Iraqi oil is unlikely to hit world markets in the next few years, as
Iraq's dilapidated and outdated infrastructure is rebuilt. Moreover,
Russian oil is cheap compared to the North Sea or Alaskan varieties and
thus constitutes an attractive investment opportunity as the recent
takeover of Tyumen Oil by British Petroleum proves. Still, the
long-term risk of being unseated by a reconstructed Iraq as the second
largest oil producer in the world is tangible.
Russia has spent the last six months enhancing old alliances and
constructing new bridges. According to Interfax, the Russian news
agency, yesterday, Russia has made yet another payment of $27 million
to the International Monetary Fund. The Russian and Romanian prime
ministers met and signed bilateral agreements for the first time since
1989. This week, after 12 years of abortive contacts, the republics of
the former Yugoslavia agreed with the Russian Federation on a framework
for settling its $600 million in clearing debts.
Recent spats notwithstanding, the Anglo-Saxon alliance still regards
Russia as a strategically crucial ally. Last week, British police, in a
sudden display of unaccustomed efficacy, nabbed Russian oligarch and
mortal Putin-foe, Boris Berezovsky, charged by the Kremlin with
defrauding the Samara region of $13 million while he was director of
LogoVaz in 1994-5.
The Russian foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, did not remain oblivious to
these overtures. Russia and the USA remain partners, he asserted. RIA
Novosti, the Russian news agency, quoted him as saying: "If we settle
the Iraqi problem by political means and in an accord, the road will
open to teamwork on other, no less involved problems."
As Robert Kagan correctly observes in his essay "Of Paradise and Power:
America and Europe in the New World Order", the weaker a polity is
militarily, the stricter its adherence to international law, the only
protection, however feeble, from bullying. Putin, presiding over a
decrepit and bloated army, naturally insists that the world must be
governed by international regulation and not by the "rule of the fist".
But Kagan - and Putin - get it backwards as far as the European Union
is concerned. Its members are not compelled to uphold international
prescripts by their indisputable and overwhelming martial deficiency.
Rather, after centuries of futile bloodletting, they choose not to
resort to weapons and, instead, to settle their differences
juridically.
Thus, Putin is not a European in the full sense of the word. He
supports an international framework of dispute settlement because he
has no armed choice, not because it tallies with his deeply held
convictions and values. According to Kagan, Putin is, in essence, an
American: he believes that the world order ultimately rests on military
power and the ability to project it.
Russia aspires to be America, not France. Its business ethos, grasp of
realpolitik, nuclear arsenal and evolving values place it firmly in the
Anglo-Saxon camp. Its dalliance with France and Germany is hardly an
elopement. Had Russia been courted more aggressively by Secretary of
State, Colin Powell and its concerns shown more respect by the American
administration, it would have tilted differently. It is a lesson to be
memorized in Washington.
Russia's Second Empire
By: Dr. Sam Vaknin
Also published by United Press International (UPI)
History teaches us little except how little we can learn from it.
Still, there is nothing new under the sun. Thus, drawing too many
parallels between the environmentalist movements of the late 19th
century and their counterparts in the second half of the twentieth
century - would probably prove misleading. Similarly, every fin de
siecle has its Fukuyama, proclaiming the end of history and the victory
of liberalism and capitalism.
Liberal parliamentarianism (coupled with unbridled individualistic
capitalism) seemed to irreversibly dominate the political landscape by
1890 - when it was suddenly and surprisingly toppled by the confluence
of revolutionary authoritarian nationalism and revolutionary
authoritarian socialism.
Yet, every ostensibly modern (or post-modern) phenomenon has roots and
mirrors in history. The spreading of the occult, materialism,
rationalism, positivism, ethnic cleansing, regionalism, municipal
autonomy, environmentalism, alienation ("ennui"), information
networking, globalization, anti-globalization, mass migration, capital
and labour mobility, free trade - are all new mantras but very old
phenomena.
Sometimes the parallels are both overwhelming and instructive.
Overview
Karl Marx regarded Louis-Napoleon's Second Empire as the first modern
dictatorship - supported by the middle and upper classes but
independent of their patronage and, thus, self-perpetuating. Others
went as far as calling it proto-fascistic.
Yet, the Second Empire was insufficiently authoritarian or
revolutionary to warrant this title. It did foster and encourage a
personality cult, akin to the "Fuhrerprinzip" -but it derived its
legitimacy, conservatively, from the Church and from the electorate. It
was an odd mixture of Bonapartism, militarism, clericalism,
conservatism and liberalism.
In a way, the Second Republic did amount to a secular religion, replete
with martyrs and apostles. It made use of the nascent mass media to
manipulate public opinion. It pursued industrialization and
administrative modernization. But these features characterized all the
political movements of the late 19th century, including socialism, and
other empires, such as the Habsburg Austro-Hungary.
The Second Empire was, above all, inertial. It sought to preserve the
bureaucratic, regulatory, and economic frameworks of the First Empire.
It was a rationalist, positivist, and materialist movement - despite
the deliberate irrationalism of the young Louis-Napoleon. It was not
affiliated to a revolutionary party, nor to popular militias. It was
not collectivist. And its demise was the outcome of military defeat.
The Second Empire is very reminiscent of Vladimir Putin's reign in
post-Yeltsin Russia.
Like the French Second Empire, it follows a period of revolutions and
counter-revolutions. It is not identified with any one class but does
rely on the support of the middle class, the intelligentsia, the
managers and industrialists, the security services, and the military.
Putin is authoritarian, but not revolutionary. His regime derives its
legitimacy from parliamentary and presidential elections based on a
neo-liberal model of government. It is socially conservative but seeks
to modernize Russia's administration and economy. Yet, it manipulates
the mass media and encourages a personality cult.
Disparate Youths
Like Napoleon III, Putin started off as president (he was shortly as
prime minister under Yeltsin). Like him, he may be undone by a military
defeat, probably in the Caucasus or Central Asia.
The formative years of Putin and Louis-Napoleon have little in common,
though.
The former was a cosseted member of the establishment and witnessed,
first hand, the disintegration of his country. Putin was a KGB
apparatchik. The KGB may have inspired, conspired in, or even
instigated the transformation in Russian domestic affairs since the
early 1980's - but to call it "revolutionary" would be to stretch the
term.
Louis-Napoleon, on the other hand, was a true revolutionary. He
narrowly escaped death at the hands of Austrian troops in a rebellion
in Italy in 1831. His brother was not as lucky. Louis-Napoleon's claim
to the throne of France (1832) was based on a half-baked ideology of
imperial glory, concocted, disseminated and promoted by him. In 1836
and 1840 he even initiated (failed) coups d'etat. He was expelled even
from neutral Switzerland and exiled to the USA. He spent six years in
prison.
An Eerie Verisimilitude
Still, like Putin, Napoleon III was elected president. Like him, he was
regarded by his political sponsors as merely a useful and disposable
instrument. Like Putin, he had no parliamentary or political
experience. Both of them won elections by promising "order" and
"prosperity" coupled with "social compassion". And, like Putin,
Louis-Napoleon, to the great chagrin of his backers, proved to be his
own man - independent-minded, determined, and tough.
Putin, like Louis-Napoleon before him, proceeded to expand his powers
and installed loyalists in every corner of the administration and the
army. Like Louis-Napoleon, Putin is a populist, traveling throughout
the country, posing for photo opportunities, responding to citizens'
queries in Q-and-A radio shows, siding with the "average bloke" on
every occasion, taking advantage of Russia's previous economic and
social disintegration to project an image of a "strong man".
Putin is as little dependent on the Duma as Napoleon III was on his
parliament. But Putin reaped what Boris Yeltsin, his predecessor, has
sown when he established an imperial presidency after what amounted to
a coup d'etat in 1993 (the bombing of the Duma). Napoleon had to
organize his own coup d'etat all by himself in 1852.
The Balancing Act
Napoleon III - as does Putin now - faced a delicate balancing act
between the legitimacy conferred by parliamentary liberalism and the
need to maintain a police state. When he sought to strengthen the
enfeebled legislature he reaped only growing opposition within it to
his domestic and foreign policies alike.
He liberalized the media and enshrined in France's legal code various
civil freedoms. But he also set in motion and sanctioned a penumbral,
all-pervasive and clandestine security apparatus which regularly
gathered information on millions of Frenchmen and foreigners.
Modernization and Reform
Putin is considerably less of an economic modernizer than was Napoleon
III. Putin also seems to be less interested in the social implications
of his policies, in poverty alleviation and in growing economic
inequalities and social tensions. Napoleon III was a man for all
seasons - a buffer against socialism as well as a utopian social and
administrative reformer.
Business flourished under Napoleon III - as it does under Putin. The
1850's witnessed rapid technological change - even more rapid than
today's. France became a popular destination for foreign investors.
Napoleon III was the natural ally of domestic businessmen until he
embarked on an unprecedented trade liberalization campaign in 1860.
Similarly, Putin is nudging Russia towards WTO membership and enhanced
foreign competition - alienating in the process the tycoon-oligarchs,
the industrial complex, and the energy behemoths.
Foreign Policy
Napoleon III was a free trader - as is Putin. He believed in the
beneficial economic effects of free markets and in the free exchange of
goods, capital, and labour. So does Putin. But economic liberalism does
not always translate to a pacific foreign policy.
Napoleon III sought to annul the decisions of the Congress of Vienna
(1815) and reverse the trend of post-Napoleonic French humiliation. He
wanted to resurrect "Great France" pretty much as Putin wants to
restore Russia to its "rightful" place as a superpower.
But both pragmatic leaders realized that this rehabilitation cannot be
achieved by force of arms and with a dilapidated economy. Napoleon III
tried to co-opt the tidal wave of modern, revolutionary, nationalism to
achieve the revitalization of France and the concomitant restoration of
its glory. Putin strives to exploit the West's aversion to conflict and
addiction to wealth. Napoleon III struggled to establish a new,
inclusive European order - as does Putin with NATO and, to a lesser
degree, with the European Union today.
Putin artfully manipulated Europe in the wake of the September 11
terrorist attacks on the USA, his new found ally. He may yet find
himself in the enviable position of Europe's arbitrator, NATO's most
weighty member, a bridge between Central Asia, the Caucasus, North
Korea and China - and the USA. The longer his tenure, the more likely
he is to become Europe's elder statesman. This is a maneuver
reminiscent of Louis-Napoleon's following the Crimean War, when he
teamed up with Great Britain against Russia.
Like Putin, Napoleon III modernized and professionalized his army. But,
unlike Putin hitherto, he actually went to war (against Austria), moved
by his (oft-thwarted) colonial and mercantilist aspirations. Putin is
likely to follow the same path (probably in Central Asia, but,
possibly, in the Baltic and east Europe as well). Reinvigorated armies
(and industrialists) often force expansionary wars upon their reluctant
ostensible political masters.
Should Putin fail in his military adventures as Napoleon III did in his
and be deposed as he was - these eerie similarities will have come to
their natural conclusion.
T H E A U T H O R
SHMUEL (SAM) VAKNIN
Curriculum Vitae
Born in 1961 in Qiryat-Yam, Israel.
Served in the Israeli Defence Force (1979-1982) in training and
education units.
Education
Graduated a few semesters in the Technion - Israel Institute of
Technology, Haifa.
Ph.D. in Philosophy (major : Philosophy of Physics) - Pacific Western
University, California. My doctoral thesis is available through the
Library of Congress.
Graduate of numerous courses in Finance Theory and International
Trading.
Certified E-Commerce Concepts Analyst.
Certified in Psychological Counselling Techniques.
Full proficiency in Hebrew and in English.
Business Experience
1980 to 1983
Founder and co-owner of a chain of computerized information kiosks in
Tel-Aviv, Israel.
1982 to 1985
Senior positions with the Nessim D. Gaon Group of Companies in Geneva,
Paris and New-York (NOGA and APROFIM SA):
- Chief Analyst of Edible Commodities in the Group's Headquarters in
Switzerland.
- Manager of the Research and Analysis Division
- Manager of the Data Processing Division
- Project Manager of The Nigerian Computerized Census
- Vice President in charge of RND and Advanced Technologies
- Vice President in charge of Sovereign Debt Financing
1985 to 1986
Represented Canadian Venture Capital Funds in Israel.
1986 to 1987
General Manager of IPE Ltd. in London. The firm financed international
multi-lateral countertrade and leasing transactions.
1988 to 1990
Co-founder and Director of "Mikbats - Tesuah", a portfolio management
firm based in Tel-Aviv.
Activities included large-scale portfolio management, underwriting,
forex trading and general financial advisory services.
1990 to Present
Free-lance consultant to many of Israel's Blue-Chip firms, mainly on
issues related to the capital markets in Israel, Canada, the UK and the
USA.
Consultant to foreign RND ventures and to Governments on macro-economic
matters.
President of the Israel chapter of the Professors World Peace Academy
(PWPA) and (briefly) Israel representative of the "Washington Times".
1993 to 1994
Co-owner and Director of many business enterprises:
- The Omega and Energy Air-Conditioning Concern
- AVP Financial Consultants
- Handiman Legal Services
Total annual turnover of the group: 10 million USD.
Co-owner, Director and Finance Manager of COSTI Ltd. - Israel's
largest computerized information vendor and developer. Raised funds
through a series of private placements locally, in the USA, Canada and
London.
1993 to 1996
Publisher and Editor of a Capital Markets Newsletter distributed by
subscription only to dozens of subscribers countrywide.
In a legal precedent in 1995 - studied in business schools and law
faculties across Israel - was tried for his role in an attempted
takeover of Israel's Agriculture Bank.
Was interned in the State School of Prison Wardens.
Managed the Central School Library, wrote, published and lectured on
various occasions.
Managed the Internet and International News Department of an Israeli
mass media group, "Ha-Tikshoret and Namer".
Assistant in the Law Faculty in Tel-Aviv University (to Prof. S.G.
Shoham).
1996 to 1999
Financial consultant to leading businesses in Macedonia, Russia and the
Czech Republic.
Collaborated with the Agency of Transformation of Business with Social
Capital.
Economic commentator in "Nova Makedonija", "Dnevnik", "Izvestia",
"Argumenti i Fakti", "The Middle East Times", "Makedonija Denes", "The
New Presence", "Central Europe Review" , and other periodicals and in
the economic programs on various channels of Macedonian Television.
Chief Lecturer in courses organized by the Agency of Transformation, by
the Macedonian Stock Exchange and by the Ministry of Trade.
1999 to 2002
Economic Advisor to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia and to
the Ministry of Finance.
2001 to present
Senior Business Correspondent for United Press International (UPI)
Web and Journalistic Activities
Author of extensive Websites in Psychology ("Malignant Self Love") - An
Open Directory Cool Site
Philosophy ("Philosophical Musings")
Economics and Geopolitics ("World in Conflict and Transition")
Owner of the Narcissistic Abuse Announcement and Study List and the
Narcissism Revisited mailing list (more than 3900 members)
Owner of the Economies in Conflict and Transition Study list.
Editor of mental health disorders and Central and Eastern Europe
categories in web directories (Open Directory, Suite 101, Search
Europe).
Columnist and commentator in "The New Presence", United Press
International (UPI), InternetContent, eBookWeb and "Central Europe
Review".
Publications and Awards
"Managing Investment Portfolios in states of Uncertainty", Limon
Publishers, Tel-Aviv, 1988
"The Gambling Industry", Limon Publishers., Tel-Aviv, 1990
"Requesting my Loved One - Short Stories", Yedioth Aharonot, Tel-Aviv,
1997
"The Macedonian Economy at a Crossroads - On the way to a Healthier
Economy" (with Nikola Gruevski), Skopje, 1998
"Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited", Narcissus Publications,
Prague and Skopje, 1999, 2001, 2002
The Narcissism Series - e-books regarding relationships with abusive
narcissists (Skopje, 1999-2002)
"The Exporters' Pocketbook", Ministry of Trade, Republic of Macedonia,
Skopje, 1999
"The Suffering of Being Kafka" (electronic book of Hebrew Short
Fiction, Prague, 1998)
"After the Rain - How the West Lost the East", Narcissus Publications
in association with Central Europe Review/CEENMI, Prague and Skopje,
2000
Winner of numerous awards, among them the Israeli Education Ministry
Prize (Literature) 1997, The Rotary Club Award for Social Studies
(1976) and the Bilateral Relations Studies Award of the American
Embassy in Israel (1978).
Hundreds of professional articles in all fields of finances and the
economy and numerous articles dealing with geopolitical and political
economic issues published in both print and web periodicals in many
countries.
Many appearances in the electronic media on subjects in philosophy and
the Sciences and concerning economic matters.
Contact Details:
palma@unet.com.mk
vaknin@link.com.mk
My Web Sites:
Economy / Politics:
http://ceeandbalkan.tripod.com/
Psychology:
http://samvak.tripod.com/index.html
Philosophy:
http://philosophos.tripod.com/
Poetry:
http://samvak.tripod.com/contents.html
After the Rain
How the West
Lost the East
The Book
This is a series of articles written and published in 1996-2000 in
Macedonia, in Russia, in Egypt and in the Czech Republic.
How the West lost the East. The economics, the politics, the
geopolitics, the conspiracies, the corruption, the old and the new, the
plough and the internet - it is all here, in colourful and provocative
prose.
From "The Mind of Darkness":
"'The Balkans' - I say - 'is the unconscious of the world'. People stop
to digest this metaphor and then they nod enthusiastically. It is here
that the repressed memories of history, its traumas and fears and
images reside. It is here that the psychodynamics of humanity - the
tectonic clash between Rome and Byzantium, West and East,
Judeo-Christianity and Islam - is still easily discernible. We are
seated at a New Year's dining table, loaded with a roasted pig and
exotic salads. I, the Jew, only half foreign to this cradle of
Slavonics. Four Serbs, five Macedonians. It is in the Balkans that all
ethnic distinctions fail and it is here that they prevail
anachronistically and atavistically. Contradiction and change the only
two fixtures of this tormented region. The women of the Balkan - buried
under provocative mask-like make up, retro hairstyles and too narrow
dresses. The men, clad in sepia colours, old fashioned suits and turn
of the century moustaches. In the background there is the crying game
that is Balkanian music: liturgy and folk and elegy combined. The
smells are heavy with muskular perfumes. It is like time travel. It is
like revisiting one's childhood."
The Author
Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited
and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He is a columnist for
Central Europe Review, PopMatters, and eBookWeb , a United Press
International (UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and the editor of
mental health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory
and Suite101 .
Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government of
Macedonia.
Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com