THE ALLIED ARMIES.
The army which was commanded by Field Marshal Blücher numbered about
124,000 men, and was thus composed:—[47]
Ist Corps: Zieten.
Four divisions of infantry,—
Steinmetz,—Pirch II.,—Jagow—Henckel 27,887 Men
One division of cavalry,—Röder 1,925 „
Artillery,—96 guns,—engineers, &c. 2,880 „
-------
Total 32,692 „
IId Corps: Pirch I.
Four divisions of infantry,—
Tippelskirchen,—Krafft,—Brause,—Langen 25,836 „
One division of cavalry,—Jürgass 4,468 „
Artillery,—80 guns,—engineers, &c. 2,400 „
-------
Total 32,704 „
------
IIId Corps: Thielemann.
Four divisions of infantry,--
Borcke,--Kämpfen,--Luck,--Stülpnagel 20,611 „
One division of cavalry,--Marwitz 2,405 „
Artillery,--48 guns,--engineers, &c. 1,440 „
-------
Total 24,456 „
IVth Corps: Bülow.
Four divisions of infantry,--
Hacke,--Ryssel,--Losthin,--Hiller 25,381 „
One division of cavalry,--
Prince William of Prussia 3,081 „
Artillery,--88 guns,--engineers, &c. 2,640 „
-------
Total 31,102 „
Workmen, waggoners, &c., about 3,120 „
-------
Grand total 124,074 „
Leaving out the last item, we have an army consisting of 120,954 men.
Of these,
the infantry numbered 99,715 Men
„ cavalry „ 11,879 „
„ artillery, 312 guns, numbered 9,360 „
-------
Total as above 120,954 „
The headquarters of Zieten’s Corps were at Charleroi, of Pirch I. at
Namur, of Thielemann at Ciney, and of Bülow at Liége. The first three
of these places were near the frontier.
The Prussian army was mainly composed of veterans; even of the youngest
soldiers most had seen service in 1813 or 1814. The corps-commanders
were experienced officers, though only one of them, Bülow, had ever
had an independent command. Bülow had in 1813 won the battle of
Dennewitz against Marshal Ney. The troops were certainly not so inured
to war as were those of Napoleon’s army, nor were they so well led; but
they knew their trade, and were prepared for battle. Blücher himself
was a veteran of the Seven Years’ War. He had seen more than fifty
years of service. In the campaigns of 1806 and 1807 he had displayed
conspicuous zeal and courage. In those of 1813 and 1814, although too
old and infirm to assume all the tasks which ordinarily devolve on an
army-commander, he had yet, with the assistance of his chief-of-staff,
markedly increased his reputation. Nevertheless no one considered
him a general of a high order of talent. His conceptions of strategy
were crude and imperfect, and his blunders caused his command to be
more than once badly defeated by Napoleon in the winter campaign in
France in 1814. But Blücher was a thorough soldier, active, daring
and resolute, and never was afraid of taking responsibility. He was
moreover a great favorite with the army. He was animated by an almost
insane hatred of Napoleon, and he entered on the work assigned to him
by the allied powers with an eager determination that bordered upon
ferocity. This spirit of his infused itself into the army;[48] every
man was ready to fight, and every man expected to beat in the end. His
chief-of-staff, Gneisenau, was an able administrator, and relieved the
old field-marshal from all attention to details.
The army commanded by the Duke of Wellington was a very heterogeneous
body of troops. Although nominally divided into corps, after the
fashion of the armies of the continent, this arrangement, being
one which had never been adopted by the Duke before, was only
imperfectly[49] practised in the campaign of 1815. We shall get a
better idea of the strength of Wellington’s forces if we enumerate them
according to their different nationalities. Leaving out the troops
employed on garrison duty at Antwerp, Ostend, Ghent and other places,
estimated at 12,233 men,[50] we find the forces available for the field
to have been thus composed:—
British:
Nine brigades of infantry,—
Maitland (Guards),—Byng (Guards),—
Adam,—Mitchell,—Halkett,—
Johnstone,—Kempt,—Pack,—Lambert 20,310 Men
Three brigades of cavalry,—
Somerset (Guards),—Ponsonby,—Vandeleur 3,578 „
Six regiments contained in four
brigades
Dörnberg,—Grant,—Vivian,—Arentsschildt,—
composed of British
troops and those of the King’s
German Legion 2,335 „
Artillery,—102 guns 5,030 „
------
Total British force, 31,253 „
King’s German Legion:
Two brigades of infantry,—Duplat,—Ompteda 3,285
Add men on detached service 16
------
3,301
Cavalry:
Five regiments contained in the four
brigades of Dörnberg, Grant, Vivian
and Arentsschildt. 2,560 „
Artillery,—18 guns 526 „
------
Total King’s German Legion 6,387 „
Hanoverians:
Five brigades of infantry,—
Kielmansegge,—Halkett,—Best,—Vincke,
—Lyon 13,788
One brigade of cavalry,—Estorff 1,682
Artillery,—12 guns 465
-------
Total Hanoverians 15,935 „
Dutch-Belgians:
Seven brigades of infantry,—
Bylandt,—Prince Bernard of Saxe
Weimar,[51]—
Ditmers,—d’Aubremé,—Hauw,—Eerens,
—Anthing 24,174
Three brigades of cavalry,—
Trip,—Ghigny,—Merlen 3,405
Artillery,—48 guns 1,635
------
Total Dutch-Belgians 29,214 „
Brunswickers:
Two brigades of infantry,—
Buttlar,—Specht 5,376
Two regiments of cavalry,— 922
Artillery,—16 guns 510
------
Total Brunswickers 6,808 „
Nassau Contingent: Kruse.
One regiment of infantry:
three battalions 2,880 „
Engineers, sappers, miners,
waggon-trains and staff-corps 1,240 „
------
Total disposable army in the field 93,717 „
Of these the
Infantry numbered 69,829
Cavalry „ 14,482
Artillery „ 196 guns 8,166
Engineers, waggon-trains, &c. 1,240
------
93,717 „
Or, according to nationality,
the British numbered 31,253
„ King’s German Legion 6,387
„ Hanoverians „ 15,935
„ Dutch-Belgians[52] „ 29,214
„ Brunswickers 6,808
„ Nassau contingent 2,880
„ Engineers, &c., 1,240
------
93,717 „
This army was organized, as we have said above, into two corps and a
reserve, in addition to which was a large body of cavalry, and a
small force of reserve artillery. There were six (so-called) British
divisions in the army, only one of which, the 1st, Cooke’s, was
composed entirely of British troops,—the Guards; the others contained
troops of the King’s German Legion and Hanoverians. To each of these
divisions were attached two batteries. Six troops of horse-artillery
were attached to the cavalry.
The 1st and 3d British divisions, those of Cooke and Alten, with the
2d and 3d Dutch-Belgian divisions of Perponcher and Chassé, composed
the 1st Corps under the Prince of Orange. They covered the front of
the army from Quatre Bras to and beyond Enghien, occupying the country
in and around Nivelles, Roeulx, Soignies and Braine-le-Comte. They
numbered 25,233 men, with 48 guns.
The 2d and 4th British divisions, those of Clinton and Colville, with
the 1st Dutch-Belgian division of Stedmann, and Anthing’s Indian
brigade, constituted the 2d Corps under Lord Hill. They continued the
line of the army to the north and west, occupying the country in and
around Ath, Grammont and Audenarde. They numbered 24,033 men, with 40
guns.
The Reserve, or rather that portion of it destined for service in
the field, and not counting the troops on garrison-duty, was under
the immediate direction of the commander-in-chief. It was composed
of the 5th and 6th British divisions, those of Picton and Cole, of
the Brunswick Corps under the Duke of Brunswick, and of the Nassau
contingent under General Kruse. They numbered 20,563 men, with 64 guns.
The British and King’s German Legion cavalry was composed of seven
brigades, the whole under Lord Uxbridge. They numbered 8,473 men. To
this corps were attached, as has been stated, six horse batteries. This
cavalry was stationed mainly in rear of the 2d Corps, near Ninove and
Grammont; but one brigade under General Dörnberg was at and in the
neighborhood of Mons.
The Hanoverian, Brunswick and Dutch-Belgian cavalry were attached
respectively to the various divisions of these troops. They numbered
6,009 men, with one horse-battery of 8 guns.
To recapitulate:—
1st Corps: Prince of Orange 25,233 Men
2d Corps: Lord Hill 24,033 „
Reserve 20,563 „
Lord Uxbridge’s cavalry corps 8,473 „
Other Cavalry 6,009 „
Artillery—196 guns 8,166 „
Engineers, &c. 1,240 „
------
Total as above given 93,717 „
Of this miscellaneous force the Duke relied really only on his English
troops and those of the King’s German Legion, a corps raised originally
in Hanover, which had for many years belonged to the English crown.
These troops had served in the Peninsula for several years with great
credit. The Hanoverian contingent, strictly so called, was composed of
very raw troops, and the same was true of the Dutch-Belgians. Little
was known about the Brunswickers and Nassauers. The fidelity of many of
the allied troops was strongly suspected, as they had been raised in
countries which had for the past few years been subject to France, and
the sympathies of the soldiers were supposed to be with Napoleon.[53]
The Duke’s opinion of his army is well known. He considered it the
poorest he had ever led.[54] Very possibly he may have underestimated
its quality; but certain it is that the force which he commanded was
a very heterogeneous collection of troops, that they had never acted
in the field as an army before, and that the character and steadiness
of a considerable number were, on account of either disaffection or
inexperience, gravely doubted by their commander.
All this was in all probability known to Napoleon, and served as the
basis of his expectations, as we shall see later on.
Of the principal officers of this motley force, it is not necessary to
say much. The Prince of Orange, who commanded the 1st Corps, though
an officer of experience, had not distinguished himself as a general.
Lord Hill, who led the 2d Corps, was a very valuable man, whose merit
had been thoroughly ascertained in the Peninsula. Sir Thomas Picton
had a well-won reputation as a man of energy, courage, and capacity in
all the positions in which he had served. Then there were many junior
officers of great merit.
The Duke himself was in the prime of life, having just passed his
forty-sixth birthday. He had never met Napoleon before, but he had
often met and defeated his Marshals. His career had been one of almost
uninterrupted success. His experience in the field against French
soldiers had been large, and he was for this reason peculiarly fitted
for the work he had now in hand. He had shown very varied ability. His
military imagination, if one may use such a word, may not have been
large, but he had few equals in the faculty of making up his mind what
it was best to do under ascertained circumstances. His decisions were
always dictated by practical reasons. He never allowed sentiment to
hinder the exercise of his common sense. He could advance or retreat,
fight or decline to fight, with equal ease,—with him it was a mere
question of what it was best under the circumstances to do. Though
esteemed a cautious officer, he had shown over and over again that
he possessed not only courage and firmness, but that in daring, and
in coolly taking great risks, he was equal to any emergency. His hold
on his army, that is, on his own troops, was perfect. In ability,
reputation, and in social rank, his preëminence among the officers
of the British army and the King’s German Legion was cheerfully
acknowledged, and over these parts of his army he exercised a perfect
and unquestioned control. And his long experience in dealing with his
Spanish allies had given him an uncommon facility in administering the
affairs of such a composite body of troops as he was now to command.
These three armies were curiously different in their internal economy.
Napoleon, as we have said before, expected from his high officers
a sort of coöperation. The “Correspondence of Napoleon” is full of
long and confidential letters to his marshals, written during his
campaigns, explaining the situation, stating his own intentions at
length, giving them not only orders to be executed, but suggestions
for their guidance in case of the happening of certain contingencies.
We shall see excellent specimens of these letters in the course of
this narrative. Napoleon had been for years constantly in the habit of
directing complicated movements, in which the active and intelligent
comprehension of his main object and purpose on the part of his
lieutenants who were operating at a greater or less distance from him,
was essential to success. Hence these elaborate communications, in
which the style of the military order is but barely preserved, and in
which the effort of the writer to impart all the information in his
power to his correspondent and to give him an intelligent and precise
knowledge of the objects of the campaign, is very evident.
In the English army there was nothing of this sort. Obedience, not
coöperation, was what Wellington required, and it was all he needed.
Operating as he did on a much smaller scale than Napoleon, his simpler
methods were quite adequate to his wants. It is needless to say that
such a relation as that which existed between Napoleon and his old
companions in arms, who had begun their careers with him in Italy or
Egypt, never existed to the least extent in the English service.
The Prussian army was managed differently from either the English
or French. Baron Müffling, who was the Prussian _attaché_ at the
headquarters of the Duke of Wellington, says:—[55]
“I perceived that the Duke exercised far greater power in the army
he commanded than Prince Blücher in the one committed to his care.
The rules of the English service permitted the Duke’s suspending
any officer and sending him back to England. * * * Amongst all the
generals, from the leaders of corps to the commanders of brigades,
not one was to be found in the active army who had been known as
refractory.
“It was not the custom in this army to criticise or control the
commander-in-chief. Discipline was strictly enforced; every one knew
his rights and his duties. The Duke, in matters of service, was very
short and decided.”
It is clear that Baron Müffling had seen a very different state of
things prevailing in the Prussian service,[56] where it would seem
that advice was sometimes thrust upon the general-in-chief, and even
criticism was not silent. Perhaps the fact that the Prussian army was
always organized in corps, and that the chiefs of corps and all the
other high officers were men of an equal social rank, rendered it hard
to conduct matters according to the far more soldierly ways prevailing
in the English service. Whatever may have been the reason, however,
such would seem to have been the fact in the early part of this century.
FOOTNOTES:
[47] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 81, 82. See vol. 2, p. 202, note G, where it
is shown that the number of men in the artillery given by Wagner is
much too small.
[48] The view of the Prussian army presented here is that of Charras
(vol. 1, p. 89); but Delbrück, the biographer of Gneisenau, states that
many of the troops were inexperienced, and some were half-hearted in
the cause. Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 381, 382. _Cf._ Siborne, vol. 1, pp.
302, 303.
[49] For instance, at the battle of Waterloo, troops of the 1st Corps,
that of the Prince of Orange, were stationed on both ends of the line.
[50] These figures are taken from Siborne.
[51] This brigade was composed of one regiment of Nassau, in three
battalions, and one regiment of Orange-Nassau and numbered 4,300 men.
[52] Including 4,300 Nassauers.
[53] Müffling, Passages; pp. 204, 223.
[54] Gurwood, vol. xii, pp. 358, 509,—letters to Lt. Gen. Stewart, May
8, and to Earl Bathurst, June 25, 1815.
[55] Müffling, Passages; pp. 213, 214.
[56] See, for instances, Müffling, Passages; pp. 15-18, 83, 304, 311:
See also Stanhope, p. 110, for the “great discussion” the night after
the battle of Ligny, when “Blücher and Grolmann carried the day for
remaining in communication with the English army” against Gneisenau.
See _post_, p. 230.
_NOTE TO CHAPTER III._
The Earl of Ellesmere, who wrote, as has been before said, under the
inspiration of the Duke of Wellington, has given us the following
critical estimate of a portion of the Duke’s army. He is speaking of
the English and German infantry, some thirty thousand in all, which
fought at Waterloo.[57]
“Of this very body, which bore the brunt of the whole contest, be
it remembered that not above six or seven thousand had seen a shot
fired before. It was composed of second battalions to so great an
extent that we cannot but imagine that this disadvantage would
have been felt had the Duke attacked the French army, as he would
have attacked it at Quatre Bras on the 17th, if the Prussians had
maintained their position at Ligny—as he would have attacked it on
the 18th at Waterloo, if the army with which he entered the south
of France had been at his disposal. For purposes of resistance the
fact is unquestionable that these raw British battalions were found
as effective as the veterans of the Peninsula; but it might have
been hazardous to manœuvre under fire, and over all contingencies of
ground, with some of the very regiments which, while in position,
never flinched from the cannonade or the cavalry charges through the
livelong day of Waterloo.”
FOOTNOTES:
[57] Ellesmere, page 299.