame
Ney, and rests his argument on the censure on Ney’s conduct contained
in the Gourgaud Narrative. One may not unreasonably conjecture that,
after publishing the edition of 1818, he was informed that Ney’s
family denied that Ney had received on the 15th any order to go to
Quatre Bras, and that Grouchy was unwilling to give evidence in this
controversy against this contention of the friends of the Marshal.
Captain Pringle, R. E., in an Appendix to Scott’s Napoleon (Paris
edition, 1828, p. 833, n.), is the only author who cites the
above-quoted statements of Marshal Grouchy.
[123] Gourgaud, p. 48, n.
[124] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 200.
[125] _Cf._ Jomini, p. 214, to whom the hesitation of Ney to occupy
Quatre Bras seems justifiable, “unless the order to rush headlong on
Quatre Bras had been expressed in a formal manner.”
[126] In his letter to the Duke of Otranto (Jones, 386), Ney says: “The
Emperor [on the 15th] ordered me immediately to put myself at the head
of the 1st and 2d Corps, &c., &c. With these troops * * * I pursued
the enemy, and forced him to evacuate Gosselies, Frasnes, Millet,
Heppignies. There they took up a position for the night. * * *
“On the 16th I received orders to attack the English in their position
at Quatre Bras.”
It will be observed that Ney omits to state what directions, if any,
the Emperor gave him on the 15th. He confines himself to enumerating
the troops placed under his orders and to stating what he accomplished
with them. The remark that he was ordered on the 16th to attack Quatre
Bras throws no light on the question we are examining, viz.:—what
orders were given to him on the 15th.
[127] Thiers, vol. xx, p. 31, n.
[128] Letter from the Duke of Elchingen to General Jomini, 16 October,
1841, published in the “Spectateur Militaire,” Dec. 15, 1841, as cited
in Charras, vol. 1, p. 119, n. _Cf._ Heymès’ Statement, Doc. Inéd., p.
4.
[129] Doc. Inéd., p. 30.
[130] See _post_, p. 69, n. 38.
[131] Doc. Inéd., p. 4.
[132] We cannot find any allusion to the evidence furnished by this
bulletin in any of the authorities, except in the “Waterloo” of La
Tour d’Auvergne (p. 75), in Mr. William O’Connor Morris’s “Campaign of
1815” (Great Commanders of Modern Times, p. 327, note), and in the work
entitled “Napoléon à Waterloo,” p. 24, n., where the proper weight is
given to the matter. Hence the elaborate discussions of Charras and
Chesney, failing as they do, to meet this important piece of evidence,
do not greatly assist in arriving at a decision. The bulletin is not
alluded to in the Duke of Elchingen’s notes to the despatches collected
in his “_Documents Inédits_.”
The probability is that the existence of this Bulletin escaped
Chesney’s attention. Charras, however, cites the Bulletin (vol. 1, pp.
113, 114, notes). The fact that “Napoléon à Waterloo” was a reply to
the work of Charras, and that the “Waterloo” of La Tour d’Auvergne was
a reply to Chesney, accounts for our not finding the subject discussed
by Chesney and Charras. It is, however, difficult to understand why
Charras in his elaborate work should have overlooked the inference to
be drawn from the statement in the bulletin.
[133] _Cf._ Charras, vol. 1, p. 120.