These brothers who had proved themselves men of such valor and as a

result of excellence had attained such a height of reputation were not

long afterward brought to court and handed over to the populace.

Lucius was condemned on the suspicion of his having appropriated no

inconsiderable share of the spoil, and Africanus nominally for having

made the conditions lighter out of gratitude for kindness shown his

son; (the true cause of his conviction was jealousy). [Sidenote: FRAG.

60] THAT THEY COULD NOT JUSTLY BE CHARGED WITH WRONGDOING IS MADE

PLAIN BOTH BY OTHER EVIDENCE AND MOST OF ALL BY THE FACT THAT WHEN THE

PROPERTY OF ASIATICUS WAS CONFISCATED IT WAS FOUND TO CONSIST MERELY

OF HIS ORIGINAL INHERITANCE, AND THAT THOUGH AFRICANUS RETIRED TO

LITERNUM AND ABODE THERE TO THE END, NO ONE EVER AGAIN PASSED SENTENCE

OF CONDEMNATION UPON HIM.

Manlius all this time was engaged in winning over Pisidia, Lycaonia,

and Pamphylia, and a large district of Galatia in Asia. For there

exists in that region too a race of Gauls which broke off from the

European stock. Years ago with their king, Brennus, at their head they

overran Greece and Thrace, and crossing thence to Bithynia they

detached certain portions of Phrygia, Paphlagonia, Mysia adjacent to

Olympus, and Cappadocia, and took up their residence in them; and they

constitute to-day a separate nation bearing the name of Gauls. This

people caused Manlius trouble, but he managed to overcome them too,

capturing their city Ancyra by assault and gaining control of the rest

of the towns by capitulation. This effected, he set sail for home

after he had received a large price for peace from Ariarathes, king of

Cappadocia.

IX, 21.--The AEtolians when they had sent ambassadors to Rome the

second time in regard to peace themselves raised the standard of

rebellion. Hence the Romans immediately dismissed the ambassadors and

referred the conduct of affairs in Greece to Marcus Fulvius. He set

out first for the large city of Ambracia (it had once been the royal

residence of Pyrrhus and was now occupied by the AEtolians) and

proceeded to besiege it. So the AEtolians held a conference with him

about peace, but finding him disinclined to a truce they sent a part

of their army into Ambracia. The Romans undertook to capture the town

by an underground passage and pushed their mine straight forward,

temporarily eluding the notice of the besieged party; but the latter

began to suspect the true state of affairs when the excavated earth

attained some dimensions. As they were not aware in what direction the

trench was being dug, they kept applying a bronze shield to the

surface of the ground all about the circuit of the walls. By means of

the resonance they found out the place and went to work in their turn

to dig a tunnel from inside and approached the Romans, with whom they

battled in obscurity. Finally they devised the following sort of

defence. They filled a huge jar with feathers and put fire in it. To

this they attached a bronze cover that had a number of holes bored in

it. Then, after carrying the jar into the mine and turning the mouth

of it toward the enemy, they inserted a bellows in the bottom, and by

blowing this bellows with vigor they caused a tremendous amount of

unpleasant smoke, such as feathers would naturally create, to pour

out, so that not one of the Romans could endure it. Hence the Romans

in despair of succeeding made a truce and raised the siege. When they

had agreed to treat, the AEtolians also changed their course and

secured an armistice. Subsequently they obtained a peace from the

People by the gift of considerable money and many hostages. Fulvius

induced Cephallenia to capitulate and reduced to order the

Peloponnesus, which was in a state of factional turmoil.

[Sidenote: B.C. 187 (_a.u._ 567)] After a little, in the consulship of

Gaius Flaminius and AEmilius Lepidus, Antiochus died and his son

Seleucus succeeded him. Much later, at the demise of Seleucus, the

Antiochus who spent some time as a hostage in Rome became king.

[Sidenote: B.C. 183 (_a.u._ 571)] And Philip had courage enough to

revolt because he had been deprived of some towns in Thessaly and of

AEnus and Maronea besides, but he was unable to do so on account of his

age and what had happened to his sons.--Some Gauls crossed the Alps

and desired to found a city to the south of the mountains. Marcus

Marcellus took away their arms and everything that they had brought:

the Romans in the capital, however, upon receiving an embassy from

them restored everything on condition that they should at once retire.

These years also saw the death of Hannibal. Envoys had been sent from

Rome to Prusias, monarch of Bithynia, and a part of their errand was

to make him give up Hannibal, who was at his court. The Carthaginian

had advance information of the facts and being unable to escape

committed suicide. [Sidenote: cp. FRAG. 64.] AN ORACLE HAD ONCE

ANNOUNCED TO HIM THAT HE SHOULD DIE IN THE LAND OF LIBYSSA, AND HE WAS

EXPECTING TO DIE IN LIBYA, HIS NATIVE COUNTRY, BUT, AS IT HAPPENED,

HIS DEMISE OCCURRED WHILE HE CHANCED TO BE STAYING IN A CERTAIN PLACE

CALLED LIBYSSA. Scipio Africanus also died at this time.

_(BOOK 20, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: B.C. 179 (_a.u._ 575)] IX, 22.--Philip, king of Macedonia,

had put to death his son Demetrius and was about to slay his other son

Perseus, when death overtook him. Because Demetrius had gained the

affection of the Roman people through his sojourn as hostage and

because he himself and the rest of the Macedonian people hoped that he

would secure the kingdom after Philip was done with it, Perseus, who

was his elder, became jealous of him and falsely reported him to be

plotting against his father. Thus Demetrius was forced to drink poison

and perished. Philip not long after ascertained the truth and desired

to take measures against Perseus; he did not, however, possess

sufficient strength and death overtook him. Perseus succeeded to the

kingdom. The Romans confirmed his claims to it and renewed the compact

of friendship enjoyed by his father.

In the period immediately following some events of importance took

place, yet they were not of so vital a character that one should deem

them worthy of record. Still later Perseus put himself in the position

of an enemy to the Romans, and in order to delay actual warfare until

he should reach a state of preparation he sent envoys to Rome

presumably to make a defence on the charges which were being pressed

against him. These messengers the Romans would not receive within the

wall, but they transacted business with them in the space before the

city; and no other answer was vouchsafed them than that they would

send a consul with whom he might confer on whatever topics he pleased.

They also caused them to depart the same day, having given them guides

to prevent their associating with anybody. And Perseus was forbidden

in the future to set foot on the soil of Italy.

The Romans next sent out Gnaeus Sicinius, a praetor, with a small force

(they had not yet made ready their greater armament) and Perseus made

a tentative invasion of Thessaly in which he won over the greater part

of that country. [Sidenote: B.C. 171 (_a.u._ 583)] When spring opened

they sent Licinius Crassus against him as well as a praetor, Gaius

Lucretius, in charge of the fleet. The latter first encountered

Perseus near Larissa and was worsted in a cavalry skirmish: later,

though, he got the best of him and Perseus accordingly retreated into

Macedonia. As for Crassus, he assailed the Greek cities which were

held in subjection by Philip and was repulsed from the majority of

them, although he did get possession of a few. Some he razed to the

ground and sold the captives. When the inhabitants of Rome learned

these details, they became indignant and later they imposed a money

fine on Crassus, liberated the captured cities, and bought back from

the purchasers such of their inhabitants as had been sold and were

then found in Italy.

So fared the Romans in these undertakings, but in the war against

Perseus as a whole they suffered many great reverses and their

fortunes at many points were at a low ebb. Perseus occupied the

greater part of Epirus and Thessaly, having gathered a large body of

troops. As a measure of defence against the Romans' elephants he had

trained a phalanx of heavy-armed warriors whose shields and helmets he

had taken care should be studded with sharp iron nails. Also, in order

to make sure that the beasts should not prove a source of terror to

the horses he constructed images of elephants that were smeared with

some kind of ointment to give them a fearful odor and were frightful

both to see and to hear (for a mechanical device enabled them to emit

a roar resembling thunder); and he kept continually leading the horses

up to these representations until they took courage. Perseus, then, as

a result of all this had acquired great confidence and entertained

hope that he might surpass Alexander in glory and in the size of his

domain; the people of Rome [Sidenote: B.C. 169 (_a.u._ 585)] when they

learned this sent out with speed Marcius Philippus, who was consul.

He, on reaching the camp in Thessaly, drilled the Romans and the

allies so that Perseus, becoming afraid, remained quietly in Dium of

Macedonia and close to Tempe, and continued to keep watch of the pass.

Philippus, encouraged by this behavior of his, crossed the mountain

range in the center and occupied some possessions of Perseus. But as

he was progressing toward Pydna he fell short of provisions and turned

back to Thessaly. Perseus gained boldness anew, recovered the places

that Philippus had occupied, and with his fleet damaged the Romans at

numerous points. He also secured allies [Sidenote: FRAG. 65^1] AND

HOPED TO EJECT THE ROMANS FROM GREECE ALTOGETHER, BUT THROUGH HIS

EXCESSIVE AND INOPPORTUNE PARSIMONY AND THE CONSEQUENT CONTEMPT OF HIS

ALLIES HE BECAME WEAK ONCE MORE. SO SOON AS ROMAN INFLUENCE WAS

DECLINING SLIGHTLY AND HIS OWN WAS INCREASING, HE WAS FILLED WITH

SCORN AND THOUGHT HE HAD NO FURTHER NEED OF HIS ALLIES, AND WOULD NOT

GIVE THEM THE MONEY WHICH HE HAD OFFERED. THE ZEAL OF SOME ACCORDINGLY

BECAME BLUNTED AND OTHERS ABANDONED HIM ENTIRELY, WHEREUPON HE WAS SO

OVERWHELMED BY DESPAIR AS ACTUALLY TO SUE FOR PEACE. AND HE WOULD HAVE

OBTAINED IT THROUGH EUMENES BUT FOR THE PRESENCE OF RHODIANS ALSO IN

THE EMBASSY. THEY, BY ADOPTING A HAUGHTY TONE WITH THE ROMANS,

PREVENTED HIM FROM OBTAINING PEACE.

[Sidenote: B.C. 168 (_a.u._ 586)] IX, 23.--At this point the war waged

against him was entrusted to AEmilius Paulus, now for the second time

consul. He rapidly traversed the distance separating him from Thessaly

and having first set the affairs of the soldiers in order forced his

way through Tempe, which was being guarded by only a few men, and

marched against Perseus. The latter had ere this erected breastworks

along the river Elpeus which intervened, had occupied and rendered

impassable by means of stone walls and palisades and buildings all the

ground between Olympus and the sea, and was encouraged by the lack of

water in the place. Yet even so the consul sought to effect a passage

and found a means of overcoming the prevailing drought. By piercing

the sand bed at the foot of Olympus he found water that was delicious

as well as drinkable.--Meanwhile envoys of the Rhodians reached him

animated by the same insolence which they had displayed on their

former embassy to Rome. He would make no statement to them beyond

saying that he would return an answer in a few days, and dismissed

them.--Since he could accomplish nothing by direct assault, but

learned that the mountains were traversable here and there, he sent a

portion of his army toward that pass across them which was the more

difficult of approach, to seize opportune points along the route (on

account of its difficulty of access it had an extremely small guard);

and he himself with the remainder of his army attacked Perseus that

the latter might not entertain any suspicion which might lead to his

guarding the mountains with especial care. After this, when the

heights had been occupied, he set out by night for the mountains and

by passing unnoticed at some points and employing force at others he

crossed them. Perseus on learning it became afraid that his enemy

might assail him from the rear or even get control of Pydna before he

could (for the Roman fleet was simultaneously sailing along the

coast), and he abandoned his fortification near the river and

hastening to Pydna encamped in front of the town. Paulus, too, came

there, but instead of immediately beginning an engagement they delayed

for a number of days. Paulus had found out prior to the event that the

moon was about to suffer an eclipse, and after collecting his army on

the evening when the eclipse was due to occur gave the men notice of

what would happen and warned them not to let it disturb them at all.

So the Romans on beholding the eclipse looked for no evil to come from

it, but it made an impression of terror upon the Macedonians and they

thought that the prodigy had a bearing on the cause of Perseus. While

each side was in this frame of mind an entirely accidental occurrence

the next day threw them into a fierce conflict and put an end to the

war. One of the Roman pack-animals had fallen into the water from

which a supply was being drawn, and the Macedonians laid hold of him,

while the water-carriers in turn tightened their grasp. At first they

fought by themselves; then the remainder of the forces gradually

issued from the respective camps to the assistance of their own men

and everybody on both sides became engaged. A disordered but sharp

conflict ensued in which the Romans were victorious and pursuing the

Macedonians as far as the sea slaughtered numbers of them by their own

efforts and allowed the fleet, which was drawing inshore, to slay

numbers more. Not one of them would have been left alive but for the

timely succor of night (for the battle had raged during the late

afternoon).

Perseus consequently made his escape to Amphipolis, where he intended

to rally the survivors and reorganize the campaign; but as nobody came

to him save Cretan mercenaries and he learned that Pydna and other

cities had espoused the Roman cause, he removed thence, and after

putting aboard some vessels all the money that he was carrying he

sailed away by night to Samothrace. Before long he ascertained that

Octavius was approaching at the head of his fleet and that Paulus was

in Amphipolis; so he sent him a letter requesting permission to confer

about terms. Since, however, he described himself in the letter as

"king", he did not get any answer. Subsequently he despatched a letter

without any such appellation contained in it and was granted a

conference to consider the question of peace, but the victor declared

that he would not sanction any conditions that did not include

Perseus's surrender of his person and all his possessions to the

Romans' keeping. Hence they failed to come to an agreement. [Sidenote:

FRAG. 65^3] AFTER THIS A DEMAND WAS MADE UPON PERSEUS BY THE ROMANS

FOR THE SURRENDER OF ONE EVANDER, A CRETAN, WHO HAD ASSISTED HIM IN

MANY SCHEMES AGAINST THEM AND WAS MOST FAITHFUL TO HIM. THE PRINCE,

FEARING THAT HE MIGHT DECLARE ALL THE INTRIGUES TO WHICH HE HAD BEEN

PRIVY, DID NOT DELIVER HIM BUT SECRETLY SLEW HIM AND HAD IT RUMORED

THAT THE MAN HAD PERISHED BY HIS OWN HAND. THEN THE ASSOCIATES OF

PERSEUS, FEARING HIS TREACHERY (for they were not ignorant of what had

occurred), BEGAN TO DESERT HIS STANDARD. Perseus, then, being afraid

that he should be delivered up to the Romans tried one night to escape

by flight and might have taken himself away unobserved to Cotys, a

Thracian potentate, but for the fact that the Cretans abandoned him.

They placed the money in boats and weighed anchor for home. So he

remained there for some days with Philip, one of his sons, hidden from

sight, but on ascertaining that the rest of his children and his

retinue had fallen into the hands of Octavius [Sidenote: FRAG. 65^4]

HE ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE FOUND. UPON HIS BEING BROUGHT TO AMPHIPOLIS

PAULUS DID HIM NO INJURY, BUT BOTH ENTERTAINED HIM AND HAD HIM SIT AT

HIS TABLE, KEEPING HIM, LIKEWISE, ALTHOUGH A PRISONER, UNCONFINED, AND

SHOWING HIM COURTESY. After this Paulus returned through Epirus to

Italy.

IX, 24.--About the same time Lucius Anicius, a praetor sent to conduct

operations against Gentius, both conquered those who withstood him and

pursued Gentius, when he fled, to Scodra (where his palace was

located) and shut him up there. The place was built on a spur of the

mountain and had deep ravines containing boiling torrents winding

about it, besides being girt by a steadfast wall; and so the Roman

commander's siege of it would have come to naught, if Gentius

presuming greatly upon his own power had not voluntarily advanced to

battle. This act gave the control of his entire domain to Anicius, who

then proceeded, before Paulus could arrive, to Epirus and tamed the

quarrelsome pride of that district as well.

The Romans of the capital by some vague report heard of the victory of

Paulus on the fourth day after the battle, but they placed no sure

confidence in it. Then letters were brought from Paulus regarding his

success and they were mightily pleased and plumed themselves not

merely upon having vanquished Perseus and acquired Macedonia but upon

having beaten the renowned Philip of old time and Alexander himself

together with all that empire which he had held. When Paulus reached

Rome many decrees in his honor were passed and the celebration of his

triumph proved a most brilliant event. He had in his procession all

the booty which he had captured, and he had also Bithys, the son of

Cotys, besides Perseus and his wife and three children altogether in

the garb of captives. Fearing that Heaven might wax envious of the

Romans on account of their excess of good fortune he prayed, as

Camillus had done before, that no ill to the State might result from

it all but rather to him if it should be unavoidable: and, indeed, he

lost two sons, one a little before the celebration and the other

during the triumphal festival itself. [Sidenote: FRAG. 66] HE WAS NOT

ONLY GOOD AT GENERALSHIP, BUT HE LOOKED DOWN UPON MONEY. OF THIS THE

FOLLOWING IS A PROOF. THOUGH HE HAD AT THAT TIME ENTERED FOR A SECOND

TERM UPON THE CONSULSHIP AND HAD GAINED POSSESSION OF UNTOLD SPOILS,

HE CONTINUED TO LIVE IN SO GREAT INDIGENCE THAT WHEN HE DIED THE DOWRY

WAS WITH DIFFICULTY PAID BACK TO HIS WIFE.

Of the captives Bithys was returned to his father without ransom, but

Perseus with his children and attendants was settled in Alba. There he

endured so long as he still hoped to recover his sovereignty, but when

he despaired of doing so he despatched himself. His son Philip and his

daughter also died shortly after: only the youngest son survived for a

time and served in the capacity of under-secretary to the magistrates

of Alba. Thus Perseus, who boasted of tracing his descent through

twenty kings and often had Philip and still oftener Alexander in his

mouth, lost his kingdom, became a captive, and marched in the

procession of triumph wearing chains as well as his diadem.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 67^1] THE RHODIANS, WHO IN THEIR EARLIER DEALINGS

WITH THE ROMANS DISPLAYED SELF-ESTEEM, NOW BEGGED THE LATTER NOT TO

BEAR ILL-WILL TOWARD THEM: [Sidenote: FRAG. 67^2] AND WHEREAS THEY HAD

PREVIOUSLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE TITLE OF ROMAN ALLIES, THEY WERE NOW

ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS TO SECURE IT; and they obtained the object of their

eagerness, but only after long delay. The Romans harbored resentment

against the Cretans, too, but in response to a number of embassies on

the part of this nation they eventually relaxed their anger. Their

behavior was similar [Sidenote: FRAG. 68] IN THE CASE OF PRUSIAS AND

EUMENES. THE FORMER CAME PERSONALLY TO THE CITY AND ENTERED THE

SENATE-HOUSE, COVERED THE THRESHOLD WITH KISSES, AND WORSHIPPED THE

SENATORS; THUS HE OBTAINED PITY and was held guiltless: Eumenes

through Attalus his brother secured himself against any continuation

of malice on their part.

At this time, too, the affairs of Cappadocia were settled in the

following manner. The monarch of that country, Ariarathes, had a

legitimate son Ariarathes. But since for a long time before she had

this son his wife had failed to conceive, she had adopted a child whom

she called Orophernes. When the true son was later born the position

of the other was detected and he was banished. Naturally after the

death of Ariarathes he headed an uprising against his brother. Eumenes

allied himself with Ariarathes, and Demetrius the king of Syria with

Orophernes. Ariarathes after sustaining a defeat found an asylum with

the Romans and was appointed by them to share the kingdom with

Orophernes. But the fact that Ariarathes had been termed "friend and

ally" by the Romans enabled him subsequently to make the entire domain

his own. Attalus soon succeeded Eumenes (who died) and drove

Orophernes and Demetrius out of Cappadocia altogether.

IX, 25.--Ptolemy, ruler of Egypt, passed away leaving two sons and one

daughter. When the brothers began to quarrel with each other about the

supreme office, Antiochus the son of Antiochus the Great sheltered the

younger, who had been driven out, in order that under the pretext of

defending him he might interfere in Egyptian politics. In a campaign

directed against Egypt he conquered the greater part of the country

and spent some time in besieging Alexandria. As the unsubdued sought

refuge with the Romans, Popilius was sent to Antiochus and bade him

keep his hands off Egypt; for the brothers, comprehending the designs

of Antiochus, had become reconciled. When the latter was for putting

off his reply, Popilius drew a circle about him with his staff and

demanded that he deliberate and answer standing where he was.

Antiochus then in fear raised the siege. The Ptolemies (such was the

name of both princes) on being relieved of foreign dread fell into

renewed disputing. Then they were reconciled again by the Romans on

the condition that the elder should have Egypt and Cyprus, and the

other one the country about Cyrene, which was likewise part of Egypt

at that time. The younger one was vexed at having the inferior portion

and came to Rome where he secured from the government a grant of

Cyprus in addition. Then the elder once more effected an arrangement

with the younger son by giving him some cities in exchange for Cyprus

and being rated to contribute money and grain.

[Sidenote: B.C. 164 (_a.u._ 590)] Antiochus subsequently died, leaving

the kingdom to a child of the same name whom the Romans confirmed in

possession of it and sent three men (with sufficient show of reason,

for he was a minor) to act as his guardians. They on finding elephants

and triremes contrary to the compact ordered the elephants all to be

slain and administered everything else in the interest of Rome.

Therefore Lysias, who had been entrusted with the surveillance of the

king, incited the populace to cast out the Romans and also kill

Gaius[39] Octavius. When these plans had been carried out Lysias

straightway despatched envoys to Rome to offer a defence for what had

been done. Demetrius the son of Seleucus son of Antiochus, who was

staying in Rome as a hostage at the time of his father's death and had

been deprived of the kingdom by his uncle Antiochus, asked for his

ancestral domain when he learned of the death of Antiochus, but the

Romans would neither help him to get it nor permit him to set out from

Rome. In spite of his dissatisfaction he remained quiet. But when the

affair of Lysias came up, he no longer delayed but escaped by flight

and sent a message to the senate from Lycia saying that his objective

was not his _cousin_ Antiochus (the children of brothers were so

termed by the ancients) but Lysias, and his purpose was to avenge

Octavius. Hastening to Tripolis in Syria he won over this town also,

pretending that he had been sent out by the Romans to take charge of

the kingdom. No one at this time had any idea of his secret flight,

and so after conquering Apamea and gathering a body of troops he

marched to Antioch. There he destroyed Lysias and the boy, who came to

meet him in the guise of friends (through fear of the Romans they had

offered no opposition), [Sidenote: B.C. 162 (_a.u._ 592)] and he

recovered the kingdom, whereupon he forwarded to Rome a crown and the

assassins of Octavius. The citizens, being enraged at him, would

accept neither the one nor the other.

[Footnote 39: This name is erroneously written by Zonaras for Gnaeus.

(Cp. Polybius 28, 3, 2; 31, 12 (also 13, 19, and 20); 32, 4 to 7.)]

Next the Romans made a campaign against the Dalmatians. This race

consists of Illyrians who dwell along the Ionian Gulf, some of whom

the Greeks used to call Taulantii, and part of them are close to

Dyrrachium. The cause of the war was that they had been abusing some

of their neighbors who were in a league of friendship with the Romans,

and when the Romans joined an embassy in their behalf the Dalmatians

returned an answer that was not respectful, and even arrested and

killed the envoys of the other nations. [Sidenote: B.C. 155 (_a.u._

599)] Scipio Nasica subdued this race in a campaign against them. He

captured their towns and several times sold the captives.--Other

events, too, took place in those days,--not, however, of a kind to

deserve mention or historical record.

_(BOOK 21, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: B.C. 153 (_a.u._ 601)] IX, 26.--The rattling of dice in the

box of Circumstance now announced the final cast in the struggle with

Carthage,--the third of the series. The Carthaginians could not endure

their subordinate position, but contrary to the treaty were setting

their fleet in readiness and making alliances as measures of

preparation for war with the Nomads: [Sidenote: B.C. 152 (_a.u._ 602)]

and the Romans, having settled other questions to their own

satisfaction, did not remain at rest, but by the mouth of Scipio

Nasica their commissioner they charged their rivals with this breach

of faith and ordered them to disband their armament. The Carthaginians

found fault with Masinissa and on account of the war with him declined

to obey the command. The Romans then arranged terms for them with

Masinissa and prevailed upon him to retire from some territory in

their favor. [Sidenote: B.C. 150 (_a.u._ 604)] Since they showed

themselves no more tractable than before, the Romans waited a bit, and

as soon as information was received that the Carthaginians had been

worsted in a great battle by Masinissa they voted for war against

them. The Carthaginians, who were feeling the effects of their defeat,

became frightened on learning this and sent envoys to Rome to secure

an alliance; for other neighboring tribes were also beginning to

attack them. They feigned a readiness to yield to the Romans on all

points, and their very intention of not remaining true to their

agreements rendered them all the more ready to promise anything.

[Sidenote: B.C. 149 (_a.u._ 605)] When the senate called a meeting to

consider the matter, Scipio Nasica advised receiving the Carthaginian

embassy and making a truce with them, but Marcus Cato declared that no

truce ought to be arranged nor the decree of war rescinded. The

senators accepted the supplication of the envoys, promised to grant

them a truce, and asked for hostages as an earnest of these

conditions. These hostages were sent to Sicily and Lucius Marcius and

Marcus Manilius went there, took charge of them, and sent them on to

Rome. They themselves made haste to occupy Africa. After encamping

they summoned the magistrates of Carthage to appear before them. When

these officials arrived they did not unmask all their demands at once,

for they feared that if the Carthaginians understood them in season

they would plunge into war with resources unimpaired. So first they

asked for and received grain, next the triremes, and after that the

engines; and then they demanded the arms besides. They secured the

entire visible supply (but the Carthaginians had a great deal of other

equipment safely hidden) and at length ordered them to raze their city

and to build in its place an unwalled town inland, eighty stades

distant from the sea. At that the Carthaginians were dissolved in

tears, acknowledged that they were trapped, and bewailed their fate,

begging the consuls not to compel them to act as the assassins of

their country. They soon found that they could accomplish nothing and

had to face the repeated command either to execute the order or to

cast the die of war. Many of the people then remained there on the

Roman side, tacitly admitting their success: the remainder withdrew,

and after killing some of their rulers for not having chosen war in

the first place and after murdering such Romans as were discovered

within the fortification they turned their attention to war. Under

these circumstances they liberated all the slaves, restored the

exiles, chose Hasdrubal once more as leader, and made ready arms,

engines, and triremes. With war at their doors and the danger of

slavery confronting them they prepared in the briefest possible time

everything that they needed. They spared nothing, but melted down the

statues for the sake of the bronze in them and used the hair of their

women for ropes. The consuls at first, thinking them unarmed, expected

to overcome them speedily and merely prepared ladders, with which they

expected to scale the wall at once. As the assault showed their

enemies to be armed and they saw that they possessed means for a

siege, the Romans, before approaching close to the city again, devoted

themselves to the manufacture of engines. The construction of these

machines was fraught with danger, since Hasdrubal set ambuscades for

those who were gathering the wood and annoyed them considerably, but

in time they were able to assail the town. Now Manilius in his assault

from the land side could not injure the Carthaginians at all, but

Marcius, while delivering an attack from marshy ground on the side

where the sea was, managed to shake down a part of the wall, though he

could not get inside. The Carthaginians repulsed those who attempted

to force their way in, and at night issued through the ruins to slay

numerous men and burn up a very large number of engines. Hasdrubal and

the cavalry, however, did not allow them to scatter over any

considerable territory and Masinissa lent them no aid. He had not been

invited at the opening of the war, and, though he had promised

Hasdrubal that he would fight now, they gave him no opportunity of

doing so.

IX, 27.--The consuls in view of the outcome of their attempts and

because their fleet had been damaged by its stay in the lake raised

the siege. Marcius endeavored to achieve some advantage by sea or at

least to injure the coast districts, but not accomplishing anything he

sailed for home, then turned back and subdued AEgimurus: and Manilius

started for the interior, but upon sustaining injuries at the hands of

Himilco, commander of the Carthaginian cavalry, whom they called also

Phameas, he returned to Carthage. There, while the outside forces of

Hasdrubal troubled him, the people in the city harassed him by

excursions both night and day. In fact, the Carthaginians came to

despise him and advanced as far as the Roman camp, but being for the

most part unarmed they lost a number of men and shut themselves up in

their fortifications again. Manilius was particularly anxious to get

into close quarters with Hasdrubal, thinking that, if he could

vanquish him, he should find it easier to wage war upon the remainder.

His wish to get into close quarters with him was eventually realized.

He followed Hasdrubal to a small fort whither the latter was retiring,

and before he knew it got into a narrow passage over rough ground and

there suffered a tremendous reverse. He would have been utterly

destroyed, had he not found a most valuable helper in the person of

Scipio the descendant of Africanus, [Sidenote: FRAG. 69] WHO EXCELLED

IN APPREHENDING AND DEVISING BEFOREHAND THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS

MOVEMENTS, BUT EXCELLED ALSO IN EXECUTING THEM. IN BODILY FRAME HE WAS

STRONG; HE WAS AMIABLE, TOO, AND MODERATE; AND FOR THESE REASONS HE

ESCAPED ENVY. HE CHOSE TO MAKE HIMSELF LIKE TO HIS INFERIORS, NOT

BETTER THAN HIS EQUALS (he served as military tribune), AND WEAKER

THAN GREATER MEN. Manilius both reported what Scipio had done and sent

a letter to the people of Rome concealing nothing, but including among

other matters an account of the proceedings of Masinissa and Phameas.

These were as follows.

Masinissa on his death-bed was at a loss to know how he should dispose

of his kingdom, his dilemma being due to the number of his sons and

the variety of their family ties on their mothers' side. Therefore he

sent for Scipio to advise him, and the consul let Scipio go. But the

demise of Masinissa occurred before Scipio arrived, and he gave his

ring to his son Micipsa and delivered and committed all the other

interests pertaining to his kingdom to Scipio, so soon as the latter

should arrive. Scipio being aware of the preferences of Masinissa's

sons assigned the kingdom to no one of them singly; but whereas there

were three most distinguished, the eldest Micipsa, the youngest

Gulussa, and intermediate in age Mastanabal, he appointed these to

have charge of affairs, though separately. To the eldest, who was

versed in business and fond of wealth, he entrusted the fiscal

administration, to the second son, who possessed the critical faculty,

he granted the right to decide disputes, and to Gulussa, who chanced

to be of a warlike temperament, he delivered the troops. They had also

numerous brothers on whom he bestowed certain cities and districts. He

took Gulussa along with him and introduced him to the consul.

Now at the beginning of spring they made a campaign against the allies

of the Carthaginians and brought many of them to terms forcibly while

inducing many others to capitulate. Scipio was especially active in

the work. [Sidenote: FRAG. 70] WHEN PHAMEAS, DESPAIRING OF

CARTHAGINIAN SUCCESS, went over to the Romans and held a conference

with Scipio, then they all set out against Hasdrubal. For several days

they assailed his fortress, but as necessaries failed them they

retired in good order. During the siege Phameas had attacked them and

made a show of fighting, and in the progress of the action he had

deserted together with some of the cavalry. Then Manilius went to

Utica and remained quiet, while Scipio took Phameas back to Rome,

where he himself received commendation and Phameas was honored to the

extent of being allowed to sit with the senate in the senate-house.

IX, 28.--It was at this time, too, that the episode occurred in which

Prusias figured. The latter being old and of an irritable disposition

became possessed by a fear that the Bithynians would expel him from

his kingdom, choosing in his stead his son Nicomedes. So on some

pretext he sent his son to Rome, with orders to make that his home.

But since he plotted against the younger man even during the sojourn

in Rome and labored to kill him, some Bithynians made visits to Rome,

took Nicomedes away secretly and conveyed him to Bithynia, and after

slaying the old man designated him king. This act vexed the Romans,

but did not incense them to the point of war.

A certain Andriscus, who was a native of Atramyttium and resembled

Perseus in appearance, caused a wide area of Macedonia to revolt by

pretending to be his son and calling himself Philip. First he went to

Macedonia and tried to upheave the country, but as no one would yield

him allegiance he took his way to Demetrius in Syria to obtain from

him the aid which relationship might afford. Demetrius arrested him

and sent him to Rome, where he met with general contempt, both because

he stood convicted of not being the son of Perseus and because he had

no other qualities that were worthy of attention. On being released he

gathered a band of revolutionists, drew after him a number of cities,

and finally, assuming the kingly garb and mustering an army, he

reached Thrace. There he added to his army numbers of the independent

lands as well as numbers of princes who disliked the Romans, invaded

Macedonia (which he occupied), and setting out for Thessaly made not a

little of that territory his own.

The Romans at first scorned Andriscus and then they sent Scipio Nasica

to effect some peaceful settlement in those parts. On reaching Greece

and ascertaining what had occurred he despatched a letter to the

Romans explaining the case; then after collecting troops from allies

there he gave attention to the business in hand and advanced as far

as Macedonia. The people of Rome when informed of the doings of

Andriscus sent an army and Publius Juventius, a praetor. Juventius had

just reached the vicinity of Macedonia, when Andriscus gave battle,

killed the praetor, and would have annihilated his entire force but for

its withdrawal by night. Next he invaded Thessaly, damaged a very

great extent of it, and ranged Thracian interests on his side.

Consequently the people of Rome once more despatched a praetor, Quintus

Caecilius Metellus, with a strong body of troops: he proceeded to

Macedonia and enjoyed the assistance of the fleet of Attalus. The

fleet inspired Andriscus with some alarm for the coast districts so

that he did not venture to advance farther but moved up to a point

slightly beyond Pydna. There he had the best of it in a cavalry

encounter but out of fear of the infantry turned back. His elation was

such that he divided his army into two sections, and with one remained

on the watch where he was, while he sent the other to ravage Thessaly.

Metellus in derision of the forces confronting him joined battle, and

by overpowering those with whom he first came into conflict he got

control of the remainder with greater ease; for they made terms with

him readily, inasmuch as they had erred. Andriscus fled to Thrace and

after assembling a body of fighters gave battle to Metellus as the

latter was advancing on his track. His vanguard, however, was routed

first; then his contingent of allies was scattered; and Andriscus

himself was betrayed by Byzes, a Thracian prince, and executed.

One Alexander, that also declared himself to be a son of Perseus and

collected a band of warriors, had occupied the country round about the

river which is called the Mestus:[40] but he now took to flight, and

Metellus chased him as far as Dardania.

[Footnote 40: Presumably an error for the _Nestus_, a well-known

stream.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 148 (_a.u._ 606)] IX, 29.--The Romans put Piso the

consul in the field against the Carthaginians. Piso did not try

conclusions with Carthage and Hasdrubal, but devoted himself to the

coast cities. He was repulsed from Aspis, captured and razed Neapolis,

and in his expedition against the town of Hippo merely used up time

without accomplishing anything. The Carthaginians took heart both for

the reasons indicated and because some allies had joined their cause.

Learning this the Romans in army and city alike had recourse to Scipio

and created him consul in spite of the fact that his age would not

properly let him hold the office. [Sidenote: Cp. FRAG. 71] His own

deeds and the excellence of his father Paulus and of his grandfather

Africanus implanted in the breasts of all a firm hope that through him

they should vanquish their enemies and utterly root out Carthage.

[Sidenote: B.C. 147 (_a.u._ 607)] While Scipio was en route to Libya,

Mancinus was sailing along the coast of Carthage. He noticed a point

called Megalia which was inside the city wall and was located on a

cliff having a sheer descent into the sea. This point was a long

distance away from the rest of the town and had but few guards because

of the natural strength of its position. Suddenly Mancinus applied

ladders to it from the ships and ascended. Not till he was safely up

did some of the Carthaginians hastily gather, but even so they were

unable to repulse him from his vantage ground. He then sent to Piso an

account of his exploit and a request for assistance. Piso, however,

being far in the interior, proved of no aid to Mancinus, but Scipio

happened along at nightfall just after the receipt of the news and

immediately sent him help. The Carthaginians would have either

captured or destroyed Mancinus, if they had not seen Scipio's vessels

skirting the shore: then they grew discouraged, but would not fall

back. So Scipio sent them some captives to tell them that he was at

hand, upon receipt of which information they no longer stood their

ground, but retired to send for Hasdrubal and fortify with trenches

and palisades the cross-wall in front of the residences. Scipio now

left Mancinus to guard Megalia and himself set out to join Piso and

the troops so as to have their support in his conduct of operations.

He made a rapid return journey with the lightest equipped portion of

the army and found that Hasdrubal had entered Carthage and was

attacking Mancinus fiercely. The arrival of Scipio put an end to the

attack. When Piso too had come there, Scipio bade him take up his

position outside the wall opposite certain gates, and he sent other

soldiers around to a little gate a long distance away from the main

force, with orders as to what they must do. He himself about midnight

took the strongest portion of the army, got inside the circuit (using

deserters as guides) and moving quietly to a point inside the little

gate he hacked the bar in two, let in the men who were on the watch

outside and destroyed the guards. Then he hastened to the gate

opposite which Piso had his station, routing the intervening guards

(who were only a few in each place), so that Hasdrubal by the time he

found out what had happened could see that nearly the entire body of

Roman troops was inside. For a while the Carthaginians withstood them:

then they abandoned the city, all but the Cotho and Byrsa, in which

they took refuge. Next Hasdrubal killed all the Roman captives in

order that his people in despair of pardon might show the greater

fortitude in resistance. He also made away with many of the natives on

the charge that they wanted to betray their own cause. And Scipio

encircled them with trench and palisade and intercepted them by a

wall, yet it was some time before he took them captive. The walls were

strong and the men within being many in number and confined in a small

space fought with vehemence. They were well off for food, too, for

Bithias from the mainland opposite the city sent merchantmen, amid

wind and wave into the harbor to them so often as there was a heavy

gale blowing. To overcome this obstacle Scipio conceived and executed

a startling operation, namely, the damming of the narrow entrance to

the harbor. The work was difficult and toilsome, for the Carthaginians

undertook to check them, yet he accomplished it by the number of

laborers at his disposal. Many battles took place in the meantime, but

the enemy were unable to prevent the filling of the channel.

IX, 30.--So when the mouth of the harbor had been filled up, the

Carthaginians were terribly oppressed by the scarcity of food; some of

them deserted, others endured it and died, and still others ate the

dead bodies. Hasdrubal, accordingly, in dejection sent envoys to

Scipio with regard to truce, and would have obtained immunity, had he

not desired to secure both preservation and freedom for all the rest

as well. After he had failed for this reason to accomplish his purpose

he confined his wife in the acropolis because she had made

propositions to Scipio for the safety of herself and her children, and

behaved in other ways more boldly on account of his despair. He,

therefore, and some others, mastered by frenzy, fought both night and

day; and sometimes they would be defeated and sometimes gain

advantage; and they devised machinery to oppose the Roman engines.

Bithias, who held a high-perched fortress and scoured wide stretches

of the mainland, did what he could to help the Carthaginians and

damage the Romans. Hence Scipio also divided his army, assigning one

half of it to invest Carthage while he sent the other half against

Bithias, placing at the head of it his lieutenant Gaius Laelius. He

himself spent his time in passing from one division to the other for

inspection. Then the fortress was taken, and the siege of Carthage was

once more conducted by an undivided force.

[Sidenote: B.C. 146 (_a.u._ 608)] The Carthaginians despairing

consequently of being any longer able to save both walls betook

themselves to the enclosure of the Byrsa, since it was higher up, at

the same time transferring thither all the objects that they could.

By night they burned the dockyard and most of the other structures in

order to deprive the enemy of any benefit from them. When the Romans

became aware of their action, they occupied the harbor and advanced

against Byrsa. Occupying the houses on each side of it some of the

besiegers walked straight along on top of the roofs by successively

stepping to those immediately adjacent, and others by digging through

the walls pushed onward below until they reached the very citadel.

When they had got so far, the Carthaginians offered no further

opposition, but all except Hasdrubal sued for clemency. He together

with the deserters (for Scipio would not grant them a truce) was

crowded into the temple of AEsculapius, as were also his wife and

children, and there he defended himself against assailants until the

deserters set fire to the temple and climbed to the roof to await the

last extremity of the flames. Then, beaten, he came to Scipio holding

the suppliant branch. His wife, who witnessed his entreaty, after

calling him by name and reproaching him for securing safety for

himself when he had not allowed her to obtain terms threw her children

into the fire and likewise cast herself in.

Thus did Scipio take Carthage, and he forwarded to the senate a letter

in these terms: "Carthage is taken. What are your orders?" This being

read they held a session to consider what should be done. Cato

advanced the opinion that they ought to raze the city and blot out the

Carthaginians, whereas Scipio Nasica still advised sparing the

Carthaginians. From this beginning the senate became involved in great

dispute and contention until some one said that if for no other reason

it must be considered necessary to spare them for the Romans' own

sake. With this nation for antagonists they would be sure to practice

excellence and not turn aside to pleasures and luxury; for if those

who were able to compel them to practice warlike pursuits should be

removed from the scene, they might become inferior from want of

practice, for a lack of worthy competitors. As a result of these words

all became unanimous in favor of demolishing Carthage, since they felt

sure that that people would never remain entirely at peace. The whole

town was therefore overthrown from pinnacle to foundation and it was

decreed that for any person to settle upon its site should be an

accursed act. The majority of the population captured were thrown into

prison and there perished, and some few (still excepting the very

foremost men) were sold. These leaders and the hostages and Hasdrubal

and Bithias lived to the end of their lives in different parts of

Italy as prisoners, yet free from bonds. Scipio secured both glory and

honor and was called Africanus not after his grandfather but from his

own achievements.

IX, 31.--This year likewise saw the ruin of Corinth. The head men of

the Greeks had been deported to Italy by AEmilius Paulus, whereupon

their countrymen at first through embassies kept requesting the return

of the men, and when their prayers were not granted some of the

exiles in despair of ever effecting a return to their homes committed

suicide. The Greeks took this situation with a very bad grace and made

it a matter of public lamentation, besides evincing anger at any

persons dwelling among them that favored the Roman cause; yet they

displayed no open symptoms of hostility until they got back the

remnants of those hostages. [Sidenote: B.C. 149 (_a.u._ 605)] Then

those that had been wronged and those that had obtained a hold upon

the goods of others fell into strife and began a real warfare.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 72] THE QUARREL BEGAN BY THE ACTION OF THE ACHAEANS IN

BRINGING CHARGES AGAINST THE LACEDAEMONIANS AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR

WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THEM. THE MEDIATORS WHOM THE ROMANS DESPATCHED TO

THEM THEY WOULD NOT HEED: they rather set their faces toward war,

acting under the supervision of Critolaus. Metellus was consequently

afraid that they might lay hands on Macedonia,--[Sidenote: B.C. 148

(_a.u._ 606)] they had already appeared in Thessaly,--and so he went

to meet them and routed them.

At the fall of Critolaus the Greek world was split asunder. Some of

them had embraced peace and laid down their weapons, whereas others

had committed their interests to the care of Diaeus and were still

involved in factional turmoil. [Sidenote: B.C. 146 (_a.u._ 608)] On

learning this the people of Rome sent Mummius against them. He got rid

of Metellus and gave his personal attention to the war. Part of his

army sustained a slight reverse through an ambuscade and Diaeus pursued

the fugitives up to their own camp, but Mummius made a sortie, routed

him, and followed to the Achaean entrenchments. Diaeus now gathered a

larger force and undertook to give battle to them, but, as the Romans

would make no hostile demonstration, he conceived a contempt for them

and advanced to a depressed piece of ground lying between the camps.

Mummius seeing this secretly sent horsemen to assail them on the

flank. After these had attacked and thrown the enemy into confusion,

he brought up the phalanx in front and caused considerable slaughter.

As a consequence Diaeus in despair killed himself, and of the survivors

of the battle the Corinthians were scattered over the country, while

the rest fled to their homes. Hence the Corinthians within the wall

believing that all their citizens had been lost abandoned the city,

and it was empty of men when Mummius took it. After that he won over

without trouble both that nation and the rest of the Greeks. He now

took possession of their arms, all the offerings that were consecrated

in their temples, the statues, paintings, and whatever other kind of

ornament they had; and as soon as he could send his father and some

other men to arrange terms for the vanquished he caused the walls of

some of the cities to be taken down and declared them all to be free

and independent except the Corinthians. The dwellers in Corinth he

sold, and confiscated their land and demolished their walls and all

their houses besides, out of fear that some states might again unite

with them, since they constituted the greatest state. To prevent any

of them from remaining hidden and any of the other Greeks from being

sold as Corinthians he assembled everybody present before he had

disclosed his determination, and after having his soldiers surround

them in such a way as not to attract notice he proclaimed the

enslavement of the Corinthians and the liberation of the remainder.

Then he instructed them all to take hold of any Corinthians standing

beside them. In this way he arrived at an accurate distinction.

Thus was Corinth overthrown. The rest of the Greek world suffered

temporarily from murders and levies of money, but afterward came to

enjoy such immunity and prosperity that it used to be said: "If they

had not been taken captive as early as they were, they could not have

been preserved."

So this end simultaneously befell Carthage and Corinth, famous,

ancient cities: but at a much later date they received colonies of

Romans, became again flourishing, and regained their original

position.

The exploits of the Romans up to this point, found by me in ancient

books that record these matters, written by men of old time, I have

drawn thence in a condensed form and have embodied in the present

history. As for what comes next in order,--the transactions of the

consuls and dictators, so long as the government of Rome was still

conducted by these officials,--let no one censure me as having passed

this by through contempt or indolence or antipathy and having left the

history as it were incomplete. The gap has not been overlooked by me

through sloth, nor have I of my own free will left my task half

finished, but through lack of books to describe the events. I have

frequently instituted a search for them, yet I have not found them,

and I do not know whether the cause is that the passage of time has

destroyed them, and so they are not preserved, or whether the persons

to whom I entrusted the errand perhaps did not search for them with

sufficient diligence; for I was living abroad and passing my life on

an islet far from the city. And because it has not been my lot to gain

access to these books in this instance, my history turns out to be

only half complete for the acts of the consuls and even for those of

the dictators. Hence, passing over them, though reluctantly, I will

record the deeds of the emperors, with some brief introductory remarks

to make clear to those who shall read my history by what steps the

Romans passed from aristocracy (or democracy) to the rule of one man,

and to impart, in addition, coherence to the narrative.

* * * * *

NOTE.--NO SUMMARY EXISTS OF THE MISSING BOOKS TWENTY-TWO TO

THIRTY-FIVE INCLUSIVE, AND WE ARE DRIVEN TO RELY ON SCATTERED AND

INCONSEQUENTIAL FRAGMENTS (THAT HAVE SOMEHOW ESCAPED THE WRECK OF

SEASONS) AS THE BASIS FOR WHATEVER MENTAL IMAGE WE MAY CHOOSE TO FORM

OF THE LOST NARRATIVE. THESE BITS POSSESS THE SAME VALUE FOR DIO'S

HISTORY AS DO THE UNRELATED PIECES OF MARBLE AND CLAY FROM EXCAVATIONS

IN ENABLING US TO GAIN A WIDER UNDERSTANDING OF ANTIQUE SCULPTURE AND

POTTERY. FOR AN ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES OF THESE FRAGMENTS SEE THE

INTRODUCTION, UNDER THE CAPTION ENTITLED THE WRITING.

* * * * *

_(BOOK 22, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXIII] (Par.) Viriathus was a Lusitanian, of very

obscure origin, as some think, who enjoyed great renown through his

deeds, for from a shepherd he became a robber and later on also a

general. He was naturally adapted and had trained himself to be very

quick in pursuing and fleeing, and of great force in a stationary

conflict. He was glad to get any food that came to hand and whatever

drink fell to his lot; he lived most of his life under the open sky

and was satisfied with nature's bedding. Consequently he was

superior to any heat or any cold, and neither was he ever troubled

by hunger nor did he suffer from any other disagreeable condition;

since he found all his wants met quite sufficiently by whatever he

had at hand, which seemed to him unexcelled. While he possessed

such a physical constitution, as the result of nature and training,

he surpassed still more in spiritual endowment. He was swift to

perceive and do whatever was requisite,--he could tell what must

be done and at the same time he understood the proper occasion for

it,--and he was clever at pretending not to know the most evident

facts and to know the most hidden secrets. Furthermore he was not

only general but his own assistant in every business equally,

and was seen to be neither humble nor pompous, but in him obscurity

of family and reputation for strength were so mingled that he

seemed to be neither inferior nor superior to any one. And, in

fine, he carried on the war not for the sake of personal gain or

power nor through anger, but because of the opportunity for action;

therefore he was regarded as most thoroughly a lover of war and a

successful warrior. (Valesius, p. 614.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXIV] [Sidenote: B.C. 143 (_a.u._ 611)] 1.

(Par.) Claudius, the colleague of Metellus, impelled by pride of birth

and jealousy of Metellus, when he had had Italy allotted to his command

and found no sign of war, was eager to secure by any means some

pretext for a triumph; hence without taking the trouble to lodge any

formal complaint he set the Salassi, a Gallic tribe, at war with the

Romans. He had been sent to reconcile them, because they were

disputing with their neighbors about the water necessary for the gold

mines, and he overran their entire country ... the Romans sent him two

of the ten priests. (Valesius, p. 617.)

2. (Par.) Claudius, even if he understood thoroughly that he had not

conquered, nevertheless even then displayed such arrogance as not to

say a word in either the senate or the popular assembly about the

triumph; but acting as if the right were indisputably his, even if no

one should vote to that effect, he asked for the requisite

expenditures. (Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXV] [Sidenote: B.C. 142 (_a.u._ 612)] (Par.) As

regards character Mummius and Africanus differed vastly from each

other in every respect. The latter ruled with a view to the greatest

uprightness and with exactitude, not esteeming one influence above

another; he called to account many of the senators and many of the

knights, as well as other individuals. Mummius, on the other hand, was

more urbane and humane in his behavior; he imputed no dishonor to any

one, and abolished many of the regulations framed by Africanus, so far

as was possible. To such an extent of amiability did his nature lead

him, that he lent some statues to Lucullus for the consecration of the

temple of Felicitas (material for which he had gathered in the Spanish

war), and then, when that general was unwilling to return them on the

ground that they had been made sacred by the dedication, he showed no

anger, but permitted his own spoils to lie there offered up in

another's name. (Valesius, p. 618.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXVI] [Sidenote: B.C. 140 (_a.u._ 614)]

(Par.) Pompeius[41] received many setbacks and incurred great disgrace.

There was a river flowing through the country of the Numantini that he

wished to turn aside from its ancient channel and let in upon their

fields; and after tremendous exertions he did accomplish this. But he

lost many soldiers, and no advantage from turning it aside came to the

Romans, nor harm to the enemy.... (Valesius, ib.)

[Footnote 41: This is Q. Pompeius A. F. Nepos (consul B.C. 141).]

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXVII] (Par.) Caepio[42] effected nothing worthy of

mention against the foe, but brought much serious harm to his own men,

so that he ran the risk of being killed by them. He treated them all,

but especially the cavalry, with such harshness and cruelty that a vast

number of most unseemly jokes and stories passed current about him

during the nights; and the more he grew vexed at it, the more jests

did they make and endeavor to infuriate him. When what was going on

became known and no one could be found guilty--though he suspected it

was the doing of the cavalry--as he could fix the responsibility upon

no one single man he became angry at all of them, and commanded them,

six hundred in number, accompanied only by their grooms, to cross the

river by which they were encamped and bring wood from the mountain on

which Viriathus was bivouacking. The danger was manifest to all, and

the tribunes and lieutenants begged him not to destroy them. The

cavalry waited for a little to see if he would listen to the others,

and when he would not yield, they deemed it unworthy to supplicate

him, as he was most eager for them to do, but choosing rather to

perish utterly than to speak a respectful word to him, they started on

the mission assigned. The horsemen of the allies and other volunteers

accompanied them. They crossed the river, cut the wood, and threw it

in all around the general's quarters, intending to burn them down. And

he would have perished in the flames, if he had not fled away in time.

(Valesius, p. 618.)

[Footnote 42: _Q. Servilius Caepio_ (consul B.C. 140).]

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXVIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 139 (_a.u._ 615)] (Par.)

Popilius so terrified Viriathus that the latter sent to him about peace

immediately and before they had tried any battle at all, killed some

of the leaders of the rebels whose surrender had been demanded by the

Romans--among these his father-in-law, though commanding his own

force, was slaughtered--and delivered up the rest, all of whose hands

the consul cut off. And he would have agreed to a complete truce, if

their weapons had not been demanded in addition: with this condition

neither he nor the rest of the throng would comply.[43] (Ursinus, p.

383.)

[Footnote 43: Adopting Reiske's conjecture [Greek: hypomeinai epsesen]

in place of the MS. [Greek: hypomeinai epoieses].]

_(BOOK 23, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXIX] [Sidenote: B.C. 136 (_a.u._ 618)] (Par.) The

Romans received the Numantine ambassadors on their arrival outside the

walls, to the end that their reception might not seem to imply a

ratification of the truce. However, they sent gifts of friendship

notwithstanding, not wishing to deprive them of the hope of possibly

coming to terms. Mancinus and his followers told of the necessity of

the compact made and the number of the saved, and stated that they

still held all of their former possessions in Spain. They besought

their countrymen to consider the question not in the light of their

present immunity, but with reference to the danger that then

encompassed the soldiers, and to think not what ought to have been

done, but what might have been the outcome. The Numantini brought

forward many statements about their previous good-will toward the

Romans and considerable about the latter's subsequent injustice,

by reason of which they had been forced into the war, and the

perjury of Pompeius: and they asked for considerate treatment in

return for the preservation of Mancinus and the rest. But the

Romans both dissolved the truce and decided that Mancinus should

be given up to the Numantini. (Ursinus, p. 383.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXX] (Par.) Claudius[44] through his harshness would

have committed many outrageous acts, had he not been restrained by his

colleague Quintus.[45] The latter, who was amiable and possessed

exactly the opposite temperament, did not oppose him with anger in any

matter and, indeed, occasionally yielded to him, and by gentle

behavior so manipulated him that he found very few opportunities for

irritation. (Valesius, p. 621.)

[Footnote 44: These are the censors for the year B.C. 136, Ap.

Claudius Pulcher and Q. Fulvius Nobilior.]

[Footnote 45: See note, page 335.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXI] (Par.) Furius[46] led out among his lieutenants

both Pompeius and Metellus though they were hostile both to him and to

each other; for, expecting to achieve some great success, he wished to

have in them sure witnesses to his deeds and to receive the evidence of

his prowess from their unwilling lips. (Valesius, ib.)

[Footnote 46: P. Furius Philus (consul B.C. 136).]

_(BOOK 24, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXIII] 1. (Par.) Tiberius Gracchus caused an upheaval

of the Roman state,--and this in spite of the fact that he belonged to

one of the foremost families (his grandfather being Africanus), that

he possessed a natural endowment worthy of the latter, that he had

gone through a most thorough course of education, and had a high

spirit. In proportion to these great gifts of his was the allurement

that they offered to follow his ambitions: and when once he had turned

aside from what was best he drifted even involuntarily into what was

worst. It began with his being refused a triumph over the Numantini:

he had hoped for this honor because he had previously had the

management of the business, but so far from obtaining anything of the

kind he incurred the danger of being delivered up; then he decided

that deeds were estimated not on the basis of goodness or truth but

according to mere chance. And this road to fame he abandoned as not

safe, but since he desired by all means to become prominent in some

way and expected that he could accomplish this better through the

popular than through the senatorial party, he attached himself to the

former. (Valesius, p. 621.)

2. (Par.) Marcus Octavius on account of an hereditary feud with Gracchus

willingly made himself his opponent. [Sidenote: B.C. 133 (_a.u._ 621)]

Thereafter there was no semblance of moderation: striving and

quarreling as they were, each to survive the other rather than to

benefit the community, they committed many acts of violence as if they

were in a principality instead of a democracy, and suffered many

unusual calamities proper for war but not for peace. In addition to

their individual conflicts, there were many who, banded together,

instituted grievous abuses and battles in the senate-house itself and

the popular assembly as well as throughout the rest of the city: they

pretended to be executing the law, but were in reality making in all

things every effort not to be surpassed by each other. The result was

that the authorities could not carry on their accustomed tasks, courts

came to a stop, no contract was entered into, and other sorts of

confusion and disorder were rife everywhere. The place bore the name

of city, but was no whit different from a camp. (Valesius, p. 622.)

3. (Par.) Gracchus proposed certain laws for the benefit of those of

the people who served in the army, and transferred the courts from

the senate to the knights, bedeviling and disturbing all established

customs in order that he might be enabled to lay hold on safety in

some wise. And after he found not even this of advantage to him, but

his term of office was drawing to a close, when he would be

immediately exposed to the attacks of his enemies, he attempted to

secure the tribuneship also for the following year (in company with

his brother) and to appoint his father-in-law consul: to obtain this

end he would make any statement or promise anything whatever to

anybody. Often, too, he put on a mourning garb and brought his mother

and children, tied hand and foot, into the presence of the populace.

(Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 129 (_a.u._ 625)] (Par.)

Scipio Africanus had more ambition in his makeup than was suitable for

or compatible with his general excellence. And in reality none of his

rivals took pleasure in his death, but although they thought him a

great obstacle in their way even they missed him. They saw that he was

valuable to the State and never expected that he would cause them any

serious trouble. When he was suddenly taken away all the possessions

of the powerful class were again diminished, so that the promoters of

agrarian legislation ravaged at will practically all of Italy. And

this seems to me to have been most strongly indicated by the mass of

stones that poured down from heaven, falling upon some of the temples

and killing men, and by the tears of Apollo. [Sidenote: B.C. 131

(_a.u._ 623)] For the god wept copiously[47] for three days, so that

the Romans on the advice of the soothsayers voted to cut down the

statue and to sink it in the deep. (Valesius, p. 625.)

[Footnote 47: In the original the word "wept" is repeated. Van

Herwerden thinks that the second one should be deleted, but Schenkl

prefers to substitute an adverb in place of the first. In the

translation I have used an adverb giving nearly the same force as the

repetition of the verb.]

_(BOOK 25, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXIV] (Par.) Gracchus had a disposition like his

brother; only the latter drifted from excellence into ambition and then

to baseness whereas this man was naturally intractable and played the

rogue voluntarily and far surpassed the other in his gift of language.

For these reasons his designs were more mischievous, his daring more

spontaneous, and his self-will greater in all junctures alike. He was

the first to walk up and down in the assemblies while he harangued and

the first to bare his arm; hence neither of these practices has been

thought improper, since he did it. And because his speaking was

characterized by great condensation of thought and forcefulness of

words and he consequently was unable to restrain himself easily but

was often led to say what he did not wish, he used to bring in a

flute-player, and from him, playing a low accompaniment, he would take

his rhythm and time, or if even so he in some way fell out of measure,

he would stop. This was the sort of man that attacked the government,

and, by assuming no speech or act to be forbidden, in the briefest

time became a great power among the populace and the knights. All the

nobility and the senatorial party if he had lived longer[48] ...

[Sidenote: B.C. 121 (_a.u._ 633)] but as it was his great authority

made him envied even by the members of his faction, and he was ruined

by his own devices. (Valesius, ib.)

[Footnote 48: One may supply here, as Reiske suggests, "would have

been overthrown", "would have been humbled", or "would have been

brought low".]

_(BOOK 26, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXV] [Sidenote: B.C. 114 (_a.u._ 640)] 1. (Par.)

The priestesses for the most part incurred destruction and shame

themselves, and proved the source of great evils to numerous others as

well, while the entire city because of them was thrown into an uproar.

For the people, in view of the fact that what was immaculate by law

and sacred by the dictates of religion and decent through fear of

vengeance had been polluted, were ready to believe that anything most

shameful and unholy might be done. For this reason they visited

punishment not only on the convicted, but also on all the rest who had

been accused, to show their hatred of what had occurred. Hence the

whole episode in which the women were concerned seemed now to be due

not so much to their feminine incontinence[49] as to a kind of madness

inspired by supernatural powers. (Valesius, p. 626.)

[Footnote 49: Reading [Greek: eti aselgeias] (Boissevain's emendation)

in place of the unintelligible [Greek: aitias algein] of the MS.]

2. (Par.) Three altogether had had intercourse with men; and of them

Marcia had acted individually, granting her favors to one single

knight[50] and would never have been discovered, had not the

investigation into the cases of the others spread and overtaken her

besides. AEmilia and Licinia had a multitude of lovers and carried

on their wanton behavior with each other's help. At first they

surrendered themselves to some few privately and secretly, telling

each man that he was the only one admitted. Later they themselves

bound every one who could suspect and inform against them to certain

silence in advance by the price of intercourse with them, and those

who had previously enjoyed their conversation, though they saw this,

yet endured it in order not to be detected by a show of vexation.

So after holding commerce with many, now singly, now in groups,

now privately, now publicly, Licinia enjoyed the society of the

brother of AEmilia, and AEmilia that of Licinia's brother. These

doings were hidden for a great period of time, and though many

men and many women, both free and slaves, were in the secret, it

was hidden for a very long period, until one Manius,[51] who

seems to have been the first to assist and cooeperate in the

whole evil, gave information of the matter because he had not

obtained freedom nor any of the other objects of his hope. He was,

indeed, very skillful not only at leading women into prostitution, but

also in slandering and ruining some of them. (Valesius, p. 626.)

[Footnote 50: Namely, L. Betutius Barrus.]

[Footnote 51: A slave of the aforesaid Barrus.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXVI] [Sidenote: B.C. 112 (_a.u._ 642)] (Par.) This

was calculated to bring him [sc. Marcus Drusus] glory first of itself

and second in the light of Cato's disaster; and because he had shown

great amiability toward the soldiers and seemed to have made success of

more importance than truth, he also secured a renown greater than his

deeds deserved. (Valesius, p. 629.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXVII] [Sidenote: B.C. 108 (_a.u._ 646)] 1. (Par.)

When Jugurtha sent to Metellus about peace the latter made separate

demands upon him as if each were to be the last, and in this way got

from him hostages, arms, the elephants, the captives, and the deserters.

All of these last he killed but did not grant a truce because Jugurtha,

fearing to be arrested, refused to come to him and because Marius and

Gnaeus[52] prevented. (Ursinus, p. 385.)

[Footnote 52: Possibly an error for _Gaudas_.]

2. For he [sc. Marius] was in general seditious and turbulent, wholly

friendly to the rabble from which he had sprung and wholly ready to

overthrow the nobility. He risked with perfect readiness any

statement, promise, lie, or false oath in any matter where he hoped to

gain a benefit. Blackmailing one of the foremost citizens or

commending some rascal he thought child's play. And let no one be

surprised that such a man could conceal his villanies for a very long

time: for, as a result of his exceeding cunning and the good fortune

which he enjoyed all through his early life, he actually acquired a

reputation for virtue. (Valesius, p. 629.)

3. (Par.) Marius was the more easily able to calumniate Metellus for the

reason that the latter was numbered among the nobles and was managing

military concerns excellently, whereas he himself was just beginning

to come forward from a very obscure and doubtful origin into public

notice:--the populace was readily inclined to overthrow Metellus

through envy, and favored Marius increasingly for his promises:--of

great assistance, too, was the report that Metellus had said to Marius

(who was just then coming forward for election): "You ought to be

satisfied if you get to be consul along with my son" (who was a mere

lad). (Valesius, p. 630.)

4. (Par.) Gaudas was angry at Metellus because in spite of requests

he had received from him neither the deserters nor a garrison of Roman

soldiers, or else because he could not sit near him,--a privilege

ordinarily vouchsafed by the consuls to princes and potentates.

(Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 107 (_a.u._ 647)] 5. (Par.) When Cirta was captured by

capitulation Bocchus sent a herald to Marius and first demanded the

empire of Jugurtha as the price for his defection, but later, as he

did not obtain it, simply asked him to make terms. So he sent envoys

to Rome, but Jugurtha while this was taking place retired to the most

desolate portions of his own territory. (Ursinus, p. 385.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 106 (_a.u._ 648)] 6. (Par.) Marius entertained the

envoys of Bocchus but said he would make no compact with him unless he

should receive Jugurtha's prisoners from his hands; and this was done.

(Ursinus, p. 386.)

_(BOOK 27, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXVIII] (Par.) Tolosa, which was formerly at peace

with the Romans but had revolted, under the influence of hope in the

Cimbri, to the extent of imprisoning the garrison, was occupied by

them at night: they were admitted unexpectedly by friends and

plundered the temples, obtaining much other money besides, for the

place had been wealthy from of old, containing among other offerings

those of which the Gauls under the leadership of Brennus had once

despoiled Delphi. Nothing of importance, however, reached the Romans

in the capital, but the victors themselves confiscated the most of it.

For this a number were called to account. (Valesius, p. 630.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXIX] [Sidenote: B.C. 105 (_a.u._ 649)] 1.

(Par.) Servilius by reason of his jealousy of his colleague[53] became

the cause of many evils to the army; for, though he had in general equal

powers, his repute was naturally diminished by the fact that the other

was also consul. And ... after the death of Scaurus[54] he [Manlius?]

sent for Servilius: but the latter replied that each of them ought to

keep his position. Then, apprehending that Manlius might gain some

success by his own resources, he grew jealous of him, fearing that he

might secure individual glory, and went to him: yet he did not bivouac

on the same ground nor make him the partaker of any plan, but took up

a distinct position with the evident intention of joining battle with

the Cimbri before him and winning all the glory of the war. At the

outset they still inspired the enemy with dread, as long as their

quarrel was concealed, so much so as to lead the foe to desire peace,

but when the Cimbri sent a herald to Manlius as consul Servilius

became indignant that they had not directed their embassy to him,

refused to agree to any reconciliation, and came near slaying the

envoys. (Valesius, p. 630.)

[Footnote 53: _Cn. Manlius Maximus_.]

[Footnote 54: _M. Aurelius Scaurus_ (consul suffectus B.C. 108).]

2. (Par.) The soldiers forced Servilius to go to Manlius and consult

with him about the emergency. But so far from coming into accord they

became as a result of the meeting even more hostile than before: they

fell into strife and abuse and parted in a disgraceful fashion.

(Valesius, p. 633.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. XC] [Sidenote: B.C. 104 (_a.u._ 650)] (Par.) After

Gnaeus Domitius obtained leave to bring suit against Scaurus, one of

the slaves then came forward and offered to bring any damaging

charges against his master: but he refused to become involved in such

despicable business, and arresting the fellow delivered him over to

Scaurus. (Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCI] 1. (Par.) Publius Licinius Nerva, who was praetor

in the island, on learning that the slaves were not being justly treated

in some respects, or else because he sought an occasion of profit (for

he was not inaccessible to bribes), circulated the announcement that

all who had any charges to bring against their masters should come to

him, for he would assist them. Accordingly, many of them banded

together, and some declared they were being wronged and others made

known some other grievances against their masters, thinking they had

secured an opportunity for accomplishing without bloodshedding all

that they wished. The freeborn, after consultation, resisted them and

would not yield to them on any point. Therefore Licinius, inspired

with fear by the united front of both sides and dreading that some

great mischief might be done by the defeated party, would not admit

any of the slaves but sent them away thinking that they would suffer

no harm or that at any rate they would be scattered and so could cause

no more disturbance. But they, fearing their masters because they had

dared to raise their voices at all against them, organized a force and

by common consent turned to robbery. (Valesius, p. 633.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 103 (_a.u._ 651)] 2. (Par.) The Messenians, believing

that they would suffer no abuse, had deposited in that place for safe

keeping all their most valuable and highly prized possessions.

Athenio, who as a Cilician held the chief command of the robbers, on

learning this attacked them while they were celebrating a public

festival in the suburbs, killed many of them as they were scattered

about, and almost took the city by storm. After building a wall to

fortify Macella,[55] a strong position, he did serious injury to the

country. (Valesius, p. 634.)

[Footnote 55: Possibly the modern _Macellaro_.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCII] [Sidenote: B.C. 102 (_a.u._ 652)] 1. (Par.) After

the defeat of the barbarians though many had fallen in battle some few

were saved. Whereupon Marius attempted to console these survivors and

to make amends by restoring to them all the plunder at a nominal

price, to prevent its being thought that he had bestowed favors

gratuitously upon any one. By this act Marius, who previously had been

the darling of the populace alone because sprung from that class and

raised to power by it, now won over even the nobles by whom he was

hated, and was praised equally by all. He received from a willing and

harmonious people a reelection for the following year, to enable him

to subdue his remaining foes. (Valesius, ib.)

2. (Par.) The Cimbri when they had once halted lost much of their spirit

and consequently grew duller and weaker in both soul and body. The

reason was that in place of their former outdoor life they rested in

houses, instead of their former cold plunges they used warm baths,

whereas they were wont to eat raw meat they now filled themselves with

richly spiced dishes and relishes of the country, and they saturated

themselves, contrary to their custom, with wine and strong drink.

These practices extinguished all their fiery spirit and enervated

their bodies, so that they could no longer bear toils or hardships or

heat or cold or sleeplessness. (Valesius, ib.)

_(BOOK 28, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 99 (_a.u._ 655)] 1. (Par.) The

son of Metellus besought everybody to such an extent both in private

and in public to let his father return from exile that he received the

appellation _Pius_, i.e. dutiful. (Valesius, p. 638.)

2. (Par.) Furius had such enmity toward Metellus that when he was censor

he took his horse away. (Valesius, ib.)

3. Publius Furius,[56] indicted for his deeds committed in the

tribuneship, was slain by the Romans in the Comitia itself. He richly

deserved to die, for he was a seditious person and after first joining

Saturninus and Glaucia he veered about, deserted to the opposing

faction, and joined its members; it was not proper, however, for him

to perish in just this way. And this action seemed to be on the whole

justifiable. (Valesius, p. 637.)

[Footnote 56: He was tribune of the plebs, B.C. 99.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCIV] 1. For there were other factional leaders, but

the greatest authority was possessed by Marcius[57] over one group,

and by Quintus[58] over the other: these men were eager for power, of

insatiable ambition, and consequently greatly inclined toward strife.

Those qualities they possessed in common; but Drusus had the advantage

of birth, and of wealth, which he lavishly expended upon those who at

any time made demands upon him, while the other greatly surpassed him

in audacity, daring, the anticipation of plots, and malignity

suitable to the occasion. Hence not unnaturally, since they

supplemented each other partly by their likeness and partly by their

differences, they created an extremely strong factional feeling which

remained even after the death of both. (Valesius, p. 638.)

[Footnote 57: _M. Livius Drusus._]

[Footnote 58: _Q. Servilius Caepio._]

2. (Par.) Drusus and Caepio, formerly great friends and united by mutual

ties of marriage, became privately at enmity with each other and carried

their feud even into politics. (Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCV] [Sidenote: B.C. 92 (_a.u._ 662)] 1. (Par.)

Rutilius, an upright man, was most unjustly condemned. He was brought to

court by a preconcerted plan of the knights on a charge of having been

bribed while serving in Asia as lieutenant under Quintus Mucius,[59]

and they imposed a fine upon him. The reason for this act was their

rage at his having ended many of their irregularities in connection

with the collecting of taxes. (Valesius, p. 637.)

[Footnote 59: The clause as found in the MS. gives no sense. The

translation here is on the basis of an emendation suggested by

Boissevain.]

2. (Par.) Rutilius made a very able defence, and there was no one of his

words which would not be the natural utterance of an upright man who

was being blackmailed and grieved far more for the conditions of the

State than for his own possessions: he was convicted, however, and

immediately stripped of his property. This process more than any other

revealed the fact that he had in no wise deserved the sentence passed

upon him. He was found to possess much less than the accusers had

charged him with having confiscated from Asia, and he could trace all

of his goods back to just and lawful sources of acquisition. Such was

his unworthy treatment, and Marius was not free from responsibility

for his conviction; a man so excellent and of such good repute had

been an annoyance to him. Wherefore Rutilius, indignant at the conduct

of affairs in the city, and disdaining to live longer in the company

of such a creature, withdrew, though under no compulsion, and went

even as far as Asia. There for a time he dwelt in Mitylene; then after

that place had received injury in the Mithridatic war he transferred

his residence to Smyrna and there lived to the end of his life nor

wished ever to return home. And in all this he suffered not a whit in

reputation or plenty. He received many gifts from Mucius and a vast

number from all the peoples and kings as well who had become

acquainted with him, till he possessed far more than his original

property. (Valesius, p. 637.)

_(BOOK 29, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCVI] [Sidenote: B.C. 90 (_a.u._ 664)] 1. (Par.)

Lupus,[60] suspecting that the patricians making the campaign with him

were revealing his plans to the enemy, sent word about them to the

senate before he had any definite information,[61] and, as a

consequence, although they were in no case well disposed[62] toward

each other through factional differences, he set them still more at

variance. There would have been even greater disturbance, had not some

of the Marsi been detected mixing with the foraging parties of the

Romans and entering the ramparts under the guise of allies, where they

took cognizance of speeches and actions in the camp and reported them

to their own men. In consequence of this discovery they ceased to be

angry with the patricians. (Valesius, p. 641.)

[Footnote 60: _P. Rutilius Lupus_.]

[Footnote 61: There are two gaps in the MS. here. "Had ...

information" is a conjecture of Tafel and Gros; and "well disposed

toward each other" of Reiske, who compares Book Fifty, chapter 16, of

Dio.]

[Footnote 62: [See previous footnote.]]

2. (Par.) Marius suspected Lupus, although a relative, and through

jealousy and hope of being appointed consul even a seventh time as the

only man who could bring success out of the existing situation, bade

him delay: their men, he said, would have provisions, whereas the

other side would not be able to hold out for any considerable time

when the war was in their country. (Valesius, ib.)

3. (Par.) The Picentes subdued those who would not join their rebellion

and abused these men in the presence of their friends and from the heads

of their wives they tore out the hair along with the skin. (Valesius,

ib.)

_(REMAINS OF BOOKS 30-35, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCVII] 1. (Par.) Mithridates, when the Roman envoys[63]

arrived, did not make the slightest move, but after bringing some

counter-charges and also exhibiting to the envoys the amount of his

wealth, some of which he had at that time spent on various objects

public and private, he remained quiet. But Nicomedes, elated by their

alliance and being in need of money, invaded his territory. (Ursinus,

p. 386.)

[Footnote 63: Their leader was M.' Aquilius.]

2. (Par.) Mithridates despatched envoys to Rome requesting them if they

deemed Nicomedes a friend to persuade him or compel him to act justly

toward him, or if not, to allow him (Mithridates) to take measures

against his foe. They, so far from doing what he wished, even

threatened him with punishment if he should not give back Cappadocia

to Ariobarzanes and remain at peace with Nicomedes. His envoys they

sent away the very day and furthermore ordered him never to send

another one unless he should render them obedience. (Ursinus, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCVIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 89 (_a.u._ 665)] (Par.)

Cato,[64] the greater part of whose army was effeminate and

superannuated, found his power diminished in every direction:

and once, when he had ventured to rebuke them because they were

unwilling to work hard or obey orders readily, he came near

being overwhelmed with a shower of missiles from them. He would

certainly have been killed, if they had had plenty of stones; but

since the site where they were assembled was given over to

agriculture and happened to be very wet, he received no hurt

from the clods of earth. The man who began the mutiny, Gaius

Titius,[65] was arrested: he was a low fellow who made his living in

the courts and was excessively and shamelessly outspoken; he was sent

to the city to the tribunes, but escaped punishment. (Valesius, p.

641.)

[Footnote 64: _L. Porcius Cato_ (consul B.C. 89).]

[Footnote 65: Properly _C. Titinius Sisenna_.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCIX] [Sidenote: B.C. 88 (_a.u._ 666)] 1. (Par.) All

the Asiatics, at the bidding of Mithridates, massacred the Romans; only

the people of Tralles did not personally kill any one, but hired a

certain Theophilus, a Paphlagonian (as if the victims were more likely

thus to escape destruction, or as if it made any difference to them by

whom they should be slaughtered). (Valesius, p. 642.)

2. (Par.) The Thracians, persuaded by Mithridates, overran Epirus and

the rest of the country as far as Dodona, going even to the point of

plundering the temple of Zeus. (Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. C] [Sidenote: B.C. 87 (_a.u._ 667)] 1. (Par.) Cinna,

as soon as he took possession of the office, was anxious upon no one

point so much as to drive Sulla out of Italy. He made Mithridates his

excuse, but in reality wanted this leader to remove himself that he

might not, by lurking close at hand, prove a hindrance to the objects

that Cinna had in mind. He fairly distinguished himself by his zeal

for Sulla and would refuse to promise nothing that pleased him. For

Sulla, who saw the urgency of the war and was eager for its glory,

before starting had arranged everything at home for his own best

interests. He appointed Cinna and one Gnaeus Octavius to be his

successors, hoping in this way to retain considerable power even while

absent. The second of the two he understood was generally approved for

his excellence and good nature, and he thought he would cause no

trouble: the other he well knew was an unprincipled person, but he did

not wish to antagonize him, because the man had some influence and was

ready, as he had said and declared on oath, to assist him in every way

possible. Sulla himself, though an adept at discovering the minds of

men and inferring correctly in regard to the nature of things, made a

thorough mistake in this matter and bequeathed a great war to the

State. (Valesius, p. 642.)

2. (Par.) Octavius was naturally dull in politics. (Valesius, ib.)

3. (Par.) The Romans, when civil war set in, sent for Metellus,

urging him to help them. (Ursinus, p. 386.)

4. (Par.) The Romans, at odds with one another, sent for Metellus and

bade him come to terms with the Samnites, as he best might: for at this

time they alone were still damaging Campania and the district beyond

it. He, however, concluded no truce with them. They demanded

citizenship to be given not to themselves alone but also to those who

had deserted to their side, refused to give up any of the booty which

they had, but demanded back all the captives and deserters from their

own ranks, so that even the senators no longer chose to make peace

with them on these terms. (Ursinus, p. 385.)

5. (Par.) When Cinna had put in force again the law regarding the return

of exiles, Marius and the rest of his followers who had been expelled

leaped into the city with the army left to them by all the gates at

once; these they shut, so that no one could make his escape, and

despatched every man they met, making no distinction, but treating

them all alike as enemies. They took special pains to destroy any

persons who had possessions, because they coveted such property, and

outraged their children and wives as if they had enslaved some foreign

city. The heads of the most eminent citizens they fastened to the

rostra. That sight was no less cruel than their ruin; for the thought

might occur to the spectators that what their ancestors had adorned

with the beaks of the enemy was now being deformed by the heads of the

citizens.

For, in fine, so great a desire and greed for slaughter possessed

Marius, that when he had killed most of his enemies and no one because

of the great confusion prevailing occurred to him whom he wished to

destroy, he gave the word to the soldiers to stab all in succession of

the passers-by to whom he should not extend his hand. For Roman

affairs had come to this, that a man had to die not only without a

trial and without having incurred enmity, but by reason of Marius's

hand not being stretched out. Now naturally in so great a throng and

uproar it was not only no object to Marius to make the gesture, but it

was not even possible, no matter how much he wished it, to use his

hand as he pleased. Hence many died for naught who ought certainly on

every account not to have been slain. The entire number of the

murdered is beyond finding out; for the slaughter went on five whole

days and an equal number of nights. (Valesius, p. 642.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 86 (_a.u._ 668)] 6. (Par.) While the Romans were offering

the New Year's sacrifice at the opening of the season and making their

vows[66] for their magistrate according to ancestral rites, the son of

Marius killed a tribune with his own hands, sending his head to the

consuls, and hurled another from the Capitol,--a fate which had never

befallen such an official,--and debarred two praetors from both fire

and water. (Valesius, p. 645.)

[Footnote 66: Reading [Greek: euchas] (Reiske, Boissevain) in place of

[Greek: archas].]

[Sidenote: FRAG. CI] 1. (Par.) The lieutenant of Flaccus, Fimbria, when

his chief had reached Byzantium revolted against him. He was in all

matters very bold and reckless, passionately fond of any notoriety

whatsoever and contemptuous of all that was superior. This led him at

that time, after his departure from Rome, to pretend an

incorruptibility in respect to money and an interest in the soldiers,

which bound them to him and set them at variance with Flaccus. He was

the more able to do this because Flaccus was insatiable in regard to

money, not being content to appropriate what was ordinarily left over,

but enriching himself even from the soldiers' allowance for food and

from the booty, which he invariably maintained belonged to him.

(Valesius, p. 650.)

2. (Par.) When Flaccus and Fimbria had arrived at Byzantium and Flaccus

after commanding them to bivouac outside the wall had gone into the

city, Fimbria seized the occasion to accuse him of having taken

money, and denounced him, saying that he was living in luxury within,

whereas they were enduring hardships under the shelter of tents, in

storm and cold. The soldiers then angrily rushed into the city, killed

some of those that fell upon them and scattered to the various houses.

(Valesius, ib.)

3. (Par.) On the occasion of some dispute between Fimbria and the

quaestor Flaccus threatened to send him back to Rome whether he liked

it or not, and when the other consequently made some abusive reply

deprived him of his command. Fimbria set out upon his return with the

worst possible will and on reaching the soldiers at Byzantium greeted

them as if he were upon the point of departure, asked for a letter,

and lamented his fate, pretending to have suffered undeservedly. He

advised them to remember the help he had given them and to be on their

guard; and his words contained a hidden reference to Flaccus, implying

that he had designs upon them. Finding that they accepted his story

and were well disposed toward him and suspicious of the general, he

went on still further and incited them to anger by accusing Flaccus of

various faults, finally stating that he would betray them for money;

hence the soldiers drove away Thermus, who had been assigned to take

charge of them. (Valesius, ib.)

4. (Par.) Fimbria destroyed many men not to serve the best ends of

justice nor to secure the greatest benefit to Rome but through bad

temper and lust of slaughter. A proof is that he once ordered many

crosses to be made, to which he was wont to bind them and wear out

their lives by cruel treatment, and then when these were found to

be many more than those who were to be put to death he commanded

some of the bystanders to be arrested and affixed to the crosses

that were in excess, that they might not seem to have been made in

vain. (Valesius, p. 653.)

5. (Par.) The same man on capturing Ilium despatched as many persons as

he could, sparing none, and all but burned the whole city to the ground.

He took the place not by storm but by guile. After bestowing some

praise on them for the embassy sent to Sulla and saying that it made

no difference with which one of the two they ratified a truce (for he

and Sulla were both Romans) he thereupon went in among them as among

friends and performed these deeds. (Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CII] [Sidenote: B.C. 85 (_a.u._ 669)] 1. (Par.)

Metellus after being defeated by Cinna went to Sulla and was of the

greatest assistance to him. For in view of his reputation for justice

and piety not a few who were opposed to Sulla's policy decided that it

was not without reason that Metellus had joined him but that he chose

what was really juster and more advantageous for the country, and hence

they went over to their side. (Valesius, p. 653.)

2. (Par.) A thunderbolt fell upon the Capitol, causing the destruction

of the Sibylline books and of many other things. (Mai, p. 551.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 83 (_a.u._ 671)] (Par.) Pompey was

a son of Strabo, and has been compared by Plutarch with Agesilaus the

Lacedaemonian. Indignant at those who held the city he proceeded

absolutely alone to Picenum before he had quite yet come to man's

estate: from the inhabitants on account of his father's position of

command he collected a small band and set up an individual

sovereignty, thinking to perform some famous exploit by himself; then

he joined the party of Sulla. Beginning in this way he became no less

a man than his chief, but, as his title indicates, grew to be "Great."

(Valesius, p. 653.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CIV] [Sidenote: B.C. 82 (_a.u._ 672)] (Par.) Sulla

delivered the army to a man[67] who was in no wise distinguished[68]

nor generally commended, in spite of the fact that he had many who had

been with him from the beginning superior in both experience and

action, whom up to that time he had employed in all emergencies and

treated as most faithful. Before he became victor he was accustomed to

make requests of them and use their assistance to the fullest extent.

But as he drew near his dream of absolute dominion, he made no account

of them any longer but reposed his trust rather in the basest men who

were not conspicuous for family or possessed of a reputation for

uprightness. The reason was that he saw that such persons were ready

to assist him in all his projects, even the vilest; and he thought

they would be most grateful to him if they should obtain even very

small favors, would never show contempt nor lay claim to either his

deeds or his plans. The virtuous element, on the other hand, would not

be willing to help him in his evil-doing but would even rebuke him;

they would demand rewards for benefits conferred, according to merit,

would feel no gratitude for them but take them as something due, and

would claim his actions and counsels as their own. (Valesius, p. 654.)

[Footnote 67: _Q. Lucretius Ofella._]

[Footnote 68: Supplying [Greek: met' epiphanei], with Reiske.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. CV] 1. (Par.) Sulla up to that day that he conquered

the Samnites had been a conspicuous figure, possessing a renown from

his leadership and plans, and was believed to be most devoted to

humaneness and piety, so that all thought that he had Fortune as an

ally because of his excellence. After this event he changed so much

that one would not say his earlier and his later deeds were those of

the same person. This probably shows that he could not endure good

fortune. Acts that he censured in other persons while he was still

weak, and others, far more outrageous even, he committed: it had

presumably always been his wish to do so, but he had been hindered by

lack of opportunity. This fact produced a strong conviction in the

minds of some that bad luck has not a little to do with creating a

reputation for virtue.[69] As soon as Sulla had vanquished the

Samnites and thought he had put an end to the war (the rest of it he

held of no account) he changed his tactics and, as it were, left his

former personality behind outside the wall and in the battle, and

proceeded to surpass Cinna and Marius and all their associates

combined. Treatment that he had given to no one of the foreign peoples

that had opposed him he bestowed upon his native land, as if he had

subdued that as well. In the first place he sent forthwith the heads

of Damasippus and the members of his party stuck on poles to Praeneste,

and many of those who voluntarily surrendered he killed as if he had

caught them without their consent. The next day he ordered the

senators to assemble at the temple of Bellona, giving them the idea

that he would make some defence of his conduct, and ordered those

captured alive to meet at the so-called "public" field,[70] pretending

that he would enroll them in the lists. This last class he had other

men slay, and many persons from the city, mixed in among them,

likewise perished: to the senators he himself at the same time

addressed a most bitter speech. (Valesius, p. 654.)

[Footnote 69: Adopting Reiske's suggestion for filling out a lacuna in

the sense.]

[Footnote 70: The _villa publica_.]

2. (Par.) The massacre of the captured persons was going on even under

Sulla's direction with unabated fury, and as they were being killed

near the temple the great uproar and lamentation that they made, their

shrieks and wails, invaded the senate-house, so that the senate was

terrified for two reasons. The second of the two was that they were

not far from expecting that they themselves, also, might yet suffer

some terrible injury, so unholy were both his words and his actions:

therefore many, cut to the heart with grief at the thought of reality

and possibility, wished that they themselves belonged to the number of

men already dead outside, and so might secure a respite at last from

fear. Their cases, however, were postponed, while the rest were

slaughtered and thrown into the river, so that the savagery of

Mithridates, deemed so terrible, in slaughtering all the Romans in

Asia in one day, was now held to be of slight importance in comparison

with the number massacred and their manner of death. Nor did the

terror stop here, but the slaughters which began at this point as if

by a kind of signal occurred in the country district and all the

cities of Italy. Toward many Sulla himself showed hatred and toward

many others his companions did the same, some truthfully and some in

pretence, in order that displaying by the similarity of their deeds a

character similar to his and establishing him as their friend they

might not, by any dissimilarity, incur suspicion, seem to be reproving

him at all, and so endanger themselves. They murdered all whom they

saw to surpass them either in wealth or in any other respect, some

through envy and others on account of their possessions. For under

such conditions many neutral persons even, though they might have

taken neither side, became subject to some private complaint, as

surpassing some one in excellence or wealth and family. No safety was

visible for any one against those in power who wished to commit an

injustice in any case. (Valesius, p. 657.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 81 (_a.u._ 673)] 3. (Par.) Such calamities held Rome

encompassed. Who could narrate the insults to the living, many of

which were offered to women, and many to the noblest and most

prominent children, as if they were captives in war? Yet those acts,

though most distressing, yet at least in their similarity to others

that had previously taken place seemed endurable to such persons as

were away from them. But Sulla was not satisfied, nor was he content

to do the same as others: a certain longing came over him to far excel

all in the variety of his slaughters, as if there were some virtue in

being second to none even in bloodguiltiness, and so he exposed to

view a new device, a whitened tablet, on which he inscribed the names.

Notwithstanding this all previous atrocities continued undiminished,

and not even those whose names were not inscribed on the tablets were

in safety. For many, some living and others actually dead, had their

names subsequently inscribed at the pleasure of the slayers, so that

in this aspect the phenomenon exhibited no novelties, and equally by

its terror and its absurdity distressed absolutely every one. The

tablets were exposed like some register of senators or list of

soldiers approved, and all those passing by at one time or another ran

eagerly to it in crowds, with the idea that it contained some

favorable announcement: then many found relatives' names and some,

indeed, their own inscribed for death, whereupon their condition,

overwhelmed by such a sudden disaster, was a terrible one; many of

them, making themselves known by their behavior, perished. There was

no particle of safety for any one outside of Sulla's company. For

whether a man approached the tablets, he incurred censure for meddling

with matters not concerning him, or if he did not approach he was

regarded as a malcontent. The man who read the list through or asked

any question about anything inscribed became suspected of enquiring

about himself or his companions, and the one who did not read or

enquire was suspected of being displeased at it and for that reason

incurred hatred. Tears or laughter proved fatal on the instant: hence

many were destroyed not because they had said or done anything

forbidden, but because they either drew a long face or smiled. Their

attitudes were so carefully observed as this, and it was possible for

no one either to mourn or to exult over an enemy, but even the latter

class were slaughtered on the ground that they were jeering at

something. Furthermore many found trouble in their very names, for

some who were unacquainted with the proscribed applied their names to

whomsoever they pleased, and thus many perished in the place of

others. This resulted in great confusion, some naming any man they met

just as ever they pleased, and the others denying that they were so

called. Some were slaughtered while still ignorant of the fact that

they were to die, and others, who had been previously informed,

anywhere that they happened to be; and there was no place for them

either holy or sacred, no safe retreat, no refuge. Some, to be sure,

by perishing suddenly before learning of the catastrophe hanging over

them, and some at the moment they received the news, were fortunately

relieved of the terrors preceding death: those who were warned in

advance and hid themselves found it a very difficult matter to escape.

They did not dare to withdraw, for fear of being detected, nor could

they endure to remain where they were for fear of betrayal. Very many

of them were betrayed by their associates and those dearest to them,

and so perished. Consequently not those whose names were inscribed

merely, but the rest, as well, suffered in anticipation. (Valesius,

pp. 658-662.)

4. (Par.) The heads of all those slaughtered in any place were brought

to the Roman Forum and exposed on the rostra, so that as often as

proscriptions were issued, so often did the heads appear. (Valesius,

ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CVI] [Sidenote: B.C. 74 (_a.u._ 680)] Lucullus said

that he would rather have rescued one Roman from danger than have

captured at one stroke all the forces of the enemy. (Mai, p. 551.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CVII] 1. For titles do not change the characters of

men, but one makes titles take on new meanings according to one's

management of affairs. Many monarchs are the source of blessings to

their subjects,--wherefore such a state is called a kingdom,--whereas

many who live under a democracy work innumerable evils to themselves.

(Mai, p. 556. Cp. Frag. XII.)

2. For nothing leads on an army or anything else requiring some

control to better or worse like the character and habits of the person

presiding over it. The disposition and character of their leaders the

majority imitate, and they do whatever they see them doing, some from

real inclination, and others as a mere pretence. (Mai, p. 556.)

3. The subservient element is wont ever to shape itself according to

the disposition of its rulers. (Mai, p. 560, from Antonius Melissa, p.

78, ed. Tigur.)

4. For who would not prefer to be upright and at his death to lie in

the bosom of the State, rather than to behold her devastated? (Mai, p.

557.)

5. If any one were building a house for you where you were not going

to remain, you would think the undertaking a loss: do you now wish to

grow rich in that place from which you must depart repeatedly before

evening? (Mai, ib.)

6. Do you not know that we tarry in others' domains just like

strangers and sojourners? Do you not know that it is the lot of

sojourners to be driven out when they are not expecting or looking for

it? That is our case. (Mai, ib.)

7. Who would not choose to die from one blow, and that with no pain or

very little, instead of after sickness? Who would not pray to depart

from a sound body with sound spirits rather than to rot with some

decay or dropsy, or wither away in hunger? (Mai, ib.)

8. Things hoped for that fail of realization are wont to grieve some

persons more than the loss of things never expected at all. They

regard the latter as far from them and so pursue them less, as if they

belonged to others, whereas the former they approach closely, and

grieve for them as if deprived of rightful possessions. (Mai, p. 558.)

9. Expectation of danger, without danger, puts the person expecting in

the position of having made things secure beforehand through imagining

some coming unpleasantness. (Mai, p. 560, from Antonius Melissa.)

10. To be elated by good fortune is like running the stadium race on a

slippery course. (Mai, ib., also from Antonius.)

11. The same author [i.e., Dio the Roman] said: "Is it not an outrage

to trouble the gods, when we ourselves are not willing to do what the

gods deem to be in our power?" (Mai, p. 561, from the Anthology of

Arsenius.)

12. The same said: "It is much better to win some success and be

envied than to fail and be pitied." (Mai, ib., from Arsenius.)

13. The same said: "It is impossible for any one who acts contrary to

right principles to derive any benefit from them." (Mai, p. 562.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CVIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 70 (_a.u._ 684)] The Cretans

sent an embassy to the Romans, hoping to renew the old truce and

furthermore to obtain some kindness for their preservation of the

quaestor and his fellow soldiers. But they, rather imbued with anger at

their failure to overcome the Cretans than grateful to the enemy for

not having destroyed them, made no reasonable answer and demanded back

from them all the captives and deserters. They demanded hostages and

large sums of money, required the largest ships and the chief men to

be given up, and would not wait for an answer from the envoys' country

but sent out one of the consuls immediately to take possession of

those things and make war upon them if they failed to give,--as proved

to be the case. For the men who at the outset, before any such demand

was made and before they had conquered, had refused to make terms

would naturally not endure after their victory the imposition of

exorbitant demands of such a character. The Romans knowing this

clearly and suspecting further that the envoys would try to corrupt

some persons with money, so as to hinder the expedition, voted in the

senate that no one should lend them anything. (Ursinus, p. 388.)