A gleam of hope arose in his mind that he might be relieved of much

detail by George B. McClellan, a brilliant young officer, who had been

called to Washington and appointed a major-general.

McClellan was a graduate of West Point, had served with distinction in

the Mexican War, had been a member of a military commission to inspect

the armies of Europe, had observed the conduct of the Crimean War, had

been engaged in various scientific and diplomatic duties, had resigned

from the army to become Chief Engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad

when only thirty-one years old, was elected its Vice-President at

thirty-two, and made President of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad

when he was thirty-four. He had made a brief but dashing campaign

in West Virginia, and was credited with saving that State to the

Union. His brilliant professional attainments, the executive ability

he had displayed in railway management, combined with attractive

personal qualities and influential social connections, made him the

most conspicuous officer in the Union army and naturally excited

the confidence of the President, who gave him a cordial welcome and

intrusted him with the most responsible duties, making him second only

to General Scott in command.

Unfortunately, however, the honors which were showered upon McClellan

turned his head, and the young commander not only failed to comprehend

the situation and his relations to the President and General Scott, but

very soon developed signs of vanity and insubordination which caused

the President great concern. He saw himself followed and flattered by

statesmen, politicians, and soldiers of twice his age and experience.

The members of the Cabinet and even the President himself came to his

residence to ask his advice, and the venerable hero of the Mexican

War deferred to his judgment and accepted his suggestions without

hesitation. McClellan was the idol of the army and a magnet that

attracted all the interest, influence, and ambition that were centred at

Washington at that period of the war. His state of mind and weakness of

character were exhibited in letters he wrote to his family at this time,

which, by a lamentable error of judgment, were afterwards printed in his

biography.

On July 27 he wrote his wife, "I find myself in a new and strange

position here, President, Cabinet, General Scott and all deferring to

me. By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power

of the land."

A little later he wrote, "They give me my way in everything, full swing

and unbounded confidence. Who would have thought when we were married

that I should so soon be called upon to save my country?" Ten days after

his appointment he declared, "I would cheerfully take the dictatorship

and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved."

Very soon, however, the tone of his letters began to change. The

President, General Scott, and the Cabinet had evidently begun to detect

his weakness and egotism and no longer accepted his own estimate of his

ability and importance. To the President's profound disappointment, he

realized within a few days that McClellan was not a staff that could

be leaned upon, while General Scott's admiration and confidence in his

young lieutenant were shaken at their first interview.

With the air of an emperor McClellan began to issue extraordinary

demands upon the President, the War Department, and the Treasury. It

soon became apparent that he desired and expected to be placed in

command of the greatest army of history; that he intended to organize

and equip it according to the most advanced scientific theories; and

when the President, the Secretary of War, and General Scott objected

to the magnitude of his plans, pointed out their impracticability,

and urged him to do something to check the alarming movements of the

Confederates, he was seized with a delusion which remained with him to

the end, that they were endeavoring to thwart and embarrass him. The

tone of his letters to his wife was radically changed.

"I am here in a terrible place," he said; "the enemy have from three to

four times my force; the President and the old General will not see the

true state of affairs."

"I am weary of all this," he said a week later, "and disgusted with this

administration,--perfectly sick of it;" and he declared that he remained

at the head of affairs only because he had become convinced that he

was alone the salvation of the country. He expressed especial contempt

for the President, and said, "There are some of the greatest geese in

the Cabinet I have ever seen,--enough to tax the patience of Job." The

incompetence and stupidity of the President, he wrote, was "sickening in

the extreme, and makes me feel heavy at heart when I see the weakness

and unfitness of the poor beings who control the destinies of this

country."

He wrote other friends that his wisdom alone must save the country, that

he spent his time "trying to get the government to do its duty, and was

thwarted and deceived by these incapables at every turn." He demanded

that all recruits be sent to his army and that all supplies be issued

to him, as if the armies in the Mississippi Valley could take care of

themselves. He demanded that "the whole of the regular army, old and

new, be at once ordered to report here," and that the trained officers

be assigned to him. "It is the task of the Army of the Potomac to decide

the question at issue," he declared. When advice and suggestions were

offered him he rejected them contemptuously, and announced that whenever

orders were issued to him he exercised his own judgment as to obedience.

General McClellan's vanity and presumption might have been overlooked

by General Scott, but his insulting remarks could not be excused. Their

relations reached an acute stage in August, 1861, notwithstanding the

President's efforts at reconciliation. Again and again he apologized

for and explained away the rudeness of the younger officer towards his

superior; and General Scott, realizing the President's embarrassment,

begged to be relieved from active command because of his age and

infirmities. Perhaps it would have been wiser if the wishes of the aged

general had been complied with, for he was now practically helpless,

fretful, and forgetful, and his sensitiveness made it necessary to

consult him upon every proposition and admit him to every conference.

Finally, McClellan's contemptuous indifference, persistent disrespect,

and continual disobedience provoked General Scott beyond endurance, and

on the last day of October he asked that his name be placed on the list

of army officers retired from active service.

"For more than three years," he wrote, "I have been unable from a

hurt to mount a horse or to walk more than a few paces at a time and

that with much pain. Other and new infirmities, dropsy, and vertigo,

admonish me that repose of mind and body are necessary to add a little

more to a life already protracted much beyond the usual span of man."

Lincoln, however, continued to consult him, and in June, 1862, made a

visit to West Point for the purpose of asking his advice upon certain

military movements then in contemplation. General Scott outlived him,

and was the most distinguished figure at the obsequies of the martyred

President at New York City in April, 1865.

After General Scott's retirement McClellan assumed even greater

importance in his own eyes, and treated the President in the same

contemptuous manner; yet the latter's indulgence was inexhaustible,

and he would not even allow personal indignity to himself to interfere

with his relations with the commander of his army. He was accustomed

to visit army head-quarters and General McClellan's residence in the

most informal manner, entering both without notification of his coming,

and, if the general was not in, returning to the White House; but one

night in November, 1861, he called at General McClellan's residence on a

matter so important that he decided to await the latter's return from a

wedding. Although informed that the President had been waiting an hour,

McClellan went directly by the drawing-room upstairs, and when a servant

went to remind him that the President wished to see him, the general

sent down word that he was retiring and would like to be excused.

Lincoln did not mention the insult. No one could have detected any

difference in his treatment of General McClellan thereafter, except that

he never entered his house again, and after that date when he wanted

to see him sent for him to come to the Executive Mansion. On another

occasion when the young general treated him with similar arrogance,

Governor Dennison, of Ohio, and General Mitchell remonstrated, but the

President replied cheerfully,--

"Never mind; I will hold McClellan's horse if he will only bring us

success."

But he did not bring success, and the public as well as both Houses

of Congress became very impatient about the idleness and delay of the

Army of the Potomac. McClellan's "All quiet on the Potomac" became a

slang phrase as notorious as General Butler's "contraband." Newspaper

artists and cartoonists made him the subject of ridicule, committees

of Senators and Representatives waited upon him, Legislatures passed

resolutions, but he was no more affected by those promptings than he had

been by the entreaties and admonitions of the President. When positive

orders were issued, McClellan refused to obey them, or obeyed them in

such a manner as to defeat their purpose. A committee of Congress was

appointed to make an investigation. The President began to lose his

patience, and declared that "if something were not done the bottom would

drop out of the whole affair. If McClellan did not want to use the army

he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it could be made

to do something." McClellan replied that his forces were insufficient;

that he was outnumbered by the enemy. Finally, at a conference with the

Cabinet, Secretary Chase, who had been his most enthusiastic admirer,

but had lost all confidence in McClellan, asked the general point-blank

what he intended to do and when he intended to do it. McClellan refused

to answer the question unless the President ordered him to do so. The

latter, with his usual consideration, attempted to protect the general,

and in a conciliatory way asked whether he had resolved in his own mind

when he would be able to make a forward movement. McClellan replied in

the affirmative, but would give no further information. The President

urged him to do so, but he continued to refuse, whereupon the former

remarked,--

"Then I will adjourn the meeting."

The President waited a few weeks longer, and, as nothing was done,

issued his famous Special War Order No. 1, in which he ordered the

celebration of Washington's birthday, 1862, by a general movement of all

the land and naval forces of the United States; but even then McClellan

reported that he would be obliged to fall back until he could construct

a railway.

"What does this mean?" asked the President, when Secretary Stanton read

him the despatch.

"It means that it is a damn fizzle!" exclaimed the Secretary of War. "It

means that he does not intend to do anything."

The President then issued General War Order No. 2, reorganizing the Army

of the Potomac, and followed it with General War Order No. 3, which

directed a movement in ten days; but still McClellan blocked the way,

and continued to drill his troops, dig entrenchments, and write insolent

letters to the President and Secretary of War.

"Had I twenty thousand or even ten thousand fresh troops to use

to-morrow I could take Richmond," he telegraphed Secretary Stanton. "If

I save this country now I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you

or any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice

this army."

The Secretary's rage may be imagined, and he would have had McClellan

arrested and sent before a court-martial; but Lincoln's patience yet

prevailed, and he crossed the Potomac for a personal conference with

his insubordinate commander, urging him to make a forward movement.

The members of the Cabinet drew up an indignant protest demanding the

immediate removal of McClellan from command, but decided not to hand it

to the President.

Finally, the Army of the Potomac was compelled to follow Lee northward,

and after the battle of Antietam the President telegraphed McClellan:

"Please do not let him [the enemy] get off without being hurt."

Two weeks later he again visited the camp, and, after reviewing and

inspecting the troops, remarked,--

"It is called the Army of the Potomac, but is only McClellan's

body-guard."

President Lincoln's warmest defenders cannot excuse his procrastination

with McClellan upon any other ground than excessive caution. They

know that he acted against his own judgment; that he was convinced of

McClellan's unfitness within three months after he had placed him in

command, and that the conviction grew upon him daily, but his fear of

offending public opinion and wounding McClellan's vanity led him to

sacrifice the interests of the government and unnecessarily prolong the

war. The same criticism can be made of his treatment of other generals

intrusted with the command of the army. Of all his officers, no one ever

possessed the full confidence of the President except General Grant.

While McClellan was in command Lincoln studied the military situation

with characteristic thoroughness and penetration, and drew up memoranda

in detail as to the movements of the army. He also gave his opinion as

to what the enemy would do under the circumstances. These memoranda were

rejected by McClellan in a contemptuous manner, but since they have

become public they have commanded the respect and admiration of the

ablest military critics.

The President's troubles were not confined to the Army of the Potomac,

nor were they bounded by the Alleghany Mountains, but extended wherever

there were military movements; wherever there were offices to be

filled the same conditions existed; the same jealousies, rivalries,

and incompetence interfered with the proper administration of the

government. And the most popular heroes, the idols of the public,

invariably caused the most confusion and showed the most flagrant

indiscretion and incompetence. Second only in popularity to McClellan,

perhaps even higher in the esteem of the Republican party, was John C.

Frémont, the first candidate of that party for the Presidency, a man

whose adventures as an explorer had excited the admiring interest of

every school-boy, and whose activity in making California a state had

given him a reputation for romance, gallantry, and patriotism. He was

"the Pathfinder," and second only to Daniel Boone as a frontier hero.

Seward had pressed him for appointment as Secretary of War; at one time

Lincoln put him down on the slate as minister to France, and when the

war broke out his name was among the first to suggest itself to the

people as that of a savior of the country. He had been in France during

the winter, and had sailed for home when Sumter was fired upon.

Upon his arrival in New York he was handed a commission as major-general

in the regular army and orders to take command in the Mississippi

Valley. It was an opportunity that any soldier might have envied, and

the President expected him to proceed at once to his head-quarters at

St. Louis, where his presence was imperatively needed; but the ovations

he received in the East and the adulation that was paid him everywhere

were too gratifying for his self-denial, and it was not until he

received peremptory orders, twenty-five days after his appointment, that

he proceeded leisurely westward to find his department in a state of

the greatest confusion and apprehension. Instead, however, of devoting

himself to the task of organization and getting an army into the field

to quell disloyal uprisings and exterminate the bushwhackers who were

burning towns, plundering farm-houses, tearing up railroads, murdering

loyal citizens, and committing other crimes, he remained in St. Louis,

taking more interest in political than in military questions, issuing

commissions to his friends, and giving contracts with such a lavish

hand and in such an irregular way as to provoke protest from the

accounting officers of the government. Political intrigue and distrust

were so prevalent that Frémont was accused of an ambition to lead a new

secession movement, separate the Western States from the Union, and

establish an empire under his own sovereignty similar to that of which

Aaron Burr is supposed to have dreamed.

President Lincoln watched with anxiety and sorrow the dethronement of

another popular idol, and defended and protected Frémont with the same

charity and patience he had shown to McClellan. Instead of removing him

from command, as he should have done, he endeavored to shield him from

the consequences of his mismanagement, and sent General David Hunter,

an old friend and veteran officer in whom he had great confidence, this

request:

"General Frémont needs assistance which is difficult to give him. He

is losing the confidence of men near him, whose support any man in his

position must have to be successful.... He needs to have by his side a

man of large experience. Will you not for me take that place? Your rank

is one grade too high to be ordered to it; but will you not serve your

country and oblige me by taking it voluntarily."

With this letter General Hunter went to St. Louis to try and save

Frémont, but it was too late. Frémont's principal political backing came

from the Blair family, who were also his warmest personal friends; but,

when they endeavored to advise and restrain him, a quarrel broke out

and Frémont placed General Frank P. Blair under arrest. Blair preferred

formal charges against his commander; and his father and brother, the

latter being Postmaster-General, demanded Frémont's removal on account

of incapacity. Then, to increase Lincoln's anxieties and perplexities,

Mrs. Jessie Benton Frémont, the daughter of Senator Benton and a

romantic figure in American history, appeared in Washington to conduct

her husband's side of the quarrel, denouncing the Blairs and all other

critics with unmeasured contempt and earnestness.

The President confesses that he was exasperated almost beyond endurance.

Mrs. Frémont, he says, "sought an audience with me at midnight, and

attacked me so violently with many things that I had to exercise all the

awkward tact I had to avoid quarrelling with her. She more than once

intimated that if General Frémont should decide to try conclusions with

me, he could set up for himself."

While the weary President was spending sleepless nights planning the

reorganization of the Army of the Potomac and an offensive campaign to

satisfy public clamor, he endeavored to arbitrate the quarrel between

Frémont and the Blairs. In the midst of his efforts at conciliation,

General Frémont startled the country and almost paralyzed the President

by issuing an emancipation proclamation and an order that all persons

found with arms in their hands should be shot. The President wrote

him a gentle but firm remonstrance, "in a spirit of caution and not

of censure," he said, and sent it by special messenger to St. Louis,

"in order that it may certainly and speedily reach you." Mrs. Frémont

brought the reply to Washington. It was an apology mixed with defiance.

Frémont asserted that he had acted from convictions of duty with

full deliberation, and proceeded at length to argue the justice and

expediency of the step; and he was as much encouraged in his defiance as

Lincoln was embarrassed by the radical Republican leaders and newspapers

of the North. Frémont's proclamation was revoked by order of the

President, but it was not so easy to correct the mistakes he had made in

administration. Finally, after long deliberation and upon the advice of

three experienced officers in whom he had great confidence and who had

been with Frémont and were familiar with his conduct and the political

and military situation, the President relieved him from command.

Frémont accepted the inevitable with dignity. He issued a farewell

address to his army, was given ovations by radical Republicans in

different parts of the country, but was not again intrusted with an

independent command.

After he arose from his sleepless bed the morning following the battle

of Bull Run, Lincoln devoted every spare moment to the study of the

map of the seat of war and to reading military history. A shelf in his

private library was filled with books on tactics, the histories of great

campaigns, and such military authorities upon the science of warfare

as might afford him ideas, valuable information, and suggestions. He

undertook the preparation of a plan of campaign precisely as he had been

accustomed to prepare for a trial in court, and before many days his

quick perceptions, his retentive memory, and his reasoning powers had

given him wider knowledge than was possessed by any of his generals.

He did not fail to consult every person in whom he had confidence

both upon abstract military questions and geographical and political

conditions, and before long he developed a plan which he submitted

to the military committees of Congress a few days after Congress

assembled in December, 1861. Several of the most influential Senators

and Representatives who did not belong to the committees were invited

to be present. He proposed, first to maintain the military force along

the Potomac to menace Richmond; second, to move an army from Cairo

southward within easy communication of a flotilla upon the Mississippi;

and, third, to send an army from Cincinnati eastward to Cumberland

Gap in East Tennessee. Preliminary to the latter movement he proposed

the construction of a railway from Cincinnati to Knoxville by way of

Lexington, Kentucky, in order to avoid the difficulties and delays of

transportation through the mountains, and military authorities now

agree that if his advice had been followed the war would have been

shortened at least two years. Mr. Nicolay, his private secretary,

reports the substance of the President's appeal to Congress, as he stood

before a map of Tennessee in the President's room at the Capitol:

"I am thoroughly convinced that the closing struggle of the war will

occur somewhere in this mountain country. By our superior numbers

and strength we will everywhere drive the rebel armies back from the

level districts lying along the coast, from those lying south of

the Ohio River, and from those lying east of the Mississippi River.

Yielding to our superior force, they will gradually retreat to the

more defensible mountain districts, and make their final stand in that

part of the South where the seven States of Virginia, North Carolina,

South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia come

together. The population there is overwhelmingly and devotedly loyal to

the Union. The despatches from Brigadier-General Thomas of October 28

and November 5 show that, with four additional good regiments, he is

willing to undertake the campaign and is confident he can take immediate

possession. Once established, the people will rally to his support, and

by building a railroad, over which to forward him regular supplies and

needed reinforcements from time to time, we can hold it against all

attempts to dislodge us, and at the same time menace the enemy in any

one of the States I have named."

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