CHAPTER III THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

It is possible to distinguish in ourselves four things: sensation,

perception, conception, and the signs by means of which we designate

objects, that is their names; these enable us to separate the one

from the other. We must not imagine that these four exist as separate

entities, “no words are possible without concepts, no concepts without

percepts, no percepts without sensations.”[28]--_Science of Thought_,

p. 2.

These four constituent elements of thought are merely four different

phases in the growth of what we call our mind.

I employ these terms because they are in use in philosophical language;

there are also many others constantly on the lips of philosophers, some

of them newly coined. This is greatly to be regretted, as much of our

confusion of thought arises from this superabundance of philosophical

terms. If such words as impression, sensation, perception, intuition,

presentation, conception, soul, reason, and many others could for a

time be banished from our philosophical dictionaries, and some only

readmitted after they had undergone a thorough purification and were

made to return to their primitive signification, an immense service

would have been rendered to mental science; as every writer defines

them as he will, or uses them without definition; and he seems to

imagine that because there are so many words, there must also be so

many variations, “Because in the German language there are two words:

_verstand_ and _vernunft_, both originally expressing the same thing,

the greatest efforts have been made to show that there is something to

be called _verstand_, totally different from what is called _vernunft_;

and as there is a _vernunft_ by the side of a _verstand_ in German,

English philosophers have been most anxious to introduce the same

distinction between understanding and reason into English”;[29] and

“because we have a name for impression, and another for sensations,

we are led to imagine that impressions do actually exist by the side

of sensations. But what was originally meant by impression was not

something beside sensation, but rather one side of sensation, namely,

the passive side, which may be spoken of by itself, but which in every

real sensation is inseparable from its active side.”[30]

All the various shades and developments of sensation were doubtless

distinguished and named for some very useful purpose; but the

inconvenience was great when the terms became too numerous. “We may

safely enjoy the wealth of language accumulated by a long line of

thinkers, if only we take care not to accept a coin for more or less

than it is really worth. We must weigh our words as the ancients often

weighed their coins, and not be deceived by their current value.”[31]

When we have bravely resolved to throw away superfluous words, we need

not imagine that we are the poorer, since we have only lost what we, in

reality, never possessed. So powerful, however, is the action of words

on thoughts, that as soon as we throw away a word, we feel ourselves

to have been robbed of the thing itself; the sun rises just the same,

though we say now that it does not rise. Those things which we call

mind, intellect, reason, memory, in fact the soul, have no existence

as such--that is apart from ourselves. This assertion may sound very

terrible to those philosophers who imagine that the dignity of man

consists in the possession of these and other powers; at last there

arises a complete mythology, a philosophic polytheism, when these are

spoken of as distinct possessions, independent powers, with limits not

very sharply defined; and however orthodox that polytheism has become,

it is never too late to protest against it. In making use of these

terms it should be understood that they represent certain modes of

action and phases of the Ego.

It is to be regretted that our modern languages have nothing to replace

the word “mind,” such as there is in the Sanscrit language, meaning

“working within.” As soon as we speak of _mind_ we cannot help thinking

of an independent something dwelling in our body, whereas by mind I

mean nothing but that working which is going on within, embracing

sensation, perception, conception, and naming, and the worker who

accomplishes this is the Ego.

Thus the Ego means nothing but consciousness of itself.

There is one word which it would be desirable to reintroduce into our

philosophical phraseology and that is Logos; it means the word and

the thought combined. Logos is a single intellectual act under two

aspects; it is an untranslatable word. We were told at school that it

was strange that the Greeks should not have distinguished between Logos

Speech and Logos Reason, and it was represented as a progress toward

clearer thought that later writers should have distinguished between

Logos the spoken word and Logos the inner thought.

But the Greeks were right: no doubt it may be an advantage to be able

to distinguish between two sides of the same thing, but that advantage

is more than neutralised if such distinction leads us to suppose that

these two sides are two different things. Let us avoid the very common

error that things which can be distinguished can therefore claim an

independent existence; we can distinguish between an orange and its

peel, but no orange can grow without peel, nor peel without the fruit.

Let it not be supposed that I am such a bigoted upholder of the

unity of the Ego as to wish to see all these names banished from our

philosophical dictionaries. Let us use the word Sense when speaking

of the Ego as perceiving. Let us use Intellect when the Ego is simply

conceiving; and the word language when it is speaking; let us even use

the word _memory_ when we wish to speak of the partial permanence of

the work done by sensation, perception, and conception; and let us use

Reason or Reasoning for the process which produces what the logicians

call propositions and syllogisms; but let us never forget that neither

to remember nor to reason implies the possession of a thing called

reason or memory. All our mental life will remain just the same though

we deny the existence of the terms which obscure our vision; let us

hold fast to the existence of the Ego, it exists in its entity, it only

is the worker, and it receives its highest expression in the Logos.

This truth, that thought and language are inseparable, that thought

without language is as impossible as language without thought has

only recently been affirmed by comparative philologists. Many learned

writers are still unwilling to admit that ideas without words are

impossible though at the same time they are quite willing to concede

that words are impossible without concepts.[32]

We possess an immense number of books on logic, yet we are met

everywhere by the same vagueness on this subject. John Stuart Mill

speaks of language as one of the principal elements or helps of

thought, but he never mentions any other instruments. This lack is

probably owing to the unfortunate influence of modern languages

which have two words, the one for language, the other for thought;

this gives the impression that there is a substantial instead of an

apparent difference between the two; it is also owing to the dislike

of philosophers to allow that all which is most lofty, most spiritual

in us should be dependent on such miserable crutches as words are

supposed to be. Yet it is evident that we cannot advance one step

towards philosophy without acknowledging the fact that we think in

words and words only. This thought would be less difficult to grasp

if we defined clearly what are thoughts. Sensation, pain, pleasure,

dreaming, or willing cannot be called true thought, but variations of

inward activity; in the same way as shrieks, howls, or even the sounds

of real words, taken from a foreign language, are no more language

than our emotions are thoughts. The word Logos expresses this, since

it had originally the two meanings of gathering and combining, and so

became the proper name of all that we call reason; but as it also means

language, it tells us that the process of gathering and combining,

which begins with sensation and passes on to perception and conception,

reaches its full perfection only when the inward activity takes form in

the Logos or speech.

Language therefore is not as has been often imagined, thought plus

sound; but thought is really language minus sound; words are the

external symbols of thought, sounding symbols when we articulate in

a loud voice, but mute when we confine ourselves to merely thinking

them, since it is a fact that we think in words, and it is not possible

to think otherwise. The possession of a language is shown even in the

tracing of whole sentences by ideographic signs, which need not be

pronounced at all, or as in the astronomical signs in our almanacks

which may be pronounced differently in different languages: or we

may substitute algebraic signs for words; we could as well calculate

without numbers as apply our reason without words I have freely and

fully admitted that thoughts may exist without words, because other

signs may take the place of words between persons speaking different

languages possibly between deaf and dumb people. Five fingers held

up are quite sufficient to convey the concept of five, thus the hand

may become the sign for five, both hands for ten, hands and feet for

twenty. In America and Australia where many dialects are spoken this

method has attained a great degree of perfection, but we notice that

in all cases under review each one thinks in his own language and then

translates his thought into pantomime.

A final fact adduced against the theory that it is impossible to think

without language, which was very popular, is that deaf and dumb people

cannot speak, and yet can think; this argument has no great value, as

it is now averred that “a man born dumb who had always lived among

deaf and dumb people, and had not been taught to express thoughts by

signs would be capable of few higher intellectual manifestations than a

monkey or an elephant; and this in spite of the fact that no naturalist

could distinguish any difference between the size of their brains and

those belonging to men who could speak.” For deaf mutes to be able to

think and reason, they must have learned from those who use words, then

only can they substitute other signs for their words and concepts.

Still Professor Huxley accords to these unfortunate men certain

intellectual heritages derived from their parents.

These are some of the chief points in the science of language. The

fundamental law which this science lays down of the unity of thought

and speech is a torch which may throw light on the origin of man.

FOOTNOTES:

[28] Max Müller says: “I use percept instead of presentation, because

it is better understood in English.”--_Science of Thought_, p. 2.

[29] Max Müller’s _Science of Thought_, p. 72.

[30] _Ibid._, p. 17.

[31] _Ibid._, p. 75.

[32] _Science of Thought_, p. 30.

The Origin of Thought and Speech · 第 3 / 13 章