In consequence of otherwise unendurable conditions, the most rapid

repairs were made to all habitable houses or those possible of being

made so. The same was true of public buildings, hospitals, factories and

warehouses. Moreover the same explanation accounts for the exodus of

many who sought for shelter to the countryside nearby; and the many more

who accepted the invitation of, and entrained for various Nova Scotian

towns which became veritable "cities of refuge" to hundreds. The

climate[98] decided the question of reconstruction in favor of temporary

structures; for it was a time of year when prompt rebuilding was out of

the question. Climatic conditions also seriously delayed the arrival of

relief supplies, allowed but scanty provision for many, kept some from

the depots of relief, or from surgical aid; and others standing in line

in the bitter cold. It also added seriously to the sanitation and

shelter problem. But it speeded and spurred the workers to prevent the

maximum of exposure and neglect. It called imperatively for the most

effective system, and many of the workable methods were hit upon under

the stress of storm. An illustration of this may be found in the

adoption of many food depots instead of one central station. Regional

influence thus "fixes the possibilities of organization and collective

effectiveness."[99] The sociologist must study maps of lands and plans

of cities. The location of the food stations at Halifax was a matter of

topography as were the later administration districts. The city is

widely spread out. It has fifty more miles of street than a city of

similar population in a neighboring province. Six depots were

established for the public distribution of supplies,[100] situated so as

to touch the entire needy population most effectively, and to equalize

the groups to some degree. So too, in the matter of dressing stations,

accessibility was a deciding factor. But even this system had to be

supplemented. Bread vans were driven hither and thither and when halted

in the center of a street were usually immediately surrounded. Thus

social reorganization in catastrophe witnesses to an urgency resident no

less in space than in time and reemphasizes the importance placed upon

the physical factors in sociology.

[98] Semple, Ellen, _Influences of Geographic Environment_ (N. Y.,

1911), p. 607, _et seq._

[99] Giddings, _op. cit._, p. 389.

[100] For a period of two weeks meals for 15,000 people were

distributed every day.

Thus may be said to have come about the transition from chaos to a

semblance of community organization. Not the normal civil social order

of pre-disaster days, but the establishment of a species of collective

behavior, and the organization of relationships apparently of a quite

different character. The difference was one which might be compared to

that between a great relief camp and a city. But the difference was only

superficial. Fundamentally there were to be seen the factors underlying

all social organization. These have been already illustrated, and are

classified as psychological, such as leadership, gregarious instinct,

imitation, consciousness of kind, discussion, recognition of utility of

association and custom; and as physical, including climate and

topography.[101] The conclusion was drawn that the part of society which

is most closely organized and disciplined in normality, first recovers

consciousness in catastrophe, and the value of a militia organization in

every community is a practical corollary. This follows not only because

of the imperturbability and the promptitude of reaction, of an army in

crisis, but also because of the rapidity with which it can be mobilized,

its value in preserving law and order, its authoritative control and

power to punish, and because of the attending psychological effects of

orderly bearing and coolness in a time of general chaos, bespeaking a

care that is at once paternal and sympathetic.

[101] Other sociological factors might also be illustrated, namely,

(a) the biological, including, besides the density of population, the

heredity and the physical and mental health of the inhabitants. (b)

the equipmental factor, including available economic resources,

general enlightenment, social surplus and institutional facilities for

re-education, _etc._ (_Vide_ ch. vii.)

CHAPTER IV

CATASTROPHE AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (Cont'd)

The reorganization of the civil social order--Division of

labor--Resumption of normal activities--State and voluntary

associations--Order of reestablishment--Effects of environmental

change--The play of imitation--The stimulus of lookers-on--Social

conservation.

It is not necessary to repeat the fact, which the reader has already

seen, that the process of complete social organization was largely

expedited by the organization of relief, and materially reacted upon by

it. The community's "big men," the men of prominence, the men of broad

experience in civic and philanthropic work, the men who knew the

resources of the city and had the prestige to command them, were deeply

immersed in the relief work while the businesses and the departments of

the shattered body politic waited or went forward in a more or less

indifferent way.

But this could be both economically and socially of a temporary nature

only. "Business and industry must be set agoing. Church and school must

resume the ordinary routine. One by one the broken threads of the former

everyday life, the life of custom and habit must be reconnected." The

division of social labor[102] is a law of society. It is traceable back

to the primitive household itself, and is a result of underlying

differences. The great "cause which determines the manner by which work

is divided is diversity of capacity." With the advent of the social

specialists at Halifax a major division of function began. The

responsibility for the relief work having been delegated to a special

social group, public thought and public men were free to turn their

energies to the restoration of a normal society.

[102] Durkheim, Emile, _De la division du travail social_ (Paris,

1893).

But it was the reorganization rather than the organization of relations

which the sociologist observes to have first taken place. The stage was

all laid. It was necessary only for the actors in the drama to resume

their places. The old "parts" awaited them, although many of the

"properties" were no more. Or to use the more sociological jargon one

might say, there was still the homogeneity of stock, still a dominating

like-mindedness, still a protocracy, still a group of mores to serve as

media of social self-control. Indeed most of the former complexities of

social structure remained. But this was only potentially true. The

social relations based upon the underlying factors had to be resumed.

Moreover the resumption was accompanied by various changes the

significance of which will appear in later discussion. The order of the

resumption of normal activities is of unusual social interest as are

also the influences which were in play and the changes which ensued. It

may be objected that such a tabulation is unfair to the various socially

component groups and that the special exigencies of each preclude

comparison. But at least one index of the bent of the social mind is the

separation of those activities which must needs be first rehabilitated,

from those which can wait. Organizing genius was not entirely occupied

with relief in the ordinary sense of the term.

Economic vigor is one of the most vital things in a community's life. It

is in a sense fundamental not only to happiness and general well-being

but accompanies and conditions the cultural institutions, religious,

educational and aesthetic. It is not surprising then that commercial

activity was in actual fact the earliest aspect of life to resume a

semblance of normality. Naturally public utilities were first on the

list, for these include systems of communication without which society

can hardly be. Reference has already been made to the speed with which a

makeshift service was established, but our purpose here is to record the

resumption of normal activity.

Wire communication is led out from the city by pole lines. Many of these

had been demolished, or broken at the crossbeam. Clerks had been injured

and instruments damaged. In spite of these odds one was reconnected

within an hour, and by the evening of the day of the disaster six direct

multiplex wires to Montreal, three to St. John and one each to Boston

and New York, had been established. Upwards of a thousand messages an

hour went forth the first week. The work became normal about December

twentieth.

The telephone system suffered the loss of the entire northern exchange

and of the harbor cable--broken through ships dragging anchor--a total

material damage of one hundred thousand dollars. Its personnel was also

depleted. Nevertheless telephone business may be said to have been

generally resumed on the seventh, the day after the disaster, and the

load of local traffic soon attained over one hundred and twenty percent

above its average figure. Telephone service was absolutely suspended for

only about two hours,--the period of prohibition from buildings,--and

the cable telephone for about three days. Messages of a social character

were tabooed for several weeks, when the work again became normal.

The illumination service was quickly restored. The company was able to

give partial light and some service from noon on the sixth. Periods of

intermittent darkness however, were not unusual. Gas service was off

until December the ninth--the top of the gasometer having been broken

and two hundred thousand cubic feet deflected from the mains into the

air--when repairs were completed and on the tenth the service resumed.

On the fourteenth gas and electric light service became normal.

Railroad communication had been dislocated. The explosion occurred in

the vicinity of the principal sidings and vital portions of the system.

Three miles of the main road were buried in debris, the station wrecked,

equipment damaged, and crews scattered searching for their dead. In

spite of this, as already noted, a hospital train was sent out in the

early afternoon of the disaster day and incoming trains were switched to

their new tracks leading to the south end terminal. On the evening of

the day following the disaster--Friday--the first regular train for

Montreal left the city. Two days later the main lines were clear and the

first train left the old passenger station on Saturday evening. By

Monday the full passenger service was resumed, to and from the station.

Eight days after the catastrophe all branches of the service were

working and conditions were fairly normal.

The rolling stock of the street-car system sustained much damage. Some

of the employees were injured and others were unavailable. A scant

service was restored at noon on December the sixth. By six o'clock of

the seventh, tram lines in the north section were able to resume an

eight-car service. Then the blizzard came and tied up all lines. It was

not until Sunday, December ninth, that it was possible to resume any

semblance of car service. On the twenty-second of December, twenty-two

cars were operating--twenty-seven is the normal number,--but the

shortage of men made it difficult to operate the full number. The

service was not entirely normal for some months owing to the severe

storms all winter which tied up the lines and caused delays, and to the

shortage of men to handle the cars.

The newspaper offices by the employment of hand compositors were able to

produce papers on December seventh but in limited editions and of

reduced size. This was owing to the dependency of the linotypes upon the

gas service which had failed. The normal-size production recommenced in

a week's time.[103]

[103] In the great Baltimore fire of 1904 the _Baltimore Sun_, by

remarkable enterprise was gotten out at Washington, 45 miles distant,

and did not miss a single issue.

The postal service was completely disorganized and was not restored to

any extent until Monday the tenth of December. Owing to the innumerable

changes of address, as well as many other reasons, it was weeks before

there was a normal and reliable distribution of mails.

The banks were open for business the morning following the catastrophe,

just as soon as the doors and windows were put in. Traffic of relief

trains coming in affected the ordinary trade for three months, more or

less, but principally outside of the city. In the city all business in

the banks went on as usual the day after the explosion.

Two instances are selected at random to illustrate the resumption of

general business activity. Out of much wreckage and a forty-thousand-dollar

loss one company restarted paint and varnish making on January

second. A large clothing establishment, had been badly damaged.

The factory and all branches of the business were running in

five weeks--January tenth. Machines were in operation with shortened

staffs at an earlier date.

The regular meetings of the City Council recommenced on December

twentieth, and were held regularly from that time on. The Board of Trade

rooms were not badly damaged and there was no cessation of work or

meetings. The theatres were speedily repaired and resumed business on

Friday, December the twenty-eighth. The Citizen's Library was a few

weeks closed for the circulation of books, and used in relief service as

a food depot, thus ministering to a hunger which is more imperious than

that of mind in the hour of catastrophe.

Of the churches several were entirely destroyed. In all cases the

edifices were injured, organs disordered and windows shattered. Parishes

were in some instances almost wiped out. In a single congregation four

hundred and four perished. In another nearly two hundred were killed,

the remainder losing their property. In a third, of the one hundred and

eight houses represented in the congregation only fourteen were left

standing. Hurried efforts were made to safeguard church property, but

church services were not generally resumed until the second Sunday.[104]

Even then the congregations were small and the worshipping-places were

not in all cases churches. Theatres, halls and other buildings housed

many a religious gathering. While the restoration of churches waited,

clergy and church workers gave themselves unremittingly to the relief of

the needy, the succor of the injured and the burial of the dead. Their

intimate knowledge of family conditions was of inestimable value in the

relief administration. Sunday schools were reassembled as accommodations

permitted, but it was many months before the attendances approximated

the normal.

[104] On the first Sunday, December ninth at eleven o'clock Archdeacon

Armitage conducted Divine service in St. Paul's Church, and the same

afternoon this edifice was used by the congregation of All Saints

Cathedral.

The school system was badly disorganized. Three buildings were totally

destroyed, and all were rendered uninhabitable for some time. The loss

was approximately eight-hundred thousand dollars. The members of the

staff were given over to relief committees, registration, nursing and

clothing service. Early in March, about three months after the

explosion, arrangements were completed whereby nearly all the children

in the city could attend classes. The double-session system was

introduced to accomplish this. Rooms were necessarily over-crowded and

ventilation impaired. By May eighth, fifteen school buildings were in

use.[105]

[105] Quinn, J. P., _Report of Board of School Commissioners for City

of Halifax_, 1918.

Progress in reopening schools is indicated by the following schedule.

Dec. 10 ................ classes in one institution

Jan. 7 ................ " " three emergency shelters

Jan. 8 ................ " " a church hall

Jan. 14 ................ " " five school buildings

Jan. 17 ................ " " one institution

Jan. 21 ................ " " two school buildings

Jan. 22 ................ " " one school building

Jan. 24 ................ " " one school building

Feb. 1 ................ " " one institution

Feb. 25 ................ " " two school buildings

Mar. 16 ................ " " one school building

Apr. 8 ................ " " one school building

May 8 ................ " " one school building

May 20 ................ " " two portable schools

The community as finally reorganized differed materially from that which

had preceded. The picture of the conditions at a considerably later

period will be fully presented elsewhere. Here will be noted only a few

social effects immediately apparent and due to the temporary

environmental conditions.

Owing to the number of men required for reconstruction work the Tramway

Company found it very difficult to get a full complement of men back

into the service. As a result they took into consideration the

advisability of employing women conductors, and finally adopted this

plan.

At the time of the explosion a heated election campaign was in progress.

Then representative men of both political parties urged their followers

to drop the election fight and the election was deferred and later

rendered unnecessary by the withdrawal of one of the candidates.

The darkening of the water-front, the shading of windows, and other

war-protective measures against the submarine menace, were given little

attention for many weeks, and the coming into operation of the Military

Service Act was postponed.

The establishment of relief stations, and later, of the temporary relief

houses in the central and southern portion of the city brought about a

very unusual commingling of classes, as well as a readjustment of

membership in schools, parishes and various institutions.

Club life, social life, lodge and society "evenings" were for a

considerable period tabooed, because of a general sentiment against

enjoyment under the existing conditions as well as to lack of

accommodation and of time.

The clamor for arrests, for the fixing of responsibility for the

disaster, and for the meting out of punishment was for a long time in

evidence, but never received complete satisfaction.

The difficulties of restoration of school attendance repeated the

experience of the Cherry disaster, and the Truant Officer had a very

strenuous time owing to the fact that so many people had changed their

addresses.

A number of "special policemen" were recruited from citizens of all

ranks, and this force materially assisted the members of the regular

department. Owing to the large influx of workmen following the

catastrophe, as well as for other reasons the work of the detectives was

greatly increased.[106]

[106] Hanrahan, F., _Report of Chief of Police_, Halifax, 1918.

The survivors of two neighboring congregations, although belonging to

different denominations, united in erecting a temporary church

building--their respective churches having been destroyed--and have

since worshipped together--a demonstration of the practicability of

church union under circumstantial pressure.

The display apartments of a furniture concern were utilized as actual

living rooms by refugees for a period, while at the same time business

was in operation throughout the rest of the establishment.

The necessary functioning of relief activities, seven days in the week,

the keeping of stores open on Sundays and the general disorganization of

the parishes was reflected for a long period in a changed attitude upon

the part of many towards Sabbath observance.

German residents of the city were immediately placed under arrest when

the disaster occurred, but all were later given their freedom.

The citizens of Halifax were almost entirely oblivious to the progress

of the war and other matters of world interest, for many days after the

disaster.

The reversion to the use of candles, oil lamps and lanterns was an

interesting temporary effect.

The rapidity of the reorganization, as well as the subsequent expansion,

noted later, was largely effected by the social law of imitation already

noticed. Many of the conditions affecting the rate of imitation were

present. There was a crisis, there was necessity, there was trade and

business advantage, social pressure, public demand, shibboleths--"a new

Halifax" for example--but above all there was a multitude of models. The

extent and scale of the rebuilding program in one area, the

civic-improvement plans which accompanied the work in that district, the

record time in which relief houses were completed, the marvellous speed

at which the demolition companies cleared away the debris acted as

models and stimuli to all inhabitants. The process of speeding-up spread

like a great contagion, until the most hardened pessimist began to

marvel at the recuperation daily enacted before his eyes.

Among the models thus presented may be mentioned that of the rapid

establishment of the morgue. This, the largest ever organized in Canada,

was fitted up by forty soldiers and mechanics in the brief period of a

day and a half. Another instance was that of the American Hospital. "At

nine a. m. Bellevue was an officer's mess. By ten p. m. the same day it

was a first-class sixty-six bed hospital, stocked with food and medicine

and, in charge of Major Giddings;" it expressed a veritable "triumph of

organizing ability." In the record time of three months, Messrs.

Cavicchi and Pagano, with a maximum strength of nine hundred and fifty

men and two hundred and seventy horses working ten hours a day removed

every vestige of the debris in the devastated area. Apartments were

built at the rate of one an hour. Motor lorries multiplied so rapidly

that visitors said there had been an outbreak of "truck fever" in the

place.

By the stimulus of models, such as these, fresh vitality and motive were

imparted to the members of the community. Halifax became busy as never

before. New homes, new stores, new piers, new banks, replaced the old as

if by magic. Men worked desperately hard.

An influence which must not be left unrecorded because of its continuity

of functioning is that of the stimulus of lookers-on. More than two

hundred cities in all parts of the world had contributed to the

reconstruction, and citizens of Halifax knew they were not unobserved.

Articles, lectures and sermons were telling forth to interested

thousands how a city blown to pieces, swept by fire, buried under ice

and snow, and deluged by rain, was a city courageous beyond words.

During the month of December, five leading periodicals in Canada and

twelve in the United States arranged for articles and photographs

descriptive of the city's advantages commercial and residential.[107]

Halifax became a world-known city. This added still further spur to

action. Halifax simply had to make good. She was bonded to the world.

[107] Saunders, E. A., _Report of Halifax Board of Trade_, 1918.

There are two considerations which may appropriately bring this chapter

to a close. The first arises naturally from what has been said, namely,

that in catastrophe it is only after division of function delegates to a

special group the responsibility for relief work that public thought is

directed to the resumption of normal society. The second is a practical

deduction--that of social conservation. Every community should possess a

permanent vigilance committee. There should be an emergency procedure on

paper with duties outlined to which pledged men may be immediately

drafted. Only in this way can social economy be preserved until the

arrival of experienced disaster authorities from a distance.

CHAPTER V

CATASTROPHE AND SOCIAL ECONOMY

The contribution of social service--Its four-fold character--The

principles of relief--Rehabilitation--Phases of application--Criticisms--A

new principle--Social results--Summary for future guidance.

We have already seen that there are certain determining factors in

catastrophe and its social results. There is not only the level of the

general capability and culture of the community, its power to meet

crises and to readjust itself, the scarcity or plenitude of its

resources, but also the presence or absence of "men skilled in dealing

with crises."[108] In the past, disaster-stricken communities have had

such men or have had them not. The disasters of the future--with the

exception of those far remote from civilization--may depend on the

presence of such leaders. They will come from near and far. The

contribution of social service is the contribution of men skilled in

dealing with crises. Relief thus becomes "an incident of progress and a

social policy." We are now to notice this further determining factor in

catastrophe as it applied itself to Halifax.

[108] Thomas, William I., _Source Book of Social Origins_ (Chicago,

1909), Introduction, p. 18.

During the first week at Halifax not only did each day bring its

contribution of relief supplies in the way of food and clothing, but

each day brought also men and women of skill and experience in social

work to place freely their vision and ability at the service of the

community.[109]

[109] J. H. Falk, an expert in charge of the social welfare work in

Winnipeg; Miss Rathburn of Toronto, Mrs. Burrington of the

Y. W. C. A., Toronto. Christopher Lanz, under whose guidance the

rehabilitation work after the Salem fire was brought to a successful

conclusion; Katherine McMahon, Head worker of the Social Service

Department of the Boston Dispensary, Lucy Wright, formerly

Superintendent for the Mass. Commission for the Blind; Elizabeth

Richards Day, Organizer and for many years Head Worker of the Social

Service Department of the Boston Dispensary; E. E. Allen,

Superintendent of the Perkins Institute for the Blind, C. C. Carstens,

Superintendent of the Mass. Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to

Children; John F. Moors, president of the Associated Charities of

Boston, who was in charge of the Red Cross relief following the Salem

and Chelsea fires; William H. Pear, Agent of the Boston Provident

Association; J. Prentice Murphy, General Secretary of the Boston

Children's Aid Society; A. C. Ratshesky, Vice-chairman of the Public

Safety Committee of the State of Massachusetts.

The Halifax disaster was one of the first of great extent which has

occurred since the principles of relief have been authoritatively

written. No other community has experienced their application so fully

or so promptly. One of the workers publicly stated that "Halifax was

further ahead in relief work in two weeks than Lynn had been in a

month." It was said that:

Never before in any extensive disaster were the essential principles

of disaster relief so quickly established as at Halifax. In less

than twelve hours from the time the American Unit from Boston

arrived, the necessary features of a good working plan were accepted

by the local committee.[110]

This was, it is true, sixty hours after the disaster, but nevertheless

the advent of the social specialists brought to Halifax that something

which was wanting when the citizens, astounded at the magnitude of their

task, wondered just how and where to begin. When Mr. Ratshesky[111] of

the Public Safety Committee of the State of Massachusetts, came into the

room in the City Hall where a dozen or so were gathered in counsel,

already overwrought with fatigue, it was the coming of a friend in need.

It was soon clear that the new-comers had had unusual experience in

dealing with other disasters. At once everyone took new heart. Only nine

hours later, the Citizens' Relief Committee was ready, and a working

plan adopted; and from it grew up a wonderful system worthy of study by

all students of emergency relief. Thus social service broke into the

midst of the great calamity not as a mere adjunct to what was already

well devised, but as a central and deciding element, justifying its

faith by its work, and its presence by its wisdom in grappling with an

inexorable need.

[110] Carstens, C. C., "From the Ashes of Halifax," _Survey_,

vol. xxxix, no. 13 (Dec. 28, 1917), p. 361.

[111] With Mr. Ratshesky were Mr. John F. Moors, and Major Giddings.

Of course there had already been a commendable essay toward the solution

of what had to be done. Applications for relief came pouring in two

hours after the explosion, and industrious workers had already been

dispensing to hundreds. On Friday morning volunteers were early at the

City Hall, among them many of the public school teachers. A species of

organization had already begun, but under congested and the least

favorable conditions. A large number of investigators had gone forth,

giving information and relief and bringing back reports of the missing,

needy, helpless and injured. The Salvation Army had commenced a program

of visits to follow up appeals. Clothing of all kinds was pouring into

every station where the refugees were gathered together. The Canadian

Red Cross was already active. But with the coming of the American

Unit,[112] the transfer of the work to a new headquarters upon their

advice, and the adoption of a complete plan of organization,[113] the

systematic relief work may be said to have in reality begun.

[112] The Public Safety Committee of Massachusetts and the Boston Unit

of the American Red Cross.

[113] The scheme as finally decided upon consisted of a small managing

committee with sub-committees in control of food, clothing, shelter,

fuel, burial, medical relief, transportation, information, finance and

rebuilding.

There was a four-fold contribution made by those experienced in relief

and disaster organization. The initial service was the establishment of

a policy of centralization of authority and administration into one

official relief organization. This policy comprised first the

coordination of the relief work into one central relief committee,

second the placing of the relief funds from all sources into the hands

of one finance committee, third the granting of relief by one central

management, all records being cleared through one registration bureau,

fourth the giving of emergency relief in food, clothing and other things

immediately without waiting for the perfection of the relief

organization, and fifth, the appointing of a small managing committee to

carry out and interpret the general policy determined upon by the

executive committee.

If the first great service rendered was that of centralization, the

second was that of effecting cooperation. The latter was only partially

successful. There was at first an inevitable overlapping, especially in

the matter of visiting, some families being visited and subjected to

interview a dozen times. Failing to achieve complete coordination, the

central committee endeavored to limit duplication so far as possible. An

invitation extended to the Salvation Army about December eleventh, to

place their visitors at the disposal of the general staff of visitors

was declined and it was not until January first that this organization

fully coordinated with the rehabilitation committee. It was about this

time also that the Roman Catholic clergy agreed to cooperate in the

registration plans. On December eighteenth the School Board gave

official cooperation by assigning fifteen school teachers as volunteer

visitors under the direction of the rehabilitation committee. Another

obstacle to the complete systematization of the relief work was the most

generous but independent distribution of clothing and supplies from the

Eaton Center, and from the station established by a charitable Boston

lady. The Protestant and Roman Catholic clergy, as well as the Salvation

Army and other organizations received supplies in bulk and distributed

to their constituents often with hasty or inadequate investigation.

There was also at times lack of cooperation among the official

committees themselves. Friction and crises arose from time to time,

which were only stopped short of scandal. They were the consequence

either of assumption of authority upon the part of the under-committees,

of ineffectiveness of leadership, or of unfamiliarity with the

principles of relief. There were also other problems, some of which it

may be useful to note. One of these was the problem of the wisest use of

local leaders who knew and could interpret the local point of view and

method of doing things. Another that of the absorption of volunteers,

many of whom could not be expected to understand the nature of

scientific relief service.

A third great contribution of social service was that of education in

the principles of disaster relief. It was the problem of getting the

idea of social conservation understood and established in a community

which had not given the subject any thought, and which was quite

unfamiliar with the ideals and purposes in view. This was the cause of

much delaying of plans, overlapping in giving relief, and giving without

substantial inquiry. It explained also the reason for the abundant

criticism which arose. When criticism came there was, consequently, no

well-informed body of public opinion to which to anchor the committee's

work.

Educational effort on this subject may be said to have begun with a

masterful presentation of the nature of rehabitation at the meeting of

the managing committee six days after the disaster. Here was set forth

and illustrated the kind of service required and the desirability of

such work was at once recognized and inaugurated. Thus the idea of

rehabilitation filtered through to the various departments. Trained

leaders imparted it to the untrained volunteers. Church, school and club

caught something of its spirit and one of the permanent social results

of the disaster remains in the partial socialization of institutions. It

was this original absence of socialization, this lack of understanding

of the true nature of disaster psychology and of the accepted methods of

relief that at first made the community so utterly dependent upon the

visiting social workers. It may be safely concluded as a fundamental

principle that the self-dependence of a community in adversity is

furthered by the socialization of existing institutions.

The principles of disaster relief cover three stages, first, that of the

emergency period; second, that of the period of transition; and third,

that of rehabilitation. These principles in order of application may be

thus briefly summarized:

1. The coordination of all the relief agencies arising, into one central

relief service.

2. The directing of relief funds from all sources to one bonded finance

committee.

3. The establishment of a temporary committee only, at first,--the more

permanent organization to await the counsel of specialists in disaster

relief, an early call having been sent for experienced workers.

4. The avoidance of, or the early abolition of mass treatment, _e. g._

bread lines, food depots, _etc._, as detrimental to a psychology of

helpfulness and as calculated to delay a return to self-support.

5. The issuing of orders for supplies on local merchants to follow

mass-provisioning.

6. The establishment of a policy of renewable cash grants for short

periods until temporary aid is discontinued.

7. Continuance of relief upon a temporary basis until all claimants are

registered and the aggregate of available aid ascertained, and the

needs, resources and potentialities of self-help studied.

8. An early effort to influence public opinion as to the wisdom of

careful policies and critical supervision.

9. The family to be considered the unit of treatment.[114]

10. A substitution of local workers wherever wise, and the use of local

leaders in responsible positions.

11. The publication of a report, including a critical survey of policies

and methods employed, and a discriminating record of the social results

arising therefrom, the mistakes made and other information of value for

future emergencies. This report in justice to contributors to include a

financial statement.

[114] "During the emergency stage of relief the people are dealt with

in large groups with little attention to the special needs of

individuals ... in the rehabilitation stage the family or the

individual becomes the unit of consideration."--(Bicknell, E. P.,

"Disaster Relief and its Problems," _National Conference of Charities

and Corrections_, sess. xxxvi, 1909, p. 12.)

The fourth great service rendered was that of the establishment of

rehabilitation policies and methods. The work of organizing for

rehabilitation, as noted above, did not begin until the sixth day after

the disaster. On the eighteenth of December the first chairman was

appointed. There followed a developmental period during which little

progress was made, save in the familiarizing of committees with the

object of rehabilitation. "The object of rehabilitation" says J. Byron

Deacon "is to assist families to recover from the dislocation induced by

the disaster, and to regain their accustomed social and economic status.

Emergency aid takes into account only present needs; rehabilitation

looks to future welfare."[115] This was the purpose constantly kept in

view. The division of work indicates the nature of the task attempted.

The division provided for an advisor, a chief of staff, a supervisor of

home visitors, a bureau of application and registration, an emergency

department, a department of medical social service and a visitor in

children's work. Later a children's sub-committee was included.

[115] Deacon, J. Byron, _Disasters_ (N. Y., 1918), ch. v, p. 137.

There was first the record and registration made and verified of all the

sufferers and those in need. Over six thousand names of registrants

resulted. Five districts or divisional areas were arranged for

convenience and thoroughness of administration. One of these covered all

cases outside of the city itself.[116] In charge of each district was a

supervisor, and under the supervisor the various department heads.

Trained workers were drawn into the service and their work and that of

the volunteer visitors was directed by capable supervisors. The

administration of relief was put upon a discriminating "case system."

[116] The town of Dartmouth on the Eastern side of Halifax harbor also

suffered very seriously in the explosion. It had its own relief

organization under the very capable chairmanship of ex-mayor A. C.

Johnstone. The nature of the relief work there did not differ

essentially from that in Halifax.

There were four important phases in which the work developed; the work

of general rehabilitation, the medical social work, the children's

problem and the problem of the blind.

The general rehabilitation service was carried on with varied success.

It secured valuable intelligence for all committees and gradually

increased in working power and efficiency. How many were put upon their

feet again through its kindly counsel and careful cooperation cannot be

estimated or told in figures.

The problem of medical social service is to learn the social condition

of the patient, and to relate that knowledge to his medical condition in

order that restoration to health and return to normal family and

community relationships shall go hand in hand. A division of medical

social service became active a week after the disaster, its workers

becoming attached to the several emergency hospitals within the city

itself and those established in nearby towns. It had as well a working

relationship with the military and the permanent Halifax hospitals.

Three thousand patients were cared for in twelve Halifax hospitals

alone. Trained medical social workers interviewed eight hundred. The one

question to which they sought an answer was: "How shall these patients

be brought back again as fully as possible into normal lives and

relationships?" Having obtained an answer as best they could, the effort

was made to help and relieve to the fullest extent that service and

science made possible.

The contribution of medical social service was two-fold, immediate

assistance and education. By the latter service, which represents the

more permanent value to the community, very valuable information and

guidance was given to the Halifax Medical Society and the children's and

nursing interests. The improvements resulting from these efforts cannot

fail to make "follow-up" and "after-care" important considerations in

the public health and dispensary work of the future.

Immediate assistance was given by the medical social service in six

ways:

1. Arranging for clothing and shelter prior to discharge from hospital.

2. Interviews to understand medical social needs.

3. Arranging about eye problems with the committee on the blind,

children's problems with the children's committee, family problems with

the rehabilitation committee, _etc._

4. Making a census of the handicapped, and classifying the returns.

5. Placing responsibility for follow-up and after-care.

6. Intensive case work where social problems involved a medical

situation.

Dr. M. M. Davis, Jr. Director of the Boston Dispensary, writes of the

medical social service as follows:

It may well be concluded that no organization or "unit" formed to

deal with a flood, fire or explosion or disaster, can hereafter be

regarded as complete unless in addition to doctors, nurses, relief

workers and administrators there is also a due proportion of trained

medical social workers. If twelve years ago medical social service

received its baptism, Halifax has been its confirmation day.[117]

[117] Davis, Michael M., Jr., "Medical Social Service in a Disaster,"

_Survey_, vol. xxxix, no. 25 (March 23, 1918), p. 675.

The children's service was thorough, as it should have been. If the

measure of success in disaster relief is the treatment which the

children receive, Halifax relief was above reproach. The children's laws

of the province are carefully drawn and adequate, the Superintendent of

Neglected and Delinquent Children is a man of singular ability and has

wide powers. He became chairman of a strong children's committee with

which were associated, besides representatives of the children's

institutions, two child-welfare workers of high reputation. This

committee came in contact with upwards of five hundred families,

including more than fifteen hundred children. Their work dealt with the

special problems listed below. More permanent supervision was assumed by

the Government Commission about five months after the disaster. The

modern principle of the widest possible child-placing was encouraged,

the effort being to keep children with parents and wherever necessary to

subsidize families rather than institutions.

The work of the children's committee consisted of

1. Getting urgent temporary repairs made to existing children's

institutions.

2. Investigating cases to ascertain if children were in proper custody

and receiving proper care.

3. Procuring necessary articles of clothing, _etc._, for children.

4. Hunting for "missing" children, identifying "unclaimed" children, and

restoring children to their parents.

5. Interviewing hundreds of people who were: (a) hunting for lost

children; (b) wishing to adopt homeless children; (c) arranging for the

care of children.

6. Attending to a large correspondence, mostly regarding the adoption of

children, for which upwards of a thousand applications were received.

7. Arranging for and supervising the transfer of children from

hospitals, shelters, _etc._, the committee in most cases having sent

some one to accompany the children.

8. Arranging for temporary maintenance, permanent care, pensions and

compensations or allowances for children, including the finding of

permanent homes.

9. Locating and referring to the proper agencies a number of wounded

children.

10. Getting possession of children unlawfully taken possession of by

improper persons.

11. Arranging for the proper guardianship of certain children.[118]

[118] Blois, Ernest H., _Report of Superintendent of Neglected and

Delinquent Children_ (Halifax, 1918), p. 110.

The problem of the blind, was a special feature of the Halifax disaster.

Blindness frequently resulted from the blizzard of glass which caused so

great a percentage of the wounds. In large proportion the wounded were

women who were engaged in their household duties. The rehabilitation of

the blind presented problems of care and retraining upon which was

concentrated the skill of three superintendents of important

institutions for the blind as well as other specialists and workers. The

presence in Halifax of a school for the blind with a capable president

facilitated greatly an early grappling with the problem. The

contributions of the social workers were chiefly of the character

already indicated such as that of general medical social service. There

were reported on March first, six hundred and thirty-three

registrants,[119] but owing to the difficulties of registration this

figure remains inexact.

[119] Fraser, Sir Frederick, _Report of_.

Rehabilitation "takes into account the feelings as well as the material

requirements of the bereaved families." An additional phase for social

workers is therefore mortuary service. Here is required an exceedingly

delicate ministry for which few are qualified. It includes quiet

cooperation in the painful process of identification, a sympathetic care

for those who succumb to shock or grief, and helpful direction regarding

the necessary steps to be taken, in interment. At Halifax this presented

a remarkable opportunity for service, and an experienced Young Women's

Christian Association worker from Toronto attended in such capacity.

There is still another secondary phase which must be referred to as not

being without social and moral results,--that of relief of animals. For

the sheltering of homeless animals, the dressing of wounds, and the

humane dispatch of the badly injured, specially designated gifts had

been received. This work received the attention of the Society for the

Prevention of Cruelty.

It will be useful as reference data to present here the nature of the

criticism to which careful supervision gave rise. It was of the most

trenchant character, and it centered about the alleged over-emphasis

which seemed to be placed on system[120] and detailed investigations

inflicted upon persons of whom many were still suffering from

deprivation and from shock, and who were unused to the cross-examination

methods of expert social diagnosticians. Often the thoroughness of the

records seemed to the sufferers to be the more emphasized part of the

proceedings. When all classes of people found themselves in need, there

were naturally many who deeply resented being treated so palpably as

"cases." But theirs was a choice which left but little regard for

personal wishes or sensibilities. It is regrettable however to have to

say that the cause of social service did not receive in the community

the much larger repute which its magnificent work justified, chiefly

because the innumerable "typewriters, card catalogues, involved indexes,

and multifarious office equipment"[121] were not made less obtrusive.

The merest touch of "cold professionalism" soon became fuel for the

burning disapproval which spread through the city regarding the methods

of relief.[122] Letters to the press gave vent to the indignation of the

sufferers. One of the judges of the Supreme Court was as outspoken as

anyone. In criticizing the food-distribution system he wrote very

plainly of the "overdose of business efficiency and social service

pedantry." Why should needy families be required, he asked, to go

through a personal visit and reexamination at the office every week,

before receiving a renewal order for food. Such things were not easily

understood or explained. It became increasingly felt that such

discriminating and tardy administration of provisions was not the will

of the innumerable donors who so spontaneously forwarded the generous

aid. It was not, so the criticism ran, for the committee to detain and

delay the needy recipients for the mere sake of preventing duplication

and for the sake of the niceties of case records. At a public meeting in

Wards Five and Six, it was charged that "too much red tape had been

insisted upon by those in charge of the relief and in consequence of

this and other objectionable features of management, there had been many

cases of hardship and much unnecessary suffering."

[120] The reader may contrast with this the early days of the relief

at the Johnstown flood "where two windows were set apart from which

clothing and boots were being thrown over the heads of the crowd, and

those having the longest arms and the stoutest backs seemed to be

getting the most of it"; and where almoners passed through the streets

handing "ten dollar bills to everyone whom they met."

[121] Johnstone, Dwight, _The Tragedy of Halifax_ (in MS.).

[122] There was however no definite organization of the dissatisfied

as actually took place at the Slocum Disaster.

As to the justice of this it has been already indicated that criticism

was inevitable because there existed no well-grounded body of public

opinion to which could be anchored the wisdom of sound and thorough

social methods. The passing of time has reenforced the rightness of the

course taken, and not a few former critics would now be ready to condemn

the methods used as not having been radical enough. Still there was an

element of justice in what was said, and social workers of the future

when thrown into a similar situation should curtain their machinery a

little closer, at least until the community can realize the principles

which organization must conserve.

The principle on which rigid procedure is justified is based upon

disaster psychology itself, and is the fruit of a long series of trials

and errors. On the first few days after disaster the finer sensibilities

of human nature appear. Men and women say "others have lost more, we

will get on with a minimum of help." About the fifth day when the

poignancy of the horrors has passed and the dead are buried, these same

people suddenly discover that there are thousands of dollars available.

Then another aspect of human nature comes into evidence. Every device is

utilized by each to out-distance the other in the scramble. There has

not been a single disaster where this state of mind has not shown

itself. The way to deal with it without complete records as yet has not

been suggested. The only way a committee can protect itself against

disgruntled criticism is to know what it is doing. This is the

justification of rigid desk procedure. It is a way to detect and to

defeat imposture; though it serves also many other purposes. It was not,

however, all adverse criticism which developed at Halifax. There were

many who were able to see the beneficent purpose behind the careful

service, and as months passed on the value of this experienced

administration came to be more generally realized. Indeed

so large a place did the Social Service workers eventually fill in

the community that many reestablished families begged for the

continuance of the department's supervision even though its aid was

no longer required. No greater testimony to the value of this

rehabilitation work could be given.[123]

[123] Johnstone, _op. cit._

When on January twenty-first the Federal Relief Commission took charge

of the entire system, it may be said that there was a change not only of

hands, but of policy as well. The large amounts made available by the

Imperial and Dominion governments and by public subscription made it

possible to substitute for rehabilitation the principle of modified

restitution. This change of policy the government adopted because of the

conviction upon the part of the people that they were suffering from the

vicissitudes of war, and that full restoration was in law and equity of

national obligation. The step is of special social significance for

Halifax is the first instance where on any large scale[124] the

principle of restitution became the guide, rather than that of

rehabilitation. This principle of indemnity

implies the reinstatement of the beneficiary as nearly as possible

into the position from which he was hurled by the calamity which has

befallen him. It implies that to the householder shall be given the

use of a house, to the mechanic his tools, to the family its

household furniture. For the community as a whole it means a speedy

restoration of such economical and industrial activities as have

been temporarily suspended, the rebuilding of bridges, the reopening

of streets, the reestablishment of banks, business houses, churches,

schools. It requires that protection shall be given the defenseless,

food and shelter to the homeless, suitable guardianship to the

orphan and as nearly as possible normal social and industrial

conditions to all.[125]

It must be made clear that while in no case was the Halifax policy

denominated restitution, but rather "generous relief," in actual

practice a large proportion of claims were verified and paid on a

percentage basis of the loss suffered, rather than that of ascertained

need. The Commission was granted power to "pay in full all personal

property and real estate claims duly established to an amount not

exceeding five thousand dollars." And while in case of the larger claims

of churches, schools, business properties and manufacturing

establishments, and the property of the more prosperous classes, there

was a policy of just and adequate relief declared, the agitation

continued and continues that "every dollar of loss shall be paid in

full."

[124] Both in Chicago and Johnstown many families were placed in a

position practically as good as that which they had occupied before.

Carnegie once completely reimbursed the sufferers from a bank failure.

[125] Devine, Edward T., _Principles of Relief_ (N. Y., 1904), pt. iv,

p. 462.

Of such a policy in disaster relief Deacon writes: "It is not the policy

of disaster relief to employ its funds in restoring losses and

compensating for death or personal injury." Commenting on this statement

John F. Moors says: "It is interesting to note that at Halifax, the

latest scene of serious disaster, such full compensation is

intended."[126]

[126] Moors, John F., Book Review, _Survey_, vol. xxxix, no. 17 (Jan.

26, 1918), p. 472.

What were the social results of this policy? This question is one of no

less interest to the community itself than to the student of sociology.

It is perhaps too early for adequate examination and comparison with the

policy which formerly held sway. While still a vital question there are

observers who have grown dubious, if not of restitution certainly of the

lump-sum method of restoration.[127] They assert that for many it proved

simply a lesson in extravagance and did not safeguard the economic

future of the recipients. Unused to carrying all their worldly goods in

their vest pockets, these same pockets became empty again with uncommon

rapidity. Victrolas, silk shirts and furbelows multiplied. Merchants'

trade grew brisk with "explosion money." There seemed to be a temporary

exchange of positions by the social classes. The following statement

made by one closely associated with social conditions in Halifax and

written over two years after the disaster, shows only too well the

danger involved in the application of such a principle. After referring

to "the spirit of passive criticism directed chiefly against the few who

have borne the burden of restoration" the statement continues:

The individuals who after all make up a community have been blinded

to the bigger interests by their own individual material losses, and

the idea of material compensation on a dollar for dollar basis. As

some of us earlier foresaw, the disaster wrought much moral damage,

for which no "claims" were even presented, even by those to whom we

might look for special moral teaching in such an experience. In the

course of our work we come daily upon evidences of this condition

lingering in our midst.

[127] The courts of small claims devoted ten minutes to each case. The

amount awarded was paid on the day the case was heard.

Upon the whole disaster-study inclines to the unwisdom of "the

disposition to proceed as though the relief committee were a

compensation board or an insurance society, and to indemnify for loss."

But as already said it is early to appraise. What in ordinary times

might be condemned might conceivably under the abnormal conditions of

war be less morally dangerous. The system may have been at fault and not

the principle.[128] Partly for reasons connected with the war it was

desired to conclude the business with dispatch, and not to set up a

banking house or a training school in thrift. There remains also the

final test, the residuum of relief, the number of those who will remain

permanently upon the charity list of the community. Will it be said of

Halifax as formerly of Johnstown, that "probably so large a sum never

passed into a community of equal size with so little danger to the

personal character of the citizens and so complete an absence of any

pauperizing or demoralizing influences?"

[128] The policy to be pursued in disaster relief cannot yet be

finally stated. It may ultimately be found necessary to distinguish

between the loss of property socially owned, and that of private

ownership.

The lessons which come out of this experience at Halifax may easily be

summarized.

1. The socialization of all communities should be promoted if for no

other reason than for protection.

2. More technical methods of coordination are desirable.

3. To display the machinery of organization is unwise.

4. The supervision of voluntary services should be in the hands of one

vocationally trained for the purpose.

5. Further consideration is required as to the policy of restitution and

its administration.

6. The wisdom should be considered of establishing a secret relief

distribution service, such as fraternal societies conduct for those who

though in need will not publicly accept assistance.

7. The necessity of using trained searchers for the dead, who will note

the precise spot where bodies are recovered, the centralization of all

morgue service, the use of metal tags instead of paper, the

sterilization and preservation of clothing and effects for purposes of

identification, and in addition the development of a morgue social

service with training and qualifications of a special character.

8. The complete organization of a social relief reserve with members

beforehand definitely assigned to special tasks, with requisite printed

supplies in readiness would render the most effective social economy in

emergency. This reserve should be trained in the general organization of

shelter, food and clothing, in the shaping of a policy of general

rehabilitation, in medical social service, in children's work and in the

use of volunteers.

To answer the requirements of what could be called in any sense a

sociological treatment of the disaster, the foregoing chapter on the

contribution of social service could with difficulty be omitted. Social

service introduces a relatively new element of leadership and control

upon which disaster sufferers of the future may rely and which assures

to any community the presence of those who have special skill in dealing

with crises. The "relation of the great man to the crisis is indeed one

of the most important points in the problem of progress"[129] in

catastrophe. The subject also assumes special importance in the

development of the thesis itself. No accounting for social changes which

may hereafter be enumerated can be accurately undertaken without full

consideration of the major influences which were present. Thus by

elimination we may be able to better gauge the strength of the factor of

catastrophe itself. The place of government and other social factors,

however, has yet to be discussed.[130]

[129] Thomas, _op. cit._, p. 19.

[130] The author regrets that it has been necessary to omit special

mention of the many institutions, societies and voluntary agencies,

which were actively engaged in the relief work, and to confine the

chapter to the principles employed by those mainly responsible for

relief and administration.

CHAPTER VI

CATASTROPHE AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

Governmental agencies in catastrophe--What seems to be expected of

governments--What they actually do--Social legislation--A permanent

contribution.

We have thus far been tracing certain of the major influences which are

brought to bear upon a community when, after having been overtaken by

catastrophe, it is settling back into its former habitistic

channels,--channels which not even catastrophe can altogether efface.

Some of these influences are intra-communal and self-generating, such as

the reconstructive impulses already examined. Others are ultra-communal,

such as those vigorous social forces which sweep in upon a disaster city

with the suddenness of catastrophe itself.

There is a further influence which is of a community yet in a sense not

of it alone, but of all communities--government--that institution of

society which expresses its will by legislation, a will which may or may

not be the will of the community concerned. And because legislative

action is responsible action, and precedent-setting action, it is apt to

be deliberative action. Perhaps this is especially true of the new and

less familiar field of social legislation. While it may be that the

latest group to function effectively at Halifax was government, social

legislation when forthcoming contributed an important and deciding

influence, and was in turn itself enriched by the calamity.

The boundaries of social legislation are still in the making and daily

enclosing a wider and wider field. But not all governments are

sympathetic with this process. There are two standards of

legislation--the one conserves above all things the rights and

privileges of the individual, the other considers first the community as

a whole. The superiority of the new ideals of legislation rests here,

that it is the general interest which is primarily consulted and becomes

the norm, rather than the rights of the individual citizen. Progress in

legislation includes its extension into all the affairs of life,

retaining as much as may be the liberty of the individual while

progressively establishing the interests of all.[131] Its evolution is

traceable from the first poor laws, all down the long succeeding line of

those dealing with education, health, labor and recreation. However much

agreement or disagreement there may be and is as to the wisdom of this

mutable sphere of ameliorative legislation, changing just as one ideal

or the other happens to be in the ascendancy, there is at least no doubt

as to the duty of the government to protect and safeguard its citizens.

[131] Lindsay, Samuel M., Unpublished Lectures on Social Legislation.

The one duty of the state, that all citizens, except the

philosophical anarchists, admit, is the obligation to safeguard the

commonwealth by repelling invasion and keeping the domestic peace.

To discharge this duty it is necessary to maintain a police force

and a militia, and a naval establishment. Such dissent from this

proposition as we hear now and then is negligible for practical

purposes.[132]

In this duty all governments alike share, be they imperial, federal,

provincial or municipal, according to their respective powers.

[132] Giddings, Franklin H., _The Responsible State_ (N. Y., 1918),

ch. iv, p. 81.

At Halifax authoritative control following the disaster was not wholly

municipal or wholly martial, but rather an admixture of authorities.

Policeman and soldier joined hands as agents of general protection. This

service government did and did at once.

One of the activities of the disaster relief first taken[133] was that

by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of Nova Scotia, when he sent

to the Chief of Police of Halifax the following order:

You are hereby authorized to commandeer and make use of any vehicle

of any kind that you find necessary for the purpose of removing the

injured and the dead of this city.

[133] Reference has already been made to the good work of the

Government railroad officials in the quick restoration of service.

The service of the police of Halifax was highly commendable. They worked

for long periods with little rest to maintain public peace and order.

The splendid service of the King's soldiers and sailors has already been

considered. They were first and foremost in the work of rescue and of

warning. Military orders to vacate the North End district as a

precautionary measure followed hard upon the explosion. Military orders

permitted the people to return. Within a few hours after the disaster

the military established a cordon around the devastated district which

no one was allowed to pass without an order, which citizens having

business obtained at the City Hall. This was to prevent looting as well

as to facilitate the search for the wounded pinned under the debris, and

to permit the removal of the bodies of the killed. The burned and

devastated area was policed by the military for about two months with

the concurrence of civic authority.

But catastrophe calls for much more than protection. It calls for a

procedure, a guidance, a paternal care, and it calls for it at once. If

we ask whether it be the function of government to take the foremost

step of leadership in this care, the question is one for Political

Science. If we ask the more sociological question whether governments

actually and always do so, the answer is unhesitatingly--they do not.

Says Cooley: "Like other phases of organization, government is merely

one way of doing things, fitted by its character for doing some things,

and unfitted for doing others."[134] This proved one of the things for

which it was unfitted. Not one of the governmental authorities, civic,

provincial, or federal, at once assumed and held authoritatively and

continuously the relief leadership. Indeed it is a peculiar commentary

that they were scarcely thought of as likely immediately to do so. It

should be said, however, that the Deputy-mayor--the Mayor being absent

from the city--was very active personally. While one of the controllers

was himself replacing the dead fire-chief, the Deputy-mayor called an

emergency meeting of citizens on the morning of the disaster, and

another at three in the afternoon to consider what to do. This meeting

of citizens was presided over by the Lieutenant-Governor, and at it, as

already noticed, a beginning in relief organization was made. The

committees, it will be remembered, were afterwards reformed upon a new

basis on the advice of the American unit. But no civic resources were

pledged to the people as was done at the Chicago fire. No moneys were

then or subsequently appropriated. The Board of Health did not assert or

assume the leadership in the unprecedented situation. The City Hall was

indeed set up as the relief center temporarily, but the advice to remove

it elsewhere was not successfully opposed. How little civic authority

was retained under the disaster circumstances is evidenced by the

following complaint. The Board of Control which was then the legal

representative body of the city had no member on the executive committee

of the disaster administration. One of these controllers publicly

criticised the method of the Citizens' Committee as autocratic. He

"almost had to have a page to reach the Committee as representative of

the Board of Control." When the cabinet ministers from Ottawa were

sitting in session in the legislative council room, and giving a hearing

to a representative public gathering, the Mayor entered a complaint that

the City Council and Corporation had been ignored by the acting

committees. The Citizens' Committee exercised the general control. They

were entrusted with the special grants and the civic authorities, Board

of Health, police, _etc._, so far as emergency matters went, cooperated

with them. But the various civic officers were not idle. No one was idle

at Halifax. They were occupied with the rehabilitation of the various

departments at City Hall and with individual programs of relief. What

the civic government continued to do officially was rather in the way of

providing the stiff formality of proclamation to the carefully weighed

suggestions of the Citizens' Committee. Several of these proclamations

were issued. Among them was one urging all people excepting those on

relief work or upon especially urgent business to stay away from Halifax

for two weeks. Another proclamation was a warning to merchants with

regard to demanding exorbitant prices. Over the Mayor's signature went

out the nation-wide appeal for aid that "a sorely afflicted people

should be provided with clothing and food." The subsequent time, thought

and help which City Hall contributed is of less sociological importance

to this study. It is sufficient if we have faithfully described

municipal aid in disaster as falling under the general category of

service, rather than direction.[135]

[134] Cooley, Charles H., _Social Organization_ (N. Y., 1912),

ch. xxxv, p. 403.

[135] This is not to be considered as without exception in

catastrophies. A special Citizens' Committee led the operations at the

Paterson fire and flood, but at the Chicago fire the City government

took immediate and responsible action. This was also the case at

Baltimore when the Mayor was the "key to the situation." It should

however be added that both at Halifax and Dartmouth the chairmen of

the Citizens' Committees were ex-mayors.

Turning briefly to the provincial and federal spheres of activity in

disaster we note that no special session of the provincial legislature

was called, as was done by the Governor of Illinois after the calamity

which overtook Chicago in 1871. Yet when the legislature of Nova Scotia

convened a fully considered and detailed act was passed incorporating

the Halifax Relief Commission, and designating and defining its

powers.[136] The several articles defined its establishment as a

rehabilitation and reconstruction committee, a town-planning board, as

well as its powers of expropriation, its relationship to the city

charter, certain parts of which it could amend or repeal; its powers to

enforce attendance at its courts and boards; its relationship to the

Workmen's Compensation Act and to the insurance problem. Besides, the

Commission was also invested with full and adequate discretion regarding

schools, churches and business properties.

[136] _An Act to Incorporate the Halifax Relief Commission_, Halifax,

1918.

Some of the disaster legislative powers and procedures are of special

interest to social legislation. Among these were the power to repair,

rebuild or restore buildings, the power to repair and carry out a

town-planning scheme, the power to amend, repeal, alter or add to

provisions in the city charter, the automatic assumption of rights of

owner to insure to the extent of the amount expended in repair, and the

automatic cancellation of workmen's compensation claims. The act

incorporating the commission with powers to make investigation, and

administer all funds and properties constitutes Chapter VI of the year

1918. The local legislature also passed Chapter XVIII authorizing the

provincial loan of one hundred thousand dollars for the benefit of the

sufferers; and Chapter XIX authorizing cities, towns and municipalities

to contribute for the relief of sufferers.

The action of Premier Borden of Canada for promptitude and wisdom is

comparable to that of President Harrison of the United States at the

time of the Johnstown flood. The Canadian Premier at the time of the

disaster was in Prince Edward Island, an island province lying near Nova

Scotia. He at once left for Halifax and arrived the following day. He

immediately placed resources from the Federal government at the disposal

of the local authorities to assist them in coping with the situation.

The third day after the disaster he attended an important meeting

regarding the harbor, and strengthened greatly the morale of the city by

assuring a complete and rapid restoration of the harbor. Following the

Premier came the Minister of Public Works and he too gave much

administrative assistance. Then came five members of the Federal

Cabinet, each announcing such programs of restoration as to give the

community new heart and inspiration. Among these announcements was that

of the establishment of a large ship-building plant upon the explosion

area. The Canadian government had already as its first act made a grant

of one million dollars, toward the sufferers' relief. It was then

forcibly urged upon the government that it assume a responsibility

towards Halifax such as the British government accepts in "its policy of

holding itself responsible for loss and damage by air-raids and

explosions." Public opinion seemed to demand that the work of

restoration and reparation be undertaken by the government of Canada as

a national enterprise. The government while disclaiming all legal

liability, acceded to the request. On January twenty-first there was

announced the formation of a Federal Halifax Relief Commission to take

over the whole work of rehabilitation and reconstruction,--an

announcement which brought a feeling of relief to the already

discouraged workers.

Another interesting contrast may be noted in the fact that while the

Governor of Ohio appointed the Ohio Flood Commission to receive and

administer relief funds and supplies, the Halifax Relief Commission was

appointed by the Governor-General of Canada in Council. This was done

under the "Enquiries Act of Canada, being Chapter CIV of the Revised

Statutes of Canada, 1906, and under the War Measures Act, 1914, being

Chapter II of the Acts of Canada for the year 1914." The Federal grant

was later increased to five million dollars, and subsequently to

eighteen millions.

There should also be here recorded the timely succour afforded by the

Imperial Government at Westminster. Following the King's gracious cable

of sympathy, the sum of five million dollars was voted by the British

Government to the relief of Halifax. The King's words were:

Most deeply regret to hear of serious explosion at Halifax resulting

in great loss of life and property. Please convey to the people of

Halifax, where I have spent so many happy times, my true sympathy in

this grievous calamity.

Reference has already been made to the policy to which the Commission

was committed. This policy may be more exactly stated by an extract from

the act incorporating the commission:

_Whereas_, the said Halifax Relief Commission as heretofore

constituted has recommended to the Governor-General of Canada in

Council, that reasonable compensation or allowance should be made to

persons injured in or by reason of the said disaster and the

dependents of persons killed or injured in or by reason of the said

disaster and the Governor-General of Canada in Council has been

pleased to adopt said recommendation; _etc._

In the provision of material assistance, the strengthening of morale and

the eventual establishment of a Relief Commission, government may be

said to have contributed an important and deciding influence in the

reorganization of the community of Halifax and its restoration to normal

conditions.

Not only must social legislation be acknowledged to have had a very

direct determining influence upon whatever picture of the community is

subsequently drawn, but social legislation itself was enriched by the

catastrophe. The association of catastrophe with progress in social

legislation has already been noticed in our introduction, the mass of

facts in support of which no writer has yet compiled. In this

introduction we noted how on many occasions disasters have been the

preceding reagents in effecting legislation of permanent social value.

It is instanced that city-planning in America took its rise from the

Chicago fire, that the origin of labor legislation is traceable to a

calamitous fever at Manchester and that the Titanic disaster

precipitated amendment to the Seamen's laws.[137] It has been said that

"the vast machinery of the Public Health Department in England has

rapidly grown up in consequence of the cholera visitations in the middle

of the last century;"[138] and also that public health work in America

practically began with yellow fever epidemics. Writing of mining

disasters, J. Byron Deacon says in this connection

If it can be said that any circumstance attending such disasters is

fortunate, it was that they exercised a profound influence upon

public opinion, to demand new effort and legislation both for the

prevention of industrial accidents and for the more equitable

distribution of the burden of individual loss and community relief

which they involved.[139]

Again E. A. Ross writes:

A permanent extension to the administration of the state has often

dated from a calamity,--a pestilence, a famine, a murrain, a flood

or a tempest--which, paralyzing private efforts has caused

application for state aid.[140]

[137] Parkinson, Thomas I., "Problems growing out of the Titanic

Disaster," _Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science_, vol. vi,

no. 1.

[138] Ross, Edward A., _Foundations of Sociology_ (N. Y., 1905),

ch. viii, p. 254.

[139] Deacon, J. Byron, _Disasters_ (N. Y., 1918), p. 43.

[140] Ross, _op. cit._, p. 253.

The student of social legislation who reads this book will turn first to

this chapter, and ask what permanent legislation will the future

associate with so dire a calamity as that suffered at Halifax. It may be

said that not only has special disaster legislation of precedent-setting

value been enacted serving in a measure to standardize relief

legislative procedure, but social legislation of wider application and

more general character ensued. And this was along the line which the

student of social law should be led to expect.

As calamitous epidemics bring forth regulations of sanitation; as marine

disasters foster regulations ensuring greater safety at sea, it might

well be expected that a great explosion would bring about regulations

controlling the handling of explosives. And this is in reality what has

occurred. There were approved on the twenty-fifth day of June, 1919, by

the Parliament of Canada, regulations respecting the loading and

handling of explosives in harbors, applicable to all public harbors in

Canada, to which the provisions of Part XII of the Canada Shipping Act

apply; and to all other public harbors insofar as the same are not

inconsistent with regulations already or hereafter made applicable.[141]

They cover

1. The provision of special areas for berth, for explosives-carriers.

2. Regulations of ship control to be observed in the navigation in

harbors of explosives-laden vessels.

3. Regulations to be observed upon vessels carrying explosives.

4. Regulations governing the handling of explosives.

"The enactment of these regulations" writes the Under-Secretary of State

for Canada[142] "was suggested in large measure by the Halifax

disaster." Had these regulations been in effect and observed in Halifax

Harbor it is hardly conceivable that the great disaster of 1917 could

have occurred.

[141] _Regulations for the Loading and Handling of Explosives in the

Harbors of Canada_ (Ottawa, June, 1919).

[142] In a letter to the author.

It should be borne in mind that the recommendation for this general

legislation of social utility originated with the Drysdale commission--a

board of enquiry appointed by the Federal Government to determine the

cause of the disaster and whose judgment, was issued on February fourth,

1918. In Section XIII of this judgment, the following occurs:

that the regulations governing the traffic in Halifax harbor in

force since the war were prepared by competent naval authorities;

that such traffic regulations do not specifically deal with the

handling of ships laden with explosives, and we recommend that such

competent authority forthwith take up and make specific regulations

dealing with such subject.

We, therefore, conclude that the function of government in disaster is

of primary importance, and that social legislation when forthcoming

constitutes an important and deciding influence and is itself in turn

enriched by calamity. Brought to the test of comparison with observed

facts the statement in the Introduction, that catastrophe is in close

association with progress in social legislation receives abundant

justification.

CHAPTER VII

CATASTROPHE AND SOCIAL SURPLUS

Mill's explanation of the rapidity with which communities recover from

disaster--The case of San Francisco--The case of Halifax--Social

surplus--The equipmental factors--Correlation of tragedy in catastrophe

with generosity of public response--Catastrophe insurance--A practical

step.

John Stuart Mill offers a very interesting explanation

of what has so often created wonder, the great rapidity with which

countries recover from a state of devastation, the disappearance in

a short time of all traces of the mischiefs done by earthquakes,

floods, hurricanes and the ravages of war.[143]

This "_vis medicatrix naturae_" he explains on an economic principle.

All the wealth destroyed was merely the rapid consumption of what had

been produced previously, and which would have in due course been

consumed anyway. The rapid repairs of disasters mainly depends, he says,

on whether the community has been depopulated.

[143] Mill, John Stuart, _Principles of Political Economy_ (London,

1917), ch. v, p. 74.

But this is not an all-sufficient explanation, and indeed applies

particularly to countries which have not been bereft of the raw

materials of industrial machinery. San Francisco recovered exceedingly

rapidly from her terrible experience of 1906. Indeed her quick recovery

has been called one of the wonders of the age. San Francisco was not

depopulated. Her actual losses of life were but four hundred and

ninety-eight, and those injured four hundred and fifteen. The loss of

life on the other hand was about two thousand in Halifax, a city of

fifty thousand population--but one-eighth that of San Francisco--and her

list of injured ran into many thousands. And yet the same phenomenon

appeared.

There are other factors both social and economic which must not be

omitted from an account of the influences of recuperation, namely the

equipmental and other factors which produce social surplus.

Disaster-stricken communities cannot survive unless their "surplus

energy exceeds their needs." They cannot become normal until the social

surplus is restored. The social surplus, according to Professor Tenney,

is "merely the sum-total of surplus energy existing in the individuals

composing a social group, or immediately available to such

individuals."[144] It includes not only "bodily vigor" but "such

material goods also as are immediately available for the restoration of

depleted bodily vigor." It is not only physiological, as life energy,

and social, as conditions of knowledge and institutional facilities, but

also socio-economic, as equipment for the maintenance or restoration of

physiological and social needs. In catastrophe bodily vigor may have

been depleted, and material goods been consumed. No period of

recuperation or rapid gain can ensue unless such equipment is in some

degree replaced and a balance of social surplus restored. This is the

_conditio sine qua non_ of recuperation, and of the transition from a

pain-economy to a pleasure-economy,[145] after disaster. Certainly the

maintenance of the standard of living demands it. The standard of living

has been defined as the "mode of activity and scale of comfort which a

person has come to regard as indispensable to his happiness and to

secure and retain which he is willing to make any reasonable sacrifice."

Following Professor Seager's association of the standard of living with

population, the reduction of population in catastrophe of a certain

character might conceivably operate to automatically heighten the

standard of living, just as the growth of population often brings about

its fall. But catastrophe often consumes great quantities of material

goods and brings about a change in incomes and in occupations.[146]

Seager notes that:

Actual starvation confronts more rarely those belonging to the class

of manual workers, but for them also under-nutrition is a

possibility which prolonged illness or inability to obtain

employment may at any time change into a reality. The narrow margin

which their usual earnings provide above the bare necessaries of

life, coupled with their lack of accumulated savings, makes them

especially liable, when some temporary calamity reduces their

incomes, to sink permanently below the line of self-support and

self-respect.[147]

[144] Tenney, Alvan A., "Individual and Social Surplus," _Popular

Science Monthly_, vol. lxxxii (Dec., 1912), p. 552.

[145] Patten, Simon N., _Theory of the Social Forces_ (Phil., 1896),

p. 75.

[146] At San Francisco "after the fire, the proportion of families in

the lower income groups was somewhat larger, and the proportion in the

higher income groups somewhat smaller than before the fire." (Motley,

James M., _San Francisco Relief Survey_, New York, 1913, pt. iv,

p. 228.)

[147] Seager, Henry R., _Economics, Briefer Course_ (N. Y., 1909),

ch. xiii, p. 210.

It must be remembered that at Halifax while the equipmental damage was

stupendous, still the heart of the downtown business section remained

sound. The banking district held together, and the dislocation of

business machinery was less protracted on that account. To this it is

necessary to add how to a very considerable extent the material losses

were replaced by communities and countries which not only supplied the

city with the material of recuperation but with men and means as well.

Were her own workmen killed and injured? Glaziers, drivers, repair men

and carpenters came by train-loads bringing their tools, their food and

their wages with them. The city's population was increased by

thirty-five hundred workmen, twenty-three hundred of whom were

registered with the committee at one time. Was her glass destroyed?

Eighty acres of transparences came for the temporary repairs and had

been placed by January the twenty-first. Were her buildings gone? Seven

million, five hundred thousand feet of lumber were soon available to

house the homeless. Were her people destitute? Food and clothing were

soon stacked high. Were her citizens bankrupt because of losses? Fifty

thousand dollars came from Newfoundland, another fifty thousand from New

Zealand, one hundred thousand from Quebec, one hundred thousand from

Montreal, two hundred and fifty thousand from Australia, five million

from Great Britain. In merchandise, clothing and cash a million came

from Massachusetts. In about fifteen weeks, aside from the Federal

grant, eight millions were contributed. The total contributions from all

sources amounted finally to twenty-seven million dollars.

Factors such as these must not be omitted in examining the sociological

recuperation of a smitten city. And when the experience of Halifax is

set side by side with the related experiences of other cities a

conclusion may be drawn that disaster-stricken communities can always

count upon public aid, for the reasons which have already been

discussed. But there is found to be strongly suggested a correlation

between the striking character or magnitude of a disaster and the

generosity of the relief response,[148] as there is also with the

immediacy of the appeal. "It is not the facts themselves which strike

the popular imagination" says Le Bon, "but the way in which they take

place."[149] There have been disasters relatively serious, such as the

St. Quentin forest fire, where repeated appeals met with astonishingly

little response from the people. "A single great accident" continues Le

Bon, "will profoundly impress them even though the results be infinitely

less disastrous than those of a hundred small accidents put together."

It was in recognition of this principle that "it was decided to transfer

the residue of the amount contributed [after the Triangle fire] to the

contingent fund of the American Red Cross, to be used in disasters,

which in their nature do not evoke so quick or generous public response,

but where the suffering is as grievous."[150]

[148] At the time of the tragic Martinique disaster the New York

committee received $80,000 more than it could disburse. (Devine,

Edward T., _The Principles of Relief_, N. Y., 1904, pt. iv, ch. vii,

p. 468.)

[149] Le Bon, Gustave, _The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind_

(London), ch. iii, p. 79.

[150] Deacon, J. Byron, _Disasters_ (N. Y., 1918), ch. v, p. 120.

Besides the relation of the tragic in catastrophe to generosity and

other expressions of sympathy, the experience at Halifax suggests also a

relationship between the aid furnished by a contributing community and

that community's own previous history in regard to calamity. As an

instance may be cited the quick and splendid response which came from

St. John and Campbellton, two New Brunswick cities with unforgettable

memories of great disasters which they themselves had suffered. It is

also not improbable that the study of comparative catastrophe would

reveal a correlation between the relative amount of aid given and the

distance of those who give. Indeed there are reasons which suggest that

the relationship might be written thus: that relief in disaster varies

inversely as the square of the cost distance. The association here

suggested is given additional plausibility from the fact that attention

to certain types of news seems to vary according to this principle, and

news notice is no inconsiderable factor in disaster aid.

Enough has been said to make it clear that at the present time, in the

absence of any scientific method of socially ameliorating the

consequences of catastrophe, relief is a fluctuating quantity, and is

poorly apportioned from the point of view of need. While such conditions

obtain, disasters must inevitably contribute to the inequalities which

break the hearts of men. It is alas true, that after all our

generosities and philanthropies

many people lose their normal position in the social and economic

scale through earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, droughts, railway

wrecks, fires, and the common accidents of industrial life. These

accidents naturally have a vast influence over the lives of their

victims; for they often render people unfit to struggle along in the

rank and file of humanity.[151]

[151] Blackmar and Gillin, _Outlines of Sociology_ (N. Y., 1915),

pt. iv, ch. v, p. 402.

The only socially defensible way of doing is to spread the economic

results of these disasters over the entire community in some form of

intra-city catastrophe insurance administered by the Federal government.

This alone will overcome the irrationality of an inequitable levy upon

the more sympathetic, and the fluctuations of disproportionate relief.

And even beyond this step is there not the possibility of an

international system in which each nation will insure the other?

Certainly at Halifax the aid contributed came from many nations and

tongues. But while we are discussing what ought to be and eventually

will be done, one very practical step remains which may be taken at

once. At the Halifax disaster, we have seen that much of the direction

and technical leadership, welcome as it was, and saving the situation as

it did, yet came from without rather than from within the country. There

is no Canadian who will close these pages without asking whether this

must always be. May it not be respectfully suggested, as a concluding

result of this study, that the Canadian government, take immediate steps

to develop a staff of experts, a reserve fund, and stations of relief

strategically located in Canada--these stations to have in their keeping

left-over war-material, such as tents, stores, and other equipment

together with records of available experts who have had experience in

disasters and who may be subject to call when emergencies arise.

And now to return to our thesis, and its special enquiry, namely,

wherein is the specific functioning of catastrophe in social change? We

have thus far concerned ourselves with the major factors of

recuperation, intra-social forces, social service, and legislation.

We find it necessary now to add that the socio-economic constitutes a no

less important factor. But the effects may not stop with mere

recuperation. Suppose a city becomes in a trice more prosperous and

progressive than ever. Suppose she begins to grow populous with uncommon

rapidity; her bank clearings do not fail but rather increase; her

industries rebuild and grow in numbers; new companies come looking for

sites as if dimly conscious that expansion is at hand! Suppose a city

rises Phoenix-like from the flames, a new and better city, her people

more kind, more charitable, more compassionate to little children, more

considerate of age! Suppose there come social changes which alter the

conservatism and civic habits of many years--changes which foster a

spirit of public service, and stimulate civic pride! Then there is

clearly some further influence associated with the day of disaster.

Perhaps we shall find progress innate in catastrophe itself.

CHAPTER VIII

CATASTROPHE AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The unchanging Halifax of the years--The causes of social

immobility--The new birthday--The indications of change: appearance,

expansion of business, population, political action, city-planning,

housing, health, education, recreation, community spirit--Carsten's

prophecy.

Halifax has had her fair proportion of tribute in her time. Kipling has

called her "the Warden of the Honor of the North." Pauline Johnston

sings of her pride of situation. As Edinburgh, "it is a city of many

charms; beautiful for situation, beyond most of the cities of the world;

vocal with history beyond most, for at every turn of its streets some

voice from the past 'comes sounding through the toon.'" Her public

gardens are the envy of all. Her vistas of the sea are without compare.

Her Northwest Arm is a veritable joy. Birds sing in her homes. Cheery

wood-fires burn brightly in her open grates. No city of her size is more

hospitable than she.

But she has always been a city which has never quite entered into her

heritage commercially. Situated where by nature she might well be great,

she has always been small. Unambitious, wealthy[152] and little jealous

of the more rapidly-growing cities, she has prided herself on being a

lover of better things. Commerce and industry were things alien[153] and

secular. She devoted herself to standards of art, music, learning,

religion and the philanthropies. Charitable and philanthropic

institutions abounded. She has had her own conservative English ways.

She affected homage to "old families," and to that illusory element

"social prestige." She welcomed each new knight which the favor of the

king conferred, and grew careless of civic prosperity and growth. She

had leaned "too long upon the army and the navy" and her citizens had

become "anaemic," "lethargic" and standstill; their "indifference" and

"inertia" were a commonplace. Halifax had been complacent and academic

rather than practical in her outlook upon the world and her general

attitude toward life.

[152] Halifax is the wealthiest city per capita in the Dominion of

Canada.

[153] For years real estate was marketed "quietly." In fact, real

property was in the hands of one or two specialists only.

Geographically she suffered by her situation on the rim of the

continent. She experienced not a little neglect and isolation because

she was an undeveloped terminal, and not a junction point. Travellers

and commercial men could not visit her _en route_ but only by special

trip.

Again "the government has had altogether too many interests in Halifax

for the good of the place." "Government-kept towns" are not as a rule

"those which have achieved the greatest prosperity." Halifax as a

civil-service headquarters and a government military depot was perhaps

open to the charge of being at least "self-satisfied." Valuable acres of

non-taxable land have been far from stimulating to civic enterprise.

An historic city too, Halifax fell under the blight of overmuch looking

backward, and sociologically the back look has been always recognized as

the foe of progress. But she has had a past to be proud of--one which

throbs with incident and interest. Born as a military settlement, she

has been a garrison city and naval station for more than a hundred and

fifty years. She has been called "the stormy petrel among the

cities--always to the front in troublous times." She has served and

suffered in four hard wars. She has gloried in this wealth of years and

storied past. Her traditions have been traditions of royalty, blue

blood, dashing officers, church parades, parliamentary ceremonies,

fetes, levees and all the splendor and spirit of old colonial times. A

newspaper has published daily items of a generation before, and weekly

featured a reverie in the past.[154] Old in her years she remained old

in her appearance, old in her ways, and in her loves. She boasted old

firms which have kept their jubilees, old churches wherein was cradled

the religious life of Canada, an old university with a century of

service. Each noon a cannon boomed the mid-day hour, and like a curfew

sounded in the night.

[154] _The Acadian Recorder_, C. C. Blackadar, editor.

Search where one will, it would be difficult to find another city which

has more completely exhibited the causes of social immobility as set

forth by sociology. For there are, it must be remembered, causes of

immobility as well as factors of social change. They may be geographical

difficulties, or elements more distinctively social--an over-emphasis of

government, discouraging innovation, too great a "volume of suggestion,"

the drag of "collective customs and beliefs," a "traditionalist

educational system," the "inheritance of places and functions" tending

to arrest development, "government, law, religion and ceremony, hallowed

by age."[155] All these reenforce the conservative tendencies in society

and preserve the _status quo_.[156]

[155] Ross, Edward A., _Foundations of Sociology_ (N. Y., 1905),

ch. viii, p. 197.

[156] There are other causes of conservatism. A comparative freedom

from disasters in the past is one. Halifax has suffered few in her

entire history. Indeed the cholera epidemic is the only one of any

consequence. She remained one of the last large wooden cities. Her

sister city, St. John, was stricken by a disastrous fire and stands

to-day safer, more substantial, more progressive in every way.

Again communities are generally conservative in character when a large

percentage are property-holding people. It was one of the surprises of

the Halifax catastrophe that so large a number of citizens were found

to own at least in part the homes they lived in.

There are other questions which the sociologist would ask if it were

possible to carry the investigation further. Is the community loath to

disturb the existing relations or to resort to extreme means to

achieve desired ends? Or is it eager to sweep away the old, to indulge

in radical experiment and to try any means that give promise of

success? He would study too the distribution of people relative to

their interests. Is there a majority of those whose experiences are

narrow and whose interests are few? Or is there a majority of those

who have long enjoyed varied experiences and cultivated manifold

interests, that yet remain harmonious? He studies the character of the

choices, decisions, selections in a people's industry, law-making,

educational and religious undertakings. It is thus that he proceeds in

diagnosing a population as to the degree of conservatism and to

discover what the ideal community should be.--Giddings, Franklin H.,

_Inductive Sociology_ (N. Y., 1909), p. 178, _et seq._

Diagnosis in detail is not essential here. Up to the time of the

disaster Halifax had certainly preserved the _status quo_. We need not

labor the how and why. Tourists had returned year after year and found

her unaltered. "Dear, dirty old Halifax" they had called her. They had

found business as usual,--old unpainted wooden houses on every side,

unswept chimneys, an antiquated garbage system and offensive gutters;

the best water and the poorest water system an inspector ever examined;

the purest air but the most dust-laden in a storm; an obsolete

tramway,[157] a "green market," ox-carts on the main streets, crossings

ankle-deep with mud, a citizenship given over to late rising. Instead of

making the city they had been "letting it happen." The "transient, the

good-enough, the cheapest possible" had been the rule of action.

[157] Halifax has now one of the best equipped tramway systems to be

found anywhere. There has recently been appropriated the sum of

$200,000 for sewers, $150,000 for water, $300,000 for street paving.