CHAPTER IV ANIMALS

Whilst philosophers and moralists have studied men, and naturalists

animals, Darwin considered it necessary to collect information

concerning both men and beasts simultaneously before making a biography

of the human being. With the modesty so often characteristic of a great

genius, the English naturalist acknowledges that “many of the views

which have been advanced are highly speculative, and some no doubt will

prove erroneous. False facts are highly injurious to the progress of

science, for they often long endure; but false views, if supported by

some evidence, do little harm, as everyone takes a salutary pleasure in

proving their falseness; and when this is done, one path towards error

is closed and the road to truth is often at the same time opened.”[33]

Although there is no doubt that the facts observed by Darwin and

recorded in the _Origin of Species_, are perfectly correct, I hope to

be able to dispose of the opinion that “man and animals follow parallel

lines in their lives, but that man advances more quickly, and has taken

his place in the front rank.”

Whilst making a short _résumé_ of remarks which Noiré and other learned

writers have made on animals, I also propose to draw a comparison

between the two who are so closely connected--the superior and inferior

animal.

Darwin was not alone in his endeavour to prove that there exists no

essential difference between man and beast; some have even asserted

that the intelligence of certain animals is not only equal to, but

at times, superior to that of man. We must be on our guard, however,

against those numerous anecdotes which have led even philosophers

astray; we will also divest our minds of prejudice and preconceived

notions, that we may introduce some order into ideas which have been

disturbed by superficial observers and the makers of false systems,

those enemies of true science; let us candidly own the smallness of

our knowledge concerning the mind of an animal; we do not in the least

know how they philosophise, nor how an ox recognises his stable door.

Instead of having recourse to animals and seeking to draw parallels

between their mental faculties and ours, let us examine ourselves to

find out what passes in our own minds. We shall then discover that

we never in reality perceive anything unless we can distinguish it

from other things by means, if not of a word, yet of a sign; that is

till we have passed through the four stages of sensation, perception,

conception, and more important than all, for our present purpose, of

naming. When it is once acknowledged that concepts are impossible

without words, and that man alone amongst organised beings possesses

the power of language, and that the mental faculties of animals are

different from ours in kind, and not only in degree, it naturally

follows that a genealogical descent of man from animals is an

impossible assumption.

Formerly, in comparing the characteristics of man and animals it was

contended that the latter were ruled by instinct in place of the reason

which was the attribute of the former; and although an affirmation

is not an explanation it appeared sufficiently plausible and was

accepted. But the fact is that both man and beast possess instinct.

If the spider weaves his net by instinct, a child takes his mother’s

breast also by instinct; both are with regard to instinct at one level.

Man involuntarily extends his arm to protect himself if he suddenly

perceives an object near him on the point of striking him. “If we tear

a spider’s web, and watch the spider first run from it in despair, then

return and examine the mischief and endeavour to mend it. Surely we

have the instinct of weaving controlled by observation, by comparison,

by reflection, and by judgment.”[34]

No one has hitherto succeeded in explaining and analysing the instinct

said to be in animals. Cuvier[35] and other naturalists have compared

it with habit.[36] This comparison gives an accurate notion of the

frame of mind under which an instinctive action is performed, but does

not necessarily explain its origin.

As reason develops in man, instinct plays a less important part;

whereas a cat chases a mouse, a bird flies, and fish swim by instinct

from their birth to their last day; and the actions of ants, bees, and

moles, do not cease to amaze us, because they are inseparable from

their structure and their vital functions. The natural impulses which

guide birds and insects in making their nests, hives, and storehouses,

cocoons of silk with which they have so enriched our world and theirs,

are the results of constant and repeated acts, during the course of

innumerable generations. The fact of not distinguishing the instinct

which is in man from that found in animals and thus attributing

man’s conscious acts to the natural leanings which guide unconscious

creatures, has perhaps caused Renan to assert that the monotheistic

tendency of the Semitic race belongs to it by a religious instinct.

It is certain that impressions are received both by man and by animals;

with both the knowledge of objects proceeds from the impressions made

on the senses, thus transmitting the image to the intelligence; but

there the likeness ends; the capacities differ. The animal remains the

slave--in every sense of the word--of his organs; the sight of a bone

to gnaw, the corner in which he lies, the signs of friendship that he

receives from human beings, call forth in a dog a chain of feelings

taking the place of the chain of ideas called out in man.

Man’s capabilities of introducing intermediaries between the intention

and the fulfilment of his object witness to his wideness of mind, his

experience of the past and prevision of the future; all those things

that he owes to his power of imagination and conception even in the

case of things having no real existence, or which do not exist as yet;

he reproduces at will the outward likeness of what is not at the moment

before him. Thus man who names an object, _thinks_ it; but the animal

from not possessing language cannot _think_ it and cannot reproduce it

when out of its sight.

The use or non-use of tools creates a great gulf between man and the

brutes. The most intelligent animal, a monkey of a high order, never

uses a tool--even the most primitive--to accomplish his will; no one

can ascribe to the animal creative actions, that is, it does not

fashion an implement that it may attain another end; it has never been

known to carry an object from one spot to another that it might act as

a ladder to bring the animal nearer to the fruit it desired to reach.

But this concession, I think, we may make to Darwin; that even in the

sphere of mental activities we can never entirely separate ourselves

from the brute creation. We experience in ourselves a certain condition

of mind, where fancies alternate with passing agitation; these proceed

from intense, but confused emotions. This condition does not allow of

clear explanation even to ourselves, since it has nothing in common

with true thought, which is inseparable from the consciousness of

objects, and therefore is lacking in words with which to express

itself. To Mendelssohn this mental condition was perfectly known, and

he says, “It is exactly at that moment when language is impotent to

express the experiences of the soul, that the sphere of music opens to

us; if all that passes in us were capable of being expressed in words,

I should write no more music.”

A flock of birds about to migrate, all follow an unanimous impulse in

uttering at starting a few high clear notes, perhaps impelled by an

unknown motive, their inclinations and wills find collective expression

therein, by a mutual impulse which comes from soundless depths of the

life of the senses, carrying all before it. This universal sympathy,

however difficult to explain, is one of the noblest possessions of the

inferior animals; even the aptitude they display for certain mechanical

acts of labour does not stand on the same level; but in the vocal

manifestations of birds there is no indication of true thought, the

basis of real language.

* * * * *

Now come, my dog, for a _tête-à-tête_. It would be impossible to hold

converse with ants, bees, monkeys, moles, or birds, as I should not

acknowledge them as my compeers, I should not admit them as intimates;

but you I know well; and, let me tell you, your judges have shown their

impartiality towards you; none of the vices which degrade us--your

superiors--have been laid to your account. You are called neither

gourmand, thief, idler, nor hypocrite; but you lack the qualities that

might have been yours had you possessed the faculty of combination.

They say that you create nothing because you fail to see what purpose

tools may serve; and you are ignorant of the fact that _A._ being

given, _B._ must follow--such is combination. Still, on looking

closely, it is possible to discover amongst us--your superiors--those

who are stupid--or awkward--who take small advantage of all the means

put within their reach to recede from a false position, to recover

from the effects of a wrong step, or, what is still more important,

remedy their ignorance. Yes, there are many such, and these also lack

the faculty of combination.

Your judges also assert that from the want on your part of being able

to attach one idea to another, you do not think of your master when

he is absent from you. What ingratitude! But I wonder whether those

friends, who profess so much pleasure in my company, think of me when I

am absent; perhaps no more than you do.

Let me continue my enquiries for a few minutes. We will suppose that

we two are in my study. I am occupied with a book, and am not thinking

of you at all. You are stretched at my feet with your nose between

your paws, watching a fly near you. I make a sudden movement, you look

at me, and at the same moment wag your tail.... Am I to suppose that

you wag it to hide your dislike to me? The noble quality which I and

all your superiors possess is lacking in you; you have no speech for

thought in which to tell me your love for me; but if you could speak,

that is, were like one of ourselves, would you be as truthful as you

are now, being only a dog that has nothing but his tail with which

to make his master understand his feelings towards him? Schopenhauer

... but you know nothing of Schopenhauer, if you could speak I should

teach you to read, and then you would know him. Schopenhauer is a great

and learned philosopher, who says, “How much this movement of the

tail surpasses in sincerity many other assurances of friendship and

devotion.”[37]

This is a long digression on Darwin’s idea that man and animals lead

parallel lives, but that the one progresses quickly, the other slowly.

I think I have shown that it is not a question of rapidity or tardiness

of progress, but rather whether both travellers are equally well

equipped with the means of passing the Rubicon.

FOOTNOTES:

[33] Darwin’s _Descent of Man_, vol. ii. p. 385.

[34] Max Müller’s _Science of Language_, vol. i. p. 402.

[35] “Cuvier maintained that instinct and intelligence stand in an

inverse ratio to each other.”--Darwin’s _Descent of Man_, vol. i. p.

37. Translator’s note.

[36] Frederick Cuvier and several of the older metaphysicians have

compared instinct with habit.--Darwin’s _Origin of Species_, p. 191.

[37] Max Müller’s _Science of Thought_, p. 178.

The Origin of Thought and Speech · 第 4 / 13 章